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Abstract
Virtue Epistemology: Some Implications for Education 
Seán Moran
The new field o f virtue epistemology has implications for educational debate. In order 
to identify these implications, I explore the seminal writings o f Ernest Sosa and Linda 
Zagzebski and develop them in directions promising for education. Both see 
knowledge as true belief arising in a socially-situated cognitive agent from 
epistemically-virtuous acts, rather than the traditional construal of true belief to which 
an idealised, individual knower has a duty to assent because o f particular properties o f 
the belief. They differ in emphasis, however: Sosa stresses reliable mechanisms, while 
Zagzebski accentuates virtuous motivation.
In dealing with Sosa’s reliabilist virtue epistemology, I analyse and build on his 
precursor Robert Nozick’s model in ways propitious for education, including an 
extension o f his use of formal logic, and the importation o f some concepts from 
artificial intelligence theory. One significant outcome of my work on reliabilist virtue 
epistemology is the importance of subjunctive conditionals, and thus a more nuanced 
view o f educational propositional targets, involving both p  and -p . Sosa’s two-tier 
model o f knowledge is also addressed.
I compare Zagzebski to her historical forebear Aristotle, and then develop some lines o f 
thought congenial to education. Zagzebski’s responsibilist virtue epistemology leads to 
named intellectual virtues. I supplement these and show how they can be co-ordinated 
between teacher and learner. Substantial consideration is also given to other-regarding 
epistemic virtue and to testimony.
The model of learning and teaching defended amounts to virtuous belief-modification, 
carried out by an epistemic agent (the learner), using intellectual virtue to bring his 
doxastic web into closer cognitive alignment with reality via intersubjective 
triangulation using the webs o f others (particularly that of the teacher). I argue that a 
combination o f the two approaches -  virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism -  
yields a richer, more decent basis for education than rival conceptions, such as 
technical rationality, can provide.
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Introduction
This thesis in the philosophy of education tests the conjecture that the new field of 
virtue epistemology has interesting and important contributions to make to educational 
discourse and practice. By engaging with education, virtue epistemology also stands to 
gain; for, seen in this new light -  in which certain parts o f  the field take on a greater 
prominence during their development in ways congenial to education -  it is itself 
clarified and enhanced. The test, it will be argued, yields a positive result: virtue 
epistemology is indeed a valuable resource to be drawn upon by education. Moreover, 
and reciprocally, virtue epistemology is shown also to benefit.
Because of its recent emergence, virtue epistemology is still relatively unknown to 
educational theorists; and virtue epistemologists have made little attempt to address 
educational concerns. I therefore provide a selective account, emphasising those parts 
which show potential for education. This filtering, through teacherly sensibilities, 
unavoidably excludes or diminishes the importance o f certain features that 
epistemologists would deem to be important,1 but it does allow a conversation to take 
place over areas o f common interest. Before mediating between the two discourses -  
virtue epistemology and education - 1 provide an exposition that sets the former in the 
context o f traditional epistemology and begins a critical engagement with its key 
features.
I then extend a number of topics in educationally promising ways, prompted by cues 
from virtue epistemology. Two notable examples o f this process are explorations o f 
the linked notions o f the virtuous testifier and the other-regarding epistemic agent. 
Since both o f these concepts are already present in virtue epistemology (but in an 
under-theorised form), and their potential importance for educational discourse seems 
clear, I develop them in virtue-theoretic directions. The early chapters are thus more 
than just a description of the main commitments, principles and debates o f virtue 
epistemology, for they also involve some new contributions to the field itself. Because 
these contributions were originally motivated by pedagogical concerns, they have some 
traction too in the field o f education. So, ideas such as the virtuous testifier and the
' For instance, the Cartesian concern that we might be dreaming has little prima facie interest for an 
educator, even though prominent virtue epistemologist Emest Sosa gives much emphasis to this 
question.
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other-regarding epistemic agent arc then used as ways o f conceptualising parts of the 
teacher’s role -  analyses which have hitherto been almost entirely absent from the 
educational literature.
The well-educated person is seen here to be one who possesses a coherent web of 
beliefs, the accuracy, robustness and value o f which are due to the epistemic virtues, 
and which thus amount to knowledge. Moreover, he2 has cultivated these intellectual 
virtues to a mature level, so that his web continues to evolve in the light o f new 
epistemic input, thereby achieving an increasingly enhanced cognitive congruence with 
reality. By mining the resources o f virtue epistemology, I present an account o f the 
teacher’s role in supporting both the learner’s development o f these virtues and his 
acquisition o f knowledge.
This is not to claim that knowledge acquisition is the only goal o f education, however. 
Although this is a contested area, cases can also be made for including such aims as 
moral development, the cultivation of aesthetic sensibility and initiation into 
worthwhile forms of life. Indeed, the cultivation of the epistemic virtues could be seen 
as part and parcel o f moral education. Nevertheless, this work will confine itself 
largely to prepositional knowledge acquisition, since this is the part o f the educational 
project which relates most directly to epistemology. One benefit o f doing so is that it 
can maintain relevance to a number of conceptions o f the aims o f education: 
conceptions which may differ on the relative importance o f the social, aesthetic, 
spiritual, political, moral and physical dimensions, but which all recognise the claim 
that knowledge ought also to be centrally included. It need not be the single defining 
goal o f education, but it is hard to conceive o f a list o f educational aims from which it 
is absent.
Thus, the student as epistemic agent -  as knower -  takes centre stage. It is part o f his 
well-being qua rational animal that he should acquire knowledge, for, as Aristotle puts 
it, ‘All men by nature desire to know’.3 Our task is to develop an account that explains 
what it means to know, how the learner’s epistemic flourishing occurs, and how the 
teacher may support it. At first blush, virtue epistemology seems well-placed to
2 The reasons for adopting this gender convention are explained later (p.27).
3 Aristotle, Metaphysics bk.lA (980a23) [tr. W.D. Ross, 1925] The Complete Works o f Aristotle: Revised 
Oxford Translation (Bollingen Series) (ed. J. Barnes) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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provide some insights into these questions, and in turn to benefit from an interaction 
with educational matters. We have already noted that virtuous testifying and the notion 
o f an other-regarding epistemic agent are potential topics for discussion and 
development, but there are others, as we shall see. Both epistemology and education 
are concerned with knowledge, so a dialogue between the two fields can enrich them 
both, by articulating and examining from different perspectives some areas o f mutual 
interest relating to knowledge-acquisition.
The work is also loosely aligned with a project which seeks to provide a more decent 
undergirding for education than that offered by technical rationality and which revives 
virtue theory so to do. Much important work has already been undertaken in exploring 
the possibilities o f virtue ethics for illuminating certain aspects o f education 
(particularly moral education): this thesis mediates between virtue epistemology and 
education, a project which has hitherto been largely neglected.
In attempting to fill this lacuna, I use examples from all phases of education: from the 
initial learning o f one’s mother tongue, through schooling and on to undergraduate and 
postgraduate study.4 This does not render the discussion overly generic, though, for 
there is a recognition that different epistemic virtues ought to gain prominence during 
the various phases of education. However, there is a unity about the educational 
project -  leaving aside discussions of pedagogy vs. andragogy -  which means that most 
o f the intellectual virtues should be promoted at every stage, for to do otherwise is to 
risk an intellectually harmful imbalance. For example, if what I term ‘the virtues of 
doxastic trust’ are over-emphasised in the early years, then there is a danger that the 
intellectual virtues associated with enquiry and creativity may be underdeveloped when 
needed later: a critical period may have passed.
On becoming aware of the new philosophical sub-discipline o f virtue epistemology, I 
recognised its particular potential for challenging the unreflective importation o f 
technical rationality into the human practice o f education.5 So, while the burden o f this
4 A number of examples are from science education, since that used to be my speciality when 1 was a 
school teacher.
5 Since a critique of technical rationality -  although an important motivating factor in the genesis of this 
thesis -  is not a major continuing preoccupation of the work, here is not the place to go into great detail 
about the term of art ‘technical rationality’ and how it relates to education. However, what I have in 
mind is such manifestations as the widespread insistence on specifying learning objectives in ways 
analogous to those of manufactured products, in order that quasi-industrial quality assurance procedures
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dissertation is to test the intuition that virtue epistemology has much to say to education 
generally, there is also the hope that a fuller analysis o f knowledge and its acquisition 
might provide a specific riposte to overconfident educational technicism and 
reductionist thinking (what we might term ‘village technicism’).6 Although we can 
sympathise with attempts to rescue education from what is perceived as slipshod 
teaching, it is not clear that the technicist’s strategy o f  keeping a tight rein on outcomes 
in an attempt to make the process ‘teacher-proof will do the trick. Indeed, the reverse 
looks more likely to be the case: that an inadequate conception o f the nature of 
knowledge will encourage a pedestrian conformity with official lists o f approved 
propositions. Simplistic technical-rational models o f knowing, teaching and learning 
may be shown largely to have missed the point: to have gained apparent objectivity and 
control, but to have lost sight o f the range o f ways in which authentic epistemic and 
pedagogical engagements actually take place; to have replaced genuine learning with a 
measurable, but often counterfeit, version: Halbbildung rather than Bildung (to 
anticipate a later discussion). The countervailing view to be examined in these pages is 
that virtue epistemology -  which pays attention to the well-motivated genesis and the 
maintenance o f concept-webs and not just to their overt demonstration -  might be both 
a more demanding and a more worthy model for teachers to live up to than rivals such 
as technicism. This is not to say that virtue epstemology is always opposed to 
particular judgements o f village technicism, but more o f a claim that virtue 
epistemology ought to be the final arbiter on questions of knowledge.
An educational development of virtue epistemology shows that both the student’s 
processes o f virtue-driven enquiry and the products o f his cognitive success deserve 
approbation. I f  the focus is entirely on outcomes, the strategic learner cannot but chase 
the rewards by apparently achieving these outcomes in the most efficient way he can. 
And the ‘apparent’ -  that is, ‘from appearances alone’ -  is all that village technical 
rationality demands. The hidden is valueless. Under this dispensation, too much 
engagement with the process is not in the learner’s interests since the product is all that 
matters. If  learning is seen as a technë, then the value resides in the poiëmata 
(products) -  the ‘Correct Answers’ -  rather than in the productive activity that
may be applied to them. The assumptions of technicist thinking in education enjoy great prestige and 
endorsement by influential bodies such as the OECD, national governments and the EU.
6 After Thomas Uebel’s pejorative label ‘village positivism’, which signifies the naïve stance that an 
austere conception of the scientific world-view can handle ‘the riddles of life’. Thomas Uebel (1998) 
‘Enlightenment and the Vienna Circle’s Scientific World Conception’, Amélie Rorty (ed.) Philosophers 
on Education (London: Routledge) pp.418-419.
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generated them. This category mistake can lead to a sort o f unhealthy conspiracy 
between teachers and learners. On another topic, John Kampfher tells us that, ‘In 
Soviet times, Russians had an expression -  we pretend to work; they pretend to pay 
us’.7 The educational conspiracy can be similarly expressed by the learners as, ‘We 
pretend to learn; you pretend to teach us’. Thus, shallow learning, un-engaged 
memorisation and, in the worst cases, plagiarism, are all rational responses on the part 
o f the learner to an impoverished construal o f knowledge. To counteract this, 
epistemic virtue ought to be more widely recognised and valorised by education -  both 
as its own reward, in the form o f intellectual flourishing, and as a route to genuine 
knowledge. We ought, I argue, to nurture virtue-conducive intellectual environments 
in our classrooms and seminar rooms.
The virtue turn in epistemology is an important one, and recent years have seen an 
increase o f interest in the new field, spawning a number o f books, web-logs, 
conferences and peer-reviewed journal articles. Virtue epistemology is beginning to 
loosen the grip o f the sceptic on epistemology, and to free it from the seizing-up that 
Descartes brought about by his technique of hyperbolic doubt. The Cartesian move led 
to what may be considered to be somewhat unproductive debates about the fate of 
knowledge in the face o f various sceptical hypotheses, and, latterly, to attempts to find 
ways o f  meeting the challenge o f Edmund Gettier’s troublesome paper.8 For 
educationalists, this was something o f a cul-de-sac, offering little by way o f insights for 
practice, while simultaneously blocking claims to know anything worth teaching.
Virtue epistemology, on the other hand, pace the sceptic and Gettier, overcomes this 
aporia by claiming that it is possible for an agent to acquire knowledge, and that this 
will be through the deliverances of the intellectual virtues. By proposing a more 
nuanced -  but, it might be claimed, also a more exigent and rigorous -  construal o f 
knowledge, virtue epistemology seems to be a good candidate for illuminating a more 
refined vision o f teaching and learning than the pervasive model o f village technical 
rationality we have touched on briefly. In a similar way to the process by which virtue 
ethics acted as a corrective to conventional deontic moral education and put the 
emphasis on ‘the promotion of desirable or admirable character traits’9 rather than on
7 John Kampfher (2003) New Statesman, 1 December, [online] Available at: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/200312010017 [Accessed 7 March 2011],
8 Edmund Gettier (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis, 23, pp. 121-123.
9 Jan Stuetel & David Carr (eds.) (1999) ‘Virtue Ethics and the Virtue Approach to Moral Education’, 
Virtue Ethics and Moral Education (London: Routledge), p.4
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attending to obligations and eschewing proscribed acts, virtue epistemology can also be 
used to restore the agent and his intellectual dispositions to prominence in general 
education, as a corrective to undue weight being accorded to lists o f prescribed 
propositions.
Although a number o f philosophers have written on virtue epistemology since the field 
emerged in the late twentieth century -  some o f whom we shall consider -  my two 
chief protagonists are Ernest Sosa and Linda Zagzebski. They are widely regarded as 
the most influential contemporary virtue epistemologists and, while they have some 
things in common, they represent the two main varieties within the field: virtue 
reliabilism and virtue responsibilism.
Sosa launched the project in his paper, ‘The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus 
Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge’(1980), and Zagzebski provided an 
alternative position in her book, Virtues o f  the Mind {1996). Both philosophers have 
subsequently written articles and edited collections o f virtue epistemology, and Sosa 
has published a number of books on the topic -  his most recent being earlier this year 
(2011). Other writers mainly gather around one o f the two flags representing Sosa’s 
reliabilism or Zagzebski’s responsibilism, or stand apart from the fray and comment on 
the relative strengths of the two factions.
Zagzebski’s neo-Aristotelian virtue responsibilism might have been expected, with 
further work, to generate normative principles for education which are congenial to 
those already sympathetic to existing analyses that stress the role o f virtues such as 
phronésis. In the present thesis, this turns out to be the case. The teacher’s role as an 
otheT-regarding epistemic agent is seen to be that o f a phronimos, animated by a variety 
of intellectual and moral virtues, the choice of which -  in the particular pedagogical 
situation -  draws upon her practical wisdom. My uni tying theme o f ‘enwebment’ also 
comes from a development o f the virtue responsibilist viewpoint. I show that for 
educational purposes the traditional epistemological picture o f the learner as an 
autonomous ‘feral knower’ is best replaced by one o f a socially-enwebbed epistemic 
agent, whose knowledge is bound up with that o f others via the testimony and the 
other-regarding virtue o f these further agents (particularly the teacher). This web 
metaphor also obtains at the level of the individual learner, in the shape o f W.V.O. 
Quine’s model o f  a web o f beliefs. I term this a ‘doxastic w eb’ and consider how it can
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be helped into better alignment with external reality, again using some o f Zagzebski’s 
key ideas.
Sosa’s virtue reliabilism, which comes from an Anglo-American analytic tradition and 
owes much to the work o f Robert Nozick, is rather different from Zagzebski’s 
responsibilism. It has less to say about named epistemic virtues and focuses more 
directly on the achievement of prepositional epistemic targets. Perhaps one can discern 
an affinity between technical rationality’s means-ends thinking and reliabilist virtue 
epistemology’s consequentialism, typified by Sosa’s image of an archer successfully 
hitting a target. But a fuller working out of the implications o f reliabilism in the 
educational realm turns out to pose a challenge to a naïve technicism. The further 
development that I carry out shows that a simplistic attempt to define learning 
outcomes narrowly, followed by a straightforward pedagogical campaign to achieve 
them, will be ineffective in bringing about knowledge-acquisition in the learner. This 
is connected with the emergent importance of subjunctive conditionals, and hence 
counterfactual conditionals, in defining what the epistemic targets might be, and it 
opens up a novel and more demanding way for educators to view prepositional 
knowledge and its acquisition. In making connections between virtue reliabilism and 
the processes o f teaching and learning, Quine’s image o f a web o f beliefs is again 
developed. In order to conceptualise the process by which individual propositions 
become incorporated into the learner’s web after reliabilist acquisition, a connecting 
piece o f theory is needed. Some concepts from the field o f Artificial Intelligence 
research prove to be helpful in analysing the processes o f learning qua belief 
modification, at a level o f generality that fits virtue reliabilism well. The result o f this 
analysis again confirms that focusing too exclusively on individual true propositions is 
a mistake, and that a hinterland o f counterfactive propositions must be also considered 
in a number o f different ways if  the learner’s web is to contain knowledge organised to 
a desirable level o f coherence.
Virtue epistemology views any putative ‘knowledge’ acquired by non-virtuous means 
as non-creditable. Drawing parallels with other acts -  an archer firing an arrow, in 
Sosa’s analysis -  it sees the value of a successful act (epistemic or otherwise) to reside 
in its success because o f  ability. Happening to hit an isolated epistemic target through 
luck or carelessness or with excessive help -  that is, acquiring a true belief without 
employing intellectual virtue -  is thus neither as valuable nor as creditable as a success
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which is due to such ability. So, the notion o f desert for virtuous epistemic acts is built 
into the structure o f virtue epistemology, and we can see that this may have 
significance for education.
I attempt to confine the writing on virtue solely to a consideration o f epistemic virtue, 
and thus to quarantine it from any discussion o f moral virtue.10 This is a relatively 
straightforward matter in respect o f Sosa’s variety o f virtue epistemology; but in the 
case o f Zagzebski’s work it involves challenging her subsumption o f the epistemic 
under the moral. Whilst I take up this challenge, I also have to concede that the 
integrity o f the border between the intellectual and the moral cannot be fully 
maintained, so I make a concession in accepting some degree o f analytic permeability. 
Nevertheless, since this is a work of educational epistemology rather than educational 
ethics, the moral realm is only entered when it cannot be avoided. In this respect, the 
notion o f benevolence is seen to be particularly important, to the extent that it can 
trump purely epistemic educational desiderata in the interests o f the learner’s 
flourishing.
At certain points, we need to make use o f formal arguments couched in the symbolism 
o f prepositional logic. This follows from one of the two main protagonists, Sosa, using 
logical notation in advancing his variety o f virtue epistemology. The work with 
artificial intelligence theory also demands some manipulation o f symbols.11 So, both 
symbolic analytical techniques and more nuanced, neo-Aristotelian, methods are 
brought to bear on certain aspects o f education.
Since this is also a work of epistemology, the influence o f Plato is strongly recognised 
too. Because the field owes much to his, and Socrates’, seminal thinking, ideas from 
his dialogues appear throughout the text. In works such as Meno and Theacetetus, the 
agenda for epistemology was largely set, and Plato’s analysis o f the differences 
between true belief and knowledge is o f great significance to the present thesis. 
Additionally, his importance to the philosophy of education is acknowledged, 
particularly his notion of ‘provocatives’ -  propositions that challenge the existing 
beliefs o f his interlocutor -  which I relate to the aporias caused in the learner when two
101 appreciate that words such as ‘moral' and ‘ethics’ are contested terms with various meanings. These 
nuances will emerge in some later discussion.
11 A full list of the symbols used appears on p.26.
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incompatible propositions, p  and ~p, are entertained simultaneously. Plato’s voice is 
also heard in the chapter on testimony; in the section onparrhesia ; when discussing the 
‘noble lie’; in our consideration o f elenchus; in his description of Socrates teaching 
M eno’s slave; in relation to recanting; and in his metaphor o f the aviary to represent 
untethered beliefs.
Because Zagzebski’s approach to virtue epistemology is strongly neo-Aristotelian, we 
shall be drawing directly on Aristotle’s writings to inform our discussion. In this 
regard, his Nicomachean Ethics features significantly, particularly Book VI, which 
deals with the intellectual virtues.
The key theme that emerges from this investigation is that the epistemic virtues are an 
important conduit to knowledge and that the teacher ought to help the learner -  qua 
epistemic agent -  to cultivate both his intellectual virtues and his knowledge.12 She can 
achieve this by means of other-regarding actions flowing from her own virtues. 
Furthermore, some degree o f co-ordination between the virtues o f the teacher and those 
o f the learner is required for this project to succeed, and such co-ordinating is the work 
o f a phronimos engaged in a praxis.
In the first half o f the thesis (chapters 1, 2, and 3) I explore the new field o f virtue 
epistemology and develop certain aspects of it, and in the second half (chapters 4, 5 and 
6) I consider and elaborate a number of implications for education. The six chapters 
are as follows:
1. Overview of Virtue Epistemology
Beginning with Plato’s discussions in Meno and Theacetetus, I analyse what he sees as 
the differences between true belief and knowledge proper, and how the latter is well 
tethered to reality. After considering a number o f the difficulties that later arose over 
Plato’s account -  due to the emergence o f  some radical sceptical hypotheses and the 
‘Gettier problem’ - 1 present a critical exposition of a promising solution that has been 
developed over the last three decades: virtue epistemology. This is an agent-based
12 ‘Epistemic virtue’ and ‘knowledge’ have more than one meaning within virtue epistemology, however. 
So, for example, Sosa’s ‘animal knowledge’ can be acquired by the deliverances of eyesight -  an 
epistemic virtue that would not be regarded as such by Zagzebski.
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epistemology that places emphasis on particular attributes o f the knower rather than on 
his beliefs per se.
Before describing Ernest Sosa’s launching o f the new field o f virtue epistemology, I 
consider its origins in Robert Nozick’s reliabilist ‘tracking’ theory of knowledge. I 
then discuss how Sosa’s important epistemic notions o f ‘safety’ and ‘sensitivity’ derive 
from Nozick’s work, and how these relate to certain properties o f subjunctive 
conditionals. Sosa’s proposal that there are two grades o f knowledge, and his 
requirement that even the lesser o f these should meet the ‘AAA’ criteria (that is, be 
accurate, adroit and apt), are both analysed and evaluated.
In giving an account of Linda Zagzebski’s neo-Aristotelian response to Sosa, I show 
the extent to which she departs from Aristotle’s analysis o f intellectual virtue. I concur 
with her departure over the origin o f moral and intellectual virtue, but find her project 
to subsume the intellectual virtues under the moral implausible. In place o f the latter, I 
suggest a eudaimonian approach, which unifies the moral and the intellectual in respect 
o f  their role in the overall flourishing o f the individual (even though their characteristic 
aims are different: the good and the true respectively). Zagzebksi’s construal of the 
epistemic virtues is richer than Sosa’s, however, and this is later useful in developing 
the educational implications o f these virtues.
This exposition and development o f virtue epistemology provides a clue to the 
importance o f testimony, and the other-regarding epistemic virtue o f others, for the 
agent’s acquisition of knowledge. Neither Sosa nor Zagzebski makes much o f these 
two areas, but their educational significance seems clear, so I explore and develop them 
fully in the following two chapters.
2. Knowledge and Testimony
The use o f testimony is widespread in education -  even though the term is not often 
used in this context -  so its theoretical bases need to be understood. Here I consider 
philosophers with a negative stance towards testimony (Plato, Descartes and Locke) 
and those with a positive stance (Hume and Coady), and draw a distinction between 
legal and natural testimony. A discussion concerning the need for us to trust adult 
testimony during our childhood acquisition o f our mother tongue shows the initial 
importance o f testimony for learning. This is followed by a comparison o f the
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‘reductionists’ and the ‘anti-reductionists’, with the latter being seen to have a more 
plausible case. Anthony Coady’s claim, that testimony deserves to be on the same 
footing as perception, memory and reasoning as an epistemic source, is examined and 
broadly endorsed. 1 next analyse the auditing o f testimony with respect to ‘safety’ and 
‘sensitivity’. The notion that knowledge is a communal asset enwebbed by natural and 
extended testimony is developed, and the traditional epistemic notion o f an autonomous 
agent (the ‘feral knower’) is questioned. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to 
considering what level o f trust in testimony is epistemically-virtuous.
3. Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues
Starting from a consideration o f other-regarding virtue, as virtue ethics understands it, I 
move on to a specifically virtue-epistemic construal, building on some ideas from Jason 
Kawall. Acts o f other-regarding epistemic virtue should, I argue, be properly 
motivated, successful and enjoyable. I develop the notion o f ‘complementary’ 
intellectual virtues which ought to animate the teacher and the taught, and take the 
default gearing o f this epistemic dyad to be Thomas Reid’s tallying propensities of 
‘veracity and credulity’. During a brief change o f perspective, based on Iris Murdoch’s 
writings, I suggest that ‘the field’ can also play a part somewhat analogous to ‘the 
other’. Returning to a more usual characterisation o f ‘the other’, I establish the 
importance o f the other-regarding moral virtue o f ‘benevolence’ in educational settings, 
by means o f some of Michael Slote’s work in virtue ethics. This leads to a discussion 
of the extent to which the benevolent teacher may virtuously depart from frank 
testifying. Although veracity ought to be the norm, a place is established for reticence, 
dissimulation, over-simplification, and the use o f myths, for the benefit o f the learner. 
The importance o f timeliness in teacher interventions, and the desirability o f pursuing 
certain epistemic aims indirectly, are discussed.
4. Reiiabilist Virtue Epistemology and Education
Here I begin to develop the educational implications o f virtue epistemology in earnest.
I first discuss various understandings of the aims o f education and claim that 
knowledge is always an element of these. Seeking a more rigorous characterisation o f 
‘knowledge’ than is to be found in some contemporary work in education (particularly 
that o f  a technicist hue) I again consider Sosa’s precursor Nozick’s reiiabilist ‘tracking’ 
model and show how each o f the four conditions has educational significance. I 
demonstrate that, while Sosa’s notion o f ‘safety’ is relevant to the teacher’s knowledge,
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Nozick’s ‘sensitivity’ condition is more pertinent to that of the learners. Since 
reliabilists (including Sosa) are still bedevilled by the project o f attempting to defeat 
the sceptic, I show how, for educational contexts, we can ignore far-fetched sceptical 
hypotheses, such as Descartes’ genium malignum. Using Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
theory, I then connect reliabilist construals of knowledge to the processes of learning 
qua virtuous doxastic web-revision. In discussions both o f reliabilism and o f Al, the 
counterfactive class o f propositions, turns out to be important, so I provide 
examples o f how this thinking might be deployed in the classroom, and link this to 
Socrates’ use o f ‘provocatives’. I contrast the safety o f the Feldwege with the openness 
o f  the Holzwege in learning situations. Finally, I discuss Sosa’s ‘AAA ’ model of 
knowledge in the light o f the reliabilist theory and practical ramifications developed so 
far.
5. Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology and Education
Next I consider what Zagzebski’s aretaic approach to virtue epistemology implies for 
education. We revisit the teacher-taught dyad to see how a virtuous development of 
this ought to avoid what I term ‘the new Athene problem’ o f an overprotective teacher. 
In contrasting short-range and long-range aims, I show that an overemphasis on the 
former can lead to Halbbildung (pseudo-edification). Next, I explore some 
epistemically virtuous ways of dealing with, and causing, aporias in the learner. A 
discussion o f Sarah Wright’s virtue contextualism follows. I then conduct an analysis 
o f the various roles that the teacher ought to embody vis-à-vis epistemic virtue. My 
taxonomy involves viewing her as: (i) a knower; (ii) an other-regarding epistemic 
agent; (iii) an exemplar o f intellectual virtue; and (iv) a mystery-alerter. I show that 
epistemically virtuous transactions ought to be accompanied by a positive affect. I then 
consider the important intellectual virtue o f open-mindedness. Finally, I develop an 
account of what the teacher’s other-regarding epistemic virtues might be. To show 
how these ought to be co-ordinated to interlock with the virtues to be cultivated in the 
learner, I elaborate upon one of the five sets o f virtues I have identified as important in 
educational settings: the ‘Social Intellectual Virtues’.
6. Key Implications of Virtue Epistemology for Educational Policy and Practice
During the course o f this concluding chapter, I draw the main threads together and 
discuss some further implications, including a reprise o f the key ideas from previous 
chapters and an identification o f their educational importance. I show that the richer
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and more demanding construals o f knowledge and learning that arise from our 
development o f virtue epistemology can be used to expose some inadequate 
educational policies and practices. We also see what epistemically-virtuous pedagogies 
might look like. In the light of virtue epistemology, I suggest how teachers and 
learners ought to act in order that the educational experience is conducive to 
intellectual flourishing.
Chapter 1 - Overview of Virtue Epistemology
Introduction
In this chapter, I set the emerging discipline o f virtue epistemology in the wider context 
o f general epistemology and describe analytically the work of two major figures in this 
new field (Ernest Sosa and Linda Zagzebski), as well as their theoretical precursors 
(Robert Nozick and Aristotle, respectively). Although I later show that a concern for 
intellectual virtue is highly congruent with the project o f teaching and learning, the 
implications for educational praxis will not be analysed in any detail at this stage.
Since epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with questions o f knowledge, 
I begin with a brief discussion o f knowledge in broad terms, starting with some 
important ideas from Plato, before moving on to describe and critique virtue 
epistemology specifically.
Traditional Definitions of Knowledge
Attempts to define knowledge in contemporary epistemology routinely begin with the 
‘tripartite definition’ -  justified, true belief -  a traditional formulation that originates in 
Socrates’ speculations in Meno and Theacetetus.Xi In the Meno, Socrates distinguishes 
between knowledge and mere ‘right opinion’ (orthe doxa). The latter he characterises 
as luckily-acquired (or divinely-inspired) true belief, which has the defect o f not being 
properly anchored by a knowledge of causes and can thus ‘walk o f f  like the statues o f 
Daedalus. The former -  knowledge -  is tethered and so constitutes epistemically-secure
13 The author of these dialogues, Plato, did not himself subscribe to the tripartite definition but confined 
genuine knowledge to the supramundane world of the Forms.
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true opinion or justified  true belief. Similarly, in the Theaetetus, Socrates again argues 
that true belief is not the same as knowledge. In this dialogue, ultimately unsuccessful 
attempts are made to discover the extra features which convert true opinion into 
knowledge. The nearest we get to a solution is the claim that knowledge is true opinion 
‘with an account’ or logos. However, despite the lack o f a final and convincing 
description o f the precise nature o f knowledge, it is clear that an ‘extra value of 
knowledge’14 thesis is being strongly expounded in these dialogues. In the Meno, for 
example, Socrates makes a distinction between someone who knows the way to Larissa 
-  having been there before -  and someone who luckily manages to find his way 
without such knowledge. In terms of outcomes and practical usefulness, the two cases 
are o f equal value (both eventually arrive in Larissa): but one situation is to be regarded 
as epistemically superior to the other.
Socrates: ... knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion.15
Socrates strongly asserts that although he does not make many knowledge-claims, this 
is amongst the select few.
Socrates: ... and yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of
conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is
most certainly one of them.16
His overall claim is that knowledge is characterised by a stability which is missing 
from mere true belief, a stability attributable in some way to its tethering to reality via a 
knowledge o f causes. So, as well as the first-order belief, the knower must also possess 
a number o f anchoring beliefs that stabilise it. Moreover, the knower needs to be able 
to use this tethering to hold on to his knowledge over the long term, and to be able to 
provide ‘an account’ in order to defend it against objections. Later, I show that the 
untethered acquisition of a true propositional belief in the educational context provides 
the epistemic agent with neither the resources to carry out a defence o f the proposition 
in the light o f evidence suggesting that the proposition is flawed, nor a principled 
approach to belief revision should it be seen that the proposition ought to be derogated 
in favour o f another with stronger claims. To be virtuously resistant to elenchus, and to
14 Some later writers use the acronym ‘EVOK’ -  for example, Alvin Goldman & Erik Olsson 
(forthcoming) ‘Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge’ in Duncan Pritchard etal. (eds.) (Forthcoming) 
Epistemic Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.4 of pre-print.
15 Plato, Meno, 98,4, Plato: Collected Dialogues (eds. Edith Hamilton & Huntingdon Caims, 1961) 
Nineteenth Printing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). All Plato quotations in the present 
work derive from this source, unless otherwise indicated.
16 Plato, Meno, 98b, 2.
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other hostile epistemic input, knowledge ought to be well-woven into the knower’s web 
o f beliefs.
It is worth emphasising here that Socrates believes that there are truths and that with 
careful enough thinking and discussion they can be obtained. The fact that they 
continually elude him is merely regrettable, not something intrinsic to the nature of 
knowledge. In the Platonic dialogues, the objections advanced by Socrates during the 
elenchus usually defeat his interlocutors’ knowledge claims, but, significantly, Socrates 
does not abandon the attempt to uncover the truth, for he lives in hope that the next 
person he meets in the agora might be able to help him attain it.
Moreover, such truths are not to be relativised to the knower, but are true for all 
epistemic agents, suggesting a ‘correspondence’ theory rather than the rival 
‘coherence’ or ‘consensus’ theories of truth.17 Although Socrates and Plato differ over 
the nature o f reality, neither denies that it exists and can in principle be captured in 
language. For both Socrates and Plato there are worlds (mundane and supramundane) 
o f which -  given a great deal o f effort -  we can know some truths, and these can be 
encoded in language which somehow corresponds to, or mirrors, reality. The knower’s 
‘account’ is one o f correspondence. Recognising that there are significant objections to 
this simple picture from radical constructivists (such as Ernst Von Glasersfeldt) and 
postmodernists (such as Richard Rorty'8), to say nothing o f W.V.O. Quine and passing 
over Ludwig Wittgenstein in silence,191 shall use the ‘proposition:reality’ 
correspondence model of truth in this thesis for two reasons: (i) It is assumed in the 
work o f both o f the main virtue epistemologists, Emest Sosa and Linda Zagzebski, and 
(ii) it is congenial to the philosophy of education in ways which postmodernist and 
radical constructivist construals o f truth are not. It would take much argument to 
defend this choice comprehensively, but since adopting either o f the rival models 
would involve the scrupulous intellectually-virtuous teacher prefacing every remark 
with, “What I am about to say is true for me, but it may not be true for everyone”, it 
can be seen that they are not prima facie well-suited to the practice o f teaching in its
17 Felipe Femández-Armesto (1997) Truth: A History and a Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bantam 
Press), p.217.
IS Richard Rorty attacks the metaphor of the mind as a mirror of reality in Richard Rorty (1979) 
Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) and proposes an anti- 
represeatationalist view in which our thoughts on reality are merely constructed, rather than being linked 
to things as they are.
191 do consider both Quine and Wittgenstein later.
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most basic form: testifying. Granted, some propositions are matters o f taste and hence 
inescapably relativised to the believer, but if  a teacher offers the statement, say, “There 
is oil under the North Sea”, the default interpretation by pupils is that, ‘It is true that 
beneath the real sea-bed of the existing North Sea there is some actual oiP. As long as 
all parties are in agreement about the referents o f the terms ‘oil’, ‘beneath’ and ‘North 
Sea’, this true proposition is knowable by competent auditors as a result o f sincere, 
well-informed testimony. Furthermore, all parties take it that the North Sea oil has an 
independent existence that does not rely on their knowing about it.20 On this, Gottlob 
Frege takes a lead from Hermann Lotze, whose notion o f ‘logical objectification’ refers 
to ‘the common world ... that is the same for and independent o f all thinking beings’.21 
Frege also uses the example o f the North Sea to illustrate this:
It does no damage to the objectivity of the North Sea that it depends on our 
arbitrary choice which part of the general water covering of the earth we want to 
delimit and call by the name o f‘The North Sea’... [0]ne claims something wholly 
objective, which is independent from our representations [Vorstellungeri]. 1
The security o f tethering o f this knowledge is a different matter, however, which I shall 
discuss later, in the context o f a wider analysis o f testimonially-derived true beliefs.
The history o f epistemology since Plato has been largely one o f attempts to analyse the 
features o f true beliefs which endow them with the extra value o f being knowledge. 
Whether the justifying conditions need to be cognitively available to the holder o f true 
beliefs (a requirement Socrates not only articulates in the phrase ‘with an account’, but 
also puts to the test by a robust elenchus in the dialogues), or it is enough that this 
tethering simply exists, unbeknownst to the believer, is the issue which separates 
internalists from externalists. Debates between these two groups appeared until 
recently to have had no prospect of resolution, and due to this and to the identification 
o f a number o f other seemingly insoluble problems (such as the conflict between 
foundationalism and coherentism), a new epistemological approach, premissed on the 
notion of epistemic virtue, has emerged over the last three decades. Before outlining
20 In a recent book, Paul Boghossian sneers at Bruno Latour’s (1998) paper ‘Ramses H est-il mort de la 
tuberculose?' La Recherche, 307, pp.84-85. Latour doubts the findings of French scientists that Ramses
11 had died circa 1213 BCE, for, ‘How could he pass away due to a bacillus discovered by Robert Koch 
in 1882?’ Latour’s constructivist claim is that, ‘Before Koch, the bacillus had no real existence.’ Paul 
Boghossian (2006) Fear o f Knowledge: against relativism and constructivism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p.26.
21 The Herman Lotze (1843) quotation is from: Lorraine Daston & Peter Galison (2007) Objectivity 
(New York: Zone Books), p.266.
12 Gottlob Frege (1884). Quoted in: Daston & Galison (2007) ibid., p.267.
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these problems and pointing the way to promising solutions emerging from virtue 
epistemology, I shall first set out a group of symbols with which to standardise the 
expression of some o f these various viewpoints.
Sym bolic C onventions and Abbreviations
Writers in this new field, as well as their precursors, use a variety o f symbolic 
representations for verbal definitions and logical arguments. On occasion, they even 
show inconsistency within the same published paper.2" So, to avoid any muddle over 
this, the following conventions will be adopted in this thesis:
p  Proposition
s Subject (Epistemic agent)
K Knows
B Believes
J Is justified
G Gettier-proofmg condition
C Corpus o f  beliefs
F  Field o f knowledge
h Sceptical hypothesis
NOT 
AND 
+ OR24
€E Is an element o f
V Universal quantification [For a l l ... ]
—► Material conditional [ I f ... then ...]
«-*■ Biconditional [If and only if, iff, just in case ... then...]
□—* Subjunctive conditional [Were it to be the case th a t ... then it would be the case
that...]
Given that many o f the key researchers in this area are American, I keep quotations 
from these in the original US English. The few Irish words that appear are not
2i For example, in various papers, Sosa uses both and to signify material implication, and the
latter, rather confusingly, also for implication under the subjunctive conditional. Since an important part
of Sosa’s virtue-epistemic theory relies on certain properties of subjunctive conditionals in contrast to 
material conditionals, this confusion is to be avoided.
241 also use a similar symbol “ +  ’ for ‘belief-expansion’, but the context will make this clear. Some 
further symbols associated with belief revision will be introduced as needed.
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italicised, unlike those o f Latin, Greek, French and German origin. Expressions and 
words that have become naturalised (such as maieutic, prima facie, pro tanto, qua and 
vignette) are generally not shown in italics.25
I follow the founder of the field, Ernest Sosa, in using the masculine pronoun ‘he’ 
when referring to the knower. In addition, I call the teacher ‘she’.26
Som e Problems of Traditional Epistem otogy
The tripartite definition o f knowledge, which is the starting point o f much 
contemporary epistemology, is, as we have seen, ‘justified true be lie f (JTB). The 
word ‘be lie f in this formulation is taken to refer to assent by the putative knower to a 
proposition p, and is conventionally regarded as being stronger than mere ungrounded 
opinion but weaker than knowledge. To upgrade a true belief into the knowledge class, 
a justification must exist, which may or may not be internally accessible to the knower: 
intemalism requires this accessibility, while extemalism allows it not to be available to 
him.
Under the tripartite definition, the three conditions, individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient, for subject 5  having knowledge of a true proposition p  are as follows:
1. p
2. s believes that p
3. s  is justified in believing that p
25 These are all in The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Revised Eleventh Edition, 2009. 1 retain the 
italics for praxis, despite it being in the COED, to indicate a specifically Greek sense of the word.
26 Most later writers in this field use ‘she’ for the knower, however. The attraction of the latter is clear. 
This usage avoids clumsy ‘s/he’ or ungrammatical ‘they’ constructions and also alludes to traditional 
portrayals of virtue as female (such as the painting by Tiepolo, The Triumph of Virtue and Nobility Over 
Ignorance, which adorns the cover of Zagzebski’s Virtues o f the Mind). I shall use ‘he’ for the knower, 
because (i) historically, putative knowers in the dialogues of one who first raised many of the important 
epistemological issues -  Plato -  are all male (Meno’s slave boy, Theastetus et al.) and (ii) since the 
present work is in the philosophy of education, it is convenient to have a way of differentiating between 
the learner qua would-be knower and the teacher qua other-regarding ethical and epistemic agent. Given 
that the gender profile of the profession across Europe is becoming increasingly feminised (Wylie, 2000) 
calling the teacher ‘she’ and the learner ‘he’ enables a clear distinction to be made (without implying, of 
course, that males cannot be teachers, nor females learners). Cathy Wylie (2000) Trends in the 
feminization o f the teaching profession in OECD countries 1980-1995 (Wellington: New Zealand 
Council for Educational Research).
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Condition (3) is arguably the most interesting epistemologically, and the various 
schools o f epistemology treat the notion of justification in different ways. For 
example, internalists, as we have already seen, require s  to have access to the justifying 
knowledge while externalists do not. However, the starting point for all camps is the 
assertion that s has knowledge ‘that p' if  and only if  p  is true, s  believes that p, and s's  
belief in proposition p  is in some way justified. Using the list of symbols defined 
above, we can re-write this as follows:
Ks/j <-► p  . B sp  . SEsp
Two traditions pose a threat to this, or, indeed, to any conception o f knowledge. The 
first, in which Descartes is a prominent figure, involves proposing a radical sceptical 
hypothesis -  the existence o f a genium malignum ,27 or others’, more recent, Matrix28 or 
‘Brain in a Vat’29 scenarios -  which undermines claims to knowledge. The arguments 
for this first tradition, in outline, begin from the premiss that having certain knowledge 
o f proposition p  requires that 5  knows sceptical hypothesis h to be false. Since s cannot 
know that h is false, because s may be subject to h (the trickery of the genium  
malignum , for example), without being aware of it, s  cannot be certain o f p. Again, this 
can be transliterated into the symbolic conventions defined a moment ago, to enable 
propositional logic to provide a handrail through the argument:
KsP ^¥Ls[~h]
~ M ~ ^ ]
MT
By modus tollens, we see that because s  does not know that h is false, it is not the case 
that \y knows p ’.30 Showing that this conclusion need not necessarily be true, and that, 
on the contrary, knowledge is possible, forms the basis o f the epistemological tradition 
o f attempting to defeat the sceptic.
27 Descartes (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy [tr. Desmond Clarke] in Meditations and Other 
Metaphysical Writings (London: Penguin Classics, 2000). He first discusses the possibility of an ‘evil 
spirit [who] entraps [his] credulity’ near the end of Meditation I, p.22.
2 A 1989 film by directors Andy and Lana Wachowski.
27 Hilary Putnam introduces this notion in his (1982) Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 1-21,
30 Modus Tollens or Modus Tollendo Tollens means literally ‘the method that denies by denying’, is 
sometimes called ‘denying the consequent’, and is a logically valid move. For example, if being a 
bishop implies having a mitre, then not having a mitre means that one is not a bishop.
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A second tradition follows from the work of Edmund Gettier, who famously shows that 
knowledge is not simply justified true belief.31 He achieves this by describing some 
vignettes in which the protagonist ‘Smith’ asserts what turn out to be justified true 
beliefs -  thus apparently meeting the criteria for knowledge -  but which had in fact 
been based on faulty evidence. The first o f these scenarios involves the logical 
conjunction o f a true and a false belief about the results of a job interview (that the 
successful candidate will have ten coins in his pocket AND that Jones will get the job) 
to arrive at an apparently justified true belief (that the successful candidate will have 
ten coins in his pocket). This cannot be regarded as knowledge, however. Smith 
him self is appointed to the post, but the fact that he also has ten coins is mere epistemic 
luck, derived from an observation o f Jones’s pocket-contents and not his own. So 
Smith has a justified true belief that p, but not, Gettier argues, a knowledge that p.
Thus, justified true belief and knowledge are shown to be not the same thing. Despite 
their apparent triviality, Gettier counter-examples such as this have proved surprisingly 
difficult to defuse, and they have set off a philosophical cottage industry which 
attempts to achieve this by proposing ‘Gettier-proof definitions o f knowledge. A 
construal o f knowledge is sought along the lines o f (JTB).G, where G is a Gettier- 
proofing requirement.
Underlying both o f the projects outlined above -  defeating the sceptic and Gettier- 
proofing knowledge-claims -  is the intuition that knowledge is something we should 
care about. It is seen as being important enough to make the effort o f neutralising both 
the sceptic and Gettier be regarded as worthwhile. In common with Socrates, as 
educators we feel that knowledge has an extra value, over and above that o f mere true 
belief, which we ought to prize. This feature o f knowledge is something for which 
virtue epistemology might be reasonably expected to account, given (in at least some o f 
its manifestations) its connections with virtue ethics -  a domain in which questions o f 
value are central. There is an explicit axiological dimension to virtue epistemology -  
particularly that part o f the field aligned with Zagzebski’s neo-Aristotelian version -  
which I feel maps well onto educational ascriptions o f  value to knowledge. Together 
with an orientation towards the other great transcendentals o f the good and the 
beautiful, a pursuit o f knowledge has value because it is crucial to human well-being. I 
claim that learners can flourish when they strive to attain worthwhile cognitive contact 
with reality, and that they do flourish when they do attain it on a given occasion.
31 Edmund Gettier (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis, 23, pp. 121-123.
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Both camps o f traditional epistemology -  internalists and externalists -  concern 
themselves primarily with beliefs. A knower has good beliefs: beliefs which are not 
only true but are also adequately justified. In this respect, traditional epistemology is 
analogous to act-based ethics. In the latter, certain acts are regarded as being good, and 
our evaluation o f a person thus flows only derivatively from an analysis o f the acts she 
performs. Analogously, traditional epistemology focuses on beliefs and relegates 
believers to the background, since they are replaceable as bearers o f such beliefs.
Changing from a Belief-based to an Agent-based Epistemology
Virtue epistemology, as an agent-based32 epistemology, reverses the direction o f 
analysis that is characteristic o f belief-based epistemologies. Knowledge is now to be 
seen as true belief arising in a cognitive agent out of acts of cognitive virtue, not true 
belief to which an idealised knower would have a duty to assent because o f particular 
properties o f the belief itself. So, the focus shifts from the attributes o f a performance 
(attributes notably valued by positivism, behaviourism and technicism, as well as act- 
based ethics) to the dispositions and qualities o f the performer.
Ernest Sosa’s (1980) paper, ‘The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations 
in the Theory o f Knowledge’,33 is widely credited with inaugurating the field o f 
contemporary virtue epistemology. Despite agreement on the main principles (such as 
the direction o f analysis just described) there has, unsurprisingly, been a gradual 
divergence o f view amongst self-described virtue-epistemologists. According to Guy 
Axtell34, one group (typified by Sosa himself, John Greco and Alvin Goldman) has its 
home in ‘virtue reliabilism’, while another (containing Linda Zagzebski, James 
Montmarquet and Lorraine Code) finds neo-Aristotelian ‘virtue responsibilism' more 
congenial. Axtell plays down these differences, however, and denies that this labelling 
implies a re-run o f the extremes o f the external ism/intemalism debates o f recent 
epistemology. Before moving on to the details o f the new field o f virtue epistemology,
32 This tends to be the term used to define the virtue approach, but perhaps ‘agent-focused’ might be 
more appropriate, since truth-conduciveness is also used as a criterion for virtuous epistemic activity.
33 Ernest Sosa (1980) ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy vol.5, pp.3-25 
Reprinted in Sosa et al. (eds.) (2008) Epistemology: An Anthology [2nd Edition] (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd.) pp. 145-164.
34 Guy Axtell (2001) quoted in Robert Lockie (2008) ‘Problems for virtue theories in epistemology’ 
Philos. Stud., 138, pp. 169-191.
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I shall describe one model of knowledge which preceded Sosa’s reliabilist version.35
A Precursor to Ernest Sosa’s Epistemology: Robert Nozick’s ‘Tracking’ Model
The reliabilist ‘tracking’ model of Robert Nozick is particularly interesting, since it 
goes some way towards defeating both the sceptic and Gettier, as well as re-appearing 
in Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology in the shape o f discussions about what he labels 
‘safety’ and ‘sensitivity’. The essential feature ofN ozick’s construal o f knowledge is 
the requirement that the knower’s beliefs should track the truth. Not only must s 
believe p, but s would also still believe p  if  circumstances were different, yet p  were 
still to be a true proposition. We might state this in the form: ls would believe (true 
proposition) p, come what may’. Conversely, were p  not to be the case, s would not 
believe that/?, despite any changes in circumstances.
Nozick starts from the first two standard JTB conditions, derived from Plato, which we 
discussed earlier (p.27):
1. p  is true
2. s  believes thatp
He then proposes two further conditions that are individually necessary, and jointly 
sufficient for knowledge when combined with (1) and (2):
(3) Ifp  weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe thatp26
(4) p -* S believes thatp.}1
Since we will later compare Nozick with Sosa, it is desirable to express their arguments 
in a consistent notation. So, using the symbol ‘box-arrow’ (□—*■) to represent the 
subjunctive conditional ( ‘were it to be the case th a t ... then it would be the case 
th a t... ’), we re-write Nozick’s four ‘tracking’ conditions for knowledge as:
35 With one exception, Sosa either refers explicitly to Nozick’s model, or uses the Nozick-derived 
concepts o f’safety’ and ‘sensitivity’, in all of the books and articles cited here, as well as in several other 
published works. Although his 1980 (op. cit.) paper makes no mention ofNozick’s thinking (for 
chronological reasons), we can detect a strong influence ofNozick’s tracking reliabilism in Sosa’s 
subsequent development of his reliabilist virtue epistemology.
36 Robert Nozick (1981) Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.172.
37 Nozick intends the subjunctive conditional here, not the material implication that his arrow might be 
taken to indicate, ibid. p.176.
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1.p
2 .
3. ~p ► ~Bsp
4 .p  ► Bsp
Condition (3) (which Sosa exclusively terms ‘sensitivity’38) describes the knower’s 
response to the counterfactual case ofp  not being true. Condition (4) can be explicated 
as: ‘Were it to be the case that p  is true, then s would believe p \  So, to have 
knowledge o f true proposition p, s must believe p  to be true, irrespective o f other 
features o f the epistemic situation AND be in a position such that p  would not be 
believed by s were it not to be true.
We can now take Nozick’s model and put it to the test by applying it to the Gettier 
scenario, which I outlined above, to check if it can identify non-knowledge. Doing so 
successfully reveals that ‘Smith’ fails to have knowledge, because his belief meets 
neither condition (3) nor condition (4). The number o f coins in one’s pocket is not 
usually a reliable predictor of interview success,39 so Smith’s ‘knowledge’ falls down 
on condition (3), which stipulates that were p  not to be the case then s would not 
believe it. Placing his faith on a coin-count, Smith would still believep, which might 
easily turn out to be false: the successful candidate could just as well have nine or 
eleven or no coins in his pocket (in close possible worlds) and this would have had no 
bearing on the interview outcome. Similar reasoning rules out Smith’s belief as 
‘knowledge’, if we use Nozick’s tracking condition (4).
One interesting feature of Nozick’s model is that although 5 ’s beliefs must track the 
truth o f the proposition p  if they are to be considered as knowledge, they need not 
necessarily be caused by p. The tracking model is compatible with a causative model 
but does not have to imply it, for I suggest that causation can in this context be 
considered as a special case or subset o f conditional tracking. Nevertheless, simply 
requiring beliefs to track the truth in this way, without specifying the tracking 
mechanism, does not seem to me to be a satisfactory solution to the problem of 
defining knowledge. It also lacks an explanation o f why knowledge is o f more value
38 Nozick himself uses the term ‘sensitivity’, but in a much looser way than Sosa, who restricts it to 
counterfactual sensitivity [that is, Nozick’s condition (3)]. Nozick labels (3) the ‘variation’ condition and
(4) the ‘adherence’ condition. (Nozick (1981) op. cit., p.211).
39 Leaving aside the possibilities for bribery.
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than true belief. An elaboration o f these points is to be found in the new field of virtue 
epistemology. Sosa, for example, suggests that the value arises from apt epistemic 
performance,40 and Zagzebski locates it in the character o f the agent.41 Both see 
epistemic virtue as the tracking mechanism: Sosa’s construal being that which enables 
the hitting o f epistemic targets, and Zagzebski’s being that which enables cognitive 
contact with reality.
Virtue Epistemology (i) -  Ernest Sosa
A causative model o f knowledge invites an analysis which examines beliefs and 
investigates their causes. The tracking model o f Nozick can be approached in this 
same way (for, as we have seen, causation can be regarded as a subset o f tracking), or 
attention can be switched to the agent, the attributes o f whom are what arguably give 
rise to a tracking between the world and his beliefs. This, as we saw earlier, is the 
overall approach o f virtue epistemology: it starts from the properties o f a cognitive 
agent rather than from the depersonalised beliefs which form the basis o f traditional 
epistemology. In other words, justification supervenes on attributes o f persons (that is, 
their intellectual virtues), rather than on aspects o f the beliefs which are thus acquired: 
a reversal o f the traditional attribution o f justification. However, virtue epistemology is 
only agent-focused not exclusively agent-based, for the beliefs must be true to count as 
knowledge.
Both o f  the images implied by the title o f Sosa’s seminal paper, ‘The Raft and the 
Pyramid relate to possible structures o f knowledge located in the mind of an 
individual knower. The ‘raft’ we recognise as Otto Neurath’s metaphor, depicting a 
coherentist view o f knowledge, and the ‘pyramid’ alludes to a foundationalist model o f 
knowledge. The overall thesis o f Sosa’s paper is that both coherentism and 
foundationalism (that is, the raft and the pyramid) are faulty in a number of respects 
and that a particular type o f reliabilism -  one founded on the intellectual virtues -  is a 
better alternative.
Sosa’s notion o f an ‘epistemic pyramid’ is intended to capture the ascription o f an 
archi tectonic structure to knowledge by early modem epistemologists: René Descartes
1,0 Ernest Sosa (2011 ) Knowing Full Well (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.8.
41 Linda Zagzebski’s (1996) Virtues of the MW (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.16.
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and David Hume in particular. The essence o f this foundationalist model is that there 
exist asymmetrical relationships between nodes o f propositional knowledge, such that 
each depends on more fundamental nodes (without these more fundamental nodes 
being in any way co-dependent on the nodes they support). All branches o f the 
epistemic pyramid terminate downwards in more basic beliefs, the upper nodes being 
derived inferentially from the lower ones. For Descartes, the foundations must be 
indubitable. This requirement poses serious problems for foundationalism, in that the 
type o f absolutely certain knowledge, which is robust enough to support the weight of 
the inferential structure built upon it, seems not to be available. If  the arguments o f 
Descartes are accepted -  but not necessarily his deus ex machina o f a non-deceiving 
God who provides a warrant for belief in clear and distinct truths -  then we are plunged 
into a deep scepticism in which very little o f our putative everyday ‘knowledge’ will 
survive. As a self-described ‘particularist’, Sosa wants to hold on to such knowledge 
and he thus rejects the methodological foundationalism o f Hume and Descartes.42
What we might call the ‘epistemic raft’, on the other hand, does not anchor itself to 
error-free foundations but floats freely, in the form o f a number o f planks o f knowledge 
tied together in co-dependent ways. No plank is immune from being removed and 
jettisoned (if we elaborate on Neurath’s metaphor), but the ‘knower’ must stand on one 
plank to repair or replace another. What gives the raft its strength are the linkages 
between the planks, or, in terms o f knowledge, the coherence between the beliefs held 
by the knower. The notorious weakness o f this model is that it can easily become 
untethered from reality and drift away, for a number o f different but equally-coherent 
sets o f  beliefs may be consistent with the same world. (Or, alternatively, one particular 
set o f  coherent beliefs could be left intact even if  the world were to take on a number o f 
possible different forms.) Because of the inability o f coherentism to adjudicate 
between similarly-coherent sets of beliefs, it too must be rejected, proposes Sosa.
He articulates further arguments which cast doubt on the prospects o f either 
foundationalism or coherentism to provide viable explanations of knowledge. One line
42 ‘Aparticularist epistemology takes it that our first awareness is to facts which are restricted to the 
particular case before us.’ Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.) (1993) A Companion to Epistemology 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), p.287. General principles follow later. So, for Sosa, the price of 
accepting everyday knowledge is to reject foundationalism and its desire for indubitability. This 
overcomes the difficulty in identifying candidates to act as load-bearing fundamental propositions.
3 3
of attack on both types o f account is his ‘doxastic ascent’ argument, which leads to an 
unacceptable infinite regress in each case. The foundationalist version is as follows:
A. A belief B is foundationally justified for S in virtue of having property F only if
S is justified in believing (1) that most at least of his beliefs with property F are
true, and (2) that B has property F.43
It is condition (1) which triggers the regress, for a first-order belief based on sensory 
experience (perhaps a ‘clear and distinct’ Cartesian event, we might suggest) requires 
the further belief that beliefs with the property F (of being based on sensory 
experience) are generally true. This second-order belief, in turn, needs supporting 
reasons, and so the regress is launched. Coherentism is vulnerable to attack on similar 
lines, but with condition (1) modified by Sosa to A': ‘that most at least o f his beliefs 
with the property F o f thus cohering are true’.44
Having undermined traditional foundationalism and shown incoherences in its 
historical alternative, Sosa still wants to hold on to the particularist notion that non- 
inferential knowledge is possible. Descartes, as we saw earlier, introduced God into 
the frame to further the dialectic, but Sosa’s deus ex machina is an alien. An argument 
is constructed, appealing to non-chauvinist principles we might say, which leads to the 
conclusion that there is a deeper level at which belief-acquisition can be analysed for 
all sensory modalities and for both humans and extra-terrestrials. As well as our 
familiar human use o f eyesight, hearing and so on, a more general account o f the 
foundations for knowledge would need to allow for the possibility o f exotic alien 
belief-acquisition involving ‘... fields o f force, waves, mathematical structures and 
numerical assignments to variables in several dimensions[.]’ 45 There is thus a need to 
find a unifying ground that can support the specifics of a variety o f  epistemic 
mechanisms.
At this point, in a short section at the end o f a substantial paper, Sosa proposes his 
solution: intellectual virtue. Primary justification ‘... would apply to intellectual 
virtues, to stable dispositions for belief acquisition, through their greater contribution
43 Sosa (1980) op. cit., p. 155.
44 ibid., p.155.
45 ibid., p. 159.
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toward getting us to the truth’.46 Particular beliefs would then receive secondary 
justification, because o f their origins in intellectual virtue.
After providing this account o f such high conceptual generality that it would apply to 
any life-form capable of knowledge, Sosa focuses on the implications for Homo 
sapiens, a species characterised, he suggests, by sociability and language-use. We 
need, he feels, to ‘ ... give due weight not only to the subject and his intrinsic nature but 
also to his environment and to his epistemic community’.47 To be ‘knowledgeable’ is 
to be a reliable source o f information, an honorific word conveying the importance of 
such reliability to social beings like ourselves. I shall develop this clue o f Sosa’s -  
which he leaves largely undeveloped in his subsequent writings48 -  in later chapters on 
‘Testimony’ and ‘Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtue’, recognising the importance of 
the social aspects o f epistemology, particularly in educational contexts.
Since ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’ is generally acknowledged to be the beginning o f 
contemporary virtue epistemology, it is worth pausing for breath at this point in order 
to consider some o f the ways in which this paper sets the agenda for subsequent work 
in the field.
Sosa’s Agenda
Sosa’s notion o f virtue is very different from Aristotle’s and is somewhat devoid o f 
content. This thinness is perhaps an unavoidable consequence of the high level o f 
abstraction and generality he seeks. ‘Intellectual virtue’ is to Sosa simply a placeholder 
for the set o f  stable dispositions and faculties which allow potential knowers to track 
the truth. Whatever form they take, in whatever terrestrial or alien species, these 
properties are truth-conducive (and by implication survival-conducive): so this is, 
broadly speaking, a consequentialist model. Sosa vacillates in this respect, however, 
and gives the rather curious example of the ethical behaviour o f ‘Frau Hitler’s’ 
obstetrician. Because the doctor, with his ‘cognitive limitations’ could not have
46 ibid., p. 159.
47 ibid., p. 160.
48 Sosa’s very latest book on virtue epistemology touches on testimony a little more. He comes to the 
same conclusion I had already reached independently of him in my Chapter 2: ‘Human testimony stands 
with the senses in providing default rational justification’. Ernest Sosa (2011) Knowing Full Well 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) p. 138.
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foreseen the undesirable consequences o f the safe delivery o f ‘little A do lf,49 he acted 
on the basis o f stable dispositions to do good and hence did not commit infanticide.
The fact that this was subsequently disastrous in terms o f the overall good in the world, 
did not negate the obstetrician’s virtuous action. This could be considered a deontic 
approach to virtuous action, in that the obstetrician did his Hippocratic duty. The 
tension between deontic and consequentialist tendencies, which Sosa highlights 
through this vignette, continues to provoke debate in virtue epistemology. Overall,
Sosa finds his home in what can roughly be considered as a species o f epistemic 
consequentialism, while others (such as Linda Zagzebski) find epistemic deontology 
more congenial -  all within the broad church o f virtue epistemology. These differences 
largely hinge on whether truth-conduciveness or well-motivated intellectual action is 
seen as the hallmark o f epistemic virtue50 -  the former being approximately aligned 
with consequentialism and the latter with deontology. Virtue epistemology avoids the 
two undesirable alternatives of consequentialism and deontology, but it still bears their 
traces to some extent.
Safety and Sensitivity
Because Sosa is in the virtue reliabilist camp, his construal o f knowledge owes much to 
Nozick -  whose model, as we have seen, treats knowledge as true beliefs that reliably 
track the truth. Some consider Nozick to have been a virtue epistemoiogist before his 
time51 and Sosa’s approach is distinctively Nozickian in its use o f subjunctive 
conditionals to define knowledge. A key feature o f Sosa’s reliabilism, is his distinction 
between ‘sensitivity’ and ‘safety’ -  two conditions that have their origin (although not 
their labels) in conditions (3) and (4) o f Nozick’s tracking model. Whilst Nozick puts 
the emphasis on sensitivity, Sosa favours safety as a condition for knowledge.
\ . p
2. p
3. ~p ~Bsp
4. P □—► By/?
49 Sosa (1980) op. cit., p. 148.
50 This division into consequentialists or deontologists broadly mirrors Axtell’s grouping of 
epistemologists into reliabilists or responsibilists.
5 Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1992) The intellectual virtues and the life of the mind: on the place of the virtues 
in epistemology, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, inc.), p.23
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Sosa claims that these two requirements for knowledge [let us call them (3) and (4a), 
for reasons that will become apparent52] are often confused, but his methods of 
showing this sometimes add to the confusion. Since the sensitivity/safety distinction is 
a key part o f the development o f Sosa’s virtue epistemology, this needs explaining 
more perspicuously, requiring some logical arguments expressed in symbolic notation. 
Were subjunctive conditionals to contrapose validly, pace Sosa, then conditions (3) and 
(4a) would collapse in such a way that Sosa’s important distinction would be lost.
First o f all, let us see how Sosa’s notion o f ‘sensitivity’ relates to Nozickian tracking 
(N) and how Sosa’s modification -  Cartesian tracking53 (C) -  defines ‘safety’.
Consider again the tracking requirement proposed in my paper.
(C) S would believe P iff P were the case
And compare that with:
(N) If P were the case, S would believe P; and
If P were false, S would not believe P.54
He has muddied the water a little here by presenting Nozick (3) and (4) in reverse 
order, and it is not obvious how his condition (C) follows from Nozick’s two tracking 
conditions. In order to make sense of his moves, we can encode it into the symbols set 
out earlier (p.26).
It seems that Sosa has taken Nozick (3), ~p □—► ~Bsp , and counterposed it to produce 
(3a) Bsp  □—> p.
He then takes Nozick (4), p  □—* Bsp, and similarly counterposes it to yield 
(4a), ~Bsp  □ * ~p,
By combining these newly-generated conditionals, he arrives at his biconditional 
Cartesian tracking requirement (C):
Bsp  o —► p, £S would believe P iff P were the case’.
52 This labelling is needed to follow what Sosa has done, even though he himself does not use it,
53 He perhaps dubs it ‘Cartesian’ tracking because, to Descartes, a clear and distinct impression would 
enable s to believe p only if it were the case, being underwritten by a non-deceiving God. However, 
Sosa intends a naturalised epistemology (rather than Descartes’ supematuralised version)
54 Ernest Sosa ‘(1996) ‘Postscript to “Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology”’, Chapter 14 of 
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) (1996) Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of 
Plantinga’s Theory (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), p.274
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Since this derives from Nozick’s work, let us give Sosa’s ‘safety’ the alternate label 
‘Nozick (5)’:
(5)
‘Safety’ [or Nozick (5)] thus obtains of proposition p, if  and only if were s to believe p, 
then p  would be true.
But, Sosa’s argument depends on the principle that subjunctive conditionals do not 
validly counterpose. If this were a permissible move, then we could simply collapse his 
variants on Nozick’s conditions for knowledge back to the Nozick originals, and his 
‘safety’ requirement for knowledge would hence disappear. Unfortunately, his ways o f 
justifying this claimed property o f subjunctive conditionals are not clear. For example, 
part o f a recent illustration is as follows:
If water now flowed from your kitchen faucet [water-tap], for example, it would 
then be false that water so flowed while your main house valve [stop-cock] was 
closed. But the contrapositive of this true conditional is false.55
Moreover, in an earlier version o f this plumbing analogy,56 Sosa uses propositional 
logic notation instead of words, but he employs the symbol for material conditionals 
(—*■) which do contrapose (despite his argument) rather than the symbol for subjunctive 
conditionals (□—>) which do not. Because I later rely on notions such as ‘sensitivity’ 
[Nozick (3)] and ‘safety’ [Sosa/Nozick (5)], I offer a clearer way o f demonstrating the 
point than those given by Sosa.
The most straightforward way for us to show this non-contraposability o f subjunctive 
conditionals is to demonstrate that, whilst material conditionals obey the rule of 
‘denying the consequent’, or modus tollens, subjunctive conditionals do not.
55 Emest Sosa (2007) A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p.25. (UK/lrish-English equivalents added for clarity).
56 Emest Sosa (1999) ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’ Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 
Epistemology, p. 150
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Modus tollens for material conditionals takes the perfectly valid form exemplified 
below:
1. If  y is a politician, s is mendacious
2. s is not mendacious
3. 5 is not a politician MT
1. p  q
2. ~q
3. ~p MT
Modus tollens does not validly apply to subjunctive conditionals, however, as Ernest 
Adams57 points out and illustrates with the following example [Line numbers replacing 
his original letters A and B]:
1. If it rained, it didn’t rain hard
2. It rained hard
3. So it didn’t rain.
Perhaps to bring out the point more clearly vis-à-vis subjunctive conditionals, the 
wording would be better as: ‘Were it to rain, it would not rain hard’.
We can then rewrite Adams’ example in propositional logic notation;
1. r  □ ->  ~  r bard
2. /Wd
3. MT (INVALID)
Because the conclusion is false, either the form o f the reasoning must be invalid, or one 
or more o f the premises must be false. Arguments can be made either way, but at least 
this shows prima facie, if not ultima facie, that there is something suspect about using 
modus tollens with subjunctive conditionals. For instance, if  we apply modus tollens to 
Sosa’s ‘faucet’ subjunctive conditional example, the outcome is: ‘If  water flowed from
57 Ernest W Adams (1988) ‘Modus Tollens Revisited’, Analysis, vol.48, no.3, p.122.
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your kitchen faucet [water-tap], and the main house valve [stop-cock] was not open, 
then water would not flow from your kitchen faucet’ -  clearly a faulty conclusion.
A third way o f looking at this feature o f subjunctive conditionals is to compare one of 
their logical properties with that o f indicative conditionals. Take two closely-related 
conditionals with different grammatical moods, one indicative and one subjunctive:
C l: If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did 
C2: If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have
C2 is untrue, however (if we adopt the ‘lone-gunman hypothesis’) so we replace it 
with:
C3: If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would not have
If  we counterpose the first sentence, C 1, we arrive at the true conditional: ‘If  someone 
else didn’t shoot Kennedy, then Oswald did’. But if we attempt this with the corrected 
second sentence, C3, we produce the false conditional: ‘Had someone else shot 
Kennedy, then Oswald would have’. We shall pursue this no further, having shown 
that Sosa acts reasonably in refusing to collapse safety and sensitivity together, since 
subjunctive conditionals do not validly counterpose in any of our three examples.
In Sosa’s more recent works, the notions o f safety and sensitivity become less 
prominent. He weakens his definition o f ‘safety’ to include the possibility o f  error and 
give an expression of relative confidence: ‘A belief that p is safe provided it would 
have been held only if  (most likely) p ’.58 This is a welcome reduction in certainty and 
a recognition that certain scenarios are so far out in possibility space as to be unlikely 
and lienee can safely be disregarded. All that we need for a belief to be safe ‘... is that 
not easily would it fail by being false or untrue.’ Later in the same work, however, Sosa 
dispenses with the ‘safety’ requirement altogether:
Knowledge is simply ... apt performance in the way of belief. Knowledge hence 
does not require the safety of the contained belief, since the belief can be unsafe 
owing to the fragility of the believer’s competence or situation.59
58 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.25.
59 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.41.
4 0
In his latest book on virtue epistemology,60 the term ‘sensitivity’ does not even appear 
in the index. However, I feel that Sosa goes too far in jettisoning these valuable 
notions in order to simplify his ‘AAA’ structure.61 ‘Sensitivity’ and ‘safety’ can be 
used to analyse how knowledge tracks the truth, both counterfactually and pro- 
factually: so I retain them for the purposes o f educational virtue epistemology in the 
shape o f Nozick’s tracking requirement (3) and Sosa’s variant (3a) respectively.
We shall return to the topic o f counterfactual subjunctive conditionals later, for despite 
their rather recondite appearance (Jonathan Vogel calls their use in epistemology 
‘subjunctivitis’)62 they turn out to be surprisingly important in the virtue epistemology 
o f education. Their property o f non-contraposability, which we have now 
demonstrated, also assists in sidelining the sceptic for educational purposes (p. 172).
Two Grades of Knowledge
Sosa’s 2007 work maintains the reliabilist, truth-conducive orientation o f his 1980 
paper, fleshes out the detail and draws a distinction between what he terms ‘animal’ 
and ‘reflective’ knowledge. Despite the names he gives them, these are both human 
accomplishments, and they can be analysed in terms o f what he calls the ‘aptness’ of 
the performance o f the knower (where ‘apt’ means that the doxastic success is due to 
the epistemic agent’s skill, and hence is creditable to him). Knowledge simpliciter is 
‘apt belief, whereas reflective knowledge is ‘apt belief aptly noted’.63 Using the 
symbols K for animal knowledge and K+ for reflective knowledge, Sosa represents the 
latter definition thus:
Y^p <-> KKp
[or K"1*/? «-► Ks Ksp, if we consistently use the notation I defined earlier (p.26)]
60 Ernest Sosa (2011) Knowing Full Well (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
61 He particularly disapproves of sensitivity as a requirement for knowledge. Sosa claims that his 
version, which, as we saw, introduces the concept of ‘safety’, ‘does not force us to reject the closure of 
knowledge under known entailment and deduction’ (Sosa, op. cit., 1996, p.277). His worry here seems 
to be that accepting the ‘closure of knowledge principle’ on Nozick’s tracking condition (3) leads to 
victory for the sceptic. However, [ feel that his model invests too much faith in the believer’s cognitive 
abilites and that we can accept closure of knowledge in Nozick’s model as long as the sceptical issue can 
be defeated or at least sidelined. 1 attend to this later (p. 170), where we see that Sosa’s ‘safety’ concept 
also forces us to ‘reject the closure of knowledge...’, despite his assertion to the contrary.
62 ‘Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential [sic] modal in 
character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals.’ Jonathan Vogel (2006) 
‘Subjunctivitis’, Philos Stud, 134, pp.73-88, p.73.
63 Ernest Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.32.
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In other words, to know a proposition p  reflectively, we need not only to have an apt 
belief that p, but also to have an apt belief that our knowing p  is defensible against 
pertinent sceptical doubts. Later I show that a consideration o f the counterfactive (such 
that ~p is the case) is an important instance o f these doubts in educational contexts 
(p. 178). In other words, a virtuous knowledge of p  can be seen to require that the 
knower be able to defend p  against attack when entertaining ~p (where ~p falls short o f 
extreme sceptical hypotheses).
Sosa’s definition of ‘reflective knowledge’ sets the bar rather high, though, and a more 
moderate construal o f knowledge, qua virtuously-acquired true belief, will allow the 
beliefs to be merely ‘apt’. The learner may not ‘know+’ the beliefs in question, but he 
nevertheless ‘knows’ them to the extent that they are apt and hence creditable to him. 
This distinction between ‘know’/ ‘know+’, or ‘animal b e lie f/’reflective belief or ‘apt 
b e lie f/‘apt belief aptly noted’ is an important one in Sosa’s scheme and we shall later 
explore its significance for education (p. 187). For now, let us simply note that, 
desirable as the pursuit of full-blown reflective belief is to the education project, it 
represents a counsel o f perfection and is not feasible as a sole regulative ideal, for both 
pragmatic and theoretical reasons. The pragmatic reason relates to the time required to 
pursue ‘knowledge+’64 rather than ‘knowledge’ and the theoretical reason recognises 
the irredeemably patchwork nature o f human knowledge, due to the unexamined part o f 
its genesis in childhood and later. Furthermore, mere ‘animal knowledge’ (that is, ‘apt 
belief) is still to be regarded as creditable -  because o f its origin in effective epistemic 
performance -  even though ‘reflective knowledge’ has greater value, being more akin 
to understanding.
Sosa explicitly identifies animal belief and reflective belief with Descartes’ scientia 
and cognitio respectively. To make this connection even firmer, he quotes Descartes’ 
Second Set o f  Replies, in which ‘an atheist can clearly be aware that the three angles o f 
a triangle are equal to two right angles ... but he cannot be certain that he is not being 
deceived’.65 Descartes uses his acknowledgement that God exists, to convert cognitio
64 I use this as shorthand for Sosa’s ‘reflective knowledge’, taking a cue from his ‘K+’, which we saw 
above. Similarly with ‘Know+’: a term that Sosa does not use.
65 ‘Second Set of Replies’ in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (eds.) (1985) The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Sosa, (2007) op. cit.,
p . 128.
42
into scientia, whereas Sosa uses knowing about knowing (where knowing is ‘aptly 
believing’) to achieve this safer perspective. Since these knowings are considered by 
Sosa to be epistemic performances, they can be evaluated along the same lines as other 
types o f performance: for example, firing an arrow. The key notion of ‘aptness’ 
emerges from such analogical reasoning.
An Archery Metaphor for Knowing
Sosa talks of an archer’s shot being a performance assessable in three respects: ‘... the 
AAA structure: accuracy, adroitness, aptness’.66 These equate to 
(i) success in hitting the target, (ii) whether the shot manifests skill and (iii) whether the 
success o f the shot is due to the skill manifested, and hence creditable to the archer.
In terms o f  epistemology, Sosa claims that his ‘AAA’ structure for assessing 
performances in general maps onto beliefs qua performances, in that we can consider 
now their (i) correctness, (ii) manifestation o f epistemic virtue and (iii) correctness 
because virtuous. This seems plausible, except that ‘correctness’ (which Sosa uses here 
interchangeably with ‘accuracy’ and ‘truth’) is, in this context, a property o f beliefs, 
whereas ‘manifesting epistemic virtue’67 seems to be something that a person does, not 
something we can attribute to a belief. However, granting Sosa (for the moment) his 
classification o f beliefs as performances, this property o f ‘manifesting epistemic virtue’ 
(that is acting in a way animated by such virtue) can be applied, since the attribute 
attaches to an act -  that of believing -  rather than a static outcome. The final criterion, 
‘aptness’ relates both to beliefs and persons, by demanding that in the case o f 
knowledge the belief be true because arrived at virtuously. Epistemically, the holder o f 
such a belief is creditable for doing so, just as, ethically, an agent performing a good 
act prompted by virtue is admirable.
Interestingly, although Sosa makes no mention o f it, the archery metaphor has 
historical antecedents which also carry a moral charge. Iris Murdoch points out that the 
Greek verb hamartano means to ‘miss the mark (as with one’s spear) and also, fail, 
miss one’s purpose, make a mistake, or (lastly) do wrong or sin’.68 Similarly, we speak
66 Sosa (2007) op. cit. p.22.
67 Sosa (2007) ibid., p.23.
68 Iris Murdoch (1992) Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Allen Lane) p.99. The related 
ancient Greek word hamartia signifies an error in judgement, but it has more recently acquired the
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o f right and wrong answers: terms which have clear moral connotations. The human 
condition is to be both fallible and peccable. Elsewhere, Murdoch again makes clear 
the connection between the moral and the epistemic by asserting that ‘virtue is the 
attempt to pierce the veil o f selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is’.69 
Aristotle, too gives us an archery-like metaphor: ‘not everyone can find the centre o f a 
circle; only the man who knows how’.70 He also offers the valuable insight that failure 
can take many forms, but success in a given case is singular, for, ‘it is easy to miss the 
target and difficult to hit it’,71 thus, ‘men are bad in countless ways but good in only 
one.’72 In terms o f knowledge, we can consider the target proposition, p, to be 
surrounded by a large number o f near-misses representing counterfactive beliefs, ~p. 
Others attempts fail more drastically to hit the bullseye, but are still nearer to it in 
possibility-space than such sceptical hypotheses as the genium malignum. So while the 
propositionp  is individual, its counterfactives, comprise a class.
Michael Slote, quoted by Juli Eflin,73 uses the term ‘deplorable’ as the converse o f 
‘admirable’ in evaluating acts in general. In the case o f beliefs, the counterpart of 
‘creditable’ is not defined by Eflin, but Linda Zagzebski’s thinking suggests one 
possibility: ‘blameworthy’. She writes, ‘I have been treating knowledge as something 
the knower earns. It is a state in which the prize of truth is credited to [him]; perhaps 
[he] is even deserving o f praise for it’.74 However, if  a putative knower holds false 
beliefs -  if he misses his epistemic target -  we may not necessarily find him 
blameworthy, but, on the contrary, perhaps even consider his virtuous motivation to be 
praiseworthy. We do not, for instance, withhold due credit from Newton and deny his 
possession o f intellectual virtues because his ideas were later shown to be wrong in 
many respects. This is more like a moral judgement than one about his knowledge. 
Conversely, if  an epistemic agent holds true beliefs without the exercise o f cognitive 
virtue -  if he hits the target by chance, or with excessive help, for example -  it would
meaning of a person’s tragic flaw that ultimately leads to his downfall. In New Testament Greek, the 
word hamartia is usually rendered in English translation as ‘to sin’ or ‘to do wrong’.
69 Iris Murdoch (1985) ‘The Sovereignty of the Good Over Other Concepts’, Reprinted in Roger Crisp & 
Michael Slote (1997) Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p.l 10.
70 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk.II, 9, 1109a26. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from the 
Nicomachean Ethics are from J.A.K. Thompson and Hugh Tredennick [trs.] (1953, 2004) Aristotle: The 
Nicomachean Ethics (London: Penguin Books). [A7i].
71 Aristotle, NE, bk.2, 6, 1106b33.
72 Aristotle, NE, 1106b35.
73 Michael Slote (1992) From Morality to Virtue. (New York: Oxford University Press) in Juli Eflin 
(2003) ‘Epistemic presuppositions and their consequences’ Metaphilosophy vol.34, nos, 1/2, p.54.
Linda Zagzebski (2003) ‘The search for the source of epistemic good’ Metaphilosophy vol. 34, 
nos. 1/2, p.20.
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be a strange use o f language to label this as blameworthy. Perhaps ‘non-creditworthy’ 
(or, to use Sosa’s terminology, ‘inapt’) captures the idea best.
Departures from Greek Tradition of Virtue
Sosa’s construal o f knowledge as having an ‘AAA’ structure seems to have departed 
significantly from his prefatory promise to present a ‘Virtue Epistemology in line with 
the tradition found in Aristotle, Aquinas...’.75 The middle A -  Adroitness -  is perhaps 
the nearest feature in his model to a virtue, but his elaboration o f the concept shows it 
to have little in common with Greek notions o f arete. We see that adroitness is 
linguistically equivalent to dexterity, and dictionary definitions o f ‘adroit’ refer to 
‘shrewdness’, ‘craft’ and ‘physical skill’.76 Sosa gives the criterion for adroitness as 
‘whether it manifests skill’,77 and he also uses the words ‘competence’ and ‘epistemic 
ability’ interchangeably with this term (this last expression being explicitly equated 
with virtue.78)
However, skills and virtues are quite clearly demarcated in the Aristotelian scheme, so 
in blurring the distinction Sosa is departing significantly from the Greek tradition he 
claims to be following. Granted, techne is an intellectual virtue and this would be the 
nearest to Sosa’s notion o f epistemic virtue, but technical reason and technical skill are 
not the same thing. The shoemaker has technical reason, but uses technical skill 
(adroitness in cutting leather; deftness in stitching) to operationalise the virtue. If 
adroitness were to be a virtue in the Aristotelian sense, it would plausibly be located at 
the mean between two vices, and this seems not to be the case. One could suggest that 
gaucheness might be the corresponding vice, but it is difficult to identify what a vicious 
excess of skill might be like. To be sure, Plato warns against devoting too much effort 
to developing a skill such as musical proficiency, but this is not a criticism o f excess 
skill per se, but a caution that the process o f acquiring it wastes time79 which could be 
used for nobler purposes, or, worse still:
15 Sosa (2007) op. cit., ‘Preface and Acknowledgements’ (repeated on the dust-cover). He does go on to 
name Reid and Descartes in his list of influences, so we ought not judge him too harshly for his 
departures from the Greek tradition.
76 Philip Gove (ed.) (1993) Webster’s Third N e w  International Dictionary (Cologne: Konernann).
77 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.22.
78 ibid., p.61.
79 What modem economists call ‘opportunity cost’.
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...when a man abandons himself to music ... and gives his entire time to the 
warblings and blandishments of song ... he melts and liquefies ... and makes of 
himself a ‘feeble w a r r io r ’ 80
Overall, then, we may conclude that Sosa’s variety o f epistemology, with its emphasis 
on skills and faculties, is valuable in many respects, but it is not undergirded in any 
substantial way by the virtue theory of Aristotle.
In limning the outlines o f virtue epistemology, the furthest territory from Sosa’s is that 
o f Linda Zagzebski. Whereas Sosa’s grounds are a dissatisfaction with traditional 
Anglo-American epistemology, in particular the ‘foundationalist vs. coherentist’, 
‘internalist vs. externalist’ and ‘Gettier vs. the rest o f epistemology’ debates, Zagzebski 
maps her virtue epistemology onto a distinctly Aristotelian landscape. Some 
commentators81 have classed Sosa’s analytical work in this area as ‘low church’ and 
Zagzebski’s neo-Aristotelian response as ‘high church’.
Virtue Epistemology (ii) - Linda Zagzebski
Linda Zagzebski suggests that Sosa’s virtue epistemology is nothing more than 
reliabilism under a different name and, as such, is a species o f consequentialism rather 
than a legitimate virtue epistemology derived from aretaic ethics (Zagzebski, VOM,*2 
p.xiii). In contrast, her own work is so derived, she claims, in keeping with her 
assertion that ‘...(N)ormative epistemology is a branch of ethics’ ( VOM, p.xv). She 
defines knowledge as ‘... a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out o f acts of 
intellectual virtue’.83
Zagzebski’s is an ambitious project: to delineate a virtue epistemology which is not 
only derived from virtue ethics, but also subsumed under it. In her strongly 
assimilationist account, she states that ‘The account o f the virtues that I have given ...
80 Plato, Republic bk.IIl, 41 la-b.
81 Amongst them Alvin Goldman and Enrique R Moros & Richard J. Umbers (2004) ‘Distinguishing 
Virtues from Faculties in Virtue Epistemology’, Southern Journal o f Philosophy, vol.XLII, p.65.
821 shall use ‘ VOM' to refer to Linda Zagzebski’s seminal (1996) Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press).
83 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p.298 [bold face in original],
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subsumes the intellectual virtues under the general category of the moral virtues or 
aretai ethikai, roughly as Aristotle understands the latter.’ (VOM, p.255). Her theory 
gives practical wisdom - phronesis -  the key role o f ‘...mediat(ing) between and among 
the whole range o f moral and intellectual virtues’ (VOM, p.xiv).
Moreover, Zagzebski complains that epistemology has hitherto concentrated too 
exclusively on the isolated propositional beliefs o f the individual ‘knower’ and has 
largely ignored the non-cognitive and social aspects o f knowledge, while also 
neglecting the two (separate) important epistemic goods o f understanding and wisdom. 
She sees ‘understanding’ as something akin to intellectual coherence: ‘One understands 
p  as part o f and because of one’s understanding o f a system or network o f truths’ .84 
Her view o f ‘wisdom’ is based explicitly on Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor o f the fox and the 
hedgehog: ‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’.85 The 
search for wisdom is thus not a matter o f piling up a large number o f propositions,^, 
nor a process of arranging these into a coherent structure, but rather a seeking after the 
single simplifying insight that enables ‘grasping the whole o f reality’. One wonders if 
such a seeking of a single simplifying insight is the act o f an Aristotelian agent, having 
more in common, perhaps, with the Platonic search for Forms.
In respect o f her wish to foreground the social dimensions o f knowledge, Zagzebksi has 
something in common with Sosa’s stress on the importance o f the ‘epistemic 
community.’86 This intuition will later be shown to be particularly valuable for the 
present work o f mediating between virtue epistemology and education.
Zagzebski’s Task
Zagzebski’s mission to ameliorate epistemology’s perceived ills by appealing to a 
particular interpretation o f the Aristotelian notion o f arete, and assimiliating the 
epistemic virtues to the moral, faces two serious objections:
1. In evaluating an act, we can only legitimately apply moral considerations if the act is 
voluntary. On the face o f it, beliefs do not appear to be voluntary in nature.
84 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p.49
85 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p.45. Berlin, in turn, takes his image from the Greek poet Archilochus, 
Zagzebski tells us.
86 Sosa (1980) op. cit.,p,160.
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2. Aristotle himself did not include the intellectual virtues among the moral virtues.
If a case is to be made for regarding intellectual virtue as simply a subset o f moral 
virtue, these two objections need to be dealt with convincingly by Zagzebski. There is 
also an issue o f nomenclature, which I shall tackle first. The word ‘moral’ is a loaded 
term, which often carries connotations o f right and wrong, praise and blame and duty. 
Zagzebski sometimes uses the term in this way, or employs deontic locutions such as: 
‘we blame a person who makes hasty generalizations’ ( VOM , p.5). However, another 
construal is an aretaic one and this is the meaning we associate with Aristotle’s moral 
virtues. Here we are concerned not with evaluating actions but with the character and 
motivations of the actor. William Frankena explains:
that deontic terms and judgments are more like legal ones than aretaic terms and 
judgments are; that the latter are or involve scalar predicates while the former are or 
include non-scalar ones; that aretaic judgments can be made of both actions and 
persons, as well as of motives and intentions, whereas deontic judgments are more 
properly made of actions than of persons, motives, or intentions; and that a 
reference to motives and intentions is involved in aretaic judgments in a way in 
which it is not in deontic ones. 87
This characterisation of aretaic terms as scalar (as opposed to the legal, or binary 
nature o f deontic judgements) is in important one, to which I shall return later (p.63)
Having registered this potential for equivocation over the word ‘moral’, we return to 
Zagzebski to see how she deals with the two objections I have raised over her project to 
subsume the intellectual virtues under the moral. Taking these in order, we find that 
Zagzebski quotes approvingly Christopher Hookway’s view that evaluation in the 
epistemic realm ought to concern itself not with belief as such but with the act o f 
enquiry. Qua act — and hence voluntary in nature, to some extent at least -  enquiry is 
therefore susceptible to moral evaluation. This, Zagzebski points out, is a different 
focus from that o f Aristotle, for whom the paradigmatic intellectual act is not enquiry 
but contemplation. By shifting the emphasis thus, thinking is construed in a more 
active way; a type o f behaviour rather than passive cogitation. This, we see, has much 
in common with Sosa’s notion of epistemic performance (p.44); but Zagzebski makes 
the additional claim that thinking, being a species o f behaviour, falls therefore under 
the remit of moral evaluation. She suggests that in everyday life we routinely apply 
moral standards in evaluating intellectual behaviour: ‘ we blame a person ... who
87 William K. Frankena (1973) ‘An Ethics of Love Conceived as an Ethics of Virtue’, The Journal o f 
Religious Ethics, vol.l, pp.21-36, p.24
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ignores the testimony of reliable authority.’ ( VOM, p.5) Merely because it is 
behaviour, however, we might argue that this does not necessarily make it subject to 
the will.
Zagzebski tackles the ‘beliefs-are-not-voluntary-hence-not-morally-evaluable’ 
objection by pointing to the range of voluntariness which can be ascribed to acts.
Cases in which acts follow from careful deliberation are rare, yet we still generally hold 
persons responsible for their acts as long as they are not forced  into their commission. 
Similarly, beliefs are held to various degrees o f voluntarism, occupying a continuum 
parallel to that for acts. Hence, so her argument goes, if  we are willing to evaluate acts 
morally across a substantial part o f their spectrum, we are entitled to do that for beliefs 
too. The legitimacy of this evaluation will depend on the position o f the act or the 
belief in its respective continuum: from reflex acts and perceptual beliefs at one 
extreme, to pre-meditated acts and carefully reasoned beliefs at the other extreme. 
Zagzebski feels that ‘... there is no reason to think that intellectual courage, 
perseverance, honesty or sincerity are any less voluntary than courage, perseverance, 
honesty and sincerity considered as moral virtues’ {VOM, p.60).
This is a plausible assertion, but it does rather undermine her case by pointing to a 
disanalogy between beliefs and acts. Courage, perseverance and so on are attributes of 
acts (we can talk of a courageous rescue of a wounded fellow-soldier in battle, for 
example) but they are properties o f the enquiries that led to beliefs, not o f the beliefs 
themselves. For example, a belief in the non-contraposability o f subjunctive 
conditionals is not on the face of it labelled with the virtue o f  the perseverance which it 
took the believer to acquire it.88 An investigation can show intellectual courage or 
perseverance, but it is unclear how these virtues can attach to the beliefs thus formed.
If  parallels are to be drawn with moral act evaluation, this epistemic evaluation too 
ought to be directed towards truth-seeking activities rather than towards the states o f 
belief which result. Zagzebski can thus be considered to be a zetetic responsibilist.
88 Having said this, I later argue (p.182) that there is a sense in which a virtuous knowledge of 
proposition p  is mentally stored together with the resources to defend p  against attack from a 
consideration that ~p might be the case. These resources are limited, however, so the believer might 
surrender in the face of superior forces and revise his belief-web by derogating p  in favour of ~p and 
following through the doxastic consequences. Furthermore, for virtuous belief-revision, these resources 
ought not to include an indication that acquiring/? took perseverance, it seems to me, for this will reduce 
the agent’s willingness to derogate it when purely epistemic considerations would suggest that he should. 
Hard-won beliefs can be unreasonably tenacious.
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The difficulty here is that in the moral realm, the agency flows character—»act, (to 
simplify greatly) whereas in the epistemic realm it runs character—*act—>belief.89 
There is thus no difficulty in bringing epistemic acts into the moral bailiwick, but, 
unless ‘beliefs’ are re-configured as ‘believings’ and are classified as acts, they seem 
to be out of place. If  Zagzebski wants beliefs to be on the voluntary spectrum, and 
hence to be morally evaluable, she will need to embrace a view o f belief-maintenance 
as being every much an act as belief-formation, belief-modification and beiief- 
derogation. However, she sidesteps such a manoeuvre, saying that she is interested 
primarily in the stable traits behind the activity, and neither in the specific activity 
itself nor even in particular beliefs -  claiming that ‘the point of a virtue theory is to 
shift the focus o f evaluation from the act or belief to the trait o f character,’ (VOM, 
p.73). She cannot, and does not, shift it completely, however, for the beliefs formed 
must also be true if we are to consider the agent’s actions as fully epistemically sound.
Next we consider a key difference between Zagzebski and Sosa on the important issue 
o f  what the intellectual virtues consist in, and, again, how permissible it is to locate 
them in the moral realm.
Differences Between Zagzebski and Sosa
In his recent work, Sosa equates intellectual virtue with ‘epistemic ability’90 and 
includes both skill (‘adroitness’) and faculties, including eyesight, as part o f his rather 
thin account o f intellectual virtue. The latter inclusion would be particularly 
problematic for both Aristotle and Zagzebski, for not only is eyesight not a virtue o f a 
man in the Aristotelian sense,91 it cannot be convincingly brought into the moral realm, 
as Zagzebski’s programme requires. It is counter-intuitive, and seems to be mistaken, 
to hold a person morally culpable for having poor eyesight and hence rank him as being 
not as epistemically adroit as another with perfect vision.
89 Here I use arrows (-*) to indicate the flow of agency, not the meaning listed in the table of symbolic 
conventions of material implication.
90 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.61.
91 Aristotle regards seeing to be the virtue of an eye (‘... it is through the excellence of the eye that we see 
well.’ Nicomachean Ethics. 1106al8) but he is speaking here only of its excellence qua function, not its 
human virtue, that is, a virtue of the soul. He makes this distinction clear immediately: '... human 
excellence will be the disposition that makes one a good man and causes him to perform his function 
well. ’ [italics in original translation]. So in one case we have the optical and physiological properties of 
a body part, and, in the other, the psychological dispositions of a person. Of course, Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism makes a strict dichotomy between the hule of the eye and its animation by the soul 
untenable, but a dispositional virtue such as courage clearly belongs to the soul first and foremost -  and 
only to the eye derivatively (we may talk of an ‘unflinching eye’ for example).
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However, I feel that we can accept Zagzebski’s line that sight, hearing, memory and so 
on are not virtues but faculties, and yet still find a place for them in the moral arena.
For example, a car-driver causing an accident because of uncorrected known defective 
vision would be regarded as negligent, and hence responsible to some degree. In the 
intellectual realm too, failure to take reasonable steps to compensate for visual 
impairments, in a situation which required good visual acuity, would be a failure to 
seek maximal ‘cognitive contact with reality’ (as Zagzebski terms knowledge) and 
would hence also be evaluable in a negative way. In this respect, the putative knower, 
neglecting to compensate for defective eyesight in a truth-seeking activity that required 
it, would be just as culpable as one who ‘makes hasty generalizations’. Sosa’s 
description of belief as a ‘performance’ which can accrue credit or discredit to the 
performer shows that he too intends a moral evaluation to be possible on this account, 
so the distance between Zagzebski and him may not be as great as it initially appears. 
Plausibly, the virtue does not reside in eyes, ears, memory and so on, but in how they 
are used and what steps are taken to compensate for their imperfections. We see that it 
is in their use that virtue is exhibited; it is in their use that credit (or discredit, or non­
credit) flows to the user. Nevertheless, Sosa’s inclusion o f eyesight and so on as 
virtues simpliciter, rather than as tools foT the exercise o f virtue has led to him being 
labelled a ‘faculty reliabilist’, and not, according to Zagzebski, a virtue epistemologist. 
He calls him self a ‘virtue perspectivist’, since his definition of ‘reflective knowledge’ 
involves the knower attaining a perspective on his knowing by having a belief about his 
belief (or by possessing, as he puts it, an ‘apt belief aptly noted’92).
Aristotle’s Distinction Between the Intellectual and the Moral Virtues
The other objection to Zagzebski’s species o f virtue epistemology is that it strongly 
claims continuity with Aristotle’s discussion o f arete, yet departs from his analysis in 
significant ways. This is not necessarily a cause for criticism: indeed, merely restating 
the arguments o f Aristotle all over again would represent a failure to develop 
epistemology, in much the same way as repeating Aristotle’s faulty scientific beliefs 
held back progress in science for a considerable time. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s 
philosophical works have stood the test o f time, so we shall make a brief excursion 
into the Nicomachean Ethics before considering Zagzebski’s neo-Aristotelian re-
92 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.32.
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interpretation, in which she brings the intellectual virtues within the ambit o f the 
moral. In this section, I also introduce some analysis by Aristotle that becomes 
significant in later chapters.
Aristotle is in no doubt that there is a clear distinction between the excellences o f the 
intellect (dianoia) and those of the character (ethike): ‘Virtue, then, is of two kinds, 
intellectual and moral’ (NE bk .l, 1103al4). Under the former heading, he places the 
examples o f theoretical wisdom, understanding and practical wisdom (sophia, nous 
andphronesis) and under the latter he puts virtues such as liberality and temperance. 
Although both classes consist of acquired excellences, for Aristotle -  importantly -  
they have different aetiologies: instruction in the case o f the intellectual aretai and 
habit in the case o f the moral.
There is also a difference in the goods at which they aim. The intellectual virtues are 
truth-directed in their motivational and operational natures: ‘Thus the attainment o f 
truth [alethia]9i is the task [ergon] of both of the intellectual parts of the soul [i.e., 
nous (understanding) and orexis (desire)]’. [NE, bk.6, 1139bl0]. The moral virtues are 
directed towards good action: ‘... we praise ... the good man and virtue, because o f 
the acti ons and effects that they produce ... ’ [NE, bk. 1, 1101 b 15 ]. However, 
phronesis (an intellectual virtue) straddles this division into intellectual and moral 
virtues, for it aims at developing us as good men. To achieve a fuller understanding of 
this taxonomy, Aristotle’s theory of the virtues needs to be set in the wider context o f 
his theory o f mind (or ‘soul’94).
Aristotle proposes an initial division of the mind into a part which deals with the 
rational (the logistikori) and a part concerned with the irrational (the alogon). Both 
parts have an appetitive aspect -  a desire for knowledge in the case of the rational half, 
as mentioned a moment ago, and one for baser fulfilment in the irrational portion. The 
irrational part is further subdivided into what he calls the ‘vegetative’ part, common to 
other living things and not susceptible to reason at all, and an ‘appetitive’ part that is, 
to some extent at least, affected by reason. Aristotle explains the latter phenomenon as
93 This literally means ‘not being covered’, so the process of finding the truth is one of unveiling.
941 recognise here that there are dangers in conflating the modem notion o f ‘mind’ with Aristotle’s 
understanding of ‘soul’. In particular, his concept of the soul as the ‘form’ of the body is not entirely 
congruent with more recent views on mind. Nevertheless, his discussion of rational and irrational parts 
of the ‘soul’ maps reasonably well onto present-day analyses of the ‘mind’.
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that o f the irrational appetitive part ‘taking account’ {logos echein) o f reason (NE, 
bk .l, 1102b33) along the lines of a son showing filial respect for the advice of his 
father. However, the appetitive part of the rational part o f the soul (the desire to know) 
is not just affected by reason in the way in which a child responds to fatherly advice, 
but is fully rational in its own right.
It is this division o f the soul into rational and irrational parts that provides Aristotle 
with a justification for dividing the virtues into intellectual and moral classes 
respectively. In his scheme, ‘virtue’ means different things vis-à-vis intellectual 
activity and moral conduct. There must be, though, a degree o f what we might term 
‘permeability’ between the two parts, for excellences could not be ascribed to man qua 
rational animal if his moral actions were entirely free o f rational influence. These 
connections are seen in Aristotle’s metaphor o f fatherly admonition and praise -  from 
the rational part o f the soul -  persuading the childlike irrational part to curb its 
appetites. A further indication that Aristotle subscribes to this view is his speculation 
that the rational and irrational parts may be as conjoined as the convex and concave 
aspects o f a circle. (NE, bk .l, 1102a30).
Moreover, all o f the aretai -  intellectual and moral -  are under the jurisdiction o f the 
intellectual virtue o fphronèsis, for an aretè is ‘a purposive disposition, lying in a mean 
that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a 
1phronimos] would use to determine it. It is a mean between two kinds o f vice, one o f 
excess and the other o f deficiency ...’ (NE, bk.2, 1107al-5). Thus, in order to be able 
to use any o f the moral aretai, or a combination o f them, to guide action in accordance 
with the good in a particular situation, the person o f practical wisdom needs to be 
animated by the virtue o f phronèsis to determine the mean between extremes. A 
crucial point to make here is that eudaimonia -  flourishing -  will not only result from 
this use o f the intellectual and moral virtues in accordance with phronèsis, it is also 
constitutive o f the exercise o f the virtues themselves. So the intellectual and moral 
virtues are not only interlinked, they are also indispensable for eudaimonia, both as 
means and as ends.
Bearing in mind this permeability, we shall now follow Aristotle in examining the 
intellectual virtues in more detail. Just as he divided the entire soul into two parts -  
the rational and the irrational -  Aristotle further subdivides the rational into two: that
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which deals with sublunary, contingent matters and that which contemplates the 
necessary, eternal and invariable. These two parts could be termed the practical (or 
deliberative) and the theoretical (or scientific). It is important to stress, though, that 
Aristotle’s construa! of science is very different from our modem notions, his being 
the contemplation o f that which is not susceptible to deliberation (boulesis), since the 
necessary, by definition, cannot be otherwise and is thus not, he claims, a suitable 
topic for deliberation. The other part of the soul -  the practical -  deals with more 
quotidian matters such as making things (poiesis) and engaging in action for its own 
sake (praxis).
The three ‘theoretical’95 virtues are sophia, nous and episteme -  usually translated as 
‘wisdom’, ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’. The two practical virtues arephronesis 
and techne, the translations o f which are usually ‘practical wisdom’ (or ‘prudence’) 
and ‘technical reason’ or ( ‘technical skill’). In each case, I shall adopt the former 
translation, for the following reasons: (i) ‘Prudence’ is arguably better captured by the 
Greek sophrosyne, is only part o f practical wisdom, and is not generally regarded as an 
unalloyed virtue.96 The Latin prudentia is equivalent to the Greek phronesis, but I 
suggest that the word ‘prudence’ in contemporary English usage has a meaning more 
aligned with ‘temperance’, ‘caution’, ‘risk-aversiveness’, ‘moderation’ or ‘tight- 
fistedness’, rather than notions o f a more expansive, other-regarding, practical 
wisdom. Perhaps, though, these prudent attributes need to be in place to allow the 
phronimos to dispense wisdom without being hampered by a practical faux pas. It 
would be difficult to help a student in his epistemic predicament if we failed to comply 
(to at least some degree) with the norms o f our institution, for instance. So, in this 
sense, the construal o f sophrosyne as ‘keeper o f phronesis’ conforms quite well to a 
notion o f ‘prudence’, in that the phronimos needs to exercise some degree o f 
circumspection if  he is to be free to assist others. I shall thus use ‘practical wisdom’ 
for phronesis. (ii) Skills are not the same as virtues but are the means by which the 
virtues are operationalised.97 Techne is thus aligned with Ryle’s ‘knowing how’,98 an 
example o f which might be the technical knowledge o f the shoemaker, who also needs
95 This term is used in preference to ‘scientific’ to avoid the possibility of confusion with modern 
empirical science.
96 Blake calls prudence a ‘rich, ugly old maid courted by incapacity’ in A.C. Grayling (2001) The 
Meaning of Things (London: Phoenix) p.41. Blake’s definition comes into play in later chapters. I 
intend a similar meaning -  that is a shrewd self-interest -  when using the word ‘prudential’.
97 Some virtues do not seem to require skills to take effect: for example charity and chastity.
98 Gilbert Ryle (1949) The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson) p.30.
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specific skills (such as the manual dexterity required for the accurate cutting o f leather) 
in order to operationalise this know-how. Thus, phronesis and techne will be thought 
o f as ‘practical wisdom’ and ‘technical reason/rationality’ respectively. The latter 
phrase is sometimes rendered ‘craft’, as in ‘the craft o f the classroom’ -  like the ‘art o f 
the angler’. (Incidentally, the translations I have rejected represent concepts that are 
prominent in much recent educational legislation and government discourse in the 
West in recent times, which promote the model o f the teacher as a prudent master of 
pedagogical technical skills.)
Although they are associated with the mundane fields o f contingency, action and 
making (rather than the rarefied, Platonic realm o f theory in which the world is seen as 
a distraction) phronesis and techne are both nevertheless to be regarded as intellectual 
virtues, housed in the rational portion o f the mind. They also exert some influence on 
at least part of the irrational area of the mind, and hence have some moral import -  in 
much the same way as a father has a role in the moral welfare o f his son. The 
strongest candidate for this paternalistic role is phronesis, the target o f which is 
beneficial action, rather than techne, which concerns itself with making (not o f itself a 
moral action).
The key difference between the two worldly (or practical) virtues is the relative 
importance of the activities associated with each virtue -  considered for their own sake 
-  compared with the outcomes o f these activities. Techne informs poiesis (productive 
activity), and phronesis is associated with praxis (beneficial social activity). In the 
case o f  techne, any value it has lies in the products o f the resultant activity, whereas for 
phronesis, the resultant activity is a valued end in itself. As Aristotle puts it: 
because, o f  Making, something beyond itself is always the object, but [this] cannot be 
[so] of Doing, because the very well-doing is in itself an end’ (NE , 1140b3).99 DP 
Chase’s (1847) translation o f poiesis and praxis as ‘making’ and ‘doing’, respectively, 
can be illustrated well by our modem distinction between ‘making lunch’ and the 
colloquial ‘doing lunch’. The former typically issues in an identifiable product on a 
plate as a separate end, while the latter is a social activity whose end is simply the act 
o f  lunching sociably. Cooking is a poiesis informed by techne whose end-product is 
food, while social dining can be a praxis informed by phronesis, with no distinct end-
99 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk.VI (tr. DP Chase, 1847) (London: Walter Scott Limited). Chase 
translates phronesis as ‘good sense’.
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product beyond the activity itself.
The paradigm case o f the bearer of techne is the shoemaker, whose poiesis results in 
shoes. The good resides in the poiema -  the shoe itself -  rather than in the productive 
activity from which they issued. In the limiting case, one would wish for a transfer o f 
techne into poiemata without going to the trouble o f manufacture. A process which 
somehow transformed knowledge directly into useful products without any 
intermediate production stage would be highly desirable. We would not mourn the loss 
o f poiesis. In industrial manufacture, an efficient transformation o f ideas into products 
is sought, so the time and energy expended on productive activity is to be minimised.
In contrast with the case of techne, it is the activity with which phronesis is associated 
-  praxis -  in which value resides, rather than the outcomes o f  the activity. Living the 
good life in a community setting is an end in itself, and any durable products o f this 
activity are less important than the activity per se. As in the case o f  techne, the 
artefacts are only o f value insofar as they support the good life. However, unlike 
techne, in which the action stage is merely a tiresome way o f achieving the desired 
productive ends, the praxis with which phronesis is involved is indispensable; indeed, 
it is its raison d ’etre. During praxis, the phronimos is able to develop excellences 
characteristic o f the good life and use these for the benefit o f others in the community. 
Because o f the contingent nature o f this enterprise, however, the outcomes cannot be 
predicted in advance (as they must be for the techne-poiesis system, in the form o f an 
eidos or plan), so it is to be regarded not as a process o f phronesis controlling praxis to 
arrive at a predetermined end but rather as a continual dialogue between thought and 
action, in which the ends can change. Praxis is not caused by phronesis (as poiesis is 
caused by techne) but is in a dialogical relationship with it. This, it is stressed, is a 
dialogical and not a dialectical relationship, for there is no definitive and final 
resolution, but an ongoing interplay between phronesis and praxis, characterised by 
mutual influence and feedback loops mediated by the attunement o f the phronimos to 
the particulars o f the situation upon which his phronesis is being brought to bear.
Now considering episteme alongside techne and phronesis, this notion o f causation 
(mutual or otherwise) can be used as a way o f  analysing the thought-action
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relationship. Episteme is not the sort o f thing which could cause action, being a rather 
rarefied, Platonic class of knowledge. As Ryle puts it, in attacking what he terms the 
‘intellectualist legend’: ‘Intelligent practice is not a step-child o f theory’.100 Techne, on 
the other hand, clearly is a type o f knowledge, or virtuous disposition, which can issue 
in productive action, and the thought-action relationship is largely one-way. Thus, 
intelligent making is a step-child of technical reason. Granted, the vagaries o f the 
materials used may cause some feedback to the artisan and prompt him to modify his 
technique, but production typically relies on technical knowledge to achieve fixed ends, 
so such modification is merely compensatory and not a radical departure from the 
eidos. Phronesis also leads to action, but the relationship in this case is more one o f 
interdependence than one o f simple causation. Phronesis informs praxis, but phronesis 
is in turn informed by the contingencies of praxis. Moreover, the process is not one of 
pursuing fixed ends or producing durable outcomes, but a continually-shifting interplay 
between ideas and action calculated to maintain, and redefine, the flourishing 
(eudaimonia) o f those involved.
Having examined Aristotle’s analysis o f the virtues in some detail, we return to an 
inheritor and developer o f this tradition: Linda Zagzebski.
Z agzebski on the Developm ent o f Intellectual V irtue in the A gent
Zagzebski departs from Aristotle’s analysis o f the intellectual and moral virtues in a 
number o f  significant respects. Aristotle, as described above, sees the intellectual and 
moral virtues as being very different. Although they are both classes o f acquired 
excellences, they have different origins: instruction in the case o f the intellectual aretai 
and habit in the case o f the moral. Furthermore, they reside in different parts o f the 
soul: the rational and the irrational, respectively. The intellectual virtues are divided 
into two types: the practical and the theoretical.
Zagzebski takes issue with such an analysis o f the different adiologies o f the 
intellectual and moral virtues, claiming, pace Aristotle, that the intellectual virtues are 
acquired by the very same process as are the moral virtues. Her line on this seems
100 Ryle, op. cit., p.26.
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highly plausible, and we may suspect that Aristotle is wrong to conflate teaching with 
instruction and to see it entirely as a techne or ars demonstrandi.101 As well as direct 
teaching qua instruction, teachers sometimes arrange things so that learners can in a 
sense ‘invent’ or construct their own knowledge, skills and intellectual virtues.
Zagzebski, contra Aristotle, argues that the journey towards intellectual virtue is 
parallel to that towards moral virtue. By cultivating the intellectual virtues, we are in a 
position to acquire knowledge. First is a stage o f imitation o f virtuous persons. By 
practice and habituation, and the overcoming of akrasia (weakness o f will), both the 
intellectual and the moral virtues are gradually acquired and internalised. She takes the 
paradigm example to be the acquisition o f the moral virtue o f courage, as described by 
Aristotle, to illustrate this. By imitating a courageous person, one gradually develops 
both the feelings associated with courage and the ability to identify those occasions on 
which courageous action is required. But, Aristotle asserts, there is an intermediate 
stage at which the agent knows what to do but suffers from akrasia and is thus unable 
to do the virtuous thing. Self-control may later enable the tyro person o f courage to 
perform ‘acts o f courage’ (with the emphasis on the acts) but these cannot be said to be 
‘courageous acts’ (with the emphasis on the virtue) since there is a degree o f having to 
resist contrary temptations. Eventually, however, truly courageous acts are performed 
because the ‘firm and unchangeable character’ o f the virtue -  courage -  is now fully 
acquired.
A parallel case to this acquisition of moral virtue by imitation, habituation and 
internalisation is set out for intellectual virtue by Zagzebski (pace Aristotle, who, we 
saw, maintains that the intellectual virtues are acquired by instruction). She lists 
examples o f the intellectual virtues: ‘... intellectual carefulness, perseverance, humility, 
vigor, flexibility, courage ... open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, insightfulness ... [and] 
... intellectual integrity’ as well as ‘ ... the virtues opposed to wishful thinking, 
obtuseness and conformity’ ( VOM, p. 155). Zagzebski does not claim that her list is 
exhaustive, nor that all of the intellectual virtues are Aristotelian means between 
extremes. Nevertheless, it is clear that at least some intellectual virtues can be 
identified as the midpoint between two vices. Let us return to Aristotle for a moment.
101 ] Lake the latter term from Edmund Husserl, who ‘.. .distinguished between the search for the truth 
that he called "ars irtveniendi" and the exposition and verification of the truth which he called “ars 
d e m o rts tra n d rAlexandra Giuculescu (1998) ‘The Leibnitzian dimension of Husserl’s 
phenomenology’, Analectia Husserliana, vol.LIl, bk.l, p. 107.
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He talks of courage simpliciter as destroyed by excess and deficiency and preserved 
by the mean’, and spells this out in the following way:
The man who shuns and fears everything and stands up to nothing becomes a 
coward; the man who is afraid of nothing at all, but marches up to every danger, 
becomes foolhardy. [NE, 1104a20-26)
Similarly, intellectual courage, if  seen through an Aristotelian lens, could thus be 
considered as the mean between intellectual rashness and intellectual cowardice. One 
might be overly thorough in amassing evidence or, at the other extreme, jump to 
conclusions too quickly: a distinction which Zagzebski also makes. Acquiring the 
disposition to find this proper midpoint reliably takes time and is context-dependent.
For example, we might feel that a medical researcher, deciding whether or not to 
publish details o f a new treatment, ought to take this decision by means o f a reasoning 
process which is neither rash (thus potentially hazardous) nor cowardly (thus depriving 
patients o f a possible cure) -  a process in which good judgement occasioned by 
phronesis will be indispensable. If we apply Zagzebski’s -  as opposed to Aristotle’s -  
account o f intellectual virtue-acquisition to our scenario, it can be seen that the trainee 
researcher would be able to begin the acquisition o f intellectual courage by imitating 
more experienced members of the research team (rather than by being directly 
instructed by them as to what intellectual courage consists in). However, akrasia 
would allow the trainee rashly to believe things which he knew he ought not to believe, 
since they were not in fact warranted by adequate empirical evidence. Checks and 
balances such as research protocols, peer-group influence and legislation would, 
however, usually prevent the outcomes o f such intellectual rashness from making it 
into print. Nevertheless, the researcher might continue to believe his unwarranted 
conclusions, whether published or not.
The next stage is one of ‘intellectual self-control’ in which ‘a person has to stop 
[himself] from accepting inadequate evidence ... or lapsing into ways o f which [he] 
disapproves (VO M p. 155).’ Now, our researcher believes only that which is not the 
product o f rash reasoning, but he has to work hard at maintaining this disposition and 
may even overcompensate by being unduly careful and unnecessarily repetitive. He 
still lacks the virtue of intellectual courage, however, for his ‘... behaviour may be 
correct, but it is not grounded in a “firm and unchangeable character” , as Aristotle 
characterises the person who truly possesses virtue’ [VOM, p. 155].
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In the final stage, our exemplary researcher internalises the virtue and embodies the 
courageous scientist who is neither rash nor cowardly qua medical researcher, and who 
reliably knows when the evidence is good enough to publish. He shows good 
judgement in not publishing if  there is still sufficient doubt to identify the protection o f 
patients as being the over-riding concern, but does publish for the sake o f these same 
patients when the potential benefits outweigh the remaining risks. Phronesis will be a 
vital part of these reasoning processes, since it enables this happy medium to be found.
Running alongside this proposed development o f intellectual virtue by imitation, 
habituation and internalisation, are changes in the affective stance o f the epistemic 
agent towards belief-formation. Not only does the virtuous person do the right thing 
for the right reason, he takes pleasure in doing so. Zagzebski quotes Aristotle on this: 
‘The man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would 
call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly ... ’ {VOM, footnote, p. 151). The 
translation I use gives ‘rejoice’ as ‘delight’, again capturing the notion that enjoyment 
is part o f  virtuous action.102 We see that these assertions concerning the joy, delight 
and delectability of virtuous actions are o f a piece with Aristotle’s broader thesis that 
acting out o f virtue is partly constitutive o f eudaimonia, as well as being instrumental 
in achieving such flourishing.
Not everyone endorses this link between virtue and pleasure: for example, Kant and 
the Puritans both view mental anguish as a more fitting accompaniment to virtuous 
action. One ought, they feel, to wrestle with one’s baser instincts and defeat them in 
order to acquire credit -  a precursor of Freud’s description o f the superego taming the 
id. Kant’s Groundwork fo r  the Metaphysic o f  Morals identifies the touchstone o f 
actions with ‘genuine moral worth’103 to be their origin in a sense o f duty and most 
certainly not any ‘delight’ which might accompany them. Indeed, for Kant, such 
emotional rewards disbar the agent from any credit for his actions. However, there is
l02A view endorsed by Aquinas, in the Latin, that the virtues are ‘voluntarie el prompte et delectabiliter, 
et etiamfirmiter’. (Roughly: ‘Voluntary, ready, delightful and yet enduring). Sancti Thomae de Aquino, 
Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus, Textum Taurini ( 1953) editum ac automato translatum a Roberto 
Busa SJ in taenias magnéticas derno recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit. Quaestio II [66017] 
De virtutibus, q.2, a.2 co. [online] Available at: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdw2.html 
^Accessed 24 May, 2010],
Immanuel Kant (1785) Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Groundwork for the Metaphysic of 
Morals [tr. Jonathan Bennett, July 2005 Last amended: September 2008] p.9 [Online] Available at: 
http:/7www.earlymodemtexts.com/pdfAantgw.pdf [Accessed 24 May, 2010].
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something appealing in our chronology o f a medical researcher, developing in both the 
intellectual and the affective domains such that he eventually acquires the reliable habit 
o f  taking the right epistemic action for the right reason and delighting in doing so. (1 
recognise that our finding this idea ‘appealing’ would disqualify it from being a 
virtuous response in Kant’s eyes.) Note that at no point does our medical researcher 
behave in a wicked way, for this would require a vicious motive. He merely (i) allows 
his intellectual incontinence to compromise his epistemic acts, up to the point that (ii) 
his akrasia is overcome and he can be merely continent, until (hi) he eventually 
becomes authentically virtuous, taking the right epistemic action with relish.
Our example o f the medical researcher also segues nicely into an intellectual activity 
identified by Zagzebski as missing from Aristotle’s account of the operations of the 
soul: ‘grasping the contingent’ in the theoretical realm ( VOM, p,214). In Aristotle’s 
scheme, the contingent only arises in the case o f the practical virtues, as the theoretical 
virtues concern themselves only with the necessary and eternal.
However, contemporary notions o f enquiry are not so strongly linked to the unveiling 
o f necessary truths. Our post-Popper notion o f science, for example, is one o f a 
weaving o f webs o f provisional theories, which may have to be re-spun in the light o f 
new evidence, and not the Aristotelian contemplation of eternal verities. There is no 
place in Aristotle’s scheme for this notion o f provisionality: to him theoretical 
knowledge cannot be contingent in nature. To some extent, the omission is forced 
upon Aristotle by his commitment to a division o f the soul into rational and irrational 
parts and its further subdivision into (i) a section that which deals with sublunary, 
contingent matters and (ii) another which contemplates the necessary, eternal and 
invariable.
Zagzebski rightly points out, though, that Aristotle is not ontologically committed to a 
divided soul, for, as I mentioned earlier (p.54), he compares the divisions to the convex 
and concave aspects o f a circle {NE bk. 1, 1102a30), suggesting a picture more o f unity 
than o f partition. Zagzebski makes interesting use o f this ontological uncertainty (or 
‘permeability’ as I have named it) in Aristotle’s account o f the division o f the soul,
She suggests that many moral virtues have an intellectual correlative: for example, the 
‘intellectual courage’ we discussed earlier.
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However, her claim that the intellectual virtues are merely a subset o f the moral virtues 
is not as convincing. In particular, her conjecture that ‘at the deepest level the moral 
and intellectual virtues arise from the same motivation, perhaps a love o f being in 
general’ (VOM, p. 167) is not adequately supported in the text. Granted, the intellectual 
virtue o fphronesis seems to be indispensable for making the right decision and acting 
at the behest o f the right virtue, at the right point between vicious extremes, in the 
moral sphere. But moral considerations do not negate knowledge qua knowledge, 
rather than knowledge as a precursor to some moral good, and it is a commonplace 
observation that clever people are not always morally good, nor morally outstanding 
people always clever.
Zagzebski deals with this latter obvious objection in two ways. The first is by 
claiming that a knowledgeable person may well also be immoral, but that there is a 
higher epistemic value, namely wisdom, and that ‘it is at least surprising, perhaps even 
incoherent, to say that a wise person is immoral’ (VOM, p.23). To Zagzebski, the 
holistic, integrative character of wisdom prevents it from being misused in the way 
available to the mere collector of atomistic propositional knowledge. The second way 
is to explain that virtuous individuals are less then perfect, so it is common for them to 
possess some virtues to a greater extent than others: for example, someone could be 
kind but not courageous ( VOM, p .156). We might visualise this as a sort o f  bar-chart 
or profile which shows the relative distribution o f the various virtues in a person. So, 
we accept a range o f strengths amongst a person’s various virtues within the moral 
sphere, without drawing the conclusion that some must therefore be o f a radically- 
different type. Thus, an individual’s being low in moral virtue and high in intellectual 
virtue (or vice versa) does not damage Zagzebski’s thesis that all the virtues are 
essentially moral; it merely shows that, in the absence o f perfection, differences in 
what we might term ‘virtue-profiles’ will obtain. Earlier, we saw that Frankena classes 
aretaic judgements as scalar (p.49). Scalar quantities have a magnitude -  as opposed 
to binary distinctions such as deontic judgements, or vector quantities which have 
magnitude and direction -  so an agent may be more or less virtuous on a range of 
virtues.
Aristotle, o f course, has a more stringent requirement for virtue, but Zagzebski argues 
against his ‘unity o f the virtues’ thesis. If  we return to the Nicomachean Ethics, we see
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Flourishing as a Unifying Principle
that not only does Aristotle require the virtuous person to possess all the virtues fully 
(that is, precisely not to have a virtue ‘profile’), he also puts the intellectual virtue of 
phronesis in prime position: ‘the possession o f the single virtue o f practical wisdom 
will carry with it the possession o f them all.’104 This is o f a piece with Zagzebski’s 
giving phronesis the key role o f mediating] between and among the whole range of 
moral and intellectual virtues’ ( VOM, xiv), and her accepting this weakens her case for 
the superiority o f the moral, since phronesis is an intellectual virtue. Clearly there are 
links between the two types -  the moral and the intellectual -  but it seems to me that 
Zagzebski’s attempt to bring them all into the moral tent is unhelpful. We may think 
that she is guilty of a category mistake in conflating Aristotle’s two different uses o f 
the word ‘virtue’ in this way, for the virtues o f book 6 o f his Nicomachean Ethics are 
to be categorised as rational not moral excellences. There are analytic advantages in 
demarcating the two types o f virtue clearly and not blurring the boundaries any more 
than necessary. If some unifying feature of the Aristotelian virtues -  both moral and 
intellectual -  is sought, we need look no further than their instrumental and 
constitutive role in the flourishing o f the individual. Zagzebski does not take this 
eudaimonian line, however, preferring a motivation-based approach instead. She does, 
though, as we saw, make the claim that the motivation underlying all o f the virtues 
might be ‘a love of being in general’ {VOM, p. 167), so this is at least compatible with a 
model premissed on flourishing.
Conclusions of Chapter 1
Sosa’s and Zagzebski’s construals o f epistemic virtue each have their own distinctive 
merits. Between them, they set the agenda for subsequent work in virtue 
epistemology. As we shall see, the field o f virtue epistemology has also much to offer 
the project o f education, and the two poles they represent -  virtue reliabilism and 
virtue responsibilism -  contribute to it in different ways.
Sosa’s version encourages a target-orientated consequentialist approach, in which the 
reliable hitting o f true propositions -  by using our epistemic skills and faculties -  is the 
chief principle. His work would clearly have much appeal for technicists in the field 
o f education. Its structural features allow an encoding in symbolic logic and, as we
104 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1145a3. 1 have replaced the translator’s version ‘prudence’ with 
‘practical wisdom', for the reasons given earlier.
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shall see, the making o f links with some recent work in artificial intelligence.
However, this work turns out to raise questions concerning a number of assumptions 
underlying village technical rationality. In particular, the means-ends reasoning and 
the preoccupation with efficiency of such technicism are seen to lead to an 
oversimplified and na'ive model of teaching and learning. I shall later elaborate on this 
(p. 178) to show that too direct a targeting o f true proposition p  can lead to a class of 
propositions, ~p, being inadvisedly ignored, and thus to an unvirtuous, non-creditable 
process o f passive belief-revision with insufficient tethering either to reality or to the 
rest o f  the learner’s doxastic web.
Zagzebksi’s variety o f virtue epistemology contains a fuller description o f the various 
epistemic virtues and vices and hence is more easily translatable than Sosa’s writings 
into educational desiderata. Although she still endorses the truth-conduciveness 
requirement for epistemic virtue that Sosa’s work posits, she places an emphasis on 
virtuous motivation and not just on reliable outcomes.
Two groups o f virtues identified by Zagzebski form a starting point for two thesis 
chapters on aspects of intellectual virtue which are highly pertinent to teaching and 
learning. The first concerns the use made by epistemic agents o f testimony, the related 
virtues being described by her as ‘being able to recognise reliable authority’ (VOM, 
p. 114), and ‘Trust is a mean between gullibility and suspiciousness’ (VOM, p. 160).
The second group involves what we might term ‘other-regarding intellectual virtue’ -  
‘fairness in evaluating the arguments of others’ (VOM, p. 114) -  and ‘the teaching 
virtues -  the social virtues o f being communicative, including intellectual candor and 
knowing your audience and how they respond’ (VOM, p .114).
We are reminded here o f Sosa’s injunction that we ought to 1 ... give due weight not 
only to the subject and his intrinsic nature but also to his environment and his epistemic 
community.’105 To do so would involve a consideration o f  the contribution that the 
giving and receiving o f testimony and the presence o f other-regarding epistemic virtue 
in the social world make to the amelioration of the individual’s epistemic predicament. 
Good testifiers are important in this epistemic ecology: to be ‘knowledgeable’ is to be a 
reliable source o f information, a creditable attribute, indicating the desirability o f such 
epistemic trustworthiness to the highly social species Homo sapiens. I shall elaborate
tos Sosa (1980) op. cit., p. 160.
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from these clues o f Zagzebski and Sosa -  which they themselves leave largely 
undeveloped -  in the following chapters on ‘Testimony’ and ‘Other-regarding Virtue’: 
two epistemic features which are clearly crucial to education.
6 5
Chapter 2 - Knowledge and Testimony
Introduction
Testimony is an important source o f beliefs in a large number o f contexts, including 
that o f education (even though the word does not often appear during educational 
discussions).106 Since much that is believed by individuals has come to them not from 
direct experience but by accepting the accounts o f others, the trustworthiness of their 
interlocutors’ testimonies, whether these be spoken, textual or electronic in form, is an 
important factor in determining whether or not they acquire true, justified beliefs. 
Testimonial trustworthiness is a combination o f competence and sincerity, and both of 
these tend to be high when a teacher testifies in her area o f expertise. Because, in the 
world beyond the classroom, there are situations in which the competence or sincerity 
o f the testifier is low, however, it is important that the learner acquires an 
epistemically-virtuous, well-attuned disposition towards testimony. In this chapter, I 
consider ways in which untrustworthy testifying can lead the epistemic agent astray, 
and also defend testimony’s role as an important source o f knowledge.
Our knowledge is testimony-saturated to a considerable degree, including such 
apparently personal knowledge as our own name and date o f birth, factual knowledge 
such as the heliocentric solar system and everyday knowledge such as the current US 
President being Barack Obama. Neither is apparently ‘direct’ experience free of 
testimonial influence, for experience rarely comes to us unmediated by theory (in the 
loose sense o f the word) but is filtered and coloured by what we have already heard and 
read about similar things, events and phenomena. Even the most solitary scientist, 
gathering data in the laboratory, relies on the labels on the reagent bottles, the 
graduations on the meters and the periodic table o f the elements on the wall. As Hume 
puts it:
... there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful and even necessary
to human life than that which is derived from the testimony of men and the reports
100 The notion of teaching as testifying is an under-explored one, to say the least. In the literature, the 
only significant discussion of the concept relates to Holocaust education, in which the testifier is a 
survivor of genocide rather than the regular teacher. One analysis draws on Levinas’ distinction between 
a ‘saying’ and a ‘said’: ‘Contemplating the accuracy and historical significance of a testimony is a 
response to its “said”. Attending to the translative, performative moment of testimony is a response to its 
“saying”’. Roger Simon & Claudia Eppert (1997) ‘Remembering Obligation: Pedagogy and the 
Witnessing of Testimony of Historical Trauma’, Canadian Journal of Education, 22, 2, pp. 175-191,
P-179.
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However, this view is at odds with much o f the Western philosophical tradition, and 
Hume himself places several restrictions on the legitimate use of testimony, as we shall 
later see (p.75).
Be that as it may, this dependence on testimony is exceptionally marked during 
childhood and other periods o f new learning, so an analysis o f testifying and auditing 
is, I feel, particularly relevant to the virtue epistemology o f education. In this chapter, I 
conduct such an analysis and show that attacks on testimony as a legitimate source of 
knowledge are ultimately self-defeating, leaving testimony in its rightful place 
alongside perception, memory and reasoning. Doing this shifts the centre o f gravity o f 
epistemology away from the individual knower and towards the epistemic community 
at large: the place where both Sosa, and particularly Zagzebski, would locate him. A 
picture emerges o f a social ly-enwebbed epistemic agent, rather than an autonomous 
knower, with a Quinean web of belief which does not reduce to a list o f individual 
propositions. To identify some links with virtue epistemology and education, I view 
testimony through the lenses of Zagzebski’s and Sosa’s versions of virtue epistemology 
and carry out an initial examination of the relationship between testimony and one 
aspect o f learning: acquiring a first language.
Historical and Contemporary Philosophical Stances towards Testimony
I shall first set out the critical arguments o f some major figures in the Western tradition 
who have historically taken a dim view o f testimony as a path to the truth, and then 
discuss the contemporary philosophy of testimony, which has largely rehabilitated it as 
a respectable knowledge-source. Anthony Coady’s (1992) book Testimony: A 
Philosophical Study, being the first philosophical work to deal exclusively with 
testimony, features prominently in the latter discussions.
Plato’s D ism issal o f Testim ony as a K now ledge-source
Plato dismisses testimony as a source of knowledge, on the whole. For example, in 
Theceietus, through the voice of Socrates, he indicts ‘those paragons o f intellect known
107 David Hume (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I, Classics o f 
Western Philosophy [ed. Steven Cahn] (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1999), p.672.
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of eyewitnesses and spectators.107
as orators and lawyers’ for ‘making people believe what they want them to believe’,108 
without giving them knowledge. The fact that true belief may on occasion be 
transmitted by such testimony does not convince Plato that knowledge too is conveyed.
In the Republic, he asserts that testimony does not even commonly deal with true 
belief, let alone full-blown knowledge. The testimony o f the prisoners in the cave of 
book VII, for instance, is considered to be worthless, in that they mistakenly believe 
they are ‘naming the passing objects’,109 when these ‘objects’ are in fact only flickering 
images on the cave wall; or they erroneously attribute the voice o f a passer-by echoing 
from the wall to a ‘passing shadow’. Elsewhere, anticipating the sceptical doubts o f 
Descartes (which follow from Descartes’ considering the possibility o f a hallucination- 
producing genium malignum), Socrates tells Theaetetus that ‘dreams and disorders, 
especially madness’, lead to ‘false perceptions’ and that ‘so far from it being true that 
what appears to any man also is, on the contrary none o f these appearances is real’.110 
I f  perception is not a reliable source of knowledge, for we cannot guarantee that we are 
awake and sane, then the second-hand deliverances o f testimony seem to be even less 
valuable, prima facie.
This is of a piece with Plato’s suspicion o f any earthly candidates for knowledge; a 
suspicion that follows from his idealist epistemology. To him the only legitimate 
knowledge is that o f the supra-mundane Forms. Even this rarefied knowledge is out of 
reach o f most mortals, either directly or via testimony: ‘Only a man o f exceptional 
gifts ... will be able to see that a Form ... exists’. 111 All o f this seems to add up to an 
unequivocal rejection of testimony-giving and testimony-receiving as justifiable 
doxastic processes, and indeed this is the standard characterisation o f Plato’s stance by 
philosophers writing on testimony.
Coady, for example, labels Plato a ‘Puritan’ vis-à-vis his response to testimony.
Setting aside the anachronism, we can challenge this labelling o f Plato and elaborate a 
more nuanced view. Coady holds that, for Plato, ‘epistemic salvation lies in 
philosophical reflection and the contemplation o f the Forms’,112 and not in the
108 Plato, Thecetetus, 201.
1M Plato, Republic, 515b.
110 Plato, Theastetus, 157e -  158.
111 Plato, Parmenides, 135b.
1,2 C.A.J. Coady (1992) Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p.22.
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establishment of beliefs from perception nor in their acquisition from testimony (the 
latter being particularly suspect). Although we can concur with Coady that this is 
largely the case in Plato’s writings, we see, however, that there are places where 
perceptually-derived knowledge is regarded as legitimate, and passages where even 
testimony has an important role. The man who has actually been to Larissa can, for 
Plato, justly claim to know the way to Larissa,113 for example (in contrast to the person 
who judges the way correctly but has never followed that route before, and so has a 
true belief which falls short of being knowledge). This we recognise as a clear instance 
o f  a perceptually-sourced true belief being endorsed as knowledge by Plato.
We can also identify a pervasive performative contradiction in Plato’s works that 
somewhat undermines his espoused opposition to testimony. The dialogues are full of 
details about the participants (for example, that Meno is a ‘spoiled boy’ and blessed 
with ‘good looks’, which Socrates ‘can never resist’) ,114 leaving the reader wondering 
if Plato really wishes us to ignore his testimony and restrict our attention solely to that 
which he deems to be important: the Forms. However, by the very act o f including 
such testimony, and not ironically undermining it as epistemically suspect, Plato is 
implicitly advocating its use. Furthermore, the testimony o f Socrates’ companions is 
taken seriously, and even assisted in its delivery by maieutic methods (see, for 
example, Thecetetus 149-152), to be subsequently tested by elenchus,115 in the hope that 
the dialogue will enable Socrates to acquire knowledge from testimony.
The fact that this project never reaches a satisfactory outcome but is nevertheless 
repeated again and again, shows not a scepticism about testimony but a confidence that 
if  knowledge can be acquired, it will come from a robust examination o f the testimony 
of others. Combining testimony with the rigorous exercise o f reason can yield 
knowledge. That this is difficult is in no doubt, but Plato even allows ‘someone still 
more remarkable [than the ‘man o f exceptional gifts’] to discover it and to instruct 
another . . . ’. ' 16 The ‘it’ in question here is knowledge o f a Form, so this is a case o f
113 Plato, Meno, 91-91b.
114 Plato, Meno, 76b-c,
115 The root meaning of ‘elenchus' relates to shame according to Paul Woodruff (1998) ‘Socratic 
Education’, Amélie Rorty [ed.] Philosophers on Education (London: Routledge) p.29. In Socrates’ case, 
this involved him in acting as a midwife (maieutikos) and then examining carefully the beliefs he had 
helped his companion to ‘deliver’, by means of a relentless, forensic questioning (elenchus). This would 
typically lead to a shamefaced admission by the companion that his putative knowledge was unfit to 
survive.
116 Plato, Pannenides, 135b.
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knowledge o f the most abstract type (but, to Plato, the only real type) being conveyed 
by testimony. Thus, although Plato sets the bar notoriously high for knowledge, he 
does not claim that its acquisition or its distribution via testimony are impossible. He 
does, however, require of us that we make a careful examination and attempted rebuttal 
of putative knowledge derived from the testimony of our interlocutors. In this respect, 
we can consider Plato’s position to be at one end o f a spectrum of approaches to 
testimony; the other end being occupied by those (such as Coady) who demand no such 
checks before accepting testimony as knowledge.
Descartes’ and Locke’s Dismissal 
Descartes is dismissive o f books which are:
further removed from the truth than the simple inferences which a man of good 
sense using his natural and unprejudiced judgement draws respecting the matters of 
his experience.117
He places his faith on direct access to knowledge by the individual knower’s 
intellectual recognition of its signature o f  clarity and distinctness, via ‘natural’ acts o f 
reasoning which are underwritten by a non-deceiving God. We are, according to 
Descartes, on shaky ground when we try to build upon the ‘loose earth and sand’ of 
received opinion, rather than on firm rock illuminated by the light o f our own 
individual God-given reason. We are all at the mercy o f these second-hand opinions 
when young, however, and this inevitability o f our childhood dependence on those 
whom Descartes terms ‘preceptors’ prompts his plaintive comment that:
... it is almost impossible that our judgements can be so correct or solid as they 
would have been had our reason been mature from the moment of our birth, and 
had we always been guided by it alone.118
This theme o f unexamined ‘knowledge’ gained in childhood being suspect but 
indispensable is an important one in contemporary discussions o f testimony. Whether 
or not the default setting o f trusting -  some would say gullible -  acceptance o f 
testimony ought to continue into adulthood is a key debate in this area. Finding the 
right route between the Charybdis of credulity and the Scylla of suspicion is a task for 
an epistemically sophisticated agent.
117 René Descartes (1637) Discourse on Method [tr. John Veitch, 1902] Everyman Edition, 1946 
(London: J.M. Dent), Part II, p.l 1.
118 Descartes (1637) op. cit., p.l 1.
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Despite his espoused faith in reason and his method of hyperbolic doubt, Descartes 
rather undermines his own project when he states his intention to adhere ‘firmly to the 
faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been educated since childhood’.119 Since this 
was acquired largely from the testimony o f his elders and teachers, perhaps together 
with an innate sensus divinitatis, we may find such stipulated immunity from sceptical 
attack to be a little surprising.120 On a more general level, if Descartes wishes us to 
ignore texts and make up our own minds about things by using the natural light o f 
reason, with which we are each individually endowed, we might wonder what his 
motive is in adding another volume to the pile of books we are to disregard.
Where Plato is suspicious o f testimony, seeking epistemic salvation in contemplation of 
the Forms, and Descartes urges us to ignore the testimony o f books and be guided by 
individual reason alone, Locke harbours similar misgivings but places his trust in first­
hand empirical examination or -  in the case of ‘rational and contemplative knowledge’
-  in ‘the fountain’, that is, in our own individual thoughts.121
The only testimony in which Locke has any faith is the ‘testimony’ o f his senses, 
particularly that o f sight: ‘... the greatest assurance I can possibly have ... is the 
testimony o f my eyes’.122 He warns those who wish to know against the dangers o f 
‘lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominions o f others.’ Any ‘borrowed 
wealth’ thus acquired is ‘like fairy-money’, which has the appearance o f gold but turns 
into ‘leaves and dust when it comes to use’. A widely-quoted dismissal o f the 
epistemic value o f testimony is Locke’s assertion that:
The floating of other men’s opinion in our own brains makes us not one jot the 
more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science is in us 
butopiniatrety,..12'1
This sounds like an echo o f Plato’s injunctions against accepting the word o f the 
‘paragons o f intellect’ in the Thecetetus, as we heard earlier (p.68) and here too the 
testifier may be providing the auditor with true beliefs but not knowledge. However,
119 Descartes (1637), op. cit., p. 19.
120 It becomes less surprising when we put this together with his deferential words about the church 
authorities having ‘condemned a certain doctrine in physics’ (that is, Galileo’s) and can thus read his 
pro-faith comments as an insurance against similar condemnation.
121 John Locke (1706) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Penguin Books, 1997)
bk.I, ch.IV, §23.
122 Locke (1706) op. cit., bk.1V, ch.XI, §2.
123 Locke (1706) op. cit., bk.I, ch.IV, §22 -  23.
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Locke’s strong stance against testimony needs to be set in the context of his political 
allegiances and agenda. The Essay is firmly pro  empiricist, and contra both ‘nativist’ 
claims to knowledge (that is, antenatally-endowed knowledge, exemplified by Plato’s 
theory o f learning as merely remembering truths acquired during the soul’s multiple 
flirtings between the Earth and Hades [anamnesis ]124) and also reliance on the 
testimony o f others. There are a number o f reasons for Locke to take this line, 
including his expressed fears that ‘blind credulity’ towards ‘some doctrines’ might 
make men ‘be more easily governed’.125 Like Plato, Locke is suspicious o f ‘rhetoric’ 
and ‘oratory’, for these, he declares, ‘are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, 
move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgem ent... ’.126 Even when the 
testimony is sincere, there are still dangers, for: ‘Passion, interest, inadvertency, 
mistake o f his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons, or capriccios ... may make one 
man quote another m an’s words or meanings wrong’.127
Locke’s rejection of testimony as a route to knowledge seems just as clear-cut as 
Plato’s, but again, upon closer examination, things turn out not to be so definite. The 
general objection can once more be levelled, as it can against Plato and Descartes, that 
if we are to accept a rejection o f testimony as a source o f knowledge, then what, we 
may ask, is the author’s purpose in offering his own testimony? What does he hope we 
shall gain by reading his works? Granted, much o f these philosophical texts consists o f 
argument and explanation, but both Plato and Locke tell anecdotes which we must 
ignore and which they must excise on pain o f incoherence. For, if  they want to show 
that testimony is worthless as a source o f  knowledge, they should take care to exclude 
any testimony from their own works, unless this is intended merely for ornamentation 
and not for serious knowledge-conducive purposes.
It is clear, however, that Locke does in fact accept testimony, provided that it comes 
from sources o f  which he approves.128 For example, to illustrate a thesis about personal 
identity, he offers a little vignette concerning a parrot which, towards the end o f a
124 Plato, Meno.
125 Locke (1706) Essay, bk.I, ch.II, §24. These ‘doctrines’ which allegedly lead to subjugation, I take to 
be Catholic orthodoxies, given Locke’s opposition to James II and support of William of Orange.
Indeed, Locke excoriates the ‘intelligent Romanist’ for being ‘prepared easily to swallow ... against... 
the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine of transubstantiation'. Locke (1706) ibid., bk.IV ch.XX 
§10. Italics in original.
f26 Locke, (1706) ibid., bk.III, ch.X, §34.
127 Locke (1706) ibid., bk.IV, ch.XVI, §11.
28 These sources turn out to be non-Catholic, and preferably Royalist too.
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remarkably human-like conversation, answered a Prince’s question, “Vous gardez les 
poulesT ' with the reply, “Otri, moi et je  sais bien fa ire”, and then, ‘made the chuck four 
or five times that people use to make to chickens when they call them’.129 The source 
o f Locke’s quotations is Sir William Temple,130 who in turn claimed to have heard the 
story from a Prince Maurice, who had translated the parrot’s speech into French from 
the parrot’s original ‘Brazilian’ language via a ‘Dutchman that spoke Brazilian ... and 
... a Brazilian that spoke Dutch.’ Despite the implausibility of this testimony in itself, 
exacerbated by the long testimonial chain involving four languages, Locke nevertheless 
takes it seriously, since ‘we have a Prince’s word for it’. Similarly, in response to 
Edward Stillingfleet, the Bishop o f Worcester’s, questioning of the credibility o f some 
o f his sources, Locke assures the Bishop ‘that he whom I relied on for his testimony 
concerning the Hottentots o f Soldania, was no less a man than an Ambassador from the 
King o f England to the Great Mogul’.131
So, although Plato, Descartes and Locke pursue individualist agendas vis-à-vis 
knowledge -  which we can characterise to a first approximation as egocentric idealism, 
egocentric rationalism and egocentric empiricism respectively -  they are unable to 
dispense entirely with an acceptance of some use of testimony, grudging though this 
be.
Hume’s Endorsement
Hume, on the other hand, is often portrayed as a philosopher who takes an opposing 
view to the general suspicion o f testimony that Plato, Descartes and Locke typify.
We saw this in the Hume quotation earlier in this chapter, in which reasoning based on 
testimony is claimed to be common, useful and necessary (p.67). However, two 
aspects o f Hume’s endorsement o f testimony as ‘necessary’ ought to be noted. The 
first is that he considers our reliance on testimony to be merely a practical necessity, 
having in fact only a probable, contingent relationship to the truth, not a ‘necessary’ 
one in the modal sense o f the word. The principle upon which trust in testimony is 
founded is, according to Hume, o f an inferential nature, for we draw upon our
129 Locke (1706) Essay, bk.II, ch.XXVII, §8.
130 MP for Carlow, Ambassador to The Hague, and friend of William of Orange, according to the name 
database, NNDB [online]. Available at: www.nndb.com [Accessed 10 March 2009]. The Prince in 
Temple’s story is Maurice of Nassau, another Prince of Orange, after whom Mauritania was named by 
Dutch explorers.
131 Locke (1706) op. cit., Appendix, Note B: Reference at I.iv.8.
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experience to hypothesise a ‘constant and regular conjunction’ between ‘facts’ and ‘the 
reports o f witnesses’.132 It is not an a priori principle but a theory o f human nature 
based on the empirical observation of regularities, and it is subject to a number of 
contra-indications which properly undermine our confidence in testimony in certain 
situations. These warning signs include a hesitant delivery o f testimony by the testifier, 
or, at the other extreme, too forceful an affirmation. The character o f a particular 
testifier needs also to be evaluated, as does the possibility o f  her having ‘an interest’ 
which compromises the sincerity of the testimony.
For all his talk o f the usefulness and necessity o f testimony, Hume is pessimistic about 
the reliability o f testifiers, complaining about the ‘bigotry, ignorance, cunning and 
roguery o f a great part o f mankind’.133 This, however, is part o f his thesis that ‘no 
testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony is of such a kind that 
its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish’; 
so the presumption against the testifiers is higher here than in more quotidian cases. 
Hume discusses, for example, a putative miracle involving a cathedral doorkeeper who, 
‘wanting a leg’, rubbed his stump with holy oil and was rewarded with a ‘true natural 
leg’. Testimony that this actually happened is then taken as prima facie evidence for 
the testifiers’ possessing the vices that Hume lists (bigotry, ignorance and so on). 
Showing an even-handedness in his treatment o f the ‘Romanist’ and ‘Mahometan’ 
faiths, he further asserts that ‘when we believe any miracle o f  Mahomet or his 
successors, we have for our warrant the testimony o f a few barbarous Arabians’.134
Hume is also critical o f the widespread sloppiness afflicting the auditors o f testimony. 
For example, he identifies the bad habit amongst country dwellers of spreading 
‘intelligence’ about the impending marriage o f two young people when they had 
merely been seen together twice, and in the light o f this he awards ‘the populace’ the 
epithet 'avidum genus auricularum \ 135 Despite these caveats, he does, unlike Plato, 
Descartes and Locke, freely accept testimony as a source o f evidence for belief- 
formation, provided that one ‘proportions [one’s] belief to the evidence’.
132 Hume (1748) op. cit., Section X, Part I, p.672.
133 Hume (1748) op. cit., section X, part II, p.677.
134 Hume (1748) op. cit., section X, part II, p.676. Hume also refers to the authors of the Pentateuch (ie
Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy) as ‘barbarous and ignorant’, and talks of the
‘mum meries’ of Catholicism.
135 ‘Gossip-hungry race’.
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It is important to note the difference between Hume, who sees testimony as evidence 
that can be used in doxastic processes, and other more recent rehabilitators of testimony 
as epistemically legitimate (such as Coady), who place it alongside perception as a 
direct source o f knowledge, not as evidence which is inferentially processed further and 
may eventually become knowledge. This evidence-processing, which Hume’s 
reductionist136 analysis requires, includes having regard both to one’s immediate 
observations of the testifier’s behaviour -  keeping alert for signs o f untrustworthiness -  
and to the wider evidence o f our background set o f beliefs. A failure of testimony to 
cohere with our pre-existing belief fabric -  to draw on Quine’s more recent analysis137 
~ encourages us to cast doubt on its veracity. Quine’s principle of ‘minimum 
mutilation’ o f our web o f beliefs in the face of recalcitrant experience, suggests that we 
make the smallest possible adjustments which enable the new experience to be 
accommodated while leaving the web largely intact. Recalcitrant testimony, however, 
is not always strong enough to mutilate our webs at all, and may well be rejected on the 
grounds that we feel that the testifier is likely to be mistaken or insincere. On this 
point, Hume tells an anecdote involving an Indian prince’s response to testimony about 
frosty weather: but Locke had published a similar account over forty years earlier 
which illustrated the point more clearly. In his version, a Dutch ambassador tells the 
King of Siam that the water in Holland freezes in the winter such that it would bear the 
weight o f an elephant. According to Locke, the king replied: ‘Hitherto I have believed 
the things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober fair man, but now I am 
sure you lie’.138 Within the world-view o f the Siamese king, such a described 
phenomenon did not cohere with the regularities he had hitherto observed in his own 
kingdom, hence was either to be placed in the category o f the miraculous or the 
fraudulent -  and by plumping for the latter he suffered no mutilation o f his web o f 
beliefs.
136 ‘Reductionist’ in that our justification for relying on testimony in some circumstances reduces to our 
own individual powers of observation and inference. By checking that testifier t has hitherto been 
reliable on things which we could personally check, we then ascribe future reliability to t's  eyewitness 
accounts, provided that she neither testifies to something miraculous -  or otherwise at odds with our 
belief-set -  nor behaves in ways which alert us to the possibility of insincerity. Some writers use the 
alternative form ‘reductivist’ (eg Welboume, 2002). I explore the key differences between reductionists 
and anti-reductionists on p.83.
137 W.V.O. Quine (1961) ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ section 6 in From a Logical Point o f  View, 
reprinted in Louis P. Pojman (2001) [Ed.] Classics o f  Philosophy: the Twentieth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p.221.
138 Locke (1706) Essay, bk.IV, ch.XV, §5.
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Besides this view of testimony as highly defeasible, an aspect to consider is the 
permitted length o f the testimonial chain. For Hume, the useful and necessary type o f 
testimony is restricted to ‘reports o f eyewitnesses and spectators’.139 There is a similar 
legal tradition o f the inadmissibility of any type o f testimony other than the first-hand 
(a principle which excludes ‘hearsay’ evidence, for example), an issue to which I shall 
later return (p.78). When an eyewitness attempts to track the truth and testily to these 
findings, issues o f reliability are always potentially important to the auditor, 
particularly in Hume’s inductivist construal o f belief-formation from testimony. But 
when the tracking is by means of looking over the shoulder o f another tracker -  so to 
speak -  the quarry may prove to be more elusive than ever and the testimony less 
trustworthy. ‘[A]ny testimony, the further it is from the original truth, the less force ... 
it has ... Each remove weakens the force o f the p ro o f, as Locke puts it.140
This stance seems correct but is ultimately untenable. One objection is that our expert 
guide might well enable us to spot quarry which our untutored eye would have missed, 
so having an expert at the beginning (or even elsewhere) in the chain could strengthen 
rather than weaken the force of the testimony. There may be differences in doxastic 
competence in the particular circumstances, which may render a direct eyewitness 
account o f an event less useful as a source o f evidence for the next auditor in the chain 
than a longer chain o f higher competence (to continue with Hume’s 
reductionist/inductivist model for the moment). For example, on a recent flight back 
from a conference in Lithuania, I saw another passenger je t pass under the aircraft on 
which I was travelling. It seemed to me that it approached us at right angles and flew 
under our aircraft, at perhaps 50m vertical separation. On raising this with a flight 
attendant, she later reported that the Captain said that he had seen the aircraft on his 
radar and that, according to him, it had crossed our path in compliance with the 
aviation safety rules (1000 feet minimum vertical separation: approximately 300m). 
Despite the fact that my account has reached the reader as eyewitness testimony, with 
one testifier and one auditor,141 it is inferior to the second account although the latter 
comes from a longer testimonial chain:
(Captain -*  flight attendant -» passenger/fmal-testifier -*> auditor).142
139 Hume (1748) Enquiry, section X, part I, p.672.
1+0 Locke (1706) op. cil., bk.IV, ch.XVI, §10.
141 Keeping the same terminology, even though the ‘auditor’ in this case is the present reader.
142 The arrows here indicate the flow of testimony, not my earlier meaning of material implication.
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The difference is that I am not competent to pronounce on the distances between fast* 
moving aircraft, while a trained Lufthansa pilot is.
We see another, related, principle at play in the case o f historiography. A historical 
work which uses the eyewitness reports o f a large number o f participants in a particular 
event, combined with chronicles, records, documentary evidence and so on, is in some 
sense superior to the testimony of any one o f the individuals, and indeed to the direct 
experience o f one who was in the fray. It does not trump the phenomenological 
experience o f being there, of course, but as a source o f propositional knowledge it is 
often o f  greater value.
There is thus no requirement for teachers to be ‘eyewitnesses and spectators’ o f the 
events and phenomena about which they testify, for they can add their expertise to a 
longer testimonial chain and render it more valuable to learners than it would otherwise 
have been. Having said this, we recognise that, say, the Physics teacher who has 
actually measured the speed o f light can testify about its value with more authority than 
the one who merely quotes the textbook, even though both teachers are highly 
dependent on the testimonial webs of science.
Legal and Natural Testimony
Traditional accounts o f testimony typically either cast doubt upon it, or simply do not 
allow for the possibility o f its ability to carry knowledge to the hearer. As we saw 
earlier (p.68), this is no surprise in the case o f Plato, for whom even direct perception, 
experienced first-hand by the individual, does not guarantee the acquiring of 
knowledge. One o f the groups he sarcastically refers to as ‘paragons’ -  the lawyers -  
has a special relationship to testimony in that an important part o f  their work is either 
affirming or casting doubt upon the credibility o f witnesses, depending on the side by 
whom they are paid to appear. The jury too has particular obligations to assess the 
testimony o f the various parties for credibility and to weigh up the balance o f 
probabilities o f their veracity. In this situation, the simple acceptance o f the 
uncorroborated word of a stranger will not do.
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The importance o f legal testimony goes beyond the epistemic, in that the defendant’s 
liberty -  or even life, in a number o f jurisdictions -  is to some extent at the mercy o f 
the testimony o f others. Traditions have thus evolved which attempt to reduce the 
likelihood o f unreliable testimony being uttered or heeded. The solemn appearance o f 
the courtroom and the swearing of oaths are intended to convey to testifiers the gravity 
o f their role. In the giving o f legal testimony, it is normally required that the testifier 
be physically present in the courtroom,143 and this carries the corollary that hearsay 
evidence is inadmissible in many jurisdictions. The reason for this prohibition is that 
absent witnesses can neither be sworn in nor cross-examined in person, so their 
testimony is free o f the sincerity-conducive influences o f the solemn surroundings, 
oaths and close questioning. The very word ‘testimony’ carries with it the implication 
o f severe punishment for lying. Oaths used to be sworn on the male genitals (L. testis) 
by the witness (also L. testis), with the implied threat o f castration for perjury.144
In contrast to the particularly demanding practices o f giving legal testimony or making 
solemn promises is that o f ‘natural testimony’, in which the seriousness o f guarantee, 
number o f permissible links to first-hand experience and level o f sceptical scrutiny are 
more relaxed. A paradigm case of natural testimony is not the giving o f evidence under 
oath, but the giving of directions -  to Larissa say -  to a lost visitor. In providing this 
help, we affirm neither that we speak the truth on pain o f castration, nor that we know 
the way first-hand and independently o f any hearsay (from a map, for example). We 
simply do what we can to alleviate the epistemic predicament o f  a fellow human being. 
In turn, the visitor assumes that we are both competent to give directions and sincere in 
our intention to guide him to the best o f our knowledge, and so acts on the basis o f our 
testimony.
After our earlier discussions of hyperbolic doubt, the possibility o f wholesale deception 
by SLgenium malignum, and the use of Socratic elenchus or courtroom cross- 
examination to put putative knowledge to the test, this simple acceptance o f the word 
o f  a stranger can be interpreted as showing a refreshing level o f trust. Another reading 
o f the transaction, though, is that the auditor is being indefensibly gullible. Even if the 
more outlandish truth-obstructing possibilities are removed from consideration, it is
143 There are exceptions to this, for example the use of video-links to a witness whose appearance in 
court is problematic for some reason,
144 Thomas G. Gutheil et al. (2003) ‘The Whole Truth Versus The Admissible Truth: An Ethics Dilemma 
for Expert Witnesses’ J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 31: pp.422-427.
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still very much the case that the testifier could be insincere, incompetent, or both 
(although this last possibility may sometimes give rise to a Gettier-style cancellation, 
luckily yielding true belief). Additionally, the possibility o f the auditor 
misunderstanding the testimony is often present. The tracking between the ‘facts o f the 
matter’ and the beliefs finally acquired by the auditor through testimony is typically 
mediated by a number of links, any one o f which could be faulty. If  the auditor is to 
acquire true beliefs -  or, better still, true, justified beliefs -  the testifier must be 
‘trustworthy’: a success-term composed, as we saw earlier, o f competence and 
sincerity. A felicitous piece o f testimony will emerge from a testifier who is in a 
position to know and  is willing and able to report his knowledge sincerely. If  there is 
subsequent uptake by the auditor, the knowledge-conducive doxastic process is 
complete. A fully-developed virtue epistemology will need to address this question o f 
testifier-trustworthiness, and to explore the virtues which govern both testifying and 
auditing.
Proper Trust in Testimony
Linda Zagzebski, in furthering her thesis o f unifying the intellectual and the moral 
virtues, suggests that our stance towards testimony has not only epistemic but also 
moral importance, for, in everyday life, ‘...w e blame a person who ... ignores the 
testimony o f reliable authority’.145 In keeping with her being a (neo)-Aristotelian, 
though, we see that she also proposes a vice at the other extreme: ‘... the unreflective 
acceptance o f the opinions of others.’146 There is thus a happy medium between 
obtuseness and gullibility, at which the virtuous epistemic agent ought to aim when 
receiving testimony. Miranda Flicker's labelling o f this mean between the two vices is 
‘reflexive critical openness’, a virtue which enables us to avoid what she terms 
‘epistemic injustice -  that is, failing to believe people when they ought to be believed, 
but also believing someone who ought not to be believed’.147 These are injustices to 
knowledge, in that what we might term a ‘false negative’ deprives us o f the possibility 
o f adding justly to our set of true beliefs, while a ‘false positive’ allows us unjustly to 
form a belief which is not true. They are, moreover, unjust to persons, for disbelieving
145 Linda Zagzebski (1996) Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.5.
146 Zagzebski (1996) p.305.
147 Miranda Fricker (n.d) in S.E. Marshall (2003) ‘Epistemic Injustice: The Third Way?’ 
Metaphilosophy, vol.34, nos.1/2, p. 176.
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the competent and sincere testifier is a type o f unjustified punishment, which, if 
recognised, is hurtful to members of a knowledge-sharing social species such as ours.
There are circumstances in which epistemic justice and moral duty clash, such as the 
mothers who ‘have to believe their child’s claims of innocence, for their child’s 
sake’.148 We note that this belief is not for truth’s sake, but for loyalty’s sake, so this is 
not a case o f epistemic ‘critical reflexive openness’, in that the critical element is 
absent. Whereas in the legal context the default position ought to lie nearer to the 
‘suspicion’ end o f the continuum, when it comes to social settings, ‘gullibility’ is often
•* 149a more fitting response.
Whilst Ernest Sosa does not directly address the issue o f reliability vis-à-vis testimony, 
his notions o f ‘safety’ and ‘sensitivity’ are pertinent here. Accepting the testimony of a 
hitherto-trustworthy source is a relatively safe -  and hence epistemically-virtuous -  
doxastic process which is not undermined by considerations o f sensitivity. As 
discussed earlier (p.28), the device of hyperbolic doubt can almost always be used to 
nullify apparently well-sourced knowledge-claims -  showing them to be insensitive -  
but the relevant beliefs can still be considered safe, despite their lack o f sensitivity to 
outlandish possibilities (including the formerly-reliable testifier -  or auditor -  being 
temporarily under the influence o f a genium malignum).
What still needs attention, though, is (i) how the epistemic agent comes to regard a 
testifier as reliable in the first place and (ii) how the epistemic agent would maintain 
confidence in the testifier in a range of ‘normal’ contexts. Here, we may gloss the 
notion o f ‘normal’ as ‘in a number o f close possible worlds’, or ‘for excursions into 
possibility space well short of implausible sceptical scenarios such as those controlled 
by an evil demon’. As we have seen, Hume answers (i) and (ii) by recourse to 
induction from constant conjunction. There are a number o f objections which can be 
raised against Hume’s inductivism, including the paucity o f direct -  that is, non­
testimonial -  evidence with which to check the large number o f testimonially-derived 
beliefs we typically hold. Coady accuses Hume of being ‘involved in a vicious
148 Marshall (2003) op. cit„ p.176.
144 In the case of the mothers above, a more robust epistemic process might unhelpfully reveal their 
children’s guilt. There are some things it is better not to know. Here we see a clash between epistemic 
and moral virtues, in which the mother’s epistemic duty to truth is trumped by her moral duty to her 
child. A similar consideration affects defence lawyers, whose job becomes more difficult if they come to 
realise that their clients are in fact guilty as charged.
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circularity’150 when he allows our induced knowledge o f a constant conjunction 
between testimony and experience to be communal knowledge -  that is, a type of 
knowledge itself reliant on testimony -  rather than confining it to the individual agent. 
If  it is restricted to the individual, the project o f attempting to check even a fraction of 
one’s testimonially-based beliefs against direct experience strikes us as being a 
hopeless one. We may also feel that there also remains the question o f how a 
developing person’s epistemic project gets o ff the ground in the first place, given the 
intertwined nature o f language-acquisition and the growth of propositional knowledge 
in the individual.
Language Learning and Testimony
A very young child typically displays a gullibility towards pronouncements by adults, 
as a consequence o f his inexperience as a knower — in particular, his lack o f other 
reference-points with which to triangulate this testimony. To exemplify this, let us 
examine the case o f first language learning. The initial entry-point into a language for 
a learner has historically been considered to be through the process o f ‘ostensión’. We 
first acquire vocabulary by building mental associations between words and objects, 
and these connections are made possible by seeing competent speakers indicate an 
object -  in one way or another -  and simultaneously hearing them utter its name. Thus 
a link is formed in our minds. This labelling process -  so the ‘ostensive’ theory claims 
-  is the foundation for all subsequent learning o f the language. St. Augustine is 
credited with first defining learning by ostensión, in his retrospective description o f his 
own first language learning as a young child in Roman North Africa:
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards 
something, I saw this and grasped that the thing was called by the sound they 
uttered when they meant to point it out [os tendere].
Augustine (398 CE) Confessions, bk.I, ch.8.151
There are philosophical and empirical problems with Augustine’s account o f learning 
from testimony in this ostensive fashion, however. Augustine compares the child 
learning his mother tongue to being a stranger in a foreign land: already in possession 
o f some sort o f language, just not the one spoken by the natives. Numerous ostensive
150 Ccady (1992) op. cit., p.81.
151 Translated by Wittgenstein. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) Philosophical Investigations [tr. G.E.M. 
Anscombe] (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p.2.
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acts by his elders allow the child to construct a mental table o f linguistic equivalences 
and thereby become proficient in the ‘new’ language. Ludwig Wittgenstein identified a 
weakness in this model o f language learning by showing the implausibility o f children 
already being in possession o f their own internal private language before being exposed 
to external linguistic stimuli in the ostensive way described by Augustine.152
If it is accepted that at this stage the child is coming fresh to these linguistically-framed 
beliefs (that is, precisely not by triangulating them with the now-discredited pre­
existing linguistic and conceptual framework o f Augustine’s ‘stranger in a foreign 
land’), then it is clear that he has little option but to be gullible and accepting. His 
initial learning will suffer from the vice o f  being derived from ‘. .. the unreflective 
acceptance o f the opinions o f others’,153 but it seems to me that it cannot be otherwise. 
Propositional knowledge by its very nature needs encoding in language, and the 
elements o f this language can only initially be acquired uncritically. This enables the 
child’s first linguistic and conceptual frameworks to be constructed: frameworks which 
can later be used to test the plausibility o f further testimony.
The initial lack o f epistemic virtue in the child’s early learning is congruent with the 
Aristotelian view that the virtues have to be acquired by experience. This leads us back 
to the question as to what constitutes a mature and intellectually-virtuous approach 
towards testimony, an approach which avoids the extremes o f the both the naive child’s 
‘unreflective acceptance’ of others’ opinions and the obdurate adult’s ignoring of 
reliable authority. To avoid the vice of unreflective acceptance, there needs to be some 
sort o f process by which the mature receiver o f testimony comes to a judgement about 
the trustworthiness o f the testifier. However, this test for trustworthiness must not set 
the bar so high that no testifier could leap the hurdle, nor must it impose unreasonable 
demands on the receiver in terms o f unduly time-consuming and comprehensive, 
conscious checks o f the testifier’s fitness as a reliable authority.
Auditing of Testimony: Reductionists vs. Anti-Reductionists
The debate about where the bar ought to be set is largely between two groups of 
epistemologists, who can be characterised as (i) reductionists and (ii) anti-reductionists.
152 Wittgenstein (1953) op. cit., pp.2-10 sets out his main arguments.
153 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p.305.
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These are schools o f thought about testimony which have their roots in the work o f two 
eighteenth century Scottish philosophers: David Hume and Thomas Reid, respectively. 
Hume, we recall, requires the testifier to have shown reliability before he will accept 
his word, whereas Reid has a default faith in the testifier unless there is reason to doubt 
him. As Reid puts it: ‘There is a much greater similitude than is commonly imagined, 
between the testimony of nature given by our senses and testimony of men given by 
language’.154 The overall position of the two opposing camps is succinctly put by 
Leslie Stevenson:
... the criterial approach [i.e. that of the anti-reductionist] treats testimony as 
“innocent” (i.e., trustworthy) unless shown guilty; the reductionist treats it as 
“guilty” (i.e., not worth of belief) until a good track record is shown.155
The reductionists seem, prima facie, to have the most tenable position, in that they 
require testimony to be supported by some non-testimonial buttressing before it can be 
accepted. They can discern no a priori warrant for simply accepting something on 
another’s say-so, but demand the individual auditor to have intemally-available 
justification for the testimony from ‘on-board’ resources such as perception, reasoning 
and memory. However, ‘global’ reductionism is an impracticable project, for it would 
require the auditor to suspend assent to every belief tainted by testimony until the 
veracity o f each piece of testimony could be established independently, using only the 
auditor’s perception, reasoning and memory. As our earlier discussion o f language 
learning in childhood shows, the process o f induction into a testifying and auditing 
community could not even get off the ground without an initial period o f simple 
acceptance o f testimony received by the novice. Being inducted into what Wittgenstein 
terms ‘a form o f  life’ requires credulity:156 ‘For how can a child immediately doubt 
what it is taught? That could mean only that he was incapable o f learning certain 
language games’.157
From the perspective o f the global reductionist, the child could not justifiably gain 
initial purchase on testimonially-derived knowledge, and would thus be barred from 
access to all knowledge framed in language. Nevertheless, in adulthood, so the
154 Dugald Stewart (1813) The Works o f  Thomas Reid, DD, FRS, Edinburgh (Charlestown: Samuel 
Etheridge jun’r). [Digitised by Google Books] p.380.
135 L. Stevenson (1993) ‘Why believe what people say?’, Synthese, 94, p.436.
15* The word ‘credulity’ has nowadays taken on a pejorative meaning, but Reid treats it as a virtue and I 
use it here in his sense.
157 Ludwig Wittgenstein [Uber Gewissheit ] [tr. and ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright & Denis 
Paul] (1951) On Certainty, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) §283 [online] Full text available at 
http://budni.by.ru/oncenaintyhtml [accessed 6 Sep 2010].
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reductionists argue, it is legitimate to seek justification for the acceptance o f individual 
pieces o f testimony: a requirement characteristic of ‘local reductionism’. This latter 
version o f reductionism is also labelled ‘inductivism’, because claims to knowledge 
derived from testimony are seen to receive inductive support from what we already 
know, combined with what we have discerned about the reliability o f particular 
testifiers. I f  a piece o f testimony resonates well with our existing beliefs and the 
testifier has a good epistemic track record as far as we can see, then we are justified in 
forming a belief based upon it. This forms the basis o f an a posteriori default rule:
If a speaker S asserts that p to the hearer H, under normal conditions, then it is 
proper and correct for H to accept S’s assertion, unless H has special reason to 
object.158
The rule is a posteriori to reductionists in that it is invoked after appropriate experience 
which enables both the ‘normal conditions’ and the ‘special reason to object’ to be 
defined inductively, and to be consciously known by the auditor.
The anti-reductionists, in contrast, treat the acceptance rule as a priori. An individual 
auditor is justified in accepting testimony from an arbitrary testifier without having any 
intemally-available evidence to bolster it. This approach looks, on the face of it, to be 
unduly permissive, but Tyler Burge has developed supporting arguments involving 
presuppositions essential for communication, and Coady makes use o f what we 
recognise to be a transcendental argument (although Coady himself does not label his 
approach thus). These provide externalist justification for the a priori acceptance of 
testimony: justifications o f which the auditor need not be aware.
Transcendental arguments, particularly o f the type developed by Immanuel Kant, show 
that certain conditions must be met in order for us to have experience o f objects. Since 
we do have experience o f objects, these conditions are themselves necessary. As Kant 
puts it in the first Critique, ‘I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied 
not so much with objects as with the mode o f our knowledge of objects in so far as this 
mode o f knowledge is to be possible a priori’.159 In order to answer the question of 
how mathematics and science are possible, Kant shows that the alternative to
158 Thomas Uebel (2009) ‘Neurath’s protocol statements revisited: sketch of a theory of scientific 
testimony’, Studies in History and Philosophy o f  Science, vol.40, iss.l, pp.4-13, p.5. He based this 
formulation on J. Adler (2006) ‘Epistemological problems of testimony’ in E.N. Zalta (ed.) Stanford 
Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy.
159 Immanuel Kant (1787) Critique o f  Pure Reason [tr. Norman Kemp Smith, 1929] (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave) B25/A12, p.59.
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scepticism (that is, to the claim that the deliverances o f mathematics and science do not 
amount to knowledge) is to take their legitimate existence as a starting point:
Since these sciences actually exist, it is quite proper to ask how they are possible; 
for that they must be possible is proved by the fact that they exist.1 0
This is the same overall strategy as that adopted by Coady in his defence of an a priori 
warrant for testimonially-derived knowledge (although, again, he does not himself 
make the link with Kant’s approach). Like Kant, he proposes a form o f positive161 
epistemology, which ‘takes it that the challenge o f scepticism is ... overcome ... and 
proceeds to investigate the structure ... to be found in human knowledge.. ,’.162 In 
essence, his argument sets out to show that testimony must convey ^ knowledge, because 
much o f our knowledge is only possible via testimony. One tine of Coady’s multiple­
pronged transcendental argument is of a Davidsonian nature:
We must apply a principle of charity (or some similar interpretive maxim) in 
interpreting the speech of others ... so that agreement is maximized or optimized 
amongst us and them, We must, that is, find their expressed beliefs mostly correct 
by our lights.163
In order to make sense of testimonial utterances, we have to assume that these are 
based on the testifiers’ perceptions of the world and that this is the same, shared, world 
with which we ourselves are familiar. Faulty perception and confusing or insincere 
testimony have to be the exception rather than the rule, for ‘Global confusion, like 
universal mistake, is unthinkable, not because the imagination boggles, but because too 
much confusion erodes the background o f true beliefs against which alone failure can 
be construed’.164 There can be no counterfeit coins without real coins and, likewise, 
false testimony only makes sense against a background o f largely true testimony, for 
meaningful communication cannot even begin to take place without widespread 
agreement about everyday facts, encoded in sincere testimony. The upshot o f this is 
the ‘acceptance principle’ which forms the main thesis o f Coady’s book. Tyler Binge
ibid., B20/2I, p.56.
161 Not of course ‘positivist’ epistemology; the term ‘positive epistemology’ is intended as a contrast to 
negative epistemology which concerns itself with refuting the sceptic.
162 Coady (1992) op. cit., p.3.
163 Coady (1992) op. cit., p. 157. Here he is summing up some of Donald Davidson’s thoughts on the 
matter, drawn from a number of works, both early and later.
164 Donald Davidson (1980) ‘Mental Events’, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), p.221 in Catherine Z. Elgin (2002) ‘Take It from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol.65, no.2, p.296.
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puts this principle elegantly (although his justification for this is not the transcendental 
argument favoured by Coady but an ‘intrinsic rationality’ route):
In interlocution we have a general a priori prima facie (pro tanto)165 entitlement to 
rely on seeming understanding as genuine understanding. And we have a general a 
prion prima facie (pro tanto) entitlement to believe putative assertions that we seem 
to understand. These are two rational default positions. 166
Testimony as Important as Perception, Memory and Reasoning
Coady specifies the conventions associated with the ‘speech act’167 o f ‘natural 
testimony’168 to be as follows:
A speaker 5 testifies by making some statement p  if and only if:
(1) His stating that p  is evidence that p  and is offered as evidence that p
(2) S has the relevant competence, authority or credentials to state truly that p
(3) 5 ’s statement that p is relevant to some disputed or unresolved question (which 
may or may not be, p?) and is directed to those who are in need of evidence on the 
matter.169
If  we now apply this to the question we derived earlier from the Meno -  “Is this the 
road to Larissa?” -  then the conventions govern the testifier s-’s speech act of answering 
“Yes” (i.e., to our question “/>?”, he expresses assent). As long as he has followed 
these conventions, then we can take his testimony as evidence that this is indeed the 
way to Larissa, assume that he is in a position to know the way to Larissa and construe 
his answer as a helpful act which can clear up our doubts. As long as S  follows the 
conventions o f  this speech act, we can know ‘that p ' from his assertion “that /?”. It 
should be noted that the word ‘evidence’ in Coady’s formulation does not imply mere 
input to a Humean inductive process (like scientific evidence being used to construct a 
theory) which later indirectly yields knowledge after weighing this, and other, evidence 
in the balance and drawing inferences from it, but a direct source o f knowledge (as in 
‘the evidence o f my own eyes’). Testimony is thus, to Coady, a sui generis doxastic 
source, alongside, and on all fours with, perception, memory and reasoning. As a 
source o f knowledge, the auditor can incorporate it more directly into his web o f beliefs 
than a piece o f Humean evidence that has to be first processed inferentially.
16:5 Pro tanto: L. ‘To a certain extent’: in this case, ‘in the absence of defeaters’.
166 Tyler Burge (1993) ‘Content Preservation’, Philos. Rev. 102, pp.457-488 in Steffen Borge (2003) 
‘The word of others’, Journal o f Applied Logic, 1, p. 110.
167 This definition is restricted to spoken testimony, so does not apply to other testimonial vehicles, such 
as the written word (which are sometimes labelled ‘extended testimony’).
168 This excludes legal testimony -  which Coady terms ‘formal testimony’.
160 Coady (1992) op. cit., p.42.
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However, if  we apply it to the Larissa example, we might feel that a weak point in this 
analysis o f testimonial transactions is the requirement that S  does in fact abide by the 
conventions that Coady proposes. A Humean analysis o f our epistemic predicament as 
strangers in a foreign land asking a passer-by for help would point out our lack o f 
opportunity to build up a picture of the trustworthiness of the testifier (by the induction 
o f a rule expressing a constant conjunction between (i) the testifier’s expressions o f 
local knowledge and (ii) the topographical facts o f the matter, as evidenced by our 
direct perception, of them). Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any other 
sources o f advice, we would be forced to take the testimony o f the stranger on trust. 
Coady, however, sees the trust we place in testimony not as a last resort, but as 
‘fundamental’.170 He attributes to it equal standing with the perceptual and the 
mmenonic as a key doxastic process. This does not mean that testimony is infallible, 
any more than our senses and memory are infallible, but it does elevate it to the status 
o f a practice giving us direct access to knowledge, rather than the traditional view o f a 
second-rate, second-hand, inferential and indirect doxastic process (as advanced by 
Hume). In just the same way as we routinely trust the deliverances o f eyesight if  we 
have no grounds for suspecting optical illusions and the like, so too can we accept 
testimony at face value if we have no grounds for suspecting deception or mistake.
This may strike one as licensing gullibility, but Coady is determined to follow through 
the implications o f putting testimony on the same footing as perception.
Safety and Sensitivity of Testimony
Even if the auditing o f unsupported testimony is accepted as a fundamental doxastic 
process, the gullibility charge still needs to be dealt with. Coady claims that ‘there is 
no question o f our being gullible’ when we take a testifier’s words as a direct source of 
knowledge, for ‘we may simply recognise that the standard warning signs o f deceit, 
confusion or mistake are not present’.171 This, then, invests the assumption that 
testimony is trustworthy with the status o f a default condition, while accepting the 
possibility o f over-riding defeaters, rather than that o f an unbreakable rule. There are 
limits to credulity,
170 Coady (1992) op. cit., p.46.
171 Coady (1992) p.47.
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To explore this further, let us take it that insincerity can reliably be detected in the case 
of a particular testifier: Pinocchio. This will act as a limiting case, the other extreme 
being a testifier whose sincerity we are completely unable to judge. To make the 
model even simpler, Pinocchio can only answer “Yes” or “No” to any questions put to 
him. This allows us to track Pinocchio’s beliefs reliably. We know that he is sincere 
as long as his nose does not grow, so when his nose does grow we can simply invert his 
answer to arrive at his actual belief. In Sosa’s terms, our beliefs about Pinocchio’s 
beliefs are both safe and sensitive. They are safe in that we correctly believe Pinocchio 
when it is the case that he is answering sincerely, and they are sensitive in that were we 
to be mistaken in believing that he is speaking sincerely, we would quickly become 
aware o f our mistake by the tell-tale sign o f his nose getting longer. Thus we can 
accept his testimony as a default, for the warning signs to indicate mendacity are 
unmistakable.
Unfortunately, this safety and sensitivity to Pinocchio’s testimony only relates to his 
beliefs and does not extend as far as knowledge, so in this sense his testimony is not 
necessarily trustworthy, even when we compensate for any nose-lengthening. 
Trustworthiness incorporates both sincerity and competence, so although we have full 
knowledge o f Pinocchio’s sincerity for any given answer, we are unable to assess his 
competence to answer. He may be genuinely reporting his beliefs, but these beliefs 
could well be mistaken and thus not true justified beliefs. Indeed, unless he is an 
infallible puppet, some false but sincerely-held beliefs will certainly be present in his 
web, and the uttering of these will not trigger our suspicion by the deliverances of his 
nasal elongation.
Nevertheless, the model does seem to take care satisfactorily o f beliefs simpliciter. If  
we ask Pinocchio, “Is this the way to Larissa”, and he answers, “Yes” , with no signs of 
nose-enlargement (or answers, “No”, accompanied by an increase in nose-length) we 
can take it that he sincerely believes it to be the case that it is the way to Larissa. This 
puts us as auditors of the testimony in an epistemically-stronger position than hitherto, 
in that we at least know what the beliefs o f our testifier are, even though these may not 
be true, justified beliefs. They may not be tethered to reality. An even stronger 
position would be one in which our testifier’s credentials as a competent knower in the 
domain o f interest (Larissan topography, in this case) were also known to us.
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How then, can this simplified model be elaborated to encompass ‘real-word’ cases of 
testifying and auditing? The analogue o f our ability to identify an enlargement in 
Pinocchio’s nose is our attunement to Coady’s ‘standard warning signs o f deceit [or] 
confusion ... \ 172 Growing up in a social world in which knowledge is important, we 
eventually become more or less adept at recognising what poker-players call a ‘tell’: a 
give-away sign that our testifier is not being sincere. We may conjecture that the 
strength o f this ability plausibly follows a normal distribution across the population, 
from those who can easily be deceived, to those who have an unerring sense of the 
sincerity of their testifier. However, even in the most well-developed real-life cases -  
for example in an experienced member o f An Garda Siochàna interviewing a suspect -  
this is not as reliable as simply watching Pinocchio’s nose, for the ability to suppress 
the ‘tell’ is also highly developed amongst some individuals.
The third ‘standard warning sign’ on Coady’s list (following those detecting ‘deceit’ 
and ‘confusion’) is an indication of ‘mistake’, and this we see to be different from 
deliberate deceit, in that it relates not to sincerity but to competence. In educational 
settings, honest mistakes are plausibly more common than insincerity. A mistake is a 
lack o f alignment between (i) the testifier’s beliefs and (ii) reality, so, if insincerity is 
ruled out, one way in which this could arise is that the testifier is in some way lacking 
in competence vis-à-vis the claimed knowledge to which testimony is being given. 
However, if the testifier is lacking in competence in a particular field o f knowledge, 
and is aware o f this shortcoming, then it is insincere to make assertions which are part 
o f that field. It is a normative part o f the speech act o f testifying that the testifier only 
makes assertions over beliefs which are legitimately held: beliefs which the testifier is 
entitled to hold. So, the only circumstances in which we would actually be ill-advised 
to follow the directions given by the sincere testifier are those in which the 
incompetence is unconscious (to use William Howell’s173 term) This would not be 
detected by our attunement to the standard warning signs o f insincerity, for the testifier 
is also unaware o f  her own lack o f entitlement to offer directions.
How then would we detect such incompetence? Clearly, the possibility of unconscious 
incompetence means that mistakes could not always be detected by direct observation
172 Coady (1992) op. cit., p.47.
173 William Smiley Howell (1982) writes of ‘unconscious incompetence’ in The Empathic 
Communicator (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co.). 1 return to this theme in chapter 4.
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of the testifier but would require supplementary knowledge in order to identify them.
If  the testifier appears to be sober and well-adjusted, a principle o f charity requires us 
to accept the testimony, in the absence o f any warning signs that the testimony might 
be flawed. We might consider whether the testimony being given is of a type that the 
testifier seems prima facie to be in a position to give. Travel directions would fall into 
this category, in the case of a testifier who appears to be a local person or who seems to 
be in an occupation in which good topographical knowledge is valued (e.g. a uniformed 
police officer or someone sitting in the driver’s seat o f a vehicle labelled ‘Taxi’). Our 
motive in asking for help is to improve our epistemic position, so, if  we have a 
complete lack of knowledge about the way to Larissa, taking the word o f someone who 
looks to be better epistemically placed than we are is a likely way o f achieving this 
ambition and acquiring the desired knowledge. A pupil asking his teacher a question in 
her announced area of expertise follows a similar principle. As we have seen, however, 
both the taxi driver and the teacher could make an honest mistake, so qua 
epistemically-virtuous auditors, we need to have ways o f detecting such erroneous 
testimony.
One way o f identifying mistakes on the part o f a sincere testifier is to compare her 
advice with our background beliefs, in order to check for coherence. The occasions on 
which we are completely bereft of any knowledge o f a particular topic o f interest are 
comparatively rare in adulthood, so we usually have at least some inkling about how 
things are. I f  we vaguely believe that we are in Farsala and that Larissa is roughly to 
the north o f our current location, but the testifier points south, then this dissonance at 
least gives us cause for suspicion. Prudence would then demand that we seek further 
confirmation before altering our existing view and covering much distance in the 
direction suggested -  and prudence could be right. Our aim is to acquire the 
knowledge upon which goal-seeking action (travelling to Larissa) can successfully be 
based, so we will make whatever epistemic manoeuvres seem to us likely to help us 
achieve this. Much of this manoeuvring takes place at an automatic level, for 
epistemically-adept adults plausibly have an unconscious competence in evaluating 
testimony: a skill which only surfaces in the form o f explicit consideration when 
certain triggers are activated. We accept our colleague’s accounts o f her weekend 
activities unreservedly until she tell us about the great god Pan smiling at her from 
inside her washing-machine.
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Similarly, in accepting Pinocchio’s testimony, we are being not gullible but merely 
legitimately trusting (for we know that we are currently receiving sincere testimony). 
Were a counterfactual state of insincere testimony to obtain, we would become aware 
of it immediately, via the nasal elongation o f our testifier.
This plausibly applies in some measure to the real world, in that we can settle for a 
default position o f believing testimony in ‘non-loaded’ situations, in the confidence that 
our insincerity-detecting and mistake-detecting sensibilities will be triggered in 
suspicious cases. The stipulation that the testimony should be non-loaded excludes 
cases where simple credulity is unwarranted because the testifier is likely to have an 
agenda other than being helpful to a fellow putative knower: in cases involving 
politicians, advertisers and property-auctioneers, perhaps. Their success in their chosen 
profession also demands that they possess advanced ‘tell-suppressing’ abilities. They 
are at the other limit from Pinocchio, in that they emit no indication of mendacity. The 
standard warning signs will thus not be detectable by us, so our spotting such a loaded 
situation is dependent upon our having a nuanced folk theory o f human nature vis-à-vis 
testimony, typically acquired by induction from experience. This will include a 
categorisation o f certain trades and professions as testimonially suspect (or not) and a 
contextual sensitivity to those situations in which there is a likelihood o f attempted 
deception (or not).
In the Larissa scenario a further possibility remains, one which involves neither 
insincerity nor falsehood nor a ‘loaded’ agenda. Should the passerby point skywards, 
we might take this as an indication that we ought to be suspicious o f the testimony 
about the directions to Larissa. However, our testifier may simply be operating in a 
different domain -  astronomy rather than geography -  and pointing the way to Larissa, 
one of the moons o f Neptune.*74 This may seem to be a far-fetched possibility, but it is 
illustrative o f the ways in which such talking at cross-purposes can be a problem in 
educational epistemic settings.
However, despite these possible problems o f dishonesty, incompetence or ‘talking past 
each other’, it seems clear that Coady is right to give the hitherto-neglected subject of 
testimony a more prominent place in epistemology.
174 This Neptunian moon was named after the water-nymph Larissa, a lover of Poseidon [Gk.] (or 
Neptune [L.]) the god of the sea. NASA, www.solarsystem/nasa.gov/planets.
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In particular, Coady’s conclusion -  that the attempt to effect a global reduction o f 
testimonial sources to non-testimonial resources is a vain project -  puts the spotlight 
more on knowledge as a communal asset and less on it as an individual 
accomplishment, won solely by one’s own resources. Perhaps epistemology is indeed 
burdened with the myopic Cartesian legacy o f the self-sufficient175 individual knower 
and has largely ignored the unavoidably wide-angled, social nature of propositional 
knowledge. This myth has hitherto been pervasive in the scientific arena: Peter Lipton 
reminds us that the Royal Society, with its emphasis on individualist empiricism’ 
has the motto ‘Nullius in verba (On no m an’s word)’.176 However, one consequence o f 
the Latter-day explosion of knowledge and the division o f epistemic labour is a de­
emphasising o f  the autonomy o f the individual knower. This is a particularly 
noteworthy feature in the scientific domain, and the philosophy o f science has much to 
say on this.177 Coady characterises the ‘autonomous knower’ as ‘an autonomous 
ignoramus’, because his isolation from the social reservoir o f testimonial knowledge 
leaves him ‘confined to a grasp o f primitive and uninteresting items o f knowledge’.178 
Martin Kusch and Peter Lipton have an even more striking designation for this 
mythical self-sufficient epistemic agent: the ‘feral knower’.179
Knowledge as a Communal Asset
17i Or divinely-assisted, in the case of Descartes’ epistemology of a non-deceiving God underwriting our 
‘clear and distinct’ conceptions.
176 Peter Lipton (1998) 'The Epistemology ofTestimony’, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., vol.29, no.l, p.4. The 
Royal Society’s website explains that this motto from 1663 reflects the Fellows’ desire to ‘withstand the 
domination of authority (such as in Scholasticism)’. Some lines from Horace
(Epistles I.i, 1.13-14) expressing the same sentiment are also quoted:
You shall not ask for whom 1 fight 
Nor in what school my peace 1 find;
I say no master has the right
To swear me to obedience blind.
(Horace, tr. C.T. Carr) 
[http://royalsociety.org/page.asp?id=6186. Accessed 1 May 2009]
177 Imre Lakatos, for example, sees science as a struggle between competing research programmes.
178 C.A.J. Coady (2002) ‘Testimony and intellectual autonomy’, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 33, p.358.
170 Kusch & Lipton (2002) op. cit., p,211.
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This, shift in emphasis is perhaps overdue, but Coady overstates his case somewhat, 
making the very strong claim that:
What should be incontestable is that there is a clear non-metaphysical sense in 
which perception, memory and testimony do put us unequivocally and ‘absolutely’ 
in touch with reality, i.e. there are definite truths which are based directly on these 
information sources. With regard to this level of expectation and suitability there 
can be no question about the reliability of perception and testimony.180
This claim is certainly not ‘incontestable’: indeed, as we have seen, there are many 
philosophical arguments which do contest Coady’s assertion that testimony puts us 
‘absolutely in touch with reality’. Many would allow perception a role in direct contact 
with reality, but would regard testimony as distinctly more indirect. There are also a 
number o f empirical arguments which undermine these claims o f testimony to be a 
royal road to the truth. The philosophical objections largely centre around 
epistemological questions concerning the gap between our perceptions (both direct and 
from testimony) about the world as-it-seems-to-be and the nature of the world as-it-is, a 
gap which is endemic to realism. The empirical objections come mainly from 
psychology.
Empirical Questioning of Testimony’s Value
A recent paper181 summarises the century o f psychological research on the topic o f 
testimony since Hugo Münsterberg’s (1908) book On the Witness Stand  was published, 
and discusses the large number of variables which affect the accuracy o f what even 
Locke would regard as the strongest type o f testimony: eyewitness testimony. One 
particularly interesting recent development is the ‘analysis o f DNA exonerations where 
wrongful convictions resulted from eyewitness testimony’.182 It seems clear that there 
is a strong empirical case against relying uncritically on testimony, bolstering the 
common-sense view that we are sometimes told things which are not true, because o f 
either the mendacious agenda or the flawed perceptions o f  the testifier.
However, Coady points out that research itself depends on testimony and this fact will 
thwart any attempted empirical attack on the general reliability o f testimony. We can
180 Coady (1992) p.267.
81 Amina Memon et al. (2008) ‘Mtinsterberg’s Legacy: What Does Eyewitness Research Tell Us About 
the Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony?’, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 22, p.841.
182 Memon et at (2008) p.849.
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see this in the DNA case: unless we carry out the testing ourselves (and even then we 
are relying on the word of the designers o f the particular methods we are following, as 
to the proper procedure and its reliability), we are forced to accept the testimony of the 
expert witness or have no DNA evidence at all. Similarly, those researching and 
writing on the fallibility of testimony typically refer unsuspiciously to the field’s 
founder’s written work (Miinsterberg, 1908), forgetting that such writings are merely 
examples o f extended testimony, so, by their own lights, suspect. Moreover Coady 
suggests that researchers,183 ‘tell the reader, fully expecting to be believed, that various 
results were obtained in a classic experiment in the 1930s by Jerome S. Bruner and Leo 
Postman at Harvard’.184
Coady’s strategy here is to rebut any criticism o f the acceptance o f testimony on 
empirical grounds, by showing that the empirical methods available themselves make 
use o f testimony: ‘Testimony cannot be unreliable if  its reliability is required to prove 
that it is unreliable’.185 However, Coady’s logic only stands up to scrutiny if we insert 
the word ‘always’ thus: ‘Testimony cannot always be unreliable if its reliability is 
required to prove that it is always unreliable’. That is, we see that Coady has only 
shown the impossibility o f using testimonially-derived empirical evidence to cast 
global doubt on testimony.
On the other hand, if we do accept this, there still remains the possibility o f local doubt 
about testimony; in other words, testimony may sometimes be unreliable: a common- 
sense observation. The testimony o f the researcher armed with foreknowledge and 
triangulated against the observations of assistants with clipboards is very different in 
epistemic status from that o f the 141 unsuspecting students who saw a mock assault 
suddenly occur during a university lecture.186 The whole scholarly apparatus of 
experimental design, careful observation, data-gathering and peer-reviewed publication 
gives us greater confidence in the sober findings of the psychologist than in the 
recollected and reported perceptions of the startled, unprepared, individual students.
We can thus accept -  though not uncritically -  the deliverances o f such eyewitness
183 Coady seems to be referring here specifically to Robert Buckhout (although he doesn’t name him), 
who gives testimony in his article about an experiment that he too heard about via (extended) testimony, 
Buckhout’s aim is to convince us that testimony is not to be believed, but he expects us to believe both 
his testimony and that of Bruner and Postman. Robert Buckhout (1974) ‘Eyewitness Testimony’, 
Scientific American 231/6, pp.23-31
184Coady (1992) op. cit., p.265.
185Coady (1992) op. cit., p.265.
186 Robert Buckhout (1974) op. cit.
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academic testimony in showing that eyewitness testimony simpliciter is itself 
sometimes flawed.
Coady’s chief critic, Elizabeth Flicker, takes exception to his ‘jeering dismissal o f 
empirical work’ and suggests that ‘the key to the epistemology of testimony is: 
disaggregate’.187 The practice of acquiring knowledge via testimony is not a single 
well-defined process which can be analysed exhaustively but a set o f related activities. 
There is, I suggest, only a Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance’ between these various 
activities, and to seek a single maxim to regulate our participation in these 
heterogeneous practices -  that we ought pro tanto188 to believe in testimony, as Coady 
asserts -  is to oversimplify. When we consider the likelihood o f the truth o f a 
particular ‘telling’ (as Flicker labels testimony, widely defined) it is well known to us 
as masters o f folk psychology that ‘some people or types of people on some topics are 
reliable, others on others aren’t’.189 It is thus not unreasonable, as in the case o f the 
social psychology experiment outlined above, to use one type o f testimony to show the 
unreliability o f another.
Monitoring Testimony for Trustworthiness
Childhood and the experience o f being a stranger lost in a foreign land have much in 
common as far as testimony is concerned, in that both the child and the visitor have no 
choice but to trust the testimony received. There is thus an a priori acceptance 
principle in play, in that there need be -  indeed, often there can be -  no bolstering o f 
the testimony from empirical or background knowledge, for this is in short supply in 
these cases.190 However, Flicker argues that in ‘normally knowledgeable adult 
hearers’191 this a priori principle is o f vanishingly small importance compared with the
187 Elizabeth Flicker (1995) ‘Critical Notice [of Coady’s (1992) book]: Telling and Trusting: 
Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony’, Mind, vol.104, no.414, p.407.
188 Coady himself does not use the Latin term, which, as we have seen, indicates ‘in the absence of 
defeatere’ in this case.
189Elizabeth Fricker (1995) op. cit,, p.407.
190 I am not suggesting here that children are tabula rasa -  for we can credit them with more than this -  
but their relative lack of experience means that they have to take testimony on trust more than do adults.
Recent empirical work has found that ‘from an early age, children monitor the reliability of particular 
informants, differentiate between those who make true and false claims and keep that differential 
accuracy in mind when evaluating new information from these people’, showing a Humean reductionist 
approach by being vigilant to testimonial track record. However, children defer ‘to adult authority on 
issues of naming and categorization.’ Melissa A. Koenig & Paul L. Harris (2007) ‘ The Basis of 
Epistemic Trust: Reliable Testimony or Reliable Sources?’, Episteme, vol.4, pp.264-284, p.264 
19 Elizabeth Fricker (2002) Trusting others in the sciences: a priori or empirical warrant? Studies in 
History and Philosophy o f Science, 33, p.380.
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rich background beliefs we can draw upon in evaluating the likelihood o f a piece o f 
testimony. Our trust of a testifier is likened by her to a simple bridge-like structure 
supported by a large number o f vertical columns, only one o f which is the a priori 
acceptance principle. In the absence of any relevant empirically-derived beliefs,
... it would be the only support, and have to bear the whole weight of the bridge 
(the right to trust). But in fact, there are very many other columns -  empirical 
beliefs supporting the hypothesis that the speaker is trustworthy on her topic -  so 
that the load bome by this column is very small.192
This seems very plausible, but Coady, contra Flicker, does believe the a priori principle 
to apply to many everyday situations, such as his ringing the telephone company to 
enquire about his bill. He claims that in such ‘ordinary dealings with others we gather 
information without this concern for inferring the acceptability o f communication from 
premisses about the honesty, reliability, probability, etc., o f our communicants.’ This 
seems to me to be mistaken. Coady is not a child who takes just about everything on 
trust, nor is he a stranger in a foreign land who is forced to rely on the advice o f an 
arbitrary passer-by. His dealings with his (Australian) telephone company take place 
against a rich backdrop o f highly believable, safe and sensitive assumptions, including 
that the number he telephones is the correct one (an assumption which will be 
confirmed or refuted when the phone company answers or not), that the representative 
he speaks to has accurate data on the screen in front o f him and that the call is likely to 
be recorded (reducing even further the possibility o f a wayward employee giving out 
false information on a whim). All o f this enables him to make inferences about his 
interlocutor’s trustworthiness, so the weight bome by Coady’s a priori blind trust is 
insignificant.
On this theme o f trust, David Henderson sets out two ‘stylized positions’193 -  roughly 
corresponding to those of the local reductionists and anti-reductionists respectively -  
governing the ways in which testimony may legitimately be used in belief-formation: 
‘Acceptance with Monitoring (AM)’ and ‘Acceptance with Reason Inhibition (ARI)’. 
Each position is held by a number of philosophers194 and differs broadly in the extent to 
which the monitoring of our testifiers ought to be conducted. AM requires that ‘one
192 Elizabeth Fricker (2002) ibid, p.381. Interestingly, Ernest Sosa supplied Flicker with this analogy in 
commenting on her paper at a conference in 1998.
193 David Henderson (2008) Testimonial Beliefs and Epistemic Competence’, Noüs, 42:2, p. 197.
194 AM is, according to Henderson, a view held by Fricker (1987, 1994), Adler (1994), Lyons (1997) and 
Falkner (2000), whilst ARI is ‘championed’ by Burge (1993, 1997) and ‘congenial’ to Coady (1992,
1994).
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must employ cognitive processes that monitor the trustworthiness o f one’s interlocutor 
or testimonial source’, while ARI considers it to be ‘a fitting epistemic default position 
that one accepts testimony, that one simply trusts one’s interlocutor’.*95 However, this 
latter ‘default’ position is not a rigid response to testimony but a pro tanto stance that 
can collapse in the presence of underminers. The two positions identified by 
Henderson as representing the two ends o f the spectrum of the contemporary 
epistemology o f testimony are all not that extreme, for both accept that testimony can 
lead to knowledge -  unlike Plato, Descartes and Locke (at least in some o f their 
pronouncements). All that the distinction seems to me to amount to is a faint echo of 
the intemalism/extemalism debate. AM is associated with a conscious monitoring for 
trustworthiness which runs parallel to the auditing o f testimony, whereas this checking 
is ‘inhibited’ in ARJ, but nevertheless takes place at a sub-conscious level and will 
ascend to conscious awareness when warning signs are present. On my analysis, AM is 
an internalist construal of monitoring, whereas ARI uses an externalist, reliabilist, 
counterfactual version, which switches to an internalist mode (that is, fully available to 
consciousness) in the presence o f appropriate cues.
The Cultivation of an Epistemically Virtuous Approach to Testimony
It is clear, then, that developing this attunement towards people and their 
pronouncements on various topics is something that sits in tandem with the gradual 
acquisition and refinement o f the other epistemic virtues. There are times when 
hyperbolic doubt and the questioning of all testimony is the intellectually-virtuous 
response -  for example, during a philosophy seminar -  and other times when simple 
acceptance is warranted -  for instance in response to a colleague saying that she is 
hungry. We gradually build up a working knowledge o f whom we can trust to help us 
in our various epistemic predicaments, and what standards we ought to be applying in 
given situations, while at the same time we weave the fabric o f beliefs which forms the 
background for assessing the likely credibility o f the putative knowledge we are 
currently being offered via testimony. This practice arguably resists any simple 
codification into rules, requires the contextual awareness and good judgement of 
phronesis, and involves a deft navigation between the two extremes o f  gullibility and 
scepticism.
195 Henderson (2008) op. cit., p. 197.
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Steven Shapin has developed an approach to testimony which is reminiscent of this 
Aristotelian notion of a virtue as the mean between two extremes, except that in his 
case either extreme can be a virtue under some circumstances and we must make a 
binary choice between them in the particular case rather than seeking a happy medium. 
Just as phronesis is indispensable in finding the midpoint between two Aristotelian 
extremes, since any rules only apply ‘for the most part’ (epi to polu), there can be no 
blanket rule which bypasses the need for such good judgement and which 
algorithmically tells us the one to plump for.
In respect o f testimony, Shapin proposes that for each epistemic maxim there is a 
counter-maxim. So, for example, the maxim that agreement between witnesses is 
epistemically desirable has the counter-maxim that this may indicate collusion or 
common dependence on an unreliable source.196 Deciding whether the maxim or its 
counter-maxim should apply in a particular case cannot be the subject o f a higher-level 
maxim (for this, I suggest, would have its own counter-maxim, thus launching an 
infinite regress), so there is no substitute for discernment and practical wisdom.
These powers o f judgement are not fully developed in the epistemic novice (the young 
child), so there are occasions in which the acceptance o f a particular testimonially- 
based belief is to be considered ‘epistemically blameless’ -  to use Duncan Pritchard’s 
terminology197 -  yet would be evidence o f a blameworthy credulity were the auditor an 
adult. As teachers, we ought to foster progress by helping the learners along this 
dimension o f ‘non-gullibility’. We may feel that Jack’s acceptance o f assurances that a 
giant beanstalk would grow from the magic beans he traded for a cow amounts to a 
touchingly naive credulity in the case o f a young child (an unmissable stage in a child’s 
epistemic development)198 but is a culpable and epistemically-remiss example of 
gullibility for an intellectually-mature adult. Perhaps the relevant testimonial maxim 
here is: ‘I f  an offer appears to be too good to be true, it is too good to be true. And the 
counter-maxim could be ‘If an offer seems too good to be true, it may still turn out to 
be true’.
l96Steven Shapin (1994) A Social History o f Truth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) Summarised 
in Peter Lipton (1998) ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Stud Hist. Phil. Sci., vol.29, no.l, p.29.
197 Duncan Pritchard (2004) ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophical Issues, 14, Epistemology, 
p-339.
198 This phenomenon of infant credulity, and the deleterious consequences for childhood testimony, is 
explored in Principe and Smith’s (2008) paper, ‘The Tooth, The Whole Tooth and Nothing but the 
Tooth: How Belief in the Tooth Fairy Can Engender False Memories’, Applied Cognitive Psychology 22, 
pp.62S-642. This has implications for educational virtue epistemology, to which 1 shall later return.
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Another view is that between the two extremes o f naive credulity (exemplified in 
fiction by Jack o f the beanstalk and Eleanor H. Porter’s Pollyanna) and hard-bitten 
scepticism (exemplified in a BBC sitcom, One Foot in the Grave, by the character 
Victor Meldrew,199 and in actuality by the BBC Newsnight television journalist Jeremy 
Paxman200) is a truth-conducive happy medium. Locating this virtuous Aristotelian 
mean between the opposing vices o f gullibility and suspiciousness is a task which 
resists easy codification and depends on developing powers of judgement to allow one 
to avoid committing an ‘epistemic injustice’201 either to oneself or to one’s testifiers. 
Politicians sometimes tell the truth to Paxman, and her friends sometimes lie to 
Pollyanna.
Conclusions of Chapter 2
This chapter has explored various viewpoints on testimony and has critically endorsed 
the contention that it is an important source o f knowledge, on a par with perception, 
memory and reasoning. It has also shown the individual agent’s dependency on the 
communal reservoir o f testimonial knowledge. However, the testimonial source shares 
with the perceptual, the mnemonic and the cognitive, a human fallibility, so while the 
default stance towards it may be trust, there is still a need for some sort of epistemic 
vigilance on the part o f the auditor. This monitoring ought to be developed and refined 
in the learners, though not to the extent o f being a corrosive suspiciousness, for such an 
extreme is not epistemically virtuous and would interfere with the legitimate use o f 
testimony in knowledge-acquisition. As Dan Sperber et al. put it: ‘Vigilance (unlike 
distrust) is not the opposite of trust; it is the opposite o f blind trust’.202
The successes o f testimony, including our ability as a species to undertake co-operative 
projects such as politics, science, and, importantly for our present concerns, education, 
ultimately rest on our acting in accordance with the other-regarding epistemic virtues.
!W Catch phrase: “I don’t believe it.”
200 Who famously claims silently to ask himself the question when interviewing politicians: “Why is this 
lying bastard lying to me now?”
201 S.E. Marshall (2003) ‘Epistemic Injustice: The Third Way?’, Metaphifosophy, vol.34, nos.1/2, p.174. 
The phrase is Miranda Fricker’s (not Elizabeth Pricker’s).
202 Dan Sperber, Fabrice Clement, Christopher Heintz, Oliver Mascara, Hugo Mercier, Gloria Origgi and 
Deirdre Wilson (2010) ‘Epistemic Vigilance’, Mind & Language, vol.25, no.4, September, pp.359-393. 
p.363
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Michael W elboume’s description of Reid’s view o f our epistemic gifts provides a clue 
as to how an analysis of testimony may be made through the lens o f such virtues:
According to Reid, we have two inherent, God-given and co-ordinate propensities, 
propensities which tally. One of them he calls the Principle of Credulity -  the 
propensity to believe what we are told; the tallying principle he calls the Principle 
of Veracity -  the propensity to be truthful when we tell other people what is
what.203
Clearly, Reid sees ‘credulity’ as a virtue and not a vice, but we need to distinguish 
between untenable credulity and reasonable acceptance.204 Nevertheless, these 
‘propensities’ o f veracity and credulity, together with an extended use o f Reid’s 
‘tallying’, will be important in epistemic ventures such as education, so in the next 
chapter I turn to these other-regarding intellectual virtues. In general, epistemic agents 
are not frequently in a position where they know little or nothing about the subject 
matter to which testimony is being given, but the formal learning situation can be one 
such case. In these circumstances, the teacher may insist on occasion that learners 
revert to the acceptance principle, since they have no way o f knowing if the testimony 
is trustworthy or not. A better action, though, is for her to attempt to bridge the gap 
between the testimony and their prior experience and knowledge, so that they are in a 
position to assess its plausibility. To do so requires the teacher to enounce her 
testimony judiciously, such that learners’ memory, perception and rationality are 
engaged. In turn, this will draw on her other-regarding epistemic virtues, guided by 
phronesis.
203 Thomas Reid (1764) An Enquiry, in Michael Welboume (2002) ‘Is Hume really a reductivist?’, Stud. 
Hist. Phil. Set., 33, p.419.
204 In the present work, there is a degree of equivocation over the word ‘credulity’, by sometimes 
following conventional usage in assuming it to be a vice. However, on these occasions it is generally 
prefaced by a critical adjective such as ‘naive’.
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Chapter 3 - Other-regarding Epistemic Virtues
Introduction
Here I begin to investigate a key theme in this thesis: that the teacher is normatively a 
person who embodies ‘other-regarding epistemic virtue’. This notion is a virtually 
unexplored one,205 particularly as it relates to the teacher, so this chapter develops 
possible meanings. These concentrate on, but go beyond, the obvious exemplification 
o f ‘other-regarding epistemic virtue’ as involving a straightforward epistemic process 
in which teachers tell students what they believe, and students gratefully receive it. In 
particular, the doxastic webs o f both teacher and learner are seen to be located in wider 
epistemic communities and disciplinary fields, and are linked by plausibility, 
reputation, and reciprocity. The presence o f what I term ‘complementary’ virtues in 
the teacher and the taught -  along the lines o f Reid’s ‘tallying principle’ -  underlies 
both virtuous knowledge-acquisition and the development o f stable intellectual 
dispositions in the learner. Reid’s own example o f credulity and veracity is used as the 
main vehicle for exploring the notions ‘other-regarding’ and ‘complementarity’. I test 
the limits o f his pairing by developing criteria for felicitous epistemic transactions that 
involve the two ideas, as well as by identifying a number o f ways in which the default 
propensity o f veracity might legitimately be subverted. Analysis o f the other 
complementary virtues pertinent to the teaching and learning situation is to be found in 
chapters 5 and 6.
To begin with, though, I shall prepare the ground for a development o f the overall 
concept o f ‘other-regarding epistemic virtue’ by examining some historical notions o f 
self-regard and other-regard. This sets the scene for an exploration o f a virtuous 
approach to ‘the other’, first in general terms, and then as a specifically epistemic 
notion.
2Ci 1 know of only one published work on the topic: Jason Kawall (2004) ‘Other-regarding epistemic 
virtues’, Ratio (new series), XV, 3, pp.257-275.
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Self-regard and Other-regard
For Homer, a virtue is an attribute which enables a free man206 to fulfil his role in life 
and death. Physical strength, deviousness and boldness allow the Homeric hero to 
excel at challenges, such as those o f the battlefield, and thus achieve fame, honour and 
glory {kudos). This intense individualism does not rule out the use o f other persons, 
but the significant word is ‘use’: the Homeric hero regards others, both ethically and 
epistemically, merely as means to his own ends or as an audience for his reputation- 
enhancing exploits. Odysseus, for example, accepts the testimony o f the enchantress 
Circe207 in plotting a course between the twin hazards of the six-headed monster 
(ScyLla) and the deadly whirlpool (Charybdis). But there is no question o f his sharing 
this knowledge in an epistemically other-regarding manner, for doing so would 
compromise his personal survival (and no doubt irritate the six o f his crew he intended 
to sacrifice to occupy the attentions of Scylla’s six heads as he navigated his ship 
within her reach). The ‘wisdom’ qua multi-skilled self-serving cunning (polymetis) o f 
Odysseus is replaced in later Greek thinking by a more other-regarding construal.
Aristotle defines practical wisdom, phronesis, as: ‘a true and reasoned state o f capacity 
to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for men’.208 In other words, 
practical wisdom enables us both to do the right thing for our own sake -  as in the 
Homeric vision -  and also to help those with whom we interact in the polis similarly to 
move towards the good and away from the bad. This type o f wisdom is at least 
potentially other-regarding, for we are to act in the best interests o f ‘m en’ rather than 
just in our own narrow interests.
Some writers, however, accuse Aristotle o f ‘egoistic eudaimonism’ and contrast this 
with the ‘noble sentiments o f Bentham and M ill’, for: ‘A good man is [to Aristotle] a 
producer o f happiness -  but o f his own happiness and not, save incidentally, that o f 
others1.209 While we would not consider Aristotle’s ethics to be agapistic,210 his
206 The Latin word Virtus also points to this notion of virtue as manliness (L. Vir = ‘Man’, as in ‘Virile’). 
The virtuous man was a brave warrior.
207 Interestingly, Aristotle quotes this advice to illustrate his claim that the mean sometimes lies nearer to 
one extreme than the other: ‘Far from this surge and surf keep thou thy ship’. The ‘lesser of the two 
evils’ ia this case was the six-headed monster instead of the deadly whirlpool, for the latter’s ‘surge and 
surf V'ould kill the whole crew, rather than just the six who would perish to feed the monster. Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, bk.Il, 9, 1109a3.
208 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, bk.VI, 5, 1140b4.
209 Jonathan Bames (2003) ‘Introduction’ to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics [tr. JAK. Thompson, notes by 
Hugh Tredennick] (London: Penguin Books, 2004). Because Bames is contrasting Aristotle’s ethics
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description o f man as by nature a political animal (^u)ov jioX it ik o v ) 2 11 shows the 
importance o f features other than the life o f solitary contemplation in his scheme. In 
particular, he claims, ‘Nobody would choose to live without friends even if he had all 
the other good things’.212 This being so, we cannot write off Aristotle’s prescribed 
modus vivendi as merely seeking egoistic eudaimonia, for this would allow only a life 
o f solitary philosophical contemplation and not the other desideratum of the exercise o f 
the social virtues.
Another significant change between the Hellenic era of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, 
and the Archaic one described by Homer, is in the perceived relationship between the 
virtues (aretai) and man’s function (ergon). To Homer, the virtues are simply means to 
an end (the hero’s glory), whilst the Hellenic virtues are partly constitutive o f an end: 
that o f eudaimonia.213 So, on the Aristotelian model, we do not act from, say, wisdom 
merely instrumentally, with the intention o f gaining advantage over our fellows (and 
thus flourishing by elevating our own position): we act from wisdom because to do so 
is to flourish. Virtue is its own reward. If this exercising o f virtue benefits others, so 
much the better. Justice (5iKaioowr|) is similarly other-regarding, as is temperance or 
prudence (ccocppocrbvri), to the extent that we tame our animal instincts and practise 
rational self-control in our dealings with others, thus protecting them from our worst 
excesses. Acting with other-regarding virtue also has the effect o f  benefiting the 
virtuous agent himself, for to Aristotle a virtuous life is a flourishing life, as we have 
seen. The good life is one in which we are wise (cppovr|cn<;), just, temperate and 
steadfast (avbpsla), not one in which we jockey for personal glory at all costs and hack 
down anyone who stands in our way. M an’s ergon in the Hellenic dispensation is to 
exercise the virtues, not simply to discharge his appointed role heroically.
From an Hellenic viewpoint, ‘other-regarding’ ought not to be conflated with 
‘altruistic’, for such an un-Aristotelian extreme position deprives us o f the balanced life 
in which we have regard both to the needs o f others and to our own needs. More recent
with modem notions of morality -  which tend towards the deontic or utilitarian, and so emphasise our 
duties lo, and effects upon, others -  he overstates a little to make his distinction clearly.
210 In the secular sense of doing the most benevolent thing in a particular situation.
211 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a2.
212 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a5.
213 Perhaps I oversimplify a little here. For Homer, to fight well in battle is to flourish, so there is a sense 
in which the Homeric virtues are also constitutive as well as instrumental. However, the ends are what 
really count, so we see Odysseus unscrupulously carrying out all manner of cunning plans -  lying, 
cheating and sacrificing many innocents -  in order to secure his victory and maintain his reputation.
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(empirical) work shows that Homo reciprocans is a 'conditional cooperator’, with a 
‘penchant for reciprocity’,214 who becomes other-regarding only when his attunement 
to the particulars o f the situation indicates the desirability o f such cooperation. His 
benevolence is neither constant nor limitless. Susan W olf suggests that what we might 
term an ‘unconditional cooperator’ with unrestricted altruism -  or, as she puts it, a 
‘moral saint’ -  lives a rather barren life, which ‘does not constitute a model of personal 
well-being towards which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a 
human being to strive’.215 Neither is the moral saint attractive to others, for:
... we look in our paragons of moral excellence for people whose moral achievements occur in 
conjunction with ... some interests or traits that have low moral tone. [...] [but moral saints] 
make us feel uncomfortable - they highlight our own weaknesses, vices and flaws216
We might quibble with W olfs use o f the word ‘uncomfortable’, though, for 
encouraging someone out o f their comfort zone by modelling a high standard of 
personal conduct could well be a highly productive move. But this ought not to involve 
excess. A moral saint who embodied the virtues to an excessive degree would 
represent an unattainable ideal, too remote from the plain person to act as an exemplar. 
To Aristotle, she would also have failed to hit the happy medium and could thus be 
regarded as having strayed towards vice. (In a similar way, a teacher whom we might 
label an ‘epistemic saint’ would be too distant from the learners to act as a role model. 
Unwarranted pedantry and exaggerated carefulness in enquiry, for example, are neither 
emulable traits nor epistemically-fruitful dispositions). Determining the right actions 
which promote both our own well-being and that of others is not easy, but will not 
involve the excesses o f full moral (or epistemic) sainthood.
Interestingly, W olf categorises such apparently harmless activities as reading Victorian 
novels or playing the oboe as inimical to moral sainthood, for they reduce the time 
available for feeding the hungry, curing the sick, and so on. 217 However, if we 
entertain my notion o f an ‘epistemic saint’ once again, her suggested prohibitions for a 
moral saint (reading Victorian novels and playing the oboe) would not apply, for being
214 Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis (1997) ‘Homo reciprocans'. A Research 
Initiative on the Origins, Dimensions, and Policy Implications of Reciprocal Fairness’, p.5.
":i Susan Wolf (1982), ‘Moral Saints’, Journal o f Philosophy, 79, pp.419-39 in Roger Crisp &. Michael 
Slote (eds.) (1997) Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p.79 [emphasis added],
216 Wotf(1982), op. cit., p.83 & p.85. She quotes George Orwell on a similar theme: ‘Many people 
genuinely do not wish to be saints, and it is probable that some who achieve or aspire to sainthood have 
never felt much temptation to be human beings’. George Orwell (1945) A Collection of Essays in Wolf 
(1982)op. cit, p.45.
217 Susan Wolf (1982), op. cit, p.83 & p.85.
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an effective other-regarding epistemic agent requires us also to exercise our self- 
regarding intellectual virtues in order that our efforts to ameliorate the epistemic 
predicament o f  others are underwritten by our own active engagement with knowledge. 
The web-like nature o f knowledge means that familiarity with (say) the Victorian novel 
may well help us to reduce the epistemic plight of our beneficiaries, even if it has no 
obvious and direct connection with the immediate issues at hand. In fact, nuanced 
insights from literature may well serve us better in our other-regarding epistemic praxis 
than nostrums drawn from some types o f educational research.218 The overall point 
though, is that in order to help others epistemically, we need also to attend to our own 
epistemic needs, for being a ‘selfless altruist’ is neither good for us qua epistemic 
agents, nor for our interlocutors. Neither is the other extreme o f  ‘selfish hedonist’ to be 
regarded as a virtuous stance for the epistemic agent, for, as we have seen, the ‘feral 
knower’ is deprived both of the advantages o f participating in knowledge sharing 
communities and o f the eudaimonian benefits of other-regarding intellectual activity.
However, these arguments look like consequentialist, rather than virtuous, justifications 
for adopting a position between epistemic altruism and what we might term ‘epistemic 
hedonism’: we locate ourselves thus because by doing so we are well-placed to gather 
up the epistemic prizes. Taking this vantage point is a utilitarian strategy designed to 
maximise our acquisition of epistemic goods, or, in a broader construal, to maximise 
our epistemic good and that of our interlocutors. Alternatively, a consideration o f our 
responsibilities might cause us to regard such a position as our deontic obligation: if  we 
wish to do our epistemic duty to those with whom we are enwebbed, some degree of 
intellectual self-maintenance will be both needed and justified.
Neither o f  these analyses really captures the notion o f epistemic, other-regarding virtue, 
though. They use traditional consequentialist or deontological alternatives. The
218 A view shared by Carr, whom it ‘strikes... as highly implausible to suppose that social or other 
scientific research into pedagogy might reveal much about teaching.’ Cam (2006) op. cit., p. 181. He 
does not, however, discount such a possibility completely, but he places more faith in our ‘wider literary 
inheritance’ as a resource for ‘professionally relevant normative enquiry into the complexities of 
educational and other forms of human motivation and association’, p. 182. Colin McGinn makes a 
similar case in his (1997) book Ethics, Evil, and Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press), using examples from 
Billy Bttdd, Lolita, Frankenstein, The Picture of Dorian Gray and other literary works. He describes, for 
instance, how Frankenstein’s Creature learned to speak and read and ‘becomefs] generally civilized’
(p. 159) by observing others. McGinn then associates this with Augustine’s account of language 
acquisition (which we have already discussed on p.82) and uses it to illuminate the connections between 
language-leaming and the growth of humanity and reason. His overall thesis is that ‘the story of morals 
is the story of moral stories’, (p. 178).
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particular nature o f the other-regarding virtues thus becomes obscured. We attempt 
next to uncover what this might be.
A Virtue-Epistemic Approach to The Other8
In developing a virtue epistemic stance to ‘the other’, we can learn much from the 
parallel work already carried out in virtue ethics. The locus classicus o f the latter term 
is Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1958) article ‘M odem Moral Philosophy’,219 which began 
the revival of virtue ethics. In essence, she argues that a moral theory based on the 
Aristotelian concept o f virtue is an improvement on a deontic one centred on notions o f 
obligation and duty -  legalistic notions that only make sense within what she considers 
to be an outmoded ‘divine law’ framework o f morality. She also attacks utilitarianism 
and sets out to show that virtue ethics is superior.
I shall consider briefly the writings of Philippa Foot and others in virtue ethics, before 
identifying some implications for virtue epistemology, using ideas from Jason Kawall 
and Linda Zagzebski. This discussion bears significant fruit, in the form o f the notion 
that the other-regarding epistemic agent ought to act in accordance with the doxastic 
predicament o f her interlocutor in a complementary way. In other words, the different 
intellectual virtues animating the epistemic benefactor and beneficiary should interlock. 
In this section, I also broaden the focus beyond the dyad o f those whom we might term 
the epistemic agent and patient, and consider how a fie ld  can also benefit from 
‘epistemic largesse’. There is discussion too o f  truth-telling and its limitations, and o f  
timely intervention, both regulated by the ideal o f  well-attuned benevolence: ideas 
which will later be shown to be important in educational virtue epistemology.
219 G.E.M. Anscombe (1958) ‘Modem Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, 33. Reprinted in Roger Crisp & 
Michael Slote (eds.) (1997) Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.26-44.
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Two years after Anscombe inaugurated contemporary virtue ethics, Georg Henrik von 
Wright claimed in his Gifford Lectures that the difference between self-regarding and 
other-regarding virtues is as follows:
One way of marking the distinction between them is to say that self-regarding 
virtues essentially serve the welfare of the agent himself, who possesses and 
practises them, whereas other-regarding virtues essentially serve the good of other 
beings ... The sharpness of the distinction is not obliterated by the obvious fact that 
virtues, which are essentially self-regarding, may also be accidentally other- 
regarding, and vice versa?™
This initially appears to be a plausible division, but it turns out to be unsatisfactory, for 
the ‘self-regarding’ virtues can have an important role -  and not merely an accidental 
one -  to play in the welfare of others. We saw this, earlier, in my claim that an other- 
regarding epistemic agent must also exercise her self-regarding intellectual virtues, so 
that her epistemic beneficence is tethered to the world by her own active enwebment 
with knowledge. I f  a lecturer keeps up with the latest work in her field for sake o f her 
students, the intellectual benefits they receive are not accidental but are essentially 
connected with her reading, writing and conference-going. In a more general way, by 
analysing who can be served by the virtues -  which Gabriele Taylor and Sybil Wolfram 
catalogue under the headings of putatively ‘self-regarding’ (‘temperance, prudence, 
courage and industry’) and ‘other-regarding’ (‘generosity, conscientiousness, honesty, 
veracity and justice’) -  they show that von Wright’s dichotomy is untenable, and 
propose their own classification.
So, we want to say, the distinction between the self-regarding and other-regarding 
virtues is the distinction between those virtues which make up what we often call 
strength of character and those which make up what we might call good intentions 
or perhaps moral goodness -  though we have to be careful about this label.221
We see, however, that Taylor & Wolfram’s division is also permeable -  at least in our 
educational setting -  for apparently self-regarding ‘industry’, on the part o f the lecturer 
who is well-enwebbed with her discipline, may well have major effects on her 
‘generosity’, ‘conscientiousness’ and ‘veracity’ vis-à-vis her work with her students.
Virtue Ethics and Regard for the Other
220 The I960 Gifford Lectures were later published as Georg Henrik von Wright (1963) The Varieties o f 
Goodness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) p. 153.
~21 Gabriele Taylor & Sybil Wolfram (1968) ‘The Self-Regarding and Other-Regarding Virtues’, The 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 18, no.72, pp.238-248, p.247
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Her intellectually self-regarding activity renews her excitement about her subject and 
encourages her to share this enthusiasm and knowledge with her students.
Another o f the first contemporary philosophers to consider the virtues with respect to 
the question, cui bono? is Philippa Foot: “But now we must ask to whom the benefit 
goes, whether to the one who has the virtue or rather to those who have to do with 
him ’. She identifies certain virtues as being beneficial both to the virtuous person 
and to those around him (for example, courage, temperance and wisdom) and other 
virtues (charity and justice) as being of direct benefit only to his fellows. Indeed, Foot 
points out that these other-regarding virtues223 may sometimes not only be o f no benefit 
to the virtuous man, they may even be against his interests and demand some sacrifice 
on his part.
Foot’s analysis is non-consequentialist, in that she places great emphasis on the 
virtuous intentions o f the agent and does not look just at the outcomes. However, she 
also sees well-intentioned shortcomings in performance as sometimes still 
blameworthy (for example, in the case o f one person doing wrong to another through 
avoidable ignorance). Earlier, I developed a similar theme concerning the culpability 
o f a motorist with uncorrected known defective eyesight causing a road accident in 
which others were injured. Related to this notion o f intentionality,224 is that o f the 
affective dimension o f virtuous acts (both intention and emotion having in common 
some sort o f mediating role between virtue and action). Foot draws attention to the 
difference between Aristotle and Kant in this respect.225
As we have seen, Aristotle considers a mark o f truly virtuous action to be the pleasure 
we take in it: not only does the virtuous person do the virtuous thing for virtuous 
reasons, he also has a well-ordered affect such that he enjoys doing it. Kant, on the 
other hand, as we find in the Groundwork fo r  the Metaphysic o f  Morals, sees ‘true 
moral worth’ only in those actions performed out o f a sense o f  duty. The philanthropist 
who ‘find[s] an inner satisfaction in spreading joy and take[s] delight in the
222 Philippa Foot (1978) ‘Virtues and Vices’ in Crisp & Slote (eds.) (1997) op. cit., p.164.
223 Foot does not use the term ‘other-regarding’, but her meaning is the same.
224 Here, I mean ‘intentionality’ in Elizabeth Anscombe’s sense of a deliberate act rather than Edmund 
Husserl’s meaning of ‘aboutness’. G.E.M. Anscombe (1957) ‘Intention’, Proceedings o f the Aristotelian 
Society, New Series, Vol. 57, pp. 321-332.
22i Foot (1978) op. cit., p.171.
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contentment o f others’226 does not receive Kant’s approbation, while for Aristotle this 
enjoyable benevolence would be praiseworthy. We note here, though, that the 
pleasurable feeling is not a sufficient mdicator o f virtue.
Foot explicitly rules out ‘mental powers’ as virtues,227 for while they are beneficial, 
they are virtues o f a mind, not of a man (just as strength is a virtue o f a body). The 
next task, then, is to show that ‘mental powers’ qua epistemic virtues can -  pace Foot -  
be analysed along the same lines as the other-regarding virtues identified by her: that is, 
as attributes which are beneficial both to ourselves and to our fellows, and which 
furthermore give us pleasure.
Epistemic Virtues as Other-regarding
Jason Kawall’s paper, ‘Other-regarding epistemic virtues’,228 goes some way towards 
such an analysis, but in concentrating on the advantages to the beneficiary he 
underplays the benefits to the agent doing the other-regarding, and ignores completely 
the element o f pleasure. Kawall lists the following as ‘candidates’ for other-regarding 
epistemic virtues:
(i) honesty (eg in one’s testimony), sincerity, integrity (including an unwillingness to 
misuse one’s status as expert), and creativity (which can inspire others, and lead to the 
discovery of new truths in a community), (ii) ... the skills of a good teacher, and (iii)
... the skills of a good listener (and critic) insofar as they help other epistemic agents to 
articulate and examine their own beliefs carefully and lucidly. 229
His first-approximation definition o f an other-regarding epistemic virtue is based on the 
condition that the knowledge-acquisition enabled by such a virtue relates to others, 
rather than to the epistemic agent herself, and this is highly significant to our project. 
The division he employs is not an altogether happy one, however, for ‘the skills o f a 
good teacher’ and ‘the skills o f a good listener’ are in separate categories, when the 
former ought to include the latter (although of course a good listener need not be a 
good teacher). Since Kawall explicitly intends an aretaic virtue-based, rather than 
reliabilist, approach, there is a need to frame the definition in such a way that the 
intentions o f whom we might call the ‘giving agent’ are important; that is, the agent is
226 Immanuel Kant (1785) op. cit., p.8 [Online] Available at: 
http ://www. earlymodemtexts.com/pdf/kantgw .pdf.
227 Foot (1978) op. cit., p. 164.
228 Jason Kawall (2004) ‘Other-regarding epistemic virtues’, Ratio (new series), XV, 3, pp.257-275
229 ibid., p.260.
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not merely a learning object who unwittingly provokes knowledge-gains in the patient 
but one who consciously intends the beneficiary o f her virtue to make such gains. He 
thus modifies Zagzebski’s definition of intellectual virtue simpliciter to capture his 
notion o f other-regarding epistemic virtue (not a concept mentioned by Zagzebski 
herself):
An act o f other-regarding intellectual virtue A is an act that arises from the motivational 
component of A, is something that a person with A would (probably) do in the circumstances, is 
successful in achieving the end of the A motivation, and is such that the beneficiaries of the act 
acquire a true belief (cognitive contact with reality) through these features of the act. 230
This is rather a demanding definition, including as it does the requirement that not only 
must the other-regarding epistemic agent intend the patient to make ‘cognitive contact 
with reality’, but also that her intentions are actually brought to fruition: that she is 
successful. I f  the Aristotelian sine qua non o f the agent taking pleasure in her virtuous 
actions is also added (an addition made neither by Kawall nor Zagzebski), the bar is set 
high for her other-regarding acts to achieve recognition as being epistemically-virtuous. 
Such an act must be (i) motivated by intellectual virtue, (ii) o f a type that an 
intellectually-virtuous person would engage in (iii) non-accidentally successful in 
achieving its goal in the intended beneficiary and (iv) pleasurable to the agent.
Crucial, but not mentioned by Kawall, is Zagzebski’s definition o f knowledge, which 
follows immediately after her quoted definition o f intellectual virtue: ‘Knowledge is a 
state o f cognitive contact with reality arising out o f acts o f  intellectual virtue’.231 If  we 
combine this with Kawall’s definition o f other-regarding epistemic virtue, it seems that 
knowledge -  not merely true belief -  is available to the beneficiary through other- 
regarding acts o f epistemic virtue on the part of an epistemic agent.
However, care must be exercised in coming to this conclusion. In Zagzebski’s model, 
the virtuous epistemic agent and the person I have characterised as the beneficiary (or 
the patient) are one and the same. It is the virtue-animated agent who achieves 
‘cognitive contact with reality’ for himself, and not some other person who benefits 
vicariously from these virtuous acts. Indeed, on Zagzebski’s construal, a passive (that 
is, non-virtuous) beneficiary has no entitlement to his epistemic benefits: unless they 
are acquired by the personal exercise of virtue, they are not to be regarded as
230 Kawall (2004) op, cit, p.265, based on Zagzebski (1996) Virtues o f the Mind, p.270 [Italics in 
original].
231 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p.270 [Emphasis in original].
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knowledge, even if the ‘benefactor’232 has acted from other-regarding epistemic virtue. 
In some very recent work, Sosa too denies the knower much legitimacy for his true 
belief if it reached him without his acting from his own epistemic virtue: ‘Relatively 
little of the credit belongs to the ultimate believer ... if  all he did was to trust the 
authoritative source without question’.233
One solution to this difficulty is the recognition that the epistemic virtues relevant to 
the benefactor need not be the same as those o f the beneficiary. To be sure, the 
beneficiary must act from some intellectual virtue in order to achieve ‘cognitive contact 
with reality’, but this could simply be Zagzebski’s ‘being able to recognize reliable 
authority’.234 In a complementary manner, the intellectual virtues motivating the 
benefactor’s acts might be ‘the teaching virtues: the social virtues o f  being 
communicative, including intellectual candor and knowing your audience and how they 
respond’.235
Complementary Intellectual Virtues
So, a fuller working-out of Kawall’s appropriation o f Zagzebski’s definition of 
intellectual virtue yields a more nuanced view o f the intellectual virtues which might be 
at work in agent-patient, benefactor-beneficiary, testifier-auditor (or, for our purposes, 
teacher-taught) dyads. Kawall’s requirement that the benefactor’s act o f other- 
regarding epistemic virtue be successful (that is, that it lead to ‘cognitive contact with 
reality’ in the beneficiary) generates, I suggest, the corollary that the beneficiary too 
must act with epistemic virtue (although not necessarily, nor even typically, the same 
particular virtue which motivates the benefactor.) For the engagement between 
benefactor and beneficiary to bear fruit, both parties have to act with conjugate 
epistemic virtue.
The two testimonial ‘propensities’ identified by Reid and mentioned in the last chapter 
-  the principle o f credulity and the principle of veracity -  are both other-regarding in 
the sense that they involve an epistemic relationship with another person: either a 
testifier or an auditor. But it is the latter propensity -  veracity -  which is the more
232 N ot a term used by either Zagzebski or Kawall.
233 Sosa (2011) op. cit, p. 129. Since Sosa’s AAA model of knowledge requires such credit (aptness 
involving credit), this is almost equivalent to saying that the trusting agent did not receive knowledge.
234 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p. 114.
235 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p.l 14.
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obvious candidate for exemplifying epistemic other-regarding virtue, in that it relates to 
occasions on which we are in some way concerned with helping a fellow knowledge- 
seeker by means o f our testimony. In the former -  credulity -  we appear to be merely 
optimistically helping ourselves. Later, however, I show that credulity too can be 
other-regarding, but in the very different sense of submission to a discipline or practice 
(p. 120). Furthermore, these two ‘co-ordinate’ propensities are to a large extent 
interdependent, for, as I argued earlier, we ought to have regard to our own epistemic 
condition in order to contribute usefully to that of another. We may consider ourselves 
to be nodes in a community o f knowers, and our usefulness to adjoining epistemic 
agents -  and hence to the community at large -  depends not just on our imih-telling 
propensities but also on our having well-developed testimony-receivmg virtues 
(together with the on-board epistemic resources of perception, memory and reason).
This represents a change o f emphasis in the characterisation o f the epistemic agent, 
whose mission has traditionally been seen as one o f selfishly accumulating the largest 
hoard o f epistemic prizes. Charles Taylor calls this Lockean ‘disengaged subject 
exercising instrumental control’ the ‘punctual se lf .236 The mythical self-sufficient 
epistemic agent — the ‘feral knower’237 — has simply to gather up as many true justified 
beliefs as possible, while ensuring that no false beliefs contaminate the booty.
These further considerations lead, I conjecture, to an even more demanding set of 
criteria for an act to be considered one o f other-regarding epistemic virtue. Not only 
must the acts o f both parties in the transaction be virtuously motivated, the specific 
virtues animating each ought also to interlock correctly, and moreover they should both 
enjoy it. I describe this interlocking in more detail in chapter 6 (p.244). I f  the putative 
beneficiary either fails to act from a complementary virtuous motivation which enables 
the benefactor’s intentions to bear epistemic fruit, or derives no pleasure from the 
engagement, then the benefactor is also deemed to have failed. This ‘success’ 
component, dependent as it is on the contingencies o f putative beneficiaries’ virtues, 
motivations, and affective responses, seems, however, to be a rather unfair requirement
236 Charles Taylor (1989) Sources o f the Self: the Making o f the Modem Identity (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press) p. 174. He intends ‘punctual’ to denote ‘point-like’, or a ‘perfectly detachable 
consciousness’ (p. 172): very different from the interconnected, engaged model of the epistemic agent 
which motivates this chapter.
237 Kusch & Lipton (2002) op. cit, p,211
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of the other-regarding epistemic agent. Kawall also wants to dilute this demanding 
criterion:
...we could hold that agents are at least epistemically praiseworthy if they testify clearly, though
their listeners fail to form an appropriate belief (where the error lies in the listeners) ...2 8
Against this, one could argue that the fully virtuous other-regarding epistemic agent -  
in the Aristotelian sense rather than that o f an epistemic saint -  ought to be aware that 
on a particular occasion simply giving clear testimony is an inadequate response to the 
epistemic predicament of her intended beneficiary. Even a less-than-perfect epistemic 
agent could justifiably be accused of naivety in blaming her interlocutor for neither 
understanding, nor paying attention to, nor enjoying her lengthy and comprehensive 
disquisition on a particular topic.
In a felicitous epistemic interchange, Aristotle’s sungndme (sympathetic judgement) is 
thus indispensable in allowing us to achieve some understanding of, and attunement 
with, our interlocutor’s precise predicament before attempting to help. However, this 
amendment aside, Kawall is right to question the extent to which the benefactor can 
legitimately be held accountable for the shortcomings o f her intended beneficiaries.
We cannot simply let the benefactor off the hook though, as Kawall suggests, and 
award her the epistemic runner-up prize o f ‘praiseworthy’. Indeed, ‘praiseworthy’, or 
our earlier ‘creditable’, implies success and not merely valiant effort.239 Perfection is 
clearly too demanding, but some degree o f empathy with the epistemic needs and 
motivations o f her beneficiaries is indispensable for the benefactor, if  the success 
component o f the Zagzebski/Kawall definition is to be addressed. This attunement is 
more likely to lead to success, defined in terms of the beneficiaries’ enhanced 
‘cognitive contact with reality’, and is thus a necessary component o f the other- 
regarding virtues, particularly for a teacher. It falls short o f being sufficient though,
238 Kawall (2004) ibid., p.265.
239 ‘Teaching’ too can be seen as a success-term. Nel Noddings quotes John Dewey (1933) on this 
theme: ‘Teaching may be compared to selling commodities. No one can sell unless someone buys ... 
There is the same exact equation between teaching and learning that there is between selling and 
buying’. (Nel Noddings (2004) ‘Is Teaching a Practice’, Joseph Dunne & Padraig Hogan (eds.) (2004) 
Education and Practice: Upholding the Integrity of Teaching and Learning (Oxford: Blackwell) p. 159). 
However, we might find Dewey’s metaphor to be badly chosen, and Noddings shows that ‘taught’ may 
be a success word but ‘teaching’ is not. We can see that there might be unanticipated thwarting factors 
which interfere with what would otherwise be successful teaching, through no fault of the teacher. Her 
sungndme ought to warn her, though, when her project has no hope of success. If this warning is absent 
or ignored, then the teacher is arguably not truly teaching. To claim to be have taught something, 
implies at least partial uptake by at least some of the learners.
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and does not guarantee success, for the process may fail in one o f three distinct ways, 
which I here label ‘Vicious Rejection’, ‘Vicious Acceptance’ and ‘Virtuous Rejection’ 
(a fourth, successful, category ‘Virtuous Acceptance’ is the desirable outcome, given 
the stipulation that the putative knowledge being offered is ‘true’ or, alternatively, that 
it represents ‘cognitive contact with reality’).
Vicious Rejection occurs when the intended beneficiary blocks the benefactor’s well- 
intentioned epistemic actions, motivated by vices such as closed-mindedness and 
dogmatism (what Roberts and Wood call ‘eidosclerosis’).240 Note that this need not 
imply a ‘transmission’ model of knowledge-transfer: closed-mindedness can also 
effectively neutralise more pedagogically constructivist approaches on the part of the 
benefactor.
Vicious Acceptance is in some ways more problematic than Vicious Rejection. The 
beneficiary has now acquired a true belief, so all appears to be well. But, since the 
belief is not justifiably held by having a virtuous provenance, it ought not to be 
regarded as knowledge. It is untethered and indefensible. An example of this might be 
a gullible acceptance o f unintentionally-true testimony, even though the ‘standard 
warning signs’ o f suspect testimony, or a failure to cohere with the auditor’s existing 
web o f beliefs, were present. A positivist or behaviourist test of the ‘beneficiary’s’ 
belief-web would attribute the title o f ‘knowledge’ to such gullibly-acquired beliefs, 
but these would not be so categorised by virtue epistemology.
Virtuous Rejection implies that the intended beneficiary has good (internalist) grounds 
for refusing to accept the true beliefs offered by his benefactor, an offering motivated 
by her epistemic virtue. This may be due to a mismatch between the epistemic virtues 
enacted by the two parties, or it may simply be a consequence o f the fallibility o f 
humans. Unless we employ a circular definition -  in which knowledge is deemed to be 
the result o f intellectual virtue, and intellectual virtue is that which yields knowledge -  
there is always the possibility o f a gap between virtuously-acquired beliefs and true 
justified beliefs. Students’ epistemic judgements, like our own, are not infallible, and 
they may opt for the ‘wrong’ virtue when two or more are in conflict (believing in 
expert testimony vs. behaving with intellectual courage, for example): so acting out of 
intellectual virtue is no guarantee o f acquiring knowledge. Because o f  these potential
240 Roberts & Wood (2007) op. cit, p.202.
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clashes between virtues, the over-arching virtue o f phronesis will be needed by the 
mature knowledge-seeker in deciding which intellectual virtue, or combination of 
virtues, is proper for the occasion.
For instance, the teacher may tell the student that all objects accelerate at the same rate 
in the Earth’s gravitational field. This true testimony invites the student to exercise the 
virtue o f ‘... proper trust of authority outside [his] area o f expertise’ (VOM, p.319)’.
But the student has already had much experience o f observing falling objects, since he 
first dropped a rattle from his pram, and later made paper aeroplanes, so he might 
instead act from ‘... the ability to think up illuminating scientific hypotheses ... ’
(VOM, p.21). He does not recognise that this is an instance o f a phenomenon outside 
his area o f expertise and thus virtuously (but incorrectly, as it turns out) rejects the 
teacher’s testimony. In another sense, though, this is not a truly virtuous action, for the 
learner’s practical wisdom is not yet fully developed and his ability to judge the 
situation and choose the right virtue(s) is thus unreliable.
Beyond the Epistemic Dyad
Other-regarding epistemic virtue in a benefactor-beneficiary dyad is likely to be 
relatively uncommon in its fullest manifestation, given the demanding definition o f acts 
o f epistemic virtue considered above (that is, they are: virtuously motivated, display 
sungndme, interlocked, successful qua virtuous uptake, and pleasurable). However, 
restricting discussion to such a dyad would betray individualist prejudices, in that by 
doing so we require successful knowledge-growth in a named other, together with the 
rest o f the criteria we have developed so far (the personal virtuous motivation o f the 
beneficiary, accompanied by personal feelings o f pleasure as a result o f his successfully 
acting individually with epistemic virtue). As we saw a moment ago, this can be 
blocked in number o f ways by the intended beneficiary, thereby thwarting his 
benefactor’s good intentions.
If, however, the named beneficiary is replaced by an epistemic community, such 
individualised demands are no longer as significant. A view o f the precise interlocking 
required o f an epistemic dyad can be replaced with a more diffuse set o f linkages which 
distribute epistemic largesse in a less direct way. The benefactor is now seen as a node 
in a web o f interconnected epistemic agents (each o f whom also possesses a personal
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web o f belief). Enhancing the knowledge available to this web causes credit to accrue 
to the benefactor -  even if there is limited uptake by any one individual member o f the 
web -  as long as there is some uptake, virtue and pleasure distributed diachronically 
around the web.
Here, one remnant of Homeric thinking -  which we largely dismissed in the move from 
being entirely self-regarding to being (somewhat) other-regardingly virtuous -  is 
reputation-maintenance.241 This notion o f punishment for transgressing social norms, 
and the concept o f preserving renown and reputation remain important in 
understanding other-regarding epistemic virtue. We are part o f epistemic communities 
in which the providing o f new knowledge is particularly prized, so it seems to me that 
our epistemic reputation depends upon our perceived reliability and co-operativeness in 
contributing such new knowledge. There are formal and informal reputational 
sanctions for individuals who transgress these norms, and there are honours for those 
who exceed them.
However, the requirement o f virtuous and pleasurable uptake by a named beneficiary is 
now made less demanding. There needs to be some virtuous uptake and pleasure 
among the other members of the web, but shortcomings in individual cases do not 
negate the epistemic credit due to the benefactor. A parallel case in the moral sphere 
would be the benevolent alms-giver whose good intentions sometimes misfire, when 
one or more o f her intended beneficiaries spend what they receive on harmful drugs.
She still deserves credit, though, if  her well-motivated acts make the world a better 
place generally (that is, if  some o f her donations are spent on food, shelter and so on). 
Furthermore, the benefactor does not not generate her contribution sui generis, but 
relies on her membership o f various webs to weave her own personal web o f beliefs, 
parts o f which she then makes publicly available. She must still act from self-regarding 
epistemic virtue to construct her own web, and be animated by other-regarding virtue in 
adding to the knowledge available in the external web o f which she is a node (deriving 
pleasure from so doing).
241 When Odysseus returns home to Ithaca, after his long adventurous voyage, he finds himself 
compelled to confront violently the suitors of his wife Penelope. Maintaining his reputation demands 
that he wreak vengeance both on the guilty suitors and on their innocent companions.
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This less demanding characterisation of other-regarding epistemic virtue I offer does 
look a little generous, however, and is itself open to criticisms such as the one I made 
earlier o f Kawall’s letting the ineffective agent off the hook (p.l 14). However, there 
are checks and balances and various types of long-run accountability which enable 
judgements to be made about the epistemic value of an agent’s contribution to the 
community. These will be more nuanced than those relating to dyadic knowledge- 
sharing, in keeping with the more subtle processes o f virtuous knowledge creation and 
diffusion by and through an epistemic web. A brief examination o f one o f the various 
epistemic enterprises undertaken by academic communities illustrates this.
Let us consider a member of the editorial board of an academic journal. I f  we attempt 
to analyse her as a testifier in a dyadic relationship with a named other, she seems to be 
unsuccessful. She appears to have no direct epistemic impact on any named individual, 
using the standard virtuous other-regarding criteria (successful uptake, recipient- 
pleasure and so on). However, by taking a broader and longer view -  that is, by 
considering her beneficial effects on the extended web o f belief characterising a 
particular discipline over a significant period o f time -  her contribution might take on a 
more favourable hue. By refereeing journal articles, she has contributed to the rigour 
and integrity o f  the discipline and its associated public and individual webs o f belief. 
The sum o f knowledge available to the community has increased because o f her 
agency, irrespective of the fact that she has neither contributed new knowledge nor 
virtuously donated any knowledge to a named beneficiary. She has still shown 
epistemic virtue and the community has benefited as a consequence.
There would be some identifiable, direct beneficiaries o f her interventions (notably the 
article authors, who benefit from the reviewer’s possession o f Kawall’s epistemic 
virtue o f being a ‘good ... critic, insofar as they help other epistemic agents to 
articulate and examine their own beliefs carefully and lucidly’242); but once the net 
spreads wider, her influence would be harder to detect. Tracing the effects o f journal 
articles launched into the world would be difficult enough, without attempting to 
analyse further what contribution the referee made to the net gain in knowledge o f an 
individual reader of these texts. The empirical fact that her influence is hard to track 
does not mean, however, that it is absent.
24" Kawall (2004) op. cit., p.260.
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One additional line of analysis is the notion that the virtuous epistemic agent is 
disposed to regard not only others as beneficiaries o f her intellectual benevolence, but 
also the field itself. Relatedly, Kawall gives the example o f an orchestral musician.
The individual player has ethical duties towards the rest of the orchestra, for by 
adjusting his own dynamics, pitching and so on, he makes the other musicians sound 
good. However, all o f these actions are also part of being an excellent musician: they 
are duties owed to the practice o f music. As Kawall puts it: ‘Abiding by these other- 
regarding duties is essential to achieving excellence in any such practice and is not 
merely an ethical requirement’ .243
This approach seems plausible in the epistemic realm too. For example, as well as 
acting in line with ethical duties towards patients, a clinician arguably ought244 to 
exercise epistemic virtue for the sake of medical knowledge. Similarly, as well as 
considering her pupils’ immediate intellectual welfare, a teacher ought to do what she 
can to advance the discipline of pedagogy. As we have seen, though, these more 
diffuse duties are particularly problematic in terms o f success criteria, and even more 
direct transactions can run into comparable difficulties. The principle ‘ought implies 
can’245 is relevant here, for ‘if we cannot guarantee the epistemic behaviour o f others, 
how can we have [other-regarding virtues and duties]?’246
Kawall’s answer to this is, in essence, that we ought to carry on acting in line with our 
other-regarding epistemic virtues and hope for the best, while recognising that 
individual uptake is largely beyond our control. Nevertheless, ‘we can at least act 
virtuously with respect to those aspects o f  the situation which we can control’.247 This 
seems to me to be a good compromise between fretting about exactly what impact our 
virtuous intentions may have in practice, and being too blasé about our other-regarding 
epistemic effectiveness. Yes, there will probably be what I term vicious rejection, 
vicious acceptance and virtuous rejection o f the knowledge we are attempting to broker
A Different Perspective: The Field as ‘Other’
243 ibid., p.273.
244 The word ‘ought’ is used here in the ordinary way, not as a deontic term. Even Anscombe, in arguing 
against the notion of duties, uses the word at the very point when she is attacking these apparent 
obligations: ‘... the moral sense of ‘ought’, ought to be jettisoned’. G.E.M. Anscombe (1958) op. cit, 
p.27.
45 Or, as some say, ‘Ought implies Kant.’
24< Kawall (2004) op. cit., p.274,
247 ibid, p.274.
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to other putative knowers (in addition to the desired state o f virtuous acceptance): but 
as long as we do our best with the means at our disposal to enhance the knowledge in 
the epistemic webs o f which we are nodes, we can count ourselves as being other- 
regardingly epistemically virtuous, albeit imperfectly.
Another interpretation o f the field as ‘other’ involves us not in contributing to the field, 
but in submitting to it. Iris Murdoch writes of the respect she feels towards the object 
o f  learning: in her case the ‘authoritative structure’ o f the Russian language. She 
describes the process thus:
Love of Russian leads me away from myself towards something alien to me, something which
my consciousness cannot take over, swallow up, deny or make unreal.248
This is a species o f ‘other-regarding’, as distinct from self-regarding, virtue, except that 
the ‘other’ is not another person, but is nevertheless analogous, with a sort of 
independent life of its own. In leaving our comfortable Platonic cave and giving 
ourselves over to something free-standing in this way, we attempt to overcome our 
egotistical fantasies and see what lies beyond: a project in which ‘the enemy is the fat 
relentless ego’.249 This process is clearly not animated by the same ‘other-regarding’ 
virtues discussed earlier (p. 110), since we are not attempting to ameliorate the 
epistemic predicament o f another person, but neither is it solely self-regarding. 
Elsewhere, Murdoch talks of falling in love with a person  and suggests that this ‘can 
prompt a process of unselfing wherein the lover leams to see, and cherish and respect, 
what is not h im self.250 Similarly, in the case o f unselfing ourselves to a field, we 
might say that we ‘regard’ it as an autonomous entity which does not depend on our 
‘regard’. More rigorously, we see that it aligns with one o f the two testimonial 
‘propensities’ identified by Reid -  the principle o f credulity (the other being the 
principle o f veracity). We suspend our selfishness and suspicion and submit ourselves 
credulously to the discipline. If language-use is categorised as a practice, Alasdair 
M cIntyre’s words are significant here. Like Murdoch, he addresses the importance of 
submission to the authority o f something pre-existing:
248 Iris Murdoch (1985) ‘The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts’, The Sovereignty of Good 
(London: Ark). Reprinted in Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.) (1997) Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) p. 107.
249 Iris Murdoch (1971) ‘On God and Good’, The Sovereignty o f Good (London: Routledge Classics, 
2001) p.52.
2i0 Iris Murdoch (1992) Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Penguin) p. 17.
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To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards [of excellence] and the 
inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, 
choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the 
practice. 51
Furthermore, it is a characteristic o f practices that there is some inevitable deference by 
the tyro to experienced practitioners, an other-regarding epistemic virtue (in the looser 
sense) in which the ‘other’ is once again a person:
... [the practice’s] goods can only be achieved by subordinating ourselves to the best practice so 
far achieved, and that entails subordinating ourselves within the practice to other 
practitioners.252
It is important to note that this submission seems to be particularly relevant to the 
initial learning stage. Having deferred to current Russian usage, or to the customs of 
other practices, we may later go on in our writing and speaking to cause changes in the 
language, or by practising, to help the practice to evolve.
To return to a more usual construal of ‘the other’, we next consider the question o f  the 
multiplicity o f the other-regarding virtues, and examine one possible way o f bringing 
some order to the list by promoting ‘benevolence’ as the chief motivation.
The Role of Benevolence in Regulating Regard for the Other
Michael Slote has developed an interesting agent-based approach to virtue ethics which 
may well have some bearing on present considerations o f  other-regarding virtue 
epistemology, given his accentuation of the virtue o f universal benevolence.
Slote begins with James Martineau’s hierarchy of motives, which ‘ascends (roughly) as 
follows: vindictiveness; love o f sensual pleasure; love o f gain; 
resentment/fear/antipathy; ambition/love o f power; compassion; and, at the apex, 
reverence for the Deity’.253 Martineau advances the theory that all moral decisions 
involve pairs o f items from this hierarchy, and that to act rightly is to act in accordance 
with the highest-ranked motive. Even setting aside the rather Victorian (1885) 
prissiness in the choice of items, it is clear that using the hierarchy uncritically will 
often lead to incorrect moral decisions. For example, two decades later, Sidgwick
251 Alasdair MacIntyre (1985) After Virtue [2nd edn.] (London: Duckworth), p. 190.
252 ibid, p. 191.
255 Michael Slote (1997) ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’ Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.) (1997) Virtue 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p.250.
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points out that ‘there are times when it is better for reasons o f justice to act from 
resentment rather than compassion’.254 Resentment and compassion (if we take the 
former to be cognate with ‘vindictiveness’) are almost as far apart as it is possible to be 
on Martineau’s hierarchy, so the objection that one can trump the other, in a reversal of 
their respective status, is a serious one. Sidgwick settles this difficulty by suggesting 
that o f the key secular candidates for a supreme regulative motive -  justice, prudence 
and universal benevolence -  the last should prevail, since it is aligned with Martineau’s 
‘compassion’, the highest motive on his hierarchy short o f ‘reverence for the Deity’. 
Unfortunately, as Slote points out, he then goes on to equate the motive with its 
outcomes: that is, human happiness. What we now have is not a hierarchy o f agent- 
centred virtuous motives regulated by compassion, but a consequentiaiist ranking on a 
par with act-utilitarianism.
However, if this move of Sidgwick’s is sidestepped, Martineau’s hierarchy, regulated 
by compassion (or by the theological virtue o f ‘charity’) is a useful way o f bringing 
some order to the other-regarding virtues -  both moral and intellectual. More 
specifically, for our educational purposes, benevolence outranks other possible motives 
for epistemic acts -  a principle which thus ought to regulate truth-telling. This again 
shows the permeability o f the moral and the epistemic, in that moral considerations are 
able to exert much influence on other-regardingly epistemic decision-making. Let us 
explore further how these and other considerations might be brought to bear on 
testifying as an other-regarding, virtuous epistemic act.
Speaking Out
Kawall255 makes much o f truth-telling as an other-regarding epistemic virtue, listing it 
first amongst his candidates: ‘honesty (eg in one’s testimony)’. Perhaps he over­
emphasises this virtue, however. Simply testifying clearly is not the only way of 
benignly enhancing the epistemic position o f one’s interlocutors; nor is it always the 
best way. But Kawall thinks that the epistemology o f teaching reduces to the question: 
‘How can an agent best transmit information and knowledge to others in her epistemic 
community?’256 This indicates a somewhat unsophisticated view o f teachers as mere 
testifiers, or truth-tellers, rather than as persons with the role, inter alia, of benevolent
254 Paraphrased in Slote (1997) op. cit, p.251.
255 Who, we might recall, has published the only article on other-regarding epistemic virtue thus far.
256 Kawall (2004) op. cit, p.271,
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epistemic agents who are motivated to enhance the knowledge o f learners by whatever 
means seem to be both virtuous and effective. Granted, there typically exists an 
asymmetry in knowledge between teacher and learner in a particular field, but this does 
not mean that simply pouring what Kawall calls ‘information’ down this knowledge- 
gradient will necessarily or sufficiently improve the epistemic status o f the learner. I 
shall pick up this point later, in considering some o f the implications for education of 
virtue epistemology (p.218). For the moment, I want to flag up concerns over 
assertions such as: ‘The study o f the methods by which an agent can convey 
information will become part o f epistemology ,..’257 Metaphors such as ‘convey’ or 
‘transmit’, where the thing being so transported is ‘information’, seem to me to be an 
inadequate way o f capturing the other-regarding epistemic agent’s actions in supporting 
the doxastic processes of learners, or persons situated at other nodes in the 
community’s epistemic web.
Contrary to the notion that truth-telling is always a virtuous epistemic action, I suggest 
that the unremitting truth-teller is almost as great a menace as the pathological liar. If 
our other-regarding epistemic virtue is to achieve the desideratum o f helping the 
beneficiary to ameliorate his epistemic predicament, then a tactful intervention may 
well be required rather than a steamrollering assertion o f truths (or, perhaps, ‘truths’). 
To be sure, we ought to be sincere, but this sincerity plausibly should take the form of 
an epistemic solicitude rather than an ill-considered blurting-out o f what we take to be 
the case. I f  we sincerely want to be of use, our over-riding epistemic concern ought to 
be to gain insight into our interlocutor’s epistemic predicament and act in ways likely 
to alleviate it. Benevolent or prudential258 concerns might o f course clash with these 
other-regarding epistemic motivations in everyday situations, however: our interlocutor 
may wish to know where he can buy some heroin, or be in the epistemic predicament 
o f possessing our bank card but not knowing the PIN number. In these cases, we 
become morally (rather than epistemically) other-regarding, or prudentially self- 
regarding, respectively. There is, I argue, no absolute requirement for sincere 
testimony, despite Kawall’s assertion that: ‘Honesty is a virtue and we have duties to 
testify clearly etc. in a fashion which should help others gain true beliefs’.259 
Benevolence, prudence or justice may well override this ‘duty’. However, as teachers
257 Kawall (2004) op. cit., p.272.
258 In the non-technical sense of ‘self interested’.
259 Kawall (2004) op. cit, p.274.
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we arguably ought, as a general principle, to default to truth-telling; so we next 
examine what this might mean. Some o f the discussion here does not relate directly to 
the teaching and learning situation, but it is nevertheless needed in order to provide a 
solid theoretical understanding of a key pedagogical activity. I develop the aspects 
most relevant to the educational context in later chapters (particularly chapters 5 and 6).
Michel Foucault writes o f an ancient Greek term, parrhesia, which in modem English 
is roughly ‘free speech’, in French 'franc-parler', and in German ‘Freimiithigkeit 
The word indicates total frankness:
Etymologically, 'parrhesiazesthai' means ‘to say everything’ -  from ‘pan ' (everything) and 
‘rhema' (that which is said). The one who uses parrhesia, the parrhesiastes, is someone who 
says everything he has in mind: he does not hide anything, but opens his heart and mind
completely to other people through his discourse.260
This is the opposite of the demagogue who uses flowery language to convince the 
audience o f  something to which the orator does not personally subscribe: the 
parrhesiastes uses the most direct language available to him, in order to share with the 
audience his sincere beliefs, unclouded by rhetoric. Foucault draws on Plato to 
distinguish between what he characterises as ‘pejorative’ uses of the term parrhesia, 
and a more positive construal which includes speaking the truth even when that is a 
risky thing to do. If we act on Foucault’s clue and go direct to Plato, we see examples 
o f the first type -  of what might be called ‘chattering’ -  including Socrates’ warning 
against allowing democratic free speech to harm the interests o f the state:
... and is the city not chock full of liberty and freedom of speech [parrhesia]? And has not 
every man licence to do as he likes? ... And where there is such licence, it is obvious that 
everyone would arrange a plan for leading his own life in the way that pleases him’.261
The other ‘pejorative’ usage identified by Foucault relates to the vows of silence taken 
by some religious orders, in whose daily life idle chat is seen as both undermining 
monastic discipline and interfering with the individual’s contemplation o f God.
A more positive construal of parrhesia, on the other hand, sees it as praiseworthy, in 
that the parrhesiastes speaks the truth, even when it would be more profitable to him to 
withhold it, or to be insincere. The image which immediately comes to mind, when
260 Michel Foucault (1983) ‘Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia',
Six lectures given by Michel Foucault at the University of California at Berkeley. Later Published 
under the title Fearless Speech (Semiotext(e) / Foreign Agents, 2001).
261 Plato, Republic, 557b. These are clearly not the views of the historical gadfly Socrates, however.
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considering Foucault’s second meaning, is o f Socrates wandering in the agora and 
saying sometimes unpalatable things to those he meets. Foucault suggests that there 
has to be some personal risk associated with the truth-telling for it to be counted as 
parrhesia: a tyrant cannot be a parrhesiastes, for speaking his mind is not dangerous, 
but to make unwise yet true pronouncements to a tyrant is the action o f a parrhesiastes. 
For this reason, Foucault claims that a teacher cannot be a parrhesiastes. This, though, 
is clearly a contestable assertion. In the conventional case o f a teacher enunciating 
received wisdom in the context of a highly stratified institution (in which teachers and 
taught have a well-defined status-differential), there is little or no risk over the 
enounced. However, risk is present in more dialogical -  Socratic -  teaching, in which 
the status-differentials are reduced or removed, and the enounced relates to the 
enunciandum262 in a way which recognises the humanity of the enunciator. Foucault 
claims, ‘The specific “speech activity” o f the parrhesiastic enunciation thus takes the 
form: “I  am the one who thinks this and that’” .263 In our educational context, we see 
that whilst there is greater risk, the enounced now bears traces o f the humanity o f the 
enunciator and renders the enunciandum more vivid and available to the learner.
We turn next to Aristotle who, unlike Plato, neither dismisses the parrhesiastes as a 
member o f the lotus-eating, chattering classes, nor requires parrhesia to involve 
speaking bravely to a higher authority (thereby putting the parrhesiastes in danger). In 
fact, in the Nicomachean Ethics, parrhesia is a practice o f the person with the ‘very 
upper class Greek virtue’264 of megalopsuchia -  magnanimity, or ‘great-heartedness’. 
The megalopsuchos is open in expressing his views, ‘because concealment, i.e. caring 
less for the truth than for what people think, is a mark o f timidity’.265 He is also 
inclined to ‘speak and act straightforwardly (his superior attitude makes him outspoken 
and candid -  except for what he says in irony to the general public)’.266 We have here 
a picture o f a haughty aristocrat, who regards himself as possessing alethia rather than 
mere doxa and expects his parrhesia to be taken seriously, even when he is being 
languidly ironic (eirdneia) for public consumption. There is no element o f reciprocity 
in his conduct; the megalopsuchos is not Homo reciprocans, for he requires nothing in
262 ‘Enunciandum’ indicates ‘that which is to be enounced’. For our purposes, a proposition contained in 
an examination syllabus would be paradigmatic example.
263 Foucault (1983) op. cit. [emphasis added].
264 Hugh Tredennick’s footnote to 1123a35, Nicomachean Ethics [tr. J.A.K. Thompson, notes by Hugh 
Tredennick] (London: Penguin Books, 2004) p.93.
265 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1124b, 27-29.
26* ibid., 1124b, 29-31.
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return for his gift of truth. As Aristotle puts it: ‘He is disposed to confer benefits, but is 
ashamed to accept them, because one is the act of a superior and the other that o f an 
inferior’.267
We see can see, then, that a single comprehensive definition o f parrhesia  is elusive. 
Indeed, I have identified four distinct characterisations: (i) a vice o f democratic 
libertines, (ii) a sin against piety, (iii) a virtue for a tyrant’s counsellor, or (iv) an 
admirable practice o f the magnanimous. This is not necessarily a problem, however, 
for this discussion began by casting doubt on Kawall’s assertion that ‘Honesty is a 
virtue and we have duties to testify clearly etc. in a fashion which should help others 
gain true beliefs’.268 The fact that such honest testimony can sometimes be regarded as 
vicious [for example, (i) and (ii)], or involves marked power-imbalances [(iii) and (iv)] 
bolsters these doubts.
The intuition that such speaking out is per se neither a virtue nor a vice leads us to the 
Aristotelian insight that there may be a happy medium for truth-telling. Aristotle 
him self suggests that there is a ‘disposition intermediate between boasting [alazoneia] 
and understatement [eirôneia]',269 To overstate one’s case is a vicious act, and so is 
understatement (although to a lesser extent). So:
Falsehood is in itself bad and reprehensible, while the truth [alêtheia] is a fine and 
praiseworthy thing; accordingly, the sincere man, who holds the mean position, is 
praiseworthy, while both the deceivers are to be censured, particularly the 
boaster.270
Attunement Towards the Other’s Epistemic Needs
Furthermore, there may well be occasions on which withholding or dissembling are 
epistemically-virtuous actions (as well as the times, mentioned earlier [p. 123], in which 
such actions are morally or prudentially indicated). Henri Bergson calls for ‘tact de la
771vérité pratique ' -  and it is this tactfulness, based on what he terms le bon sens, which
enables us to discern what our interlocutor needs from us, and to provide it in the most
267 ibid, 1124b, 10-12.
268 Jason Kawall (2004) op. cit, p.274.
167 Alazoneia and eirônei. The translator, J.A.K. Thompson, renders eirdnei as ‘understatement’ this 
time, rather than the ‘irony’ he had plumped for earlier. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1127al3-15.
270 Aristotle, op. cit, 1127a29-33,
271 ‘Tactfulness in practical truth.’ From a speech at the Sorbonne prize-giving of 1895 (in Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (1975) Truth and Method, 2nd Edition (New York: The Seabury Press) p.25.
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helpful way we can. This is a familiar theme in various writings. In Aristotle, for 
example, we have the ‘attunement’ component of phronesis, which enables us to be 
sensitive to the contingencies of praxis in which we currently find ourselves and thus 
do the right thing as befitting ‘good men in their behaviour towards others’.272 Hans- 
Georg Gadamer also draws our attention to Aristotle’s discussion o f sunesis 
(understanding) in bk.VI, ch.l 1 o f the Nicomachean Ethics. His reading is that 
‘Understanding is a modification of the virtue o f moral knowledge. It appears in the 
fact of concern, not about myself, but about the other person’.273 The person who has 
such understanding ‘thinks with the other and undergoes the situation with him ’.274 
This links nicely with present discussions o f other-regarding epistemic virtue and 
points to the need to draw on our fellow-feeling (Aristotle’s sungndme, sympathetic 
judgement) to empathise with, and understand, our interlocutor’s predicament before 
lending a hand. This attentiveness, or aisthesis215 enables us to attain the ‘situational 
appreciation’ needed for epistemic eupraxia.
The specific needs o f our interlocutor could be considered as the minor premiss in a 
practical syllogism in which the major premiss asserts our (defeasible) epistemic duty 
to aid our fellows in their epistemic predicaments. It is by using the aisthetic intuitions 
furnished by sungndme and nous that we are able to discern the minor premiss, of 
which our interlocutors are denizens:276 ‘... the intuition that operates in practical 
inferences being concerned with the ultimate and contingent, i.e. the minor premiss’.277 
However, having used our attunement278 to capture the minor premiss, our troubles are 
not yet over. W e now have achieved an insight into what it is that our interlocutor 
wishes to know, but simply telling him may not satisfy his epistemic thirst. I next 
examine the various possibilities for virtuous, other-regarding epistemic action.
If  our interlocutor’s desire is to know the way to Larissa, and we have used our bon 
sens to identify his target as the Greek town and not the Neptunian moon, then our
272 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk.VI, 11,1143a, 32.
i73 Gadamer (1975) op. cit., p.288.
274 ibid, p.288.
275 Richard Smith translates aisthesis as ‘attentiveness’, whilst Dunne and Wiggins render it ‘situational 
appreciation’, according to Smith (1999) ‘Paths of Judgement: The revival of practical wisdom’, Carr, W 
(ed.) (2005) The RoutledgeFalmer Reader in Philosophy of Education (London: Routledge) p.209.
275 To borrow Smith’s epigram: ‘we are denizens of the minor premiss’. Smith (1999) op.cit, p.212.
277 Aristotle, ibid., bk.VI, 11, 1143b41.
‘7S Or the French bon sens, Latin sensus communis, and German Gesunder Menschenverstand -  all terms 
used as near-equivalents at various places by Gadamer (1975) in Truth and Method. I take these to be 
cognate with sungndme.
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epi stem ically-virtuous response is quite straightforward. We simply point the way. 
This action might, however, be over-ridden by moral considerations, and we could 
conceivably behave virtuously by preventing our interlocutor from finding his way -  to 
a town currently affected by widespread rioting, for example. This would ideally be by 
way o f  furnishing extra knowledge about Larissa (thus drawing further on our other- 
regarding epistemic virtue), but language difficulties might force us to carry out what 
could, prima facie, be considered a insincere act, in order to save our interlocutor from 
harm: pointing him in the opposite direction. Such an act would be epistemically 
culpable, but perhaps morally the right thing to do (taking benevolence as our supreme 
regulative principle, after Slote and Martineau). This clash between two o f the great 
transcendental desiderata -  the true and the good -  is o f some importance here. 
Interestingly, in the vignette sketched out above, the true has the potential to act in 
concert with the good, as long as all of the salient facts can be known by the 
beneficiary. It is partial knowledge -  knowing the way to Larissa, but not knowing the 
severe hazards which will greet him upon arrival -  which is dangerous, and which can, 
arguably, legitimately be hobbled in the interests o f our beneficiary’s good. But this 
act is, in itself, fraught with dangers.
The Dangers of Epistemic Insincerity
Plato, notoriously, pursues such a line o f putatively warranted deception in book III o f 
the Republic. He talks o f ‘opportune falsehoods’ and ‘one noble tie’, which he 
attempts to justify as being in the state’s interests, for ‘the rulers o f the city may, if any, 
fitly lie on account o f enemies or citizens for the benefit o f the state’.279 This is an 
asymmetrical dispensation, however, since ‘for a layman to lie to rulers o f that kind we 
shall affirm to be ... a g rea t... sin’.280 The ‘noble lie’ proposed for the state to 
propagate takes the form o f a myth intended to maintain the social order, in that the 
rulers are to be regarded as having been fashioned by the gods deep under the earth, 
and made precious by the inclusion of gold during this process. Lesser humans -  those 
destined to be farmers and craftsmen -  were infused with iron and brass.281 Such a lie 
is different in intention from that o f the Larissan local, for not only is it epistemically 
vicious, it also appears to be morally vicious (that is, maleficent rather than beneficent)
279 Pislo, Republic, III, 389b.
280 Plalo, Republic, III, 389c.
28’ Plalo, Republic, III, 415.
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with respect to the individual auditor, for whom (say) a life as a rude mechanical 
follows his brassy designation.
Plato claims that in the absence o f these and other repressive measures, an overly- 
liberal democracy will evolve, in which ‘The teacher ... fears and fawns upon the 
pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher’.282 The main worry here is that the 
stable structure and authority-relationships o f society will be overturned and that even 
slaves will no longer know their place, being ‘no less free than the owners who paid for 
them’ 283 Karl Popper, among others, draws attention to the inconsistency between 
these views, which Plato puts in the mouth of Socrates in the Republic, and those 
expressed by the Socrates of the Meno. In the former, slaves are seen as less than 
human, and teachers as having unarguable intellectual authority; in the latter, Socrates 
shows an anti-authoritarian intellectualism284 by engaging a slave’s reasoning powers 
in his role as an intellectual midwife rather than that of a master.285
Assertions that the individual’s best interests and those o f the state are necessarily in 
alignment, and the widespread use o f misinformation, are characteristic o f totalitarian 
states (such as those led by Stalin and Mao) and are deeply troubling. The justification 
is consequentialist, in that telling such an ‘opportune falsehood’ is regarded as having 
beneficial outcomes for the body politic -  in the claimed form o f a stable society, 
unambiguous roles being apparent to each individual, citizens being content with their 
lot, and so on.
However, to deontologists such as Kant, the lie is culpable since it deprives the 
individual o f what Kant characterises as our chief human birthright: the ability to use 
our reason to make informed and autonomous decisions. Our being misled by Plato’s 
propagandist’s typology -  which he claims to be divinely-ordained -  o f gold man, brass 
man and so on, removes the possibility o f our making rational choices based on 
relevant knowledge. To a lesser degree, giving the intended visitor to Larissa false 
geographical beliefs (from benevolent motives) has the same effect o f thwarting his 
autonomous wishes (see p.128). For all we know, he might be a peace envoy whose
282 ibid., VIII, 563.
283 ibid., Republic, VIII, 563.
284 Karl Popper (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) p. 137.
285 A theme that Plato develops in the Thecetetus.
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actions could stop the public disorder, or a photojoumalist whose images might 
beneficially alert the world to the plight o f the Larissans. By lying about the way to 
Larissa we have not only transgressed our deontic moral obligations but may have also 
caused consequential harm (as well as evading our epistemic duties and producing 
undesirable epistemic consequences).
Neither a deontological nor a consequentialist analysis helps much in this Larrisan 
cameo, though. The deontological approach requires us to adjudicate between 
conflicting duties -  those of truthfulness and benevolence -  and Kant claims that 
truthfulness is a ‘perfect duty’, that is, an exceptionless one. Every lie, he asserts, ‘is 
objectionable and contemptible in that we purposely let people think that we are telling 
them our thoughts and do not do so’.286 To Kant, lying -  qua insincerity — falls down 
on two counts: (i) It fails the test of the categorical imperative, in that we could not 
coherently will universal lying and (ii) it treats other humans as means to our ends, 
rather than as ends in themselves. Neither o f these seems to apply to the current case, 
though: we are not contemplating a generalisation from our particular quandary to 
advocate universal lying (we merely wish to treat the present situation as exceptional), 
nor are we treating the enquirer as means to our own ends (we are acting, we hope, in 
concert with one of his own ends -  that o f self-preservation).
A consequentialist analysis is equally unsatisfactory. In order to justify misleading the 
enquirer, we need to be able to predict reliably the consequences o f our actions: we 
need perfect knowledge o f the entire context. Such comprehensive knowledge o f 
causal chains is unavailable in all but the most simple o f situations. One needs to 
appeal neither to chaos theory nor to quantum physics to show the implausibility o f 
total predictability vis-à-vis human affairs. However, by having even slightly more 
knowledge than in the rather stark situation described -  perhaps by knowing a few 
words o f the enquirer’s language, or being able to perform a little mime act -  we can 
apprise him both o f the correct way to Larissa and  also o f the riot situation he will 
encounter should he still choose to venture there. This removes us from the need to 
reason consequentially: we have discharged both our epistemic duty and our moral one, 
and it is now up to the enquirer to exercise his informed autonomy in deciding whether 
or not to go to Larissa in the light of his newly-enhanced epistemic status.
286 Immanuel Kant (1778) Lectures on Ethics [tr. L.Infield] (New York: Harper Row, 1930, 1963).
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The advantages o f the virtue approach to our quandary is that it demands neither the 
strict adherence to the perfect duties embodied in deontology (at least on the Kantian 
construal) nor the perfect future knowledge needed for consequentialism. The 
question we ask is: what would a virtuous person do in this situation? If  such moral 
defeaters (as in the riot scenario) do not intrude on our attempts at epistemic 
benevolence, then the transaction concerning Larissa proceeds felicitously. Our 
sungnome alerts us to the predicament o f a fellow epistemic agent; we act from other- 
regarding virtue to resolve his quandary; our beneficiary is motivated by his own 
epistemic virtue (perhaps ‘being able to recognize reliable authority.’287) to acquire the 
knowledge he desires; and everyone is happy.288 The questions (i) “Which way is it to 
Larissa?” and (ii) “Is it advisable to go there?” are not the same, but in the event o f the 
answer to the notional question (ii) being “No”, we we might consider that the right 
thing to do would be to mislead the enquirer about his actual question (i).
In the educational context, we are concerned to promote the learners’ flourishing -  
particularly their epistemic flourishing. This, not infrequently, involves benevolence 
and pedagogical sincerity combined with epistemic insincerity (in the sense o f a 
mismatch between our beliefs and assertions). Elsewhere, I argue that many standard 
school science propositions such as ‘The visible spectrum consists of seven colours’ are 
not true.289 We know that they are not true, yet we promote them for the sake o f future 
beliefs which are more congruent with reality.
Epistemically-justified Dissimulation
To justify insincerity on epistemic grounds is a species of consequentialism, since our 
expectation is that a misleading avowal now will be o f benefit to the auditor later, in 
the form o f enhanced epistemic status. We sacrifice short-term truthfulness in the 
interests o f  deferred, but fuller, doxastic gratification, and feel warranted in causing a 
temporary flaw in our beneficiary’s web of belief for the sake o f its better integrity in 
the medium term. The virtue-epistemology version o f consequentialism is a moderate 
reliabilism (such as Sosa’s), but this is not in complete alignment with present 
considerations, since it typically considers individual propositions rather than intricate
"S7 Zagzebski (1996) Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.l 14.
288 Quite literally happy, if Aristotle’s analysis is correct.
289 Sea.n Moran (2006) ‘Do we deal in knowledge in science lessons?’ School Science Review, 88 (322) 
pp. 113-117, p.l 13.
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webs o f belief. We wish to help the learner to improve his overall web and are willing 
to compromise the truth o f some individual propositions to achieve this. A 
recalibration may be in order here, re-defining epistemic virtue qua reliability as ‘that 
which leads to a better web of be lie f, rather than Sosa’s a quality bound to help 
maximise one’s surplus o f truth over error’.290 I recognise that defining ‘better’ here is 
somewhat problematic, but at least it improves on Sosa’s accounting metaphor, which 
implies that the sum of correct atomistic propositions (taking incorrect ones as negative 
in the overall reckoning) is important, not their organisation nor the learning trajectory 
o f the web as a whole.
However, this notion o f a virtuous, other-regarding epistemic agent being motivated to 
act in such a way as to encourage a medium-term enhancement o f the belief web o f her 
beneficiary -  justifying a dispensation from the requirement for short-term truthfulness 
— is not without its difficulties. Walter Scott’s warning, ‘O what a tangled web we 
weave when first we practice to deceive’,291 is pertinent in this regard. It is difficult 
enough to maintain the integrity o f our doxastic own webs, so introducing temporary 
flaws or unravellings in others’ webs -  for the claimed sake o f future improvements -  
is an action fraught with risk. Since our intentions are medium-term, we will need to 
be able to remember in detail, over a prolonged time-period, the layout o f the relevant 
parts o f  all o f our beneficiary’s webs -  in particular the location o f the flaws we have 
deliberately introduced. As Quintillian puts it: ‘the common saying that “a liar should 
have a good memory” is very true’.292
This adds a degree o f complexity to the overall epistemic situation which puts it 
beyond consequentialist analysis and into the realm o f the radically unpredictable. We 
have our own webs o f belief, but we are also nodes in the wider community’s epistemic 
web, some nodes of which have personal webs that temporarily suffer from flaws 
which we have introduced: flaws which are at odds with our own beliefs, but which we 
hope will enable our intended epistemic beneficiaries to build better webs.
Furthermore, these individual and community webs o f belief interact with one another
290 Ernest Sosa (1985) ‘Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue’, Monist, 68, No.2 (April) p.227.
291 Walter Scott (1808) Marmion. In this long poem, the English aristocrat Marmion induces a nun -  
Constance de Beverley -  to escape her French convent and accompany him on his travels, disguised as 
a page-boy. Constance is subsequently captured and executed for breaking her vows.
2<>' D A. Russell (2001). Quintilian: The Orator’s Education, bks. I to XII. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press). In Paul O’Neill (2008) The Educational Theory o f Quintilian
(Marcus Fabius Quintilianus) NewFoundations [online] Available at:
http://www.newfoundations.com/GALLERY/Quintilian.html [Accessed July 2009] bk lV, p.265.
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(v ia  testim on y), w ith the physica l w orld (v ia  em pirical experience) and w ith  reason, 
m em ory, em otion  and aesthetic sensib ility . C learly, any attem pt at p recise  
con seq u en tia list (that is, reliabilist) analysis is doom ed  to fail in such a chaotic293 
milieu.
A  m ore A ristotelian  version  o f  intellectual virtue, as prom oted by Z agzeb sk i, is better 
able to exp la in  good  ep istem ic action in this com p lex  arena. T he phronimos is able to 
live  w ith uncertainty in praxis and thus attem pts do the right thing, based  on a 
cu ltivated  (though fallib le) discernm ent and a desire to do good . In our tim ely  
interventions -  u sin g  our sen se o f  eukairos (see  p. 138) -  w e  spot the opportune 
m om en t to repair or disrupt som eon e’s w eb  and act w ith  ju st the right degree o f  other- 
regarding force. In the event o f  any uncertainty over this, the default epistemic action  
for the virtuous ep istem ic agent is sincere testim ony. W e have a prim a facie , pro tanto, 
virtuous d isp osition  to tell what w e  regard as the truth. H ow ever, even  o n  those  
o cca sio n s in w hich  our phronesis indicates the desirability  o f  w ell-in ten tion ed  
d issim u lation  (w h en  w e  put what w e consider to be the best interests o f  our 
interlocutors ab ove their access to our thoughts) w e are not thereby, in the ey es o f  
so m e, totally exculpated:
If a prima facie  duty is outweighed or overridden, it does not simply disappear or evaporate. It 
leaves what Robert Nozick calls ‘moral traces’. The agent should approach such a decision 
conscientiously and should expect to experience regret and perhaps even remorse at having to 
override and infringe this prima facie duty.294
T his is in teresting language, expressing som eth ing  a lm ost akin to re lig iou s notions o f  
sin . W e  have ch osen  the lesser o f  tw o ev ils , and have therefore acted  virtuously: but 
w e have still ch osen  the ‘e v i l ’ o f  insincerity and thus have sinned. T hom as A quinas’ 
an alysis , in h is Summa Theologica, is particularly u sefu l in defen d in g  a nuanced v iew  
o f  such  ‘sin s against truth’, w hich  draws on  A ristotle (and a lso  A u gu stin e). H e  
d ev e lo p s a hierarchy o f  types o f  lies, w ith ‘m isch iev o u s’ lies against G od  being the 
m ost serious, and th ose intended to save som eon e from  ‘un law fu l defilem en t o f  his 
b o d y ’ being the least serious.
293ln the sense o f  being a complex system.
_94 TL Beauchamp & JF Childress (1989) Principles o f  Biomedical Ethics, 3rd Edn. (New York: Oxford 
University Press) p.5. The Nozick quotation is from Robert Nozick (1968) ‘Moral Complications and 
Moral Structures’, Natural Law Forum, 13, pp. 1-50.
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A quinas regards the key characteristic o f  a lie  as b ein g  a d iscrepancy b etw een  (i) w hat 
is  in the agent’s m ind and (ii) what he says -  and not a lack  o f  congruence w ith  the 
w orld. T his, in turn, relies on h is interpretation o f  the A ristotelian  d istinction  betw een  
e ssen ces  and accidents.295 The w orldly congruence o f  the agen t’s b e lie f  is  accidental, 
for th is is  beyon d  the scop e o f  his w ill, but:
the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person 
intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word ‘mendacium’ [lie] is derived from its being 
in opposition to the ‘mind.’296
H avin g agreed w ith  A quinas that insincerity (and not untruth) is the signature o f  ly in g , 
w e look  next to h is d iscussion  for p ossib le  excu lp ation s o f  the various typ es o f  w e ll-  
m eaning deception  to w hich teachers are prone. A quinas ex p lic itly  seek s to d im in ish  
the apparently unam biguous warning o f  Psalm 5:7, T h o u  w ilt  destroy all that speak  a 
lie by d evelop in g  a taxonom y o f  ly ing , sorted by sin fu lness:
Now the sin o f lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, 
and this is called a ‘mischievous’ lie, while the sin o f  lying is diminished if it be 
directed to some good -  either o f pleasure and then it is a ‘jocose’ lie, or of 
usefulness, and then we have the ‘officious’ lie, whereby it is intended to help 
another person, or to save him from being injured.297
T his is a relief, perhaps, to m any teachers, w h o  u se  jocu larity  in their teaching, or w h o  
utter w hat are tech n ica lly  ‘o ffic io u s’ lies in order to prom ote learning. Furtherm ore, 
the ‘j o c o s e ’ lie  is show n by A quinas not to be a sin at all, for it fo o ls  no one and d o es  
not arise from  a m align  desire to m islead:
...not every lie is a cause o f  deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies 
o f this kind are told, not with the intention o f  being believed, but merely for the sake o f giving 
pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is 
a sin.298
Other types o f  ly in g  are still to be regarded as sin fu l, but not m ortally  so , for ‘a m ortal 
sin  is, properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity’, thus ‘o ff ic io u s  lies are not 
m ortal s in s ’ b ecau se  they are com m itted w ith  the b est in tentions o f  the auditor at heart. 
A  con sid eration  o f  intellectual virtue m ay ex cu se  ep istem ic  insincerity w h ich  is w e ll  
m otivated , for:
295 There is some reification occurring here, for a lie is not traditionally a ‘thing’, so notions o f  essence 
and accident are being used in a parallel, but I feel plausible, way.
296 Aquinas, op. cit.
297 ib id , Q .l 10, art.2.
298 ibid., art.3.
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...it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin o f lying diminished in 
gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration o f  the matter will show that these various kinds o f  
lies are enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the pleasurable 
good, and life o f the body than money, and virtue than the life o f  the body.299
A quinas ind icates here that in pursuing the h ighest good  for another (that is , h is virtue) 
our d ecep tion s are greatly dim inished in gravity. T his is s ign ificant for us as teachers, 
and it is o f  a p iece  w ith M artineau’s and S lo te ’s line on b en evo len ce . Furthermore, 
since our aspirations relate not to m oney, nor pleasure, nor the body, but to intellectual 
virtue, our ‘s in fu ln ess’ turns out to be m inuscule on  A q u in as’ analysis. W e are not 
H u m e’s ‘sen sib le  k n aves’,300 for w e are not seek in g  personal profit but the m edium - 
term ep istem ic  flourishing o f  others.
Childhood Myths
O ne rather pecu liar phenom enon, w hich w e  can  bring under A q u in as’ category o f  the 
‘jo c o s e ’ lie , is the fa lse stories and explanations com m on ly  told  to you n g  children. 
B etw een  the ages o f  three and eight, the m ajority o f  children consider such fantasy  
figures as Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, unicorns and m onsters to be real.301 T h ese  
fa lse  b e lie fs  have their origin in fam ily rituals (secretly  b iting the carrot left for 
R udolph and the m ince p ie  for Santa; rep lacing a d ecid u ou s tooth beneath a ch ild ’s 
p illo w  w ith  a fe w  Euro) and in popular culture (A n  P ost rep lying to letters addressed to 
Santa; dentists g iv in g  children special b o x es in w h ich  to keep  their lost teeth  until the  
T ooth F airy’s nocturnal v isit.) Such practices, com bined  w ith  im p lied  penalties for 
scep tic ism  on  the part o f  the young auditor, constitute a w idespread  consp iracy  to  
engender fa lse  b e lie fs  by m eans o f  insincere, but consisten t, testim ony. M otivation s  
for such  d ece it range from the innocent p leasure experienced  by parents and children in 
sp inn ing th ese  w eb s o f  fantasy and m agic, to hard-nosed m arketing that cy n ica lly  taps 
into the se llin g  pow er o f  myth.
299 ibid, art.2.
300 Who believe that ‘honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many 
exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the 
general rule, and takes advantage o f all the exceptions.’ David Hume (1777) An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles o f  Morals (Teddington: The Echo Library, 2006) p.76. Hume thinks that the knave’s attitude 
is mistaken, for he has to live with himself after compromising his character ‘for worthless toys and 
gewgaws’.
01 Extensive empirical evidence for this is cited in Gabrielle Principe and Eric Smith (2008) ‘The Tooth, 
the Whole Tooth and Nothing But the Tooth: How Belief in the Tooth Fairy Can Engender False 
Memories.’ Applied Cognitive Psychology, 22, p.626.
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S om e o f  these m yths are so  firm ly em bedded that any attem pt at icon oclastic  parrhesia  
w ou ld  b e lik e ly  to incur significant disapprobation. C onsider, for exam p le, the 
reactions o f  a you n g  ch ild ’s teacher and c lassm ates to h is report that, “M y D ad says 
there is no Santa.” T his objective truth is lik ely  to be d ism issed  w ith  the pragm atic 
advice that, “I f  you  d on ’t b elieve  in Santa, you  w o n ’t get any presents.” T his, then, 
sets up a rather cyn ica l d isposition  to fake the h old in g  o f  certain b e lie fs  becau se o f  their 
instrum ental utility  rather than their know n truth or, w orse  perhaps, incu lcates a m eta­
b e lie f  that h igh ly-im plausib le  things and even ts can becom e true as a result o f  fervently  
b e liev in g  them  to be so. It could be argued, h ow ever, that these are both valuable  
insights w h ich  m ay b enefit the tyro knower. Strong b e lie f  contrary to  the objective  
ev id en ce  (for exam ple, that one w ill w in  a race against an apparently superior field) 
cou ld  w e ll p lay  a part in the desired event actually  com in g  to pass (w in n in g  the race, 
against the odds). M oreover, it w ould  take a flinty-hearted  parent to  deny children their 
innocent en joym ent o f  the Santa myth, w h ile  at the sam e tim e alienating them  from  
their c lassm ates. This w ou ld  seem  to constitute acting against charity for the sake o f  
ep istem ic  rectitude, for there is a sense in  w h ich  Santa has a sort o f  reality, and the 
con cep t o f  freely -g iven  g ifts has theologica l overtones.
N everth eless, there can be serious con seq u en ces to deliberately  blurring the lines  
b etw een  im agination  and reality (lines w hich  m ay be blurred enough  already, w ithout 
further help). C hildren p ossessed  o f  baroque m ental constructions based on  the Tooth  
Fairy m yth, including fu ll descriptions o f  fantastical even ts firm ly b e liev ed  to have  
b een  personally  experienced , have then g o n e  on  to a lleg e  that their p re-sch oo l teacher  
has turned c lassm ates into m ice, taken them  on  trips to outer space, or w o rse .302 
Furtherm ore, h avin g  spurious b e lie fs  in o n e ’s w eb  m ay have e ffec ts  on  future ep istem ic  
activ ity , b eyon d  that c lo se ly  associated  w ith  the b e lie f. A  propensity  for unwarranted  
supernatural explanations w hich  continues into adulthood m ay be on e  such  fall-out o f  
‘Santa’ and ‘T ooth-F airy’ indoctrination. O n this top ic , B lackburn quotes Voltaire: 
‘T h ose  w h o  can m ake you  b e liev e  absurdities can m ake y o u  com m it a trocities’.303
I f  w e  are to continue presenting as veridical tall ta les such as th ese, B lackburn’s 
concern  n eed s to be addressed. T w o  criteria, I su ggest, m ight govern  the acceptab ility
302 These allegations featured in the notorious Wee Care Nursery School and Little Rascals Day Care 
abuse scandals in the USA. (Reported in: Principe and Smith (2008) op. cit., p.625). All o f the accused 
were eventually exonerated, but some served part o f  their prison sentences first.
303 Simon Blackburn (2005) Truth: A Guide fo r the Perplexed (London: Penguin Books).
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o f  such  stories: (i) The m yth is in itself at least not harm ful,304 and preferably o f  ben efit  
to the auditor and (ii) The auditor’s doxastic w eb  is enhanced, either im m ediately  or at 
som e point in the future, by believ ing  in  the story. T he first criterion relates to our 
general princip le o f  ben evo len ce  and the secon d  in v o lv es  the con seq u en ces o f  the 
ep istem ic  input. W e have seen  that the Santa m yth per se is harm less -  or even  
th eo lo g ica lly  beneficial -  so  it ‘p asses’ the first criterion (the sam e cannot b e said  o f  
the m essage  in  the tooth fairy story that there are sh ad ow y individuals prepared to pay  
for hum an body parts). S o  how  might it m eet the secon d  criterion b y  enhancing  the  
auditor’s w eb  o f  belief?
A s  w e  d iscu ssed  earlier (p .82), a naïve credulity is a necessary  condition  for learning  
o n e ’s native tongue in childhood. W e generally  accept the testim on y  o f  our elders 
u nreservedly -  at least in their nam ing o f  things -  for th is is  the on ly  entry point to 
eventual lingu istic  proficiency. H ow ever, to continue this trait o f  p assive  acceptance o f  
w h at w e are to ld  into adulthood, even  in the p resence o f  the standard w arning sign s o f  
d ecep tion  or m istake, is a dangerous d isposition  w h ich  needs to b e replaced by a m ore  
ep istem ica lly -astu te  approach. In other w ords, w e  need  to acquire a sen sitiv ity  to both  
m endacity  and ep istem ic incom petence. A  safe w a y  in  w hich  th is can happen is  to  be  
exp osed  to a harm less m yth in childhood  (e .g . a b en evo len t Santa, w h o  rewards our 
g o o d  behaviour) w h ich  adults present as true, but w h ich  later turns out to b e fa lse . In  
see in g  through this deception , the child  learns the valuable lesson s that (i) not all 
testim ony is to be trusted and -  straining things a little here perhaps -  that (ii)  there is  
n o  guarantee that virtuous behaviour w ill attract an external reward. T o  the 
p ed a g o g ica l constructivist, this is an adm irable technique. B y  exp erien cin g  deceit, the 
learner can construct the concept o f  d eceit for h im self; a m uch m ore en g a g in g  and  
e ffe c tiv e  learning experience than being sim ply  to ld  the proposition  ‘p eop le  som etim es  
lie  in a co n v in c in g  w ay. ’ Thus, it is desirable in the educational con tex t that so m e fa lse  
propositions are on offer, in order that the learner can  lo se  the dangerous d isp osition  o f  
naïve credulity . Later (p .264 ), I suggest so m e w ays in w h ich  th is can  be ach ieved , 
in clu d in g  by the use o f  virtual testim ony.
For the virtue ep istem olog ist, the notion o f  kairos can  a lso  b e in vok ed , in  that an 
opportune intervention in the w eb  o f  b e lie f  o f  the ch ild  is  m ade w h ich  b y-p asses the
304 Foi example, a parent threatening a young child that the 'bogey man’ will come for him if he doesn’t 
go to sleep would involve a potentially harmful myth, which could cause nightmares and anxiety.
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autonom y o f  the individual in the short term, and introduces fa lse  b e lie fs . H is  
ep istem ic  autonom y w ill be strengthened in the long  run, h ow ever, for on ce  the Santa 
d ecep tion  is uncovered, the desirability o f  using  h is ow n  ju d gem en t circum spectly in 
a ssess in g  future know ledge cla im s b ecom es m ore apparent. In the case  o f  m ore 
com p lex  and sustained interactions (typ ified  b y  those taking p lace  in a fairly stable w eb  
o f  ep istem ic  agents such as w e  m ight find in a classroom  or sem inar-room ), this notion  
o f  tim elin ess  is a significant one.
The Importance of Timely Intervention
T he idea that there is a propitious tim e for any action  has a lon g  history. For exam ple, 
in  Ecclesiastes 3, w e  have the advice that ‘there is a tim e for everyth in g’, including the 
ep istem ica lly -relevan t references to ‘a tim e to search and a tim e to g iv e  u p ’ (3 .6 ) and ‘a 
tim e to  b e silen t and a tim e to speak’ (3 .7 ). I f  w e read it m etaphorically , 3 .7  can also  
apply  to our w ork  w ith  w eb s o f  belief: ‘a tim e to tear and a tim e to m en d .’
T he G reek  con cep t o f  Koupo^ (from  Kairos, the grandson o f  C hronos) encapsulates the 
sam e them e, Eukairos s ig n ifies  the right tim e to do som eth ing; kakakairos is  the 
w rong tim e; akairos is a tim e w ithout opportunity.305 Eric C harles W h ite’s description  
o f  kairos (w h ich  w e  can take in the sense o f  eukairos) is w orth  quoting at length, 
becau se  it incorporates beautifu lly  two m etaphors w h ich  are sign ifican t to the present 
work: im ages from  archery o f  hitting the target, and the n otion  o f  b e lie fs  form ing a 
fabric or w eb.
Kairos is an ancient Greek word that means ‘the right moment’ or ‘the opportune’.
The two meanings o f  the word apparently come from two different sources. In 
archery, it refers to an opening, or ‘opportunity’ or, more precisely, a long tunnel­
like aperture through which the archer’s arrow has to pass. Successful passage o f  a 
kairos requires, therefore, that the archer’s arrow be fired not only accurately but 
with enough power for it to penetrate. The second meaning of kairos traces to the 
art o f weaving. There it is ‘the critical time’ when the weaver must draw the yam 
through a gap that momentarily opens in the warp o f the cloth being woven. Putting 
the two meanings together, one might understand kairos to refer to a passing instant 
when an opening appears which must be driven through with force if  success is to 
be achieved.306
305 Philip Sipiora (2002) ‘Introduction: the Ancient Concept o f  Kairos', Philip Sipiora & James S 
Baumlin (eds.) (2002) Rhetoric and kairos: essays in history, theory and praxis (Albany: SUNY Press) 
p.2, p.19.
06 Eric Charles White (1987) Kaironomia: On the Will-to-lnvent (Ithaca, USA: Cornell University 
Press)p. 13 quoted in Philip Sipiora & James S Baumlin (eds.) (2002) op.cit., pp. 17-18.
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W h ite’s analysis is interesting, in that it adds the idea o f  force to that o f  tim elin ess, and 
this is  h igh ly  sign ificant i f  w e  apply it to  present considerations o f  other-regarding  
ep istem ic  virtue. A n opportune intervention in the w eb  o f  b e lie f  o f  another ep istem ic  
agent n eed s to be strong enough to have the intended effect. The problem  w ith th is is 
that such  forcefu l w eavin g  m ay w ell by-pass the autonom y o f  the individual in an 
undesirable w ay . W e m ight be able to co m p el our students to acquire a true b e lie f  by  
m eans o f  a v iv id  and tim ely  intervention, but w e  need to take care that such  com p u lsion  
d oes not stray over the line that separates virtuous education from  w ell-in ten tion ed  
brainw ashing. T his is a fam iliar them e in  criticism s o f  the Sophists:
Georgias the Sicilian ... glorifies the magic effects o f the word (goetia psychagogia), and
teaches and explains that the rhetor must know, scientifically, the ways to the soul, from which
the speeches capable o f  spellbinding and persuading descend.307
B ut another point o f  v iew  is that the Sophists, becau se  o f  the form ulaic nature o f  their 
techne, w ere lack ing the attunem ent and flex ib ility  needed  to prom ote learning: ‘O ne o f  
the reasons for the general in effectiven ess o f  the Sophists, according to Isocrates, is 
their inab ility  to  recogn ize  the kairik ex ig en c ie s  o f  particular d iscou rses’ .308 S o  kairos 
seem s to be a necessary  but not su ffic ien t feature o f  e ffec tiv e  education . For virtuous 
education , the m otivation  for its use, and the m anner o f  its dep loym en t m ust a lso  be  
virtuous and not ju st effective. The question  o f  m otivation  is not a straightforward one, 
how ever, for, as w e  have seen , our kairik intervention m ay have a long-term  ep istem ic  
p a y -o ff  for the beneficiary, even  though the im m ediate e ffec t m ight be on e  o f  his 
acquiring a fa lse  belief.
A s w ell as tem porarily deluding others for the sake o f  enhancing their longer-term  
ep istem ic  status, there m ay be tim es w hen  delud ing  ourselves is, paradoxically , the 
o n ly  w a y  to ach ieve  certain desiderata. A n  eg o istic  ep istem ic  agent w ith  a clear agenda  
w ill  not a lw ays g e t w hat he wants: indeed, the very pursuit o f  the agenda m ay disbar 
him  from  a ch iev in g  it.
307 Augusto Rostagni (2002) [tr. Philip Sipiora] ‘A New Chapter in the History o f Rhetoric and 
Sophistry’, in Philip Sipiora & James S Baumlin (eds.) (2002) op. cit., p,24 [Emphasis in original].
308 Philip Sipiora (2002) ‘Introduction: the Ancient Concept o f  K a i r o s Philip Sipiora & James S 
Baumlin (eds.) (2002) op. c it, p.9.
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In exp loring  this paradox, w e  can discern parallels in  the older fie ld  o f  virtue ethics  
w h ich  m igh t be helpful to virtue ep istem ology , and som e o f  the problem s for the 
eg o istic  hed on ist have already been analysed in the form er fie ld . For exam p le, M ichael 
Stocker su ggests that in traditional ethical theory w e  exh ib it a ‘sch izophren ia’ betw een  
our m o tiv es  and our reasons for carrying out a particular act, a lack  o f  harm ony w hich  
virtue eth ics is in a position  to  address. T w o points n eed  to be m ade about S tocker’s 
thesis: (i)  H is u se  o f  the term ‘schizophrenia’ is unfortunate, for the m ental health  
m etaphor he seeks is m ore like ‘sp lit personality d isorder’,309 ( ii)  B y  ‘reason s’ he 
intends to  include both justifications and values. A ccord in g  to Stocker, in  the very act 
o f  pursuing certain ends unam biguously as h edon istic  eg o ists , w e  bar access  to those  
ends, for:
Love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling and community are important sources o f  personal 
pleasure. But can such egoists get these pleasures? I think not -  not so long as they adhere to 
the motive o f pleasure-for-self. 10
T his has im portant con seq u en ces for virtue ep istem o lo g y , i f  the notion  finds a hom e  
there. In particular, a too-direct pursuit o f  ‘k n o w le d g e ’ (for exam ple, b y  m eans o f  
m em orisin g  chunks o f  a rev ision  guide as so le  preparation for an exam ination) m ay  
m ake us m iss the target. B ein g  too nakedly g o a l-seek in g  deprives u s o f  the p ossib ility  
o f  ach iev in g  the ep istem ic good  o f  genuine k n ow led ge. S tock er’s o w n  exam p le  asserts 
that seek in g  lo v e  for the pleasure it m ight bring is too  se lfish  to a ch iev e  the very aim  it 
seek s, and w ill thus deprive the seeker o f  the p ossib ility  o f  lo v e  (and a lso  the 
con seq u en t p leasure or reward). Furthermore, the ob ject o f  lo v e  is being  treated as 
essen tia lly  replaceable -  having on ly  to m eet the criterion o f  bringing about the 
pleasures associa ted  w ith  love.
S o  too  w ith  k n ow led ge. I f  w e  pursue it too  s in g le-m in d ed ly  and se lfish ly , w e  m iss out 
on the p leasures o f  acting from  other-regarding m otives (in  tw o  sen ses o f  the term  
‘oth er’ and tw o  sen ses o f  the term ‘regarding’, as I d iscu ssed  earlier [p. 120]) and,
Taking Indirect Routes to Knowledge
300 Which the standard taxonomy o f mental illness has renamed ‘Dissociative Identity Disorder’. APA 
(2000) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  Mental Disorders [4th edn.] DSM-IV (Arlington, VA: 
American Psychiatric Association) p.529.
310 Michael Stocker (1976) ‘The schizophrenia o f  modern ethical theories’, Journal o f  Philosophy, 73, 
pp.563-66. Reprinted in Crisp & Slote (eds.) (1997) op. cit., p.68.
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furtherm ore, fail to acquire the very k now ledge w e  seek ,311 S im plistic  technical 
rationality w ou ld  find this notion o f ‘indirection’ absurd, o f  course: ‘getting w hat w e  
w ant by seek in g  som ething e ls e ’312 is p recise ly  the opposite  o f  the ends-driven  
tech n icist approach.313 In the ep istem ic field , the ‘sch izop h ren ia’ o f  v illa g e  technical 
rationality leads to insincerity, sin ce w h en  gripped by this cond ition  the student 
b e liev es  that the k now ledge (c .f. person) has va lue not in itse lf  but on ly  in respect o f  
the rewards it can bring him. He also considers the sp ec ific  k n ow led ge (or particular 
person) to be a sort o f  placeholder, w hich  cou ld  be filled  b y  a num ber o f  eq u a lly -u sefu l 
‘fa c ts’ (or persons). T hey have no value per se , but o n ly  insofar as they are v e h ic le s  to  
pleasure. Such ersatz ‘k n o w led g e’ acquisition , in w h ich  the putative k n ow led ge  is 
neither ju stified  nor loved  for its ow n  sake but on ly  as an interchangeable m eans to an  
end, is not uncom m on, it seem s to me. On the other hand, g iv in g  ourselves over to  
k n o w led g e , perhaps b y  being part o f  an ep istem ic com m unity , w ill a llo w  us to acquire  
k n o w led g e  in  a m ore deserving, richer w ay  than by sin g le-m in d ed ly  pursuing it, and 
sh o w s that w e  va lu e it for its ow n sake rather than for the external ben efits w h ich  can  
fo llo w  in its w ake. W e acquire k now ledge virtuously  by engagem ent, not b y  seizure.
I f  w e  sh ift the focus to teachers, w e  can see  that supporting such learner engagem en t in  
an other-regarding w ay is a m ore w orthy activ ity  than the e ffic ien t techn icist d eliverin g  
o f  tightly-prescribed syllabi w hich  ou tcom es-focu sed  accountability  and inspection  
reg im es foster. R ecent em pirical work in Ireland by M ark M organ, M ichael O ’L eary  
and others found that teachers do subscribe to an other-regarding modus vivendi, as
the events that motivate teachers on a day-to-day basis are grounded in their reasons 
for becoming teachers in the first place, i.e. ‘making a difference’. Thus, factors 
like ... student engagement in learning can be regarded as experiences that stem 
directly from the motivation to enter teaching.314
311 Dunne quotes Newman on this theme: ‘There are no short cuts to knowledge; nor does the road to it 
always lie in the direction in which it terminates, nor are we able to see the end on starting ... No one can 
go straight up a mountain; no sailing vessel makes for port without tacking ... John Henry Newman 
(1852) The Idea o f  a University, p.230, in Joseph Dunne (2006) ‘Newman Now: Re-examining the 
Concepts o f  “Philosphical” and “Liberal” in The Idea o f a University’, British Journal o f  Educational 
Studies, vol.54, no.4, pp 412-428, p.421.
312 Stocker (1976) ibid., p.75.
313 A very recent book, however, suggests that such ‘obliquity’ -  as the author terms it -  is also good for 
business. John Kay (2011) Obliquity: Why our Goals Are Best Achieved Indirectly [paperback]
(London: Profile Books Ltd.)
314 Mark Morgan, Larry Ludlow, Karl Kitching, Michael O ’Leary & Aleisha Clarke (2010) ‘What makes 
teachers tick? Sustaining events in new teachers’ lives’, British Educational Research Journal, vol.36, 
no.2, pp. 191-208, p.201.
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W e w ou ld  be fa lling  into the naturalistic fa llacy  w ere w e  to adduce this em pirical fact 
as a ju stifica tion  for prom oting the desirability o f  engagem ent, but sin ce  the 
recom m en dation  com es from  philosophical argum ents, this represents a benign  
co n flu en ce  o f  norm ative and em pirical considerations. B u ild in g  on  the instrinsic 
m otivation  o f  the profession  is not on ly  a m ore virtuous project than focu sin g  on ‘the 
ph ilo sop h y  o f  perform ativity’, it w ill a lso  do m uch to avoid  the ‘unintended negative  
con seq u en ces, w h ich  are evident in  loss o f  m orale and jo b  sa tisfaction ’, as M organ et 
a I. put it.315
Conclusions of Chapter 3
T his chapter has exam ined  the notion o f  other-regarding virtue in  general and has set 
out a nuanced  v ie w  o f  the n ovel idea o f  other-regarding, sp ec ifica lly  epistemic virtue.
- The teacher’s being  anim ated by such  virtues assists the learner to ach ieve  enhanced  
co g n itiv e  contact w ith  reality. Our other-regarding virtue is enhanced  by a continued  
en gagem en t w ith  k now ledge -  a process that requires us to act from  self-regarding  
ep istem ic  virtue.
The archetypal credulity-veracity pairing has b een  exp lored  in  detail, as a 
representative o f  a larger class o f  ta lly ing propensities. W h ile  straightforward truth- 
te llin g  ought to be the norm  for teachers, w e  n eed  to  exerc ise  our phronesis to find the 
happy m ed iu m  b etw een  saying too m uch (a  garrulous parrhesia  or an over-em phatic  
boasting, alazoneia] .316) and too little (a  self-deprecating  eirdneia). N either should  w e  
be ep istem ic  saints. C hildhood m yth o log isin g , partial truth-telling, indirection, 
d issim u lation  and oversim plification  m ay all b e used  as skopic  routes to  the longer- 
range telos o f  enhanced cogn itive  contact w ith  reality. T his blurring o f  the lines  
b etw een  w hat w e  see as reality and w hat w e  encourage our benefic iaries to b e liev e  for  
the tim e b e in g  can  be a dangerous practice, how ever, and as teachers w e  ought to resist 
any tem ptation  to overuse our kairik pow ers o f  ‘sp e ll-b in d in g’. In this regard, virtue  
sim p liciter has unavoidably  (and fittingly) encroached o n  the project o f  prom oting  
ep istem ic  virtue, in the shape o f  the m oral virtue o f  b en ev o len ce  taking a leading role 
in regulating teach ers’ other-regarding ep istem ic  conduct. A lth ou gh  the notion  o f  an
315 Morgan et a t  (2010), p.202
316 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1127al3-15.
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autonom ous learner has been  questioned, respecting the autonom y o f  the learner qua 
person  ought to rem ain a k ey  principle in the learning situation. The im portance o f  
a ch iev in g  an attunem ent w ith  those w h ose ep istem ic  predicam ents w e  w ish  to help  
am eliorate, before intervening in a tim ely  and virtuous w ay , has a lso  been  
dem onstrated.
A  strict defin ition  o f  an act o f  other-regarding in tellectual virtue w as built o n  criteria 
su ggested  b y  K aw all, w h o  in turn draws on  Z agzebsk i. T his requires that it be  
properly-m otivated , generally  su ccessfu l in a ch iev in g  its p ed agog ica l aim , and that it 
g iv e  p leasure to both the teacher (w h ose  w ell-ordered  a ffect cau ses her to respond  
correctly  to the exercise  o f  the virtues) and the taught. A  m ore w id e-an g led  v iew  o f  
our role sees  us located  in an ep istem ic w eb  characterised b y  a range o f  reciprocities 
and asym m etries. The criteria here are not as am enable to  ch eck ing , but our 
in terventions need  to have som e b en efic ia l e ffec t on  the fie ld  or the ep istem ic  
com m unity . In an educational setting, this w ou ld  in v o lv e  a degree o f  uptake by at least 
so m e o f  the learners, v iew ed  diachronically. W hile  this attaining o f  ends is important, 
so  too  is the d oxastic  engagem ent o f  the learners: th is is  w hat g iv e s  the praxis  o f  
teaching its m ean ing to the practitioners. Prom oting such  virtuous interaction is  g o o d  
for the in tellectual flourishing o f  the students and produces p o sitiv e  a ffect in  the 
teachers, protecting the latter from  the tech n icist-in d u ced  ‘fee lin g  o f  being  under a 
discip linary reg im e w hich , in turn, results in n egative em otion s including fear, anger 
and d isa ffec tio n ’.317
D uring teach ing  and learning, the intellectual v irtues dem anded o f  teacher and learner 
are not typ ica lly  identical, but they should in terlock like gear-w h eels. It is up to the  
teacher to prom ote this interlocking, an exam p le o f  w h ich  appears on  p .245  in the case  
o f  the S o c ia l E pistem ic Virtues. This is not a sim p le  matter, h ow ever, for over-u sin g  
particular com binations m ay a llow  others to se ize  up. For exam p le, the co-ordinate  
virtue to the learner’s virtue o f  ‘being ab le to recogn ize  reliab le authority’318 is 
in tellectual candour on the part o f  the teacher (S e e  A p p en d ix  B for a table sh ow in g  
h o w  th ese  co-ordinated  virtues m ight look ) and th is straightforw ard credulity-and- 
veracity  configuration  ought, as w e  have seen , to be the defau lt gearing in the
3,7 Morgan et. at., (2010) p.202
3IS Zagzebski (1996) Virtues o f  the Mind, p.] 14.
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classroom . H ow ever, despite the com fort o f  this interlocking, and the im m ediate  
d oxastic  torque to be obtained, the under-use o f  other virtuous com binations is 
detrim ental to the ep istem ic telos, in that they w ill have rusted through d isu se w hen  
later required. The ideal is to use other configurations, w ithout the teacher depleting  
her o w n  ep istem ic  reputation to the extent that the trust w hich  supports c lassroom  
d oxastic  interactions is underm ined. For exam ple, to prom ote ‘re flex iv e  critical
i i q  ' l O f i
o p en n ess’ in the learner, the teacher m ight be anim ated b y  provocativeness. T o  
encourage in tellectual boldness, she m ay exercise  the maieutic v irtues.321 A  fuller  
d iscu ssio n  o f  th ese ta lly ing virtues is to  be found in chapters 5 and 6.
319 Miranda Flicker, op. cit
320 Plato, Republic, 523b-c
321 Plato, Theœtetus 149-152
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Chapter 4 - Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology and 
Education
Introduction
In this chapter, I begin  to develop  further the key them es o f  virtue ep istem ology , w hich  
I have already identified , described and extended , in order to elaborate and defend a 
virtue approach to  teaching and learning.
T his project is on e  w hich  has not been attem pted in  any substantial w a y  by the virtue  
ep istem o lo g ists  them selves. S ince it is su ch  a n ew  fie ld , the attention naturally tends to  
fo cu s on  the em erging ep istem ologica l theories rather than on  their im plications for  
practice. V irtue ep istem olog ists Robert R oberts and Jay W ood  (2 0 0 7 ) p a y  m ore  
attention to education  than m ost, by devoting  tw o-an d -a -h a lf pages to ‘T each ing  and  
L earn ing’ in  their b ook  Intellectual Virtues, but the insights they  offer on  this top ic  are 
quite lim ited . T hey stress the im portance to  learners o f  p o sse ss in g  ‘w hat the m ed ieva ls  
ca lled  the virtue o f  docility  or teachab leness’,322 and ‘a d isp osition  to respect the  
teacher both as a hum an being and for w hat she k n ow s, and to be grateful to  her for  
w hat she im parts’. T he teacher is to  d ep loy  ‘g en tlen ess’,323 for she w ill thus ‘at the end  
o f  the day . . .  have transm itted m ore ep istem ic g o o d s than her harsher counterpart.’ 
‘T ea ch in g ’ is about ‘passing intellectual g o o d s on  from  the le ss  ignorant to the m ore  
ignorant’.324 T he authors’ som ew hat C onfiician  educational scenario  -  o f  ben ighted  
students in fused  w ith  filia l p iety  directed tow ards the teacher as a fount o f  w isd om , 
w h o g en tly  ‘im parts’ her k n ow led ge to them  -  w ou ld  m ake for a p leasant w orking  
environm ent for teachers. H ow ever, w hether this is a g o o d  w a y  o f  cultivating virtue 
and d ev e lo p in g  the learners’ w ebs o f  k n o w led g e  is open  to doubt.
R ichard Paul contributes a short chapter entitled  ‘C ritical T hinking, M oral Integrity, 
and C itizenship: T each ing  for the Intellectual V irtu es’ to G uy A x te ll’s (2 0 0 0 )  
Knowledge, B elief and Character. He is critical o f  the n egative  e ffects  o f  the
322 Robert Roberts & Jay Wood (2007) Intellectual Virtues; an Essay in Regulative Epistemology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 142
323 Although Roberts and Wood do not mention the fact, ‘Gentleness’ is, we recall, one o f  the ‘crowning’ 
teacherly virtues o f  Agathon/De La Salle.
324 Roberts & Wood (2007) op. cit., p.293
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‘in tellectual arrogance’325 that can result from  a sh a llow  learning based  on algorithm s 
and u nreflective m em orisation. H is m ain interest here is  in  prom oting the virtues o f  
fa ir-m indedess and intellectual hum ility as a basis for m oral education. H ow ard  
G ardner’s latest b ook  (published April 2 0 1 1 ) is subtitled Educating fo r  the Virtues in 
the Twenty-First Century ,326 but it m akes no m ention at all o f  virtue ep istem o lo g y  and 
d o es  not exp lo it any o f  the insights o f  Sosa, Z agzeb sk i, N o z ick , or the other reliabilist 
and resp on sib ilists w hom  w e  have d iscussed .
O nly a sm all num ber o f  peer-review ed journal articles deal w ith  the im plications o f  the 
in tellectual virtues for education. Christopher O ’T o o le  (1 9 3 8 ), in  h is ‘T he T each ing  o f  
Intellectual and M oral V irtues’, te lls us that ‘T o teach, therefore, is to impart truth’,327 
and takes a sim p listic  approach to A ristotle’s analysis o f  the d ifferent aetiologies o f  the 
in tellectual and m oral virtues: ‘Intellectual v irtues, then, can  be taught d irectly. The  
student can enter a classroom , and after an hour’s w ork  h e can  co m e a w ay  k now ing  
several im portant intellectual princip les’ .328 W illiam  Abraham  (2 0 0 6 ), a theologian , 
w arns that an educational goal ‘o f  social transform ation [can] m orph into the fostering  
o f  in tellectual v ic e ’.329 D raw ing briefly on Z agzeb sk i, and on S o sa ’s earliest work in 
the fie ld , he m akes an argum ent for sem inaries adopting a w orking m od el o f  im proving  
in tellectual ex ce llen ce  and elim inating in tellectual v ic e s  T ike w ish fu l thinking, 
ob tu sen ess and paroch ia lism ’.330 R yan B evan  (2 0 0 9 ) su ggests that ‘c itizensh ip  
education  in particular can benefit greatly from  this m ore exp an sive  theory [i.e. virtue 
ep istem o lo g y ] w ith  concrete pedagogica l im p lication s’ .331 H ow ever , he quotes neither  
Sosa nor Z agzeb sk i and m entions the w ork o f  virtue ep istem o lo g ist Jam es  
M ontm arquet o n ly  by w ay o f  introducing the virtues o f  ‘im partiality, the virtues o f  
in tellectual sobriety, and the virtues o f  in tellectual cou rage’.332
325 Richard Paul (1993) Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing 
World, pp.319-332 (Sonama: Foundation for Critical Thinking) reprinted as ch. 13, Guy Axtell (ed.) 
(2000) Knowledge, Belief and Character (Lanham, Maryland: Rowtnan & Littlefield), p. 164.
326 Howard Gardner (2011) Truth, Beauty and Goodness Reframed: Educating fo r  the Virtues in the 
Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books)
321 Christopher J. O’Toole (1938) ‘The Teaching o f  Intellectual and Moral Virtues’, Ethics, vol.49, n o.l, 
pp.81-84, p.81. To be fair to him, we note that this was written well before the advent o f contemporary 
virtue epistemology.
328 ibid., p.82.
329 William J. Abraham (2006) ‘Education, Transformation and Intellectual Virtue’, Christian Higher 
Education, 5, pp.3-19, p.3.
330 ibid., p. 16.
331 Ryan Bevan (2009) ‘Expanding Rationality: The relation between epistemic virtue and critical 
thinking’, Educational Theory, vol.59, no.2, pp.167-179, p .167.
332 ibid. p. 177
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W e see , then, that the conversation betw een  virtue ep istem o lo g y  and education  has 
b een  lim ited , and confined  m ainly to citizensh ip  and m oral education . T he sm all 
am ount o f  d iscu ssion  that has taken place has been  restricted to the neo-A ristotelian  
r e s p o n s ib i l is t  variety, has virtually ignored the insights o f  S o sa ’s reliab ilist strain, and 
typ ica lly  in v o lv es  proposing a list o f  the in tellectual virtues to be cu ltivated  in 
educational settings. The remainder o f  th is thesis thus concerns it s e lf  w ith  the 
question , ‘H o w  can virtue ep istem ology  o f  both m ain typ es (that is, reliab ilist and 
resp on sib ilist) b e  exploited  to inform  the practices o f  teach ing and learning in general 
(that is , not on ly  m oral and citzenship ed u cation )?’
I start w ith  S o sa ’s version  o f  virtue ep istem ology  -  virtue re liab ilism 333 -  w h ich  seem s  
to have rece ived  no attention at all from educationalists (u n less  w e  include the p assing  
m ention  b y  Abraham ). In his m ost recent Work, (2 0 1 1 ) S osa  d escrib es teachers as 
m ou th p ieces for institutionalised inform ation,334 so  h is ow n  educational insights, un like  
his ep istem o lo g y , m ay be considered to be o f  lim ited  va lue. I evaluate the extent to 
w h ich  h is ep istem ic  m odel stands up w hen considering  not ju st the act o f  acquiring an  
iso la ted  true b e lie f  reliably, but also the overall learning p rocess o f  b e lie f  rev ision . I 
sh o w  that in education  it is not on ly  S o sa ’s ‘accurate, adroit and apt’335 hitting o f  true 
proposition  p  w h ich  is important, but a lso  an engagem en t w ith  the counterfactive c la ss  
o f  p rop osition s such that -p. Furthermore, by using  som e prin cip les drawn from  
artificial in te lligen ce  theory, I connect reliab ilist notions o f  k n o w led g e  to  the active  
p ro cesses  o f  learning qua w eb-m odification .
T his w ork  sh ow s that in the mature ep istem ic agent the warrant for p  ought generally  to  
be learned a lon gsid e  proposition p itself. T he warrant can p ro tectp  from  ««warranted  
h o stile  ep istem ic  input. I f  there is a challenge strong en ou gh  to  ov erco m e p ’s particular 
degree  o f  ep istem ic  entrenchm ent, h ow ever, it w ill cau se  the ju stified  derogation  o f  p  
in  favour o f  ~p from  the learner’s belief-corpus, C. B eca u se  o f  the nature o f  the  
argum ents d ep loyed , there is an unavoidable core o f  sy m b olic  m anipulation , u sin g  
som e e lem en ts o f  form al log ic  and artificial in te llig en ce  theory, w h ich  o ccu p ies  the
333 Sosa describes his own approach as ‘virtueperspectivism ', but Guy Axtell places Ernest Sosa, John 
Greco and Alvin Goldman in the camp o f ‘virtue reliabilism \ and I feel that Sosa’s close connections 
with N ozick’s reliabilism makes Axteil’s a plausible taxonomy. [Axtell (2001) quoted in Robert Lockie 
(2008) 'Problems for virtue theories in epistemology’ Philos. Stud 138: pp.169-191].
334 Sosa (2011) op. cit., p.47
335 Sosa (2007) A Virtue Epistemology. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, vol.I (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p.22.
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m iddle part o f  the chapter. T his is fram ed by m ore o b v io u sly  educational concerns at 
the b eg in n in g  and towards the end, but the them e o f  ep istem ica lly  reliable and virtuous 
education  runs throughout.
Aims of Education
B efore  conducting  a conversation betw een  the reliab ilist construal o f  virtue 
ep istem o lo g y  and education, it is usefu l to consider b riefly  w hat the aim s o f  the 
educational project m ight be. There is a lack o f  unanim ity on  this question , as can be 
seen  b y  a cursory advertence to a handful o f  writers on  the top ic. A .N . W hitehead, for 
exam p le , in  The Aims o f  Education, proposes that ‘the e ssen ce  o f  education  is that it be  
relig iou s . . .  an education that inculcates duty and reveren ce’.336 A .S . N e ill  takes the 
v iew  that education  should ‘m ake peop le  happier, m ore secure, le ss  neurotic, less  
preju d iced ’, Jean-Jacques R ousseau  b e lieves that educational a im s ‘com e into accord  
w ith  the teach ing  o f  nature’, and Sergei Shapovalenko insists that the aim  o f  education  
ought to be ‘to inculcate the m aterialist ou tlook  and com m u n ist m en ta lity ’.337 M atthew  
A rnold  see s  education as a liberal introduction to ‘the best that has been  thought and  
said in the w o r ld ’.338 John H enry N ew m an  takes the aim  o f  a university education to 
be ‘K n o w led g e  . . .  not m erely a m eans to som eth ing  b eyon d  it, or the prelim inary o f  
certain arts into w hich  it naturally reso lves, but an end su ffic ien t to rest in  and to pursue  
for its o w n  sak e’.339 H oward Gardner, as w e  have already noted, cla im s that education  
should  nurture w hat he terms the ‘c lassica l v irtu es’340 o f  truth, beauty and goodness.
T h ese  are substantial and important ideas, and to do them  ju stice  w ou ld  take m uch  
d iscu ssion . M y reason for listing them  is  to  sh ow  that education  is  a  contested  topic. 
W hether or not it is ‘essen tia lly  contestab le’, though, is  a d ifferent matter, for, as D avid  
Carr puts it, ‘even  though m any o f  the issu es and q u estion s o f  education  are not
336 A.N. Whitehead (1962) The Aims o f  Education and Other Essays [paperback edn.] (London: Ernest 
Benn Ltd), p.23.
337 K. Harris (1999) ‘Aims! Whose Aims?’ in R. Marples (ed.) The Aims o f  Education (London: 
Routledge) p .l. Quoted in Paul Standish (2006) ‘The Nature and purposes o f  Education’, Randall Curren 
(ed.) (2006) A Companion to the Philosophy o f  ¿Education (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
338 S. Gribble, 1967, quoted in David Carr (2009) ‘Revisiting the Liberal and Vocational Dimensions o f  
University Education’, British Journal o f  Educational Studies, vol.57, n o .l, pp. 1-17, p.3.
339 John Henry Newman The Idea o f  a University [online] available at
http:/Vw w w.newmanreader.org/works/idea/discourse5.html [accessed 20 April 2011]. ‘Discourse 5. 
Knowledge its Own End’, section 2.
340 Gardner (2011) op. cit., p. 13. In the present thesis, truth, beauty and goodness are viewed not as 
virtues but as the transcendentals towards which the epistemic, aesthetic and moral virtues aim.
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decidab le on  theoretically  (or em pirically) neutral or norm atively  d isconnected  grounds 
. . .  there is n evertheless the distinct p ossib ility  o f  arriving at better or w orse  practical 
d ec is io n s and p o lic ies  on  such qu estion s’.341 W hen governm ents m ake attem pts at 
d efin in g  such  p o lic ie s  and aim s, they typ ica lly  frame education  in instrum ental terms, 
by asserting  that the populace needs to be w e ll educated in order that the country m ight 
com p ete eco n o m ica lly  w ith the rest o f  the world:
In today’s global economy, in which our national competitiveness increasingly 
depends on the skills o f each and every person ...[t]oo many young people are 
unattractive to employers; deficient in the basics o f  English and maths, unprepared 
for further study; and unable to demonstrate their true potential.342
H ow ever, in  a pluralist society , this issue is not a straightforward on e  to settle, so  
govern m en t c la im s that all o f  the contesting v iew s o f  the a im s o f  education  are trum ped  
by con sid erin g  w hat is in the best interest o f  the nation are not con vin cin g . O ne can  
a lw ays qu estion  w h o se  interests are being served w hen  assertions are m ade about ‘the 
national interest’ . T he rhetoric often  appears to b e laudable, in  that it is, prim a facie, 
on e  o f  w ish in g  to liberate pupils to ‘dem onstrate their true p oten tia l’, but,
The State resorts to the narrative o f freedom each time it assumes direct control 
over the training of the “people” under the name o f the “nation” in order to point 
them down the path o f “progress”,343
as Jean-Fran9o is  Lyotard acerbically  com m ents.
W hatever the esp ou sed  aim s o f  the educational project are c la im ed  to be, though, 
k n o w led g e  a lw ays seem s to have a major part to play. T o return to the first v iew  o f  the 
aim s o f  education  quoted above, W hitehead offers the further su g g estio n  that 
‘E ducation  is  the acquisition  o f  the art o f  the utilisation o f  k n o w le d g e ’.344 N ew m an , in  
co m m o n  w ith  the G reeks, sees k n ow led ge as a w orthw hile end in itself, but even  the 
v o ic e s  raised in favour o f  other agendas w ou ld  scarcely  d en y  its instrum ental value. It 
is  hard to  im agine a defensib le  set o f  educational aim s b eing  constructed w hich  did not 
a ssign  a central role to know ledge.
341 David Carr (2010) 'Education, Contestation and Confusions’, British Journal o f  Educational Studies, 
vol. 58, n o.l, pp.89-104, p .102.
342 Speech by the then UK. Education and Skills Secretary Ruth Kelly, introducing the White Paper 14-19 
Education and Skills in the House of Commons, 23 Feb 2005.
343 J-F. Lyotard (1979) [tr. Bennington, G. and Massumi, B. (1984)] The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press) p.32.
344 Whitehead (1962) op. cit., p.6.
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K n o w led g e  is  som eth ing w e  ought to care about, as educators. It has an extra value, 
over and ab ove that o f  m ere true belief, w h ich  should  be prized  and look ed  upon  as one  
o f  the k ey  aim s o f  the educational project. A s  one o f  the three great transcendentals, 
the pursuit o f  truth is a k ey  part o f  a flourishing life . Learners b enefit both from  the 
k n o w led g e  w h ich  results from  their ep istem ically-v irtuous activ ity  and from  the  
k n o w led g e-seek in g  activity itself.
B ut the w ord ‘k n o w led g e’ is, o f  course, open  to interpretation. In som e ca ses, a  
d efic ien t m od el o f  education (such as that o f  the tech n ic ists) is  partly attributable to  an  
im p overish ed  v ie w  o f  know ledge. So w e  seek  a dem anding construal o f  ‘k n o w le d g e ’ 
that m akes it a w orthy target for our p edagogica l efforts. W e thus return to a precursor 
to S o sa ’s approach, N o z ic k ’s elaboration o f  P lato’s tripartite d efin ition  o f  k n ow led ge  
(true ju stified  b e lie f), as a starting point for d eve lop in g  a  reliab ilist v irtue-theoretic  
v iew  o f  education .
Developing Reliabilist Construals of Knowledge in an Educational 
Context
Here w e  unpack N o z ic k ’s reliabilist defin ition  o f  k n o w led g e  and use it to cast light on  
the educational context. This leads to a m ore nuanced approach to supporting learning: 
on e  in w h ich  counterfactives (~p) are seen  to b e sign ificant. In d ec id in g  w hether or not 
N o z ic k ’s four cond itions are m et in the particular case , w e  ju d g e  w hether or not the 
learner has a cla im  to k n ow led ge p  by reliab ilist lights.
N o z ic k ’s tracking m od el sets out the fo llo w in g  four con d ition s for k n ow led ge:
W e can  add to this list the notion  that S osa  derived  from  (3 ) and (4 ) -  and that w e  
d iscu ssed  earlier (p .38 ) -  that o f  Cartesian ‘sa fe ty ’:
5. B sp  * -□ -* p
For s to k n ow  that p , then, it m ust be the case  that (1 ) p  is  true, (2 )  s  b e liev es  that p ,
(3 )  w ere  p  not to  be true, 5 w ould  not b e liev e  it, (4 ) w ere  p  to b e  true, 5 w o u ld  b e liev e  it 
and (5 ) w ere s  to b elieve  it, it w ou ld  be true. S in ce  w e  are n o w  d ealin g  w ith  an 
educational setting, s  can b e understood as ‘student’ a n d p  as ‘so m e p iece  o f  
prep osition a l k n o w led g e’ -  such as that ‘Larissa is north o f  F arsala’. T here is  a lso  an 
im p lication  (due to  Sosa) that the know er d eserves credit for k n ow in g  that p.
A  consideration  o f  the five  conditions, w h ich  together d efin e  k n o w led g e , raises a 
num ber o f  questions w hen applied to education.
1. W hat range o f  propositions ought to be regarded as su itab le for the learners’ 
ed ification?
2. W hat lev e l o f  b e lie f  is required o f  the learner? H o w  can it b e m ade m anifest?
3. I f  p  is stipulated to b e true, w hy is  it necessary  to  entertain the p ossib ility  that it 
m igh t be fa lse  and h ow  ought this be done?
4. B y  w hat m eans ought the learner form  the b e lie f  ‘that p '  from  the fact that p i
5. H o w  can  the learner ensure that h is b e lie fs  are safe -  that is, not ea sily  m istaken?
W e can deal w ith  the first three under the head ings ‘R ange o f  P rop osition s p \  
‘B e liev in g  T h a tp ’ and ‘Counterfactual S en sitiv ity ’ . T he last tw o  are considered  
together as ‘A cquiring Safe B e lie fs ’. T aking th ese in  turn:
Suitable Range of Propositions for the Learner — Including ‘Threshold Concepts’
T he q u estion  about w hat range o f  propositions the educational project ought to  treat 
can be answ ered  w ith reference, inter alia , to (a) the p erce iv ed  n eed s o f  the learner (b) 
national priorities or (c) the subject d iscip lines. For the first (a), an overarching  
educational (as op p osed  to  subject-centred or p o litica l) reason  for in clu d in g  a 
p rop osition  o f  a particular type m ay be that it s im p ly  g iv e s  the learner practice in
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dealing  w ith  that type o f  concept. Or, it m ay concern a top ic that is lik ely  to pique his 
interest and extend  his k n ow led ge in w orthw hile w ays. For the secon d  (b ) w e  can  
readily find  exam ples o f  political attempts to m ake educational ou tcom es match  
national priorities. This happens at all phases o f  education , including university. The  
euphem ism  o f  a lignm ent is used  here instead o f  com p lian ce  to indicate the requirem ent 
o f  h igher education  institutions to conform  to governm ent ed icts v is -à -v is  their 
educational ou tcom es, on  pain o f  funds w ithdraw al for non-com pliance:
To drive the reform and modernisation o f the third level sector by enabling 
institutions to align their strategies with national priorities through the 
implementation o f the new funding arrangements and the impact o f major 
investment under the Strategic Innovation Fund.34S
It w ou ld  be n a ïve to argue that education ought to be d ecou p led  co m p le te ly  from  the 
eco n o m ic  agenda. H ow ever, i f  narrow ly-conceived  national priorities are the so le  
determ inant o f  the range o f  propositions, p ,  o f  w h ich  w e  ought to  treat, so m e other 
candidates -  for exam ple, the subject d isc ip lin es, the n eed s o f  the learner and  
‘threshold  co n cep ts’ -  m ay be relatively and unvirtuously  n eglected . For the last, (c), 
individual propositions can be identified as n od es in a coherent su bject-w eb , the m ost  
im portant o f  w h ich  w ill include ‘threshold co n cep ts’, a top ic  that needs further 
elaboration.
A  variety  o f  propositions are considered b y  educational program m es, but they do not 
all h ave the sam e im portance. Som e are so  trivial that su ggestin g  a con n ection  b etw een  
their acqu isition  and w hat m ay be considered the educational telos o f  enhancing the 
learner’s in tellectual flourishing w ould  be untenable, w h ile  others are c la im ed  to  h ave a 
sp ecia l s ign ifican ce . H ow ever, som e im portant in stan ces o f p  in vo lve  ‘threshold  
co n cep ts’, w h ich  are ‘akin to . . .  portal[s], op en in g  up . . .  n ew  and prev iou sly  
in a ccessib le  w a y s o f  thinking about som eth ing . . .  w ith ou t w hich  the learner cannot 
progress’,346 and hence could  w ell have a m ajor bearing on  h is ep istem ic  flourish ing. 
T w o  caveats ought to be m ade at this point, though, s in ce  va luab le as the n otion  o f  
‘threshold  co n cep t’ m ay be, the coiners o f  the term  (i)  intend it to be u sed  to help  
university teachers in their planning and (ii) are w ork ing  w ith in  a rather tech n icist  
‘learning o u tco m es’ paradigm . H ow ever, the idea o f  a p rev iou sly  b lock ed  route to  
troub lesom e k n ow led ge  becom in g  n ew ly-p assab le  is  a fam iliar on e in  ancient G reek
345 Government o f Ireland (2007) ibid,, p. 189.
346 Jar Meyer & Ray Land (2003) ‘Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge: Linkages to Ways 
o f  Thinking and Practising within the Disciplines.’ Occasional Report no.4. (Edinburgh: ETL Project).
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thought -  the aporia reveals a euporid!47 ~ which suggests that, used with caution, the 
concept might have more general educational import. We shall explore the notion a 
little further.
Meyer and Land characterise threshold concepts as transformative, irreversible, 
integrative, bounded and troublesome. After his epiphany, the learner sees things in a 
new light: one in which disparate and puzzling phenomena now appear lucidly 
connected. Following his transformation, the knower is changed forever and cannot 
return to his old ways o f thinking: Saul becomes Paul. The idea is an attractive one, 
but we ought to look at the details to see how this plays out in practice.
Interestingly, many o f the examples cited by Meyer and Land relate to absence or 
negation rather than presence: ~ p  rather than/?.348 Medical undergraduates, for 
instance, need to leam to see pain as ‘an ally that aids diagnosis and healing’,349 rather 
than as an unredeemably negative phenomenon which needs to be removed. Similarly, 
in physics, the absence o f order -  entropy -  is a problematic concept which is 
nevertheless essential for accessing the key ideas of thermodynamics. For economists, 
the threshold concept o f ‘opportunity cost’ deals with what Homo economicus could be 
doing with his time, but is in fact not doing, rather than with the costs and benefits o f  
what he is actually doing. More formally: ‘Opportunity cost is the evaluation placed on 
the most highly valued of the rejected alternatives or opportunities’.350 For the 
economics student, coming to know that evaluations o f actual and counterfactual 
choices (including the choice o f not choosing) can be made -  and that plumping for X 
means eschewing Y and Z -  involves crossing an intellectual threshold. In doing it he 
acquires the notion o f ‘opportunity cost’ and has access to economic thought o f a more 
abstract and generalisable nature than he had before.
343 Meyer & Land make no mention o f  the Greek provenance o f  their idea.
348 Meyer & Land do not talk in these terms, nor do they seem to have noticed this common feature o f  
many o f their examples.
349 Jan H.F. Meyer & Ray Land (2005) ‘Threshold concepts and troublesome knowledge (2) 
Epistemological considerations and a conceptual framework for teaching and learning’, Higher 
Education, 49: pp.373-388, p.374.
350 Eatwell (1998) in Meyer & Land (2003) op. cit, p.3.
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In mathematics, Meyer and Land identify the term ‘limit’ as a threshold concept, as in 
the following.351
In the limit, as 0 -» 0, F(0) =  (sin 0)/0 = 1
(0 [the angle between the base and the hypotenuse] in radians)
Again, we see that what is important here is not what exists (a right angled triangle 
with 0 having a non-zero value such that 0 < ji/2 radians) but what cannot exist (a right 
angled triangle in which 0 is zero). The triangle which represents the limit is not only 
counterfactive, it is also impossible. If 0 is zero, there is no triangle but only a single 
straight line. Moreover, attempting to calculate (sin 0/0) involves the mathematical 
felony o f dividing by zero. The student o f mathematics ought eventually to appreciate 
that as 0 approaches zero, the fraction (sin 0/0) approaches 1. The significant word 
here is ‘approaches’, for were ft,per impossibile, to arrive at zero, the triangle would 
disappear, making nonsense o f the idea o f measuring its sine. Being able to accept 
such incompossible pairs as (i) p [that if 0 were zero, then (sin 0/0) would be 1] and (ii) 
~ p [that if  0 were zero, then (sin 0/0) would not be l]352 liberates the tyro 
mathematician from the everyday notion o f a limit as something that can be reached. 
Furthermore, having crossed this conceptual threshold, the differential calculus -  which 
essentially deals with rates o f change [dy/dx] in the limit, as x approaches zero -  is now 
more genuinely available to him.
From an educational viewpoint built on epistemic virtue, what is particularly interesting 
in the last example is the question o f epistemic authenticity. The student who has not 
passed the intellectual threshold and acquired the mathematical notion ‘limit’ (which 
cannot itself be transgressed) may still manage to demonstrate an ersatz mathematical 
proficiency, one that simulates the genuine work o f his classmate, who has stepped 
through the conceptual portal and now has what we might term ‘echt-proficiency’. The 
aporectic student has perhaps learned the appropriate algorithms in the form of what 
David Perkins calls ‘ritual knowledge’. He has become habituated to mathematical 
rituals o f ‘a routine and rather meaningless character’; he knows ‘the routine that we
351 I have written this expression slightly differently from the version in Meyer & Land, for clarity and 
completeness. They omitted the important condition that 0 must be expressed in radians.
352 ‘(sin 0 /  0) = 1’ would not be true, since it trades on meaningless expressions.
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execute to get a particular result’.353 To the positivistically-inclincd assessor, both 
students deserve the same credit, but from a virtue perspective one is less 
epistemically-praiseworthy than the other, for his correct answer comes from an 
uncomprehending and shallow mimesis rather than from intellectual virtue.
Another example from Meyer and Land’s paper is the threshold concept of 
‘signification’ in the field o f cultural studies. Again, ~p makes an appearance, if  we 
glossp  as ‘that this is being said’:
... techniques o f deconstruction for analyzing literary texts (with a strong emphasis 
on the ironic, the contradictory, the ludic) often appear counter-intuitive, looking 
for absences, or what is not there, in order to gain insights into how the text is 
currently structured by a prevailing set o f (occluded or tacit) values or priorities.354
In other words, it is not the readily-apparent conclusionp  (that this is being said in the 
text) on which the the reader ought to reflect, but ~p (it is not the case that this is being 
said in the text). ‘ This' is the explicit message o f a text, but it is the unsaid, the hidden 
and silent assumptions that are of greater interest.
A final instance concurs with my own experience o f teaching Newtonian mechanicsj55, 
and, for learners, falls into Perkins’ category o f ‘foreign’ knowledge which ‘comes 
from a perspective that conflicts with our own’.356 Pupils often spontaneously adopt 
explanations for the motion o f bodies, which are at odds with classical physics and of a 
distinctly Aristotelian type: for example, that a rocket needs to bum continuously to 
sustain its movement in travelling to a distant planet. These misconceptions are 
eminently reasonable, though, for everyday experience seems to contradict the 
Newtonian law that ‘in the absence of a force’, an object will either remain at rest or 
‘continue to move in a straight line at constant velocity’.357 Objects do seem to need a
353 David Perkins (1999) ‘The many faces o f constructivism’, Educational Leadership, 57 (3), p.8. 
Meyer & Land (2003) quote Perkins (1999) too, but they give incorrect page numbers and change 
Perkins’ ‘foreign knowledge’ into ‘alien knowledge’. The latter change is arguably for the better, since 
Perkins gives a history-teaching example o f what he means by this: ‘presentism’, in which pupils 
view past events through present knowledge and values’. (Perkins, ibid, p. 10). A period o f  remote 
history may be ‘alien’ to us, but being ‘foreign’ has a different connotation,
354 Meyer & Land (2003) op. cit., p.3. [Italicized words in original].
355 This is not just anecdotal evidence, however. For further evidence o f  such misconceptions, see Kevin 
M. Leander and David E. Brown (1999) “‘You Understand, But You Don’t Believe It” : Tracing the 
Stabilities and Instabilities o f interaction in a Physics Classroom Through a Multidimensional 
Framework’, Cognition and Instruction, vol.17, n o .l, pp.93-135. p.95.
356 Perkins (1999) op. cit., p.10.
357 Isaac Newton (1687) Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Law I. [This is a merely a 
special case o f  Law II [F =  ma] in which F -  0, but it usefully underlines Newton’s rejection o f  the 
Aristotelian treatment o f forces and motion].
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motive force to keep them moving, although within Newtonian mechanics this is 
explained by the necessity o f overcoming the opposing force o f friction. Here we leave 
Meyer and Land’s notion of threshold concepts and consider briefly how the faulty 
propositions held by the learners in this final example can be ousted.
In setting out to displace these ‘alternative frameworks’ (such as pupils’ Aristotelian 
ideas about motion), it is important to bear in mind that their mistaken adoption by 
learners is neither arbitrary nor intellectually vicious but is based quite reasonably on a 
priori categories and sensory experience: a tethering that makes them particularly 
tenacious. This tenacity is strengthened by the fact that the elegant mathematical 
constructions o f classical physics are not easily vulnerable to attack or engagement by 
pupils in school science laboratories. There is something abstract and Platonic about 
Newton’s work that insulates it from empirical falsification in the classroom. Only on 
the quantum scale, or at speeds approaching that o f light, does the Newtonian world­
view break down, so any apparent classroom departures from Newton’s laws are 
usually (and correctly) explained away with reference to friction or experimental error. 
Thus, our experiments with ‘friction-compensated’ ramps, trolleys and timers are 
designed not to put Newton to the empirical test but to make sure that we confirm his 
laws in the eyes of our pupils.
This dependence on authority (Newton’s authoritative position in the scientific 
pantheon; our dual role as both authority-figure and an authority in our subject) is not 
likely to engage learners in responsible, intellectually-virtuous dialogue. It will, rather, 
encourage unresponsive acceptance of a pre-defined version o f reality. Teachers might 
seek to reassure their pupils that if they just take it on trust for the time being, it will all 
make sense eventually. Unfortunately, an unwillingness to accept the deferred 
gratification required, and revulsion at the often forbidding nature o f the scientific 
corpus, has led many to seek alternative explanations for fundamental questions not in 
the scientific domain, but in pseudoscience. To avoid this epistemically-unfortunate, 
but understandable, abdication on the part o f pupils, we need to be honest about the 
conflicts that abound and concede the apparent attractiveness and plausibility o f a range 
o f counterfactive propositions ~p, instead o f merely dismissing them and substituting p  
by teacherly edict. This search for genuine knowledge rather than second-hand 
opinions requires authentic dialogue. In Republic 435a, Plato offers the image of the 
two fire-sticks which cannot individually make fire but require contact to produce the
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necessary spark. It is the intersubjective nature o f this construction358 o f knowledge 
that gives this approach its power. To flourish epistemically requires intellectually- 
virtuous informed dialogue and guided experience. However, the teacher would be 
unwise to emulate the rigorous insistence on definitions and steamrollering reductio 
moves frequently found in Plato’s dialogues. The root meaning o f ‘elenchus’ relates to 
shame, we recall, which is not usually a desirable emotion in classroom contexts.
So, a consideration o f Nozick (1) has led us to consider the range o f propositions which 
are proper for the education project. Some o f these -  such as the threshold concepts -  
appear to be particularly important for the intellectual flourishing359 o f learners and 
may justifiably be promoted on that ground. However, the construction o f a ‘shopping 
list’ of propositions,/?, (for example in an examination syllabus) might cause teachers 
to approach them in too direct a manner and inadvisedly brush off the counterfactive 
propositions, ~p, held by learners. These misconceptions need to be addressed to clear 
the way for a ‘pro-factual’ concept acquisition o fp, and dialogue is a good candidate 
for a way o f dealing with them virtuously.
Believing That p  versus Being Able to State “Thatp ”
Asserting as a condition for knowledge that‘s believes that p  ’ is not, I suggest, to be 
conflated with the requirement that‘s is able to state that p  In Dickens’ Hard Times, 
for example, Sissy Jupe’s deep, first-hand knowledge o f horses is over-ridden by 
Gradgrind’s demand for propositional evidence that she really does know what a horse 
is -  a demand allegedly not met by her, but (by positivist lights) adequately 
demonstrated by another pupil: ‘Bitzer,’ said Thomas Gradgrind. ‘Your definition o f a 
horse.’
‘Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four 
grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the 
spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but 
requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth.'
Thus (and much more) Bitzer.
‘Now girl number twenty,’ [Sissy Jupe] said Mr. Gradgrind.
‘You know what a horse is.’
358 Socrates is o f course no radical constructivist, but he believes that The Truth can best be sought by 
dialogue. In this respect, he is what we might term a ‘pedagogical constructivist’.
359 Flourishing is o f  course an Aristotelian rather than a reliabilist notion. A reliabilist justification for 
including the threshold concepts in a syllabus would be that they open up access to a wider range o f  true 
beliefs and hence ‘help maximise one’s surplus o f  truth over error’, to use Sosa’s phrase. Ernest Sosa 
(1985) ‘Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue’, Monist, 68, no.2, p.227.
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The significance o f this vignette is that Sissy Jupe, by virtue o f her experience, is in a 
better position than any o f the other protagonists to know what a horse is, but her voice 
is silenced in favour o f the ‘facts’ o f the propositional description offered by Bitzer.360 
We can locate her in Michael Polanyi’s ‘... area where the tacit predominates to the 
extent that articulation is virtually impossible; we may call this the ineffable 
domain ’,361 Were Gradgrind a more virtuous teacher, he would act in a maieutic role 
here, by helping her to deliver her knowledge in a form suitable for respectful public 
discussion. He would enable her to make the tacit more explicit. Sissy has a good web 
of beliefs about horses: representing sound cognitive contact with reality, and woven 
during long first-hand experience, helped by intersubjective triangulation with the 
interpretations o f her father and others. But Gradgrind has isolated her and treated her 
like a feral knower. Bitzer, however, is a horse o f a different feather, who might be 
considered to occupy ‘... the area in which the tacit and formal fall apart, since the 
speaker does not know, or quite know, what he is talking about’.362 In typical 
educational contexts, having no real feel for what one is talking or writing about is not 
a barrier to obtaining reward, for often what counts is that ‘knowledge’ be explicitly 
demonstrated. The ‘diffident schoolboy’363 can state ‘thatp ' in an exam, yet not be 
entitled to claim it as knowledge, since he does not believe the proposition, beyond 
having a faint intuition that it is more likely than not that p  might be the right answer to 
the question. Although this is not a creditworthy, qua virtuous, response, it usually will 
earn him credit in the form of academic reward. I return to this problem later (p.207).
In educational contexts, then, authentic belief and espoused belief can come apart in a 
manner that may deny the learner knowledge on the criterion o f Nozick (2), but not on
360 We can regard her more favourably as a knower, however, when we consider her ‘being-in-the 
world’, a la Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s La structure du comportement (1942). Merleau-Ponty stresses 
‘the primacy o f  the lived over the conceptual.... [A] 1 ready emphasized by Husserl and Heidegger, is the 
emphasis on the concrete, the felt, the lived, the here-and-how available to you and me. But o f course if  
one is to stay true to the lived and yet have concepts, then there must be a way in which concepts can be 
related to (without replacing) the concretely lived.’ Eugene T. Gendlin (1964). ‘Review o f Merleau- 
Ponty's The structure o f behavior’, The Modem Schoolman, 42, pp.87-96, p.88 [Online] available at 
http://www.focusing.org/gendlin/docs/gol_2091.html [Accessed 15 April 2011].
361 Michael Polanyi (1958/1962) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: 
Routledge & Regan Paul), p.87 [Emphasis in original],
362 ibid., p.87.
363 Although the idea o f the diffident schoolboy not really knowing what he half-heartedly plumps for in 
an exam is not a new one, the earliest reference 1 can find is Jonathan Dancy (1985) Introduction to 
Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell) p.40.
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positivist tests for knowledge. The converse can also be the case, as we saw with Sissy 
Jupe.
Sensitivity Towards Counterfactive Possibilities
Nozick proposes the counterfactual conditional \~p □—* ~Bsp\ to be indispensable for 
knowing that p, which prompts the question: Ifp  is deemed to be true, then why is it 
necessary to entertain the possibility that it might be false? This, rather counter­
intuitively, turns out to be an essential aspect o f virtuous knowledge-acquisition.
A modest fallibilism requires the learner to hold back from full assent to true belief p, 
and to be alive to the possibility that is in fact the case. This is analogous to 
Popper’s ‘supreme rule’ (similar in scope to Kant’s categorical imperative, but in the 
domain o f enquiry rather than ethics) which stipulates that all rules regulating empirical 
method, ‘must be designed in such a way that they do not protect any statement in 
science from falsification’.364 As we saw a moment ago, the rules o f engagement o f  
classroom science do protect authoritative statements, such as those o f Newtonian 
science, from falsification. In principle, all propositions offered and entertained in the 
classroom should have notional small-print ‘terms and conditions’ attached, indicating 
that their value may go up or down in the light o f new evidence or analysis. In 
practice, though, many propositions are simply taken on trust, because considering the 
alternatives would be too time-consuming. This may be an argument for restricting the 
number and range o f propositions encountered during schooling, for being 
parsimonious with content would allow a more virtuous approach to be taken to its 
acquisition, leading to a relatively greater uptake o f  full-blown knowledge rather than 
mere true belief. Taking this to extremes would be unvirtuous, however: without 
accepting some propositions p  (while ignoring ~p), the project o f  constructing a web o f  
beliefs could not even begin. Furthermore, as we saw in chapter 2, testimony is a 
legitimate source o f knowledge, alongside perception, memory and reasoning. 
Nevertheless, at some judiciously-chosen points in the process, the possibility o f  
propositions ~p ought to be entertained, together with a consideration o f what evidence 
would support them, and what implications would follow from their being the case.
The question needs to be asked: How do we know that ~p is false? And what is it
364 Karl Popper (1959) The Logic o f  Scientific D iscovery (New York: Basic Books) p.54.
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about p  that convinces us o f its safety as a belief? Answering these questions provides 
the learner with a second-order perspective on his first-order knowing.
Acquiring Safe Beliefs
According to virtue epistemology, the processes by which the learner forms the belief 
‘that p ' from the fact thatp  ought to be virtuous ones. Linda Zagzebski proposes a rich 
neo-Aristotelian construal o f what this might mean, to which I later attend for 
educational purposes (p. 196), but for the moment I shall continue to critique and 
develop a reliabilist version, using some further analysis o f subjunctive conditionals. 
The next few pages are hence rather technical in nature, but a full exploration of belief 
formation vis-à-vis conditionals, followed by a consideration o f belief formation as 
artificial intelligence theory sees it, has significant pay-offs for a reliabilist virtue 
epistemology of education. One o f these outcomes is that the sceptic is sidelined from 
the educational realm. This part o f the thesis also justifies our educational 
appropriation o f Nozick’s four reliabilist conditions for attributing knowledge to the 
student, in preference to Sosa’s Cartesian ‘safety’ tracking.
Subjunctive Conditionals and Belief Formation
Our student s 's believing that p  means that he holds the view that p  is the case. For this 
to be knowledge, though, Nozick’s tracking condition (3) [were p  not to be the case, 
then j  would not believe it] and condition (4) [were p  to be the case, then s would 
believe it, even if  circumstances changed] must also obtain. Furthermore, in some o f  
his writings Sosa requires a belief to be ‘safe’ to constitute knowledge, and to him a 
belief is safe iff (B^/? □—► p)26S: in other words, a belief is safe just in case were s to 
believe it, then it would be true. My contention is that Nozick’s original set o f four 
conditions is suitable for analysing the development o f knowledge in the student, while 
Sosa’s safety [Nozick (5)] is better reserved for describing the reliability o f the 
teacher’s knowledge in her field o f expertise.
365 Sosa (1999) ‘How to defeat opposition to Moore’, Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology, 
p. 146.
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Let us begin by considering the teacher t’s beliefs in her specialist field, F. If t is 
reliable in F, then her beliefs are safe: if  she believes that p  (where p  is a non-peripheral 
part o f F) thenp  is in fact the case.
p G f
Vp: Bfp  □—> p
This captures the idea that a knowledgeable teacher is a reliable epistemic source. The 
propositions in which she believes, in her area o f specialisation,366 are (largely) true. 
Furthermore, if  she asserts (A) any propositions from her field, these will be true, so 
learners can thus rely on her testimony.
p E z F
Vp: A, p  □—*■ p
However, while Sosa’s notion of safety is a useful one for describing the nature o f  
stable beliefs (such as a teacher might hold) it is not as helpful in analysing the 
learner’s developing knowledge.367 When considering learning, we are interested in the 
genesis and maintenance o f beliefs and not just in their safety. In this respect, Sosa’s 
definition o f ‘safety’ gives an unfortunate impression about the direction o f causation. 
Were we to apply it to the learner, we would seem to be implying a causal link between 
his beliefs and some aspect o f the world, in which the cause is his belief, and the effect 
is p  becoming the case.368 It looks like s ’s act o f believing p  makes it true, by fiat, as it 
were. This was not Sosa’s intention, but we need to look elsewhere for arguments to 
quash this interpretation. William Harper offers a rival version to the ‘Ramsey Test’
(the latter being suitable only for analysing indicative conditionals, not subjunctive 
conditionals such as Sosa’s safety).369
356 In the case o f  Primaiy school teachers, they need to master a number o f  fields to a suitable level.
3671 argue elsewhere that the teacher ought also to be a learner, but here we are considering the two 
separately and restricting our discussion to well-established knowledge in a field in which the teacher is 
already well-grounded.
368 David Chalmers & Alan Hijek arrive at a similar conclusion using a slightly different form o f the 
conditional: ‘Consider also an indicative conditional o f the form (2) If 1 believe p , then p. ... And if  one 
accepts all instances o f  (2), one should accept that one is infallible. So Ramseyan ... principles entail that 
rational subjects should accept that they have the epistemic powers o f  a god’. David Chalmers and Alan 
IWjek, A. (2007), ‘Ramsey + Moore = God.’ Analysis, 67: pp.170-.172, p.172. Sosa’s version though is 
a subjuctive conditional, rather than an indicative conditional, so Ramsey’s test does not apply in that 
case.
369 1 have had reluctantly to change the author’s text slightly in this case. Original letters P and Q have 
been changed to D and E, since the originals might cause confusion in the context o f  my use of p.
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On this rival account 
D  □—+ E
Would be acceptable just in case one accepted either of:
(a') D  would bring about E
or
(b’) E, and D  would not change this
Harper’s condition (a') conforms to the undesired interpretation o f ‘safety’, in which 
the agent would ‘bring about’ the truth in a godlike fashion by merely believing it to be 
the case. Condition (b') denies that the agent’s believing affects the truth -  thereby 
getting Sosa o ff the hook -  but in doing so it removes causation from the expression 
completely. So if  we want to attend to the causal train that enables students to acquire 
knowledge -  in other words, the learning processes — we are better off staying with 
Nozick’s tracking rather than with Sosa.
Returning to Nozick’s four conditions, then, we can say that s knows p  if  and only if:
\ . p
2. B sp
3. ~ p  □ —► ~Bsp
4.p  □—*■ Bj/7
If we can notionally tick all four conditions, then our putatively knowing student 
indeed has knowledge. Deciding whether or not the first two are assertible is 
conceptually (if  not operationally) straightforward: (1) is p  true? and (2) does s believe 
‘that/?’? The third condition is not so simple to decide upon, however, for it treats o f  
counterfactuals: statements which are true in some other possible worlds. How then 
can the statement be assessed for truth in this world? How can it be evaluated as ‘tick­
worthy’?
Here again, we use the Harper test. Applying it to Nozick (3) ~p ► -B* p, we see 
that either [(a') ~p would bring about ~B, p] OR [(b') ~B, p, and ~p would not change
William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, Glenn Pearce (1981) JFs: conditionals, belief, decision, chance and 
time (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.), pp. 18 & 19.
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this]. Clearly, this time we ought to reject (b'), for implausibly claiming as a condition 
for knowledge that s would have a belief with no causal link to ~p, and was thus a fixed 
and incorrigible prejudice. So we are left with the causative claim of (a'). In other 
words, the method that s uses to determine that p  must be counterfactually sensitive: it 
tracks the truth, such that ifp  were false he would notice.
Nozick’s fourth condition [p ► Bsp] requires that 5 would carry on believing p in a  
close possible world in which p  still remains the case. Applying the Harper test to this 
condition, we find that this means either that (a') p  brings about s ’s belief OR that it is a 
prejudice with no link to the truth, but it it happens by luck to be true. Here again, we 
favour the causative interpretation, on the grounds that a fortunately-true belief with no 
causal provenance is not to be classed as knowledge
My contention, then, is that in the educational context we can employ Nozick’s four 
tracking conditions to the student in order to decide whether or not he has non­
accidental knowledge, and use Sosa’s ‘safety’ to describe the teacher’s knowledge. In 
the case o f Nozick, we follow the causal version o f the two possible Harper 
interpretations o f the conditionals, and in the case o f Sosa’s safety we take the other, 
non-causal version, in order to avoid a claim o f infallibility. To make this clearer, I 
offer an example set in a school sixth-form science lesson, constructed to put Nozick’s 
criteria to the test.370
A physics teacher announces that ip) a new particle has been discovered during an 
experiment in the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. At break time, one o f the sixth- 
form students, Simon goes out for a smoke, while another student tells the rest o f the 
class that she (the teacher) is mistaken because he had seen on the evening news that 
the LHC was being shut down for a week for repairs. In fact, only the teacher had seen 
a morning news bulletin which had reported that the problem had been fixed and the 
new particle discovered.
370 My model uses a famous example from the epistemological literature as a template. In Gilbert 
Hannan’s 1973 story -  designed to undermine Nozick (4) -  a dictator is assassinated. The first editions 
o f a newspaper report the incident, but the regime suppresses the news and forces later editions to 
publish a (false) retraction. Harman wants us to consider whether or not s  (who read only the earlier 
reports) knows that p  (that the dictator is dead). Since s  only missed the later editions by chance, and in 
close possible worlds he might have seen them, Harman concludes that s did not have knowledge and so 
Nozick (4) is a faulty condition for knowledge. Sherrylin Roush (2005) Tracking Truth: Knowledge, 
Evidence and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p.94
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If we now ask the question, “Does Simon know that p?" we may feel that the answer is 
“Yes. He has used a reliable method to acquire the belief that p  exists.” This passes 
the first three o f Nozick’s conditions.
1. It is the case that p.
2. Simon believes that p.
3. Had p  not been the case, his teacher would not have told the class that it was, so 
Simon would not have believed it.
But it fails on the fourth:
4. Hadp  been the case, but the other circumstances were to be slightly different (i.e. he 
hadn’t gone for a smoke), s would not have believed p.
So Nozick (4) seems not to be a suitable criterion for knowledge, since it would deny 
Simon knowledge o f p  at that moment. However, if  we take a diachronic rather than 
synchronic view o f Simon’s predicament, a rather different picture emerges. After the 
break, a discussion between the proponents o fp  (Simon and his teacher) and those o f  
~p (the non-smoking students) would allow everyone to form the belief that p. Not 
only that, but a productive dialogue about the genesis o f the knowledge could provide 
the participants with an enhanced epistemic perspective which would elevate it to the 
category o f Sosa’s ‘reflective knowledge’: that is, ‘apt belief aptly noted’. 371 The 
aptness (i.e., accuracy because adroit) o f the teacher’s new knowledge in this case 
would be higher than that o f the students, because she had a fuller and more coherent 
conceptual framework against which to test the plausibility o f p, and, furthermore, she 
bad interpreted and presented the experiment in ways accessible to her students. This 
extra level o f engagement with p  would have increased its epistemic standing in her 
own doxastic web, C.
Nozick (5) (Sosa’s ‘safety’) works well for the teacher, however. She believes thatp  
because she understands the physics theory underlying the experiment, she has seen the 
scenes o f jubilation at CERN and she has heard the announcement from the team- 
leader that the particle’s existence has been confirmed. This is thus a safe belief (i.e., it
371 Ernest Sosa (2007) A Virtue Epistemology. Apt B elief and Reflective Knowledge, vol.I (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) p.32.
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wouJd not easily turn out to be false). It has passed Nozick (4) at the acquisition stage, 
but it has also met the safety requirement by being solidly accommodated into a stable 
set o f  related pre-existing true beliefs. She knows by long-term induction that this type 
o f testimony reported by this particular news channel is generally sincere and 
competent. The announcement also coheres with her well-established conceptual 
framework in particle physics. It is not an infallible belief, for science is always 
provisional: but it is nonetheless one upon which she can rely pro tanto.
Reliabilism is concerned with the non-accidental acquisition o f true single propositions 
p. To count as knowledge in Sosa’s model, the epistemic act o f hitting these individual 
targets must be accurate, adroit and apt -  perhaps too high a bar in practice. As 
educators, however, we are interested in the webs o f beliefs o f learners, and the genesis 
o f these, and not just their atomic constituents, so a further elaboration of the reliabilist 
model is needed. To develop this in a principled way we draw on a theory that has a 
similar level o f generality to reliabilism simpliciter, and that considers the effects of 
new epistemic input on an existing corpus o f beliefs -  a tenet from the field of artificial 
intelligence (AI). This enables an elegant handling o f three features that have been 
prominent in our discussions so far: proposition p, counterfactive proposition and 
the learner’s existing corpus of beliefs, C (or doxastic web).
Artificial Intelligence Theory: Revising the Doxastic Web
Virtue epistemology has much to say about the role o f the agent’s virtues (variously 
construed) in acquiring true beliefs. It is relatively silent, however, on the mechanics 
of belief modification. In order to extend reliabilist virtue epistemology, we turn to AI 
theory to provide some insights at the high level o f generality we seek. I should make 
it clear here that in drawing upon this work, I am not attempting to conceptualise the 
mind as a sort o f machine and thereby deferring to technicism and scientism. Nor is 
this a simple reductio move. The function o f this fragment o f AI theory in this thesis is 
to develop reliabilism in a coherent way, and to show that certain aspects o f village 
technicism in education are deeply flawed, even on its own terms.
164
As we saw earlier (p. 149), a major aim o f education is for the learner to acquire 
knowledge. Since students always have some pre-existing beliefs, learning typically 
involves revising their general belief corpora, C, to incorporate new knowledge: say, 
‘that p \  Because o f the web-like nature o f  individual belief-systems, however, the 
addition o f a new proposition, p, to C may well have effects on nodes other than the 
one representing the new belief. The overall scheme is as follows372:
Co * Epistemic Input = Ci
This is a dynamic model o f belief c/tange, in contrast to static descriptions of 
preformed belief. Understanding virtuous belief revision ought to be a natural concern 
o f virtue epistemology and of education. Understanding the logical details o f how this 
works is also a major preoccupation of artificial intelligence (AI) theory, a branch 
which owes much to the seminal work o f  Carlos Alchourron, Peter Gardenfors, and 
David Makinson (AGM).373 The links become clearer when we consider Gardenfors’ 
definition o f ‘epistemic inputs’ as ‘the deliverances o f experience or as linguistic (or 
other symbolic) information provided by other individuals (or machines)’.374 In virtue- 
epistemic terms, ‘experience’ relates to our earlier discussion of the ‘on-board’ source 
o f perception,375 and ‘linguistic ... information provided by other individuals ...’ is 
simply testimony. So, there is much congruence between the two fields, in that AI’s 
‘epistemic input’ can be considered as equivalent to virtue epistemology’s ‘experience 
and testimony’. The reference to machines is an indication that the ‘deliverances’ o f  
the virtual world now have to be taken seriously in any comprehensive theory o f belief 
change (an avenue I explore later [p.264]). The denizens o f cyberspace are a source o f  
extended testimony.
Belief Revision, Contraction and Expansion
372 Here I intend Co to be the original belief-set and C t to be the revised belief-set which the learner 
possesses after a learning event. The symbol ‘AT' is commonly used in this field to signify a belief-set, 
but, mindful o f  the possibility o f  confusion, given my usage o f  K to mean ‘knows’, I instead use C (for 
‘Corpus o f  background “knowledge”’). The asterisk, *, stands for the process o f  belief revision.
373 C. Alchourron, P. Gardenfors and D. Makinson (1985) ‘On the logic o f theory change: Partial meet 
contradiction and revision functions’, The Journal o f  Symbolic Logic, 50, pp.510-531.
374 P. Gardenfors (1988) Knowledge in Flux (Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press), p.7, quoted in John L. 
Pollock and Anthony S. Gillies (2000) ‘Belief Revision and Epistemology’, Synthese, vol. 122, no. 1/2, 
p.70,
I appreciate that conflating experience with perception in this way does not do justice to the notion of 
‘experience’, which is a rich combination o f perception and interpretation. A connoisseur o f  opera, for 
example, would hear things unavailable to the newcomer, even though the sonic and visual perceptions 
may have been very similar. Nevertheless, for the sake o f  simplicity and generality, this elision is 
allowed.
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la the ‘AGM’ framework, three belief change operations are defined (see Table 1)
Operation Explanation
+  : Belief expansion The epistemic input is such that it can 
simply be added to Co, with no need to 
remove or modify any existing beliefs
“  : Belief contraction The epistemic input causes the removal o f  
one or more existing beliefs from Co-
* : Belief revision The epistemic input is incorporated into 
Co, but consistency requires the removal 
of some existing beliefs.
Table 1 -  Belief Change Operations in AGM Theory
In other words, belief expansion adds to our corpus o f beliefs, belief contraction 
removes previously-held beliefs, and belief revision is a combined operation of 
expansion and contraction.
It is important to note here that we can consider a reduction in the number o f our 
beliefs to be -  paradoxically -  an instance o f leaning. Curriculum planners do not 
usually state that students will know less at the end o f a course than they did at the 
beginning, but this would be a legitimate aspiration (as long as the equivocation over 
the word ‘know’ is recognised: the students would only believe less, not know less).
By reducing the number o f false beliefs in their corpus, C, students would have 
enhanced their cognitive contact with reality and hence would have leamt. Jettisoning 
untruths is a type o f learning.
However, it is debatable whether in practice a proposition p  can just be discarded from 
C without putting something in its place. Granted, p  may simply fade from C without 
any rebutting epistemic input: we can simply forget that Lagos is the capital o f Nigeria. 
But belief-contraction is stipulated to require epistemic input, so memory-loss does not 
constitute contraction under the AGM rules. Furthermore, in educational terms, there 
is nothing creditworthy about increasing one’s proportion o f true beliefs by forgetting a 
false belief. Lagos is not in fact the capital o f Nigeria, but this commonly-held false
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belief needs to be discarded as a result o f some epistemic input, and not simply by 
mental atrophy, if  its removal is to count as contraction. In my case, I accepted the 
testimony o f a Nigerian taxi driver in Dublin that Abuja is now the capital o f his 
homeland, and my subsequent on-line research revealed that the change occurred some 
thirty years ago. Here was an example of Gardenfors’ ‘epistemic inputs’ being ‘the 
deliverances o f ... linguistic ... information provided by other individuals (or 
machines)’.376 However, this was not a case o f belief-contraction simpliciter, for my 
jettisoned false belief that ‘Lagos is the capital o f Nigeria’ was replaced by the true, 
virtuously-acquired belief that ‘Abuja is the capital o f Nigeria’, or, should I forget this, 
that ‘Lagos is no longer the capital of Nigeria’. This last proposition is o f a form which 
I suggest is a commonplace way of replacing a false belief p : we simply replace it with
377  • .
~ p .  So, a child will fill the vacuum left by p  (Santa exists) with its negation ~ p  (It is 
not case that Santa exists). A further point to make is that not all epistemic input will 
lead to a change in one’s corpus o f beliefs. It may be that the deliverances o f the 
epistemic input are entertained only long enough to mount a rebuttal, and that one’s 
cherished beliefs are left unharmed by the recalcitrant experience. According to 
Quine378 we can always make modifications to our webs to save particular beliefs. 
Whether or not such a defence is virtuous is an issue to which I shall return.
Let us now consider belief-expansion and examine how this combines with belief- 
contraction to produce a belief-revision that is consistent with other entrenched beliefs. 
Following the conventions introduced earlier, let the epistemic input be such that it can 
be encoded in proposition p. If the existing belief-corpus is Co , then the result o f  
revising this, by the incorporation o fp, is a modified belief-set, Ci, such that:
C i  =  C o * p
The principle o f minimum mutilation (a term I have imported from Quine,379 rather 
than from Gardenfors) means that C \  is in all respects the same as Co, save those 
minimal modifications which have to be made in order to accommodate p .  If these
376 Peter Gardenfors (1988) Knowledge in Flux (Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press), p.7, quoted in 
Pollock and Gillies (2000) op. cit., p.70.
377 Here, I use p  to represent a false belief and ~p for a true one: the reverse o f  the convention employed 
in the rest o f  this thesis.
378 W.V.O. Quine (1961) ‘Two Dogmas o f Empiricism’ section 6 in From a Logical Point o f  View, 
reprinted in Louis P. Pojman (ed.) (2001) Classics o f  Philosophy: the Twentieth Century (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
379 From Quine (1961) op. cit., p.212.
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modifications are restricted to p  (in other words, if no changes need be made to the 
remainder o f the original belief-base, because p  is logically consistent with the rest of 
C0), then the belief-revision process is one o f straightforward belief expansion:
Ci = (Co * p) = (Co +  p)
(Where ‘+ ’ is the expansion operator, as defined above).
An example o f belief-revision qua expansion is the following educational scenario. A 
pupil knows that crows are birds and can fly. He knows that magpies are birds and can 
fly. He receives epistemic input (via some combination o f testimony and perception) 
such that he comes to know that pheasants are birds and can fly. Here, there is no clash 
with prior knowledge, no cognitive dissonance, and hence no difficulty in simply 
revising his existing belief set by expansion.
We earlier typified belief-contraction, or ‘the derogation o fp  from C”380 (as 
Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson put it, using legal terminology), by the 
epistemic input that Santa Claus does not exist (p. 168). This causes the believer to 
remove from his stock o f beliefs the proposition that there is a Santa. Here, though, it 
is not enough simply to subtract the now-discredited beliefp, ‘that Santa exists’ (and 
replace it with its negation ~p), for the concept was formerly enwebbed with other 
elements of Co, which too may be affected. Removal o fp  may, for example, also 
damage the nodes which encode the propositions that assertions from adults are to be 
trusted and that good behaviour is always rewarded. It could even lead to the 
additional positive belief that myths are sometimes used as methods o f social control 
(as in Plato’s ‘noble lie’, for the claimed benefit o f the state).381 Some workers in this 
field, however, make the stronger statement that ‘belief sets are closed under logical 
entailment’.382 In essence, this means that if  we know that p, and p  implies q, then we 
also know that q.
380 Alchourrôn, Gârdenfors and Makinson [AGM] (1985) op. cit., p.510, They write ‘the derogation o f  x 
from A ’, but I have changed the letters to match my earlier convention and avoid possible confusion.
381 Plato, Republic, III, 389b.
382 Pollock and Gillies (2000) op. cit., p.71.
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This claim, however, seems implausible and generates a requirement to consider far­
fetched sceptical hypotheses \h\, such as the possibility that Descartes’ genium 
malignum is introducing falsehoods into our minds without our knowledge. ‘Knowing 
that /?’ has the logical implication that we know that skeptical hypothesis h is not the 
case (ie the genium malignum is not deceiving us about p):
K s P  — >
Since we do not know for sure that h is not the case, then neither do we have 
knowledge o f p.
Ksp  Ks [~h]
~Ki [~A]
~Ksp
As well as being a disaster for knowledge-claims in general, the demands o f closure 
lead to particular problems for Nozick’s ‘sensitivity’ requirement, by which we set 
such great store earlier. Nozick (3), we recall, requires that were p not to be the case, 
we would not believe it. But under the influence o f the genium malignum, we might 
believe it anyway, by being in a state insensitive to the contrafacticity o f p. The 
sensitivity requirement stipulates that in an alternative world in which ~p obtains, we 
would believe that ~p. But if  this world is one in which Descartes’ demon has free 
reign, we might (wrongly) believe that/?, being subject to his undetectable deceptions. 
Sosa claims that the failure o f ‘sensitivity’ to allow closure o f knowledge under 
implication is a reason to support his rival notion o f ‘safety’, but Jonathan Kvanvig has 
shown convincingly that ‘safety’ too suffers from this shortcoming.383
Closure of Belief Sets Under Logical Entailment
383 Jonathan Kvanvig concludes that ‘safety theorists have no more right to claims about closure than to 
sensitivity theorists. The difference is that defenders o f sensitivity have admitted failure o f  closure and 
safety theorists such as Sosa deny that their view has this implication.’ He reaches this judgement after 
describing a scenario involving randomly-allocated fake bams and real green-painted real bams. ‘B ill’ 
can safely say that what he sees is a green bam, but he cannot safely say that it is a bam. Thus ‘safety 
does not preserve closure’. Jonathan Kvanvig (2004) ‘Nozickian Epistemology and the Value o f  
Knowledge’, Philosophical Issues, 14, Epistemology, p.209.
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There are two ways o f dealing with this problem: we can ignore the sceptical challenge 
or we can deny that the lack o f closure o f knowledge under implication matters. The 
First move is the educational version of David Hume’s banishment o f the sceptic: if  we 
cannot dismiss him completely, we can at least suspend him until he desists from 
shouting down all our claims to knowledge, holus bolus.384 This is the standard 
practice: philosophy of education does not traditionally concern itself with the 
hyperbolic sceptical challenge, and neither is it o f great interest in the classroom 
(unless it is a philosophy seminar).385 Some, such as Carr, however, claim that 
philosophy o f education has been ‘infected’ with postmodern varieties o f scepticism.
The second move for sidelining the sceptic’s argument from ignorance is via the 
principle o f closure. Here I offer a pair o f options, one pragmatic and one neo- 
Moorean:386
a. We fallible humans do not exhibit logical omniscience. Our belief-sets are not 
logically watertight, nor could they ever be so, in toto, in practice. We typically 
hold so many beliefs that the act of calling pairs o f them to our conscious attention 
and inspecting them for logical compatibility would take an impracticably long 
time. Furthermore, like painting the Forth railway bridge, once this task was 
ostensibly completed we would have to start again because o f the appearance, 
during the time taken for the first pass, o f a large number of new beliefs needing to 
be checked both against each other, and against the existing body o f beliefs, for the 
desired closure under logical entailment. Even if  this feat could be achieved, there 
is the further complication that the process is not essentially a linear one (as the 
Forth railway bridge metaphor implies) but involves manoeuvring through a highly
384 Hume asserts that ‘the great subverter o f . . .  scepticism, is action, and employment, and the 
occupations o f common life. These [sceptical] principles may flourish and triumph in the schools, where 
it is indeed difficult, if  not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the 
presence o f the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put into opposition to the 
more powerful principles o f our nature, they vanish like smoke and, and leave the most determined 
sceptic in the same condition as other mortals’. David Hume (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, Section XII, Part II, para. 83. Classics o f  Western Philosophy [ed. Steven Cahn] 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1999), p.693.
385 Even here it does not gain much purchase. There is a performative contradiction in asking a 
philosophy student to hand an essay on scepticism in to a lecturer, the existence o f  whom, together with 
the rest o f  the external world, he has argued can never be known.
386 G.E. Moore in a (1939) paper ‘Proof o f  an External World’, wrote: ‘I can prove now, for instance, 
that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands and saying, as I make a certain gesture 
with my right, “Here is one hand,” and adding, as 1 make a certain gesture with the left, “and here is 
another.’” Reprinted in Robert R, Ammerman (ed.) Classics o f  Analytic Philosophy (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.), p.81
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complex, interconnected web of beliefs. The specific chronology o f our inspections 
will thus powerfully determine the outcome o f the process. In other words, the 
order in which we check and reject certain beliefs will affect radically what the 
final belief-set will be. This is a characteristic o f complex systems: that minor 
changes in initial conditions, and apparently trivial interventions, have major
387consequences. So closure o f knowledge is neither needed nor possible in 
practice.
b. Although the logical treatment of the sceptical hypothesis [h\ is traditionally
couched in the form of material conditionals, this seems to be a mistake. We do not 
really believe that the genium malignum exists, so the proper form - 1 suggest -  is 
the counterfactual subjunctive conditional: ‘Were it to be the case that the genium 
malignum existed, then we would not know that p. ’
h □—* —Ks p
This conditional is a true statement for any value of p, even if  we do not accept the 
antecedent, h. The tempting (but illicit) move to make here is to apply modus tollens, 
by assuming IQ/? and concluding ~ h. But, as we saw earlier (p.39), subjunctive 
conditionals do not contrapose, so we can assert “IQ/?”, yet still be agnostic on the 
matter o f h. Put simply, our claiming to know ‘that/?’ has no bearing on the existence, 
or otherwise, o f the genium malignum. This is a relief for educators, for were we to be 
forced to take the sceptical hypothesis seriously, we would not be in a position to 
regard any beliefs as constituting knowledge, and this would undermine our role vis-à- 
vis the cultivation o f such ‘knowledge’.
Once the extreme sceptical position [/i] has been neutralised -  at least for educational 
purposes -  we can propose that the more distant implications o f each fragment o f  
knowledge in which we believe need not be considered. The requirement for closure o f  
knowledge under logical entailment, I take to be confined to those propositions which 
are closely connected to the fragment in question. Defining ‘closeness’ is problematic, 
and will vary according to the particular subject in hand, and the nature o f the learners, 
but appealing to an Aristotelian mean between the extremes o f (i) entailments
387 Meteorologist Edward Lorenz famously gave a seminal conference-paper on the topic of 
complexity/chaos theory which drew attention to these phenomena. Edward Lorenz (1972) ‘Does the 
Flap o f  a Butterfly’s wing in Brazil Set O ff a Tornado in Texas?’ (Washington DC, USA).
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associated with distant sceptical hypotheses and (ii) no entailments at all* will at least 
point the way to a solution.
Analysing Learning, Using Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology and Al Theory
Now we shall return to Artificial Intelligence theory. Having earlier explored the work 
o f Alchourrôn, Gàrdenfors and Makinson, we next consider how it might mesh with 
reliabilist epistemic virtue and with the processes o f learning. As part o f this 
discussion, the ‘Levi identity’ is introduced. One outcome o f this is the importance o f 
the hinterland o f propositions which support a proposition p, including those of the 
counterfactive class, ~p (which we saw earlier was important for a b eliefs being 
‘sensitive’).
Belief Revision and Epistemic Virtue
Belief-revision, then, is a process by which a new proposition, p, is added to the 
learner’s stock o f  beliefs, and compensations are made elsewhere in his doxastic web. 
In the AGM theory, the disturbances caused by the introduction o f any new knowledge 
obey a principle o f “‘informational economy”, according to which no belief is to be 
given up unnecessarily’.388 This, as we have seen, is akin to Quine’s ‘minimum 
mutilation’ criterion. Furthermore, AGM incorporates the ‘Levi Identity’,389 which 
states:
C * p  = ( C - ~ p ) + p
I shall use this equation to link several o f the key ideas discussed so far. My first task 
here is to unpack the meaning of the Levi identity, before considering its implications 
for learning. In essence, belief revision is defined as an operation composed o f belief 
contraction and belief expansion: a sequence we can think o f as a scouring followed by 
a re-filling. ‘C * p'  can be read as ‘Belief revision o f knowledge-corpus C, by 
incorporating a piece o f new knowledge p'.  The introduction o f p  to the existing set o f  
beliefs, C, causes revisions to be made to C. The right-hand-side asserts that this
388 Pollock & Gillies (2000) op. cit., p.71.
3891 have used the version o f  Isaac Levi’s equation in Pollock & Gillies (2000) op. cit., p.72 [with minor 
modifications for consistency].
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process o f belief revision consists of a belief contraction (—) and a belief expansion 
(+) .  The belief contraction part is particularly interesting because it involves one o f  
the recurring themes o f the present work: counterfactives. In the belief-contraction 
phase o f belief revision, we remove from our belief-web (C) the counterfactive (~ p). 
This removal is not a simple subtraction from our stock o f beliefs, however. Because 
our beliefs show some measure o f coherence (although not in practice, as I have 
argued, to the extent of being closed under logical entailment [see p. 170]), removing ~p 
and other propositions closely implied by ~p  may not be a trivial matter. Once this 
contraction operation is carried out, though, p  can be deployed in expansionary mode, 
and further amendments made to the existing belief-corpus C, as a result o f  
incorporating p  and its close implications.
A more formal version of Quine’s ‘minimum mutilation’ relies on the notion of 
epistemic entrenchment. There is an ordering o f ‘degree-of-entrenchment’, which 
allows decisions to be made over what to discard and what to keep. Seung Hwan Kang 
and Sim Kim Lau explain the process thus (although the authors do not recognise their 
philosophical forebear, Quine):
In each case when a new belief is considered by a belief revision operator, a 
ranking for the new belief will be assigned based on its entrenchment ordering. In 
applying the contraction operator, [the] epistemologically least entrenched sentence 
is retracted first to allow minimal loss o f  information.390
Frances Johnson attempts to define a concept which we might consider to be cognate 
with Kang & Lau’s ‘entrenchment ordering’ more thoroughly:
The tuple belief, degree-of-credibility contains the belief and its input credibility as 
specified by the user (where degree-of-credibility ranges from 0 to 1 -  with the 
higher number indicating greater credibility)... It is this input credibility that will 
be used when selecting culprits for removal -  the least credible beliefs underlying 
an inconsistency should be removed.391
If ‘entrenchment ordering’ does depend upon ‘input credibility’, then this points to 
possibilities for a construal o f these operations which involves acting from intellectual
390 Seung Hwan Kang and Sim Kim Lau (2007) ‘Ontology Revision on the Semantic Web: Integration of  
belief revision theory’, Proceedings o f  the 40th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.
We can take ‘belief revision operator’ here to translate into ‘epistemic agent’, since we are dealing with 
human beings not computers
391 Frances L. Johnson (2004) Dependency-Directed Reconsideration (NY, NY: The State University of  
New York), pp.1-2 [Italics in original]. Johnson’s use o f  the word ‘tuple’ looks slightly odd when 
referring to what would usually be called a duplet -  his term normally being reserved for larger 
groupings, in the form o f ‘quintuple’, ‘octuple’ or ‘n-tuple’. However, it has the specialist meaning in 
computing o f ‘a data structure consisting o f  multiple parts’. Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2009)
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virtue, for such virtue can regulate input credibility. We next look at how this might 
take place, beginning with an implementation of the Levi identity:
C * p  = ( C -  ~ p ) + p
Firstly, the proposition p  has to come to the attention o f the learner and be entertained 
for long enough for the relevant intellectual virtues -  whether o f a Zagzebskian or a 
Sosa-ish stripe -  to be brought to bear upon it. If it comes from a prima facie credible 
source (for example, from the testimony o f a teacher), then it is reasonable for the 
learner to initiate the process o f belief-revision (C * p), in the absence o f any o f the 
standard warning signs o f ‘deceit, confusion or mistake’.392 Let the proposition be the 
uncontroversial one that ‘pheasants are birds and can fly’. When we turn to the right- 
hand side of the equation, and the learner begins expelling the counterfactive, ~p, from 
any locations in which it may have lodged in his corpus o f beliefs, C, no problem 
presents itself. Unless the learner has mixed up ‘pheasants’ and ‘peasants’, or some 
such mistake, the proposition ~p is unlikely to be present anywhere in his web, for this 
would require the learner to believe either that pheasants are not birds or that they 
cannot fly (or both). Thus, the contraction (C — ~p)  has no doxastic effect, for ~p was 
never a resident o f C and so stands in no need of eviction. All that remains is for the 
learner to carry out the expansion ( +  p) and add p  to his existing web o f beliefs, by 
simple accretion. This causes no destructive mutilation; in fact it merely lengthens an 
existing thread o f the web (that concerned with birds which are capable o f flight) while 
leaving everything else intact. The learner now has a new enlarged belief set, C\, such 
that:
Ci = (Co * p) = (C0 +  p)
It also leaves undisturbed the learner’s view that teachers are in the category o f those 
whose testimony is to be trusted, as a default position, when speaking o f matters in 
their field(s) o f specialisation. If, however, the learner would still believe the teacher­
voiced proposition “that p '\ even if  it were to be wrong, then his belief is insensitive. 
For Nozick (3) [~p □—> ~Bsp] to be ‘ticked’, the learner must be able to track the truth 
counterfactualiy. It seems to be the case that many testimonially-derived beliefs 
acquired in the classroom setting are thus not sensitive, for in these cases Nozick (3)
392 Coady (1992) op. cit., p.47.
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does not obtain. If the teacher were to be mistaken or even mendacious, the pupils 
might still believe her, for their trusting method o f forming the belief ‘that p ’ is not 
alive to the counterfactual possibilities. Teacher assertions, however, are generally 
‘safe’, for not easily would a teacher’s belief ‘thatp ’ be false, where p  is within her 
field o f expertise. In an alternative world in which ~  p  were to be the case, the teacher 
would not be asserting that p. Let us turn next to an example.
Example of Non-sensitive True Belief Acquisition in the Classroom
A pupil times a simple pendulum for various angles o f swing. He finds that longer 
angles take longer times and draws the conclusion that there is a relationship between 
period, T, and angle, 0 (See Figure 1).
Figure 1 - Pendulum Experiment
The teacher contradicts this evidence and (correctly) claims that the formula for the 
period [T] o f a pendulum o f length [1] under gravity [g] is as follows:
T = 2n V( 1/g)
393 Source for diagram: http://newton.ex.ac.uk/research/qsystems/people/sque/physics/simple- 
pendulum/pendulum-forces.gif.
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The angle o f swing, 0, does not appear in this equation, so the pupil is deemed to be 
wrong: contra his experience, it is not the case that the angle o f swing, 0, affects the 
period, T, o f  a simple pendulum. Stated positively, we can write p  as that ‘the period,
T, o f a simple pendulum is independent o f the angle o f swing, 0 ’. The pupil found 
evidence to suggest strongly that ~p is in fact the case, but he compliantly over-rides 
this with the teacher’s assertion “that p.” In fact,p  only applies when the ‘small-angle 
theorem’ can be invoked (that is when 0 s  10°), so the pupil is right to voice the 
opinion “that ~p”, in the light o f his first-hand experience, for he exceeded this limit of 
10° in his experiment. In this scenario, Nozick (3) is not assertible, so the pupil’s belief 
‘thatp ’ is insensitive. So insensitive is it that even in the face o f first-hand evidence he 
believes the testimonially-sourced version p  rather than the (strictly-correct) version ~p. 
Interestingly, in this situation, both p and ~p are correct, but not at the same time, for 
they apply over different ranges of angle. My point, though, is that pupils will 
sometimes ignore the evidence o f their own eyes and accept a received version of 
events. This could be an instrumental use o f  belief rather than an instance o f belief 
simpliciter, however. The pupil may well have learned that what is required to earn 
credit in examinations is the reporting o f the ‘official view’ and not what he actually 
believes to be the case. We are reminded here o f Freire’s complaint that ‘... the 
naming o f the world is the task o f an elite’.394
It is not only the teacher’s testimony that over-rides challenges from first-hand 
evidence, though: the pupils’ own existing beliefs may do this too. There has been 
much research on the tenacity o f misconceptions (or, more kindly, ‘alternative 
frameworks’) in pupils’ minds.395 Another example from experiments with pendulums 
illustrates this phenomenon: pupils commonly believe that the mass o f  a pendulum-bob 
will affect its timing. Although in fact mass has no effect here [for, as we have seen, 
mass does not appear in the formula T = 2k  V(l/g)], this is highly counter-intuitive, so 
pupils reasonably think that making a pendulum heavier will affect the rate at which it 
swings. The surprising fact is that learners do not easily abandon this intuitive
394 Paulo Friere (1970, tr. 1996) Pedagogy o f  the Oppressed  [tr. MB Ramos] (New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group inc.) p.90.
395 Kevin Leander and David Brown state that, ‘In recent years, there has been an explosion o f  research 
attempting to identify such conceptual misalignments, which are variously called misconceptions, 
preconceptions, alternative frameworks, children’s science, and so forth (for a bibliography including 
4,500 references, see Pfundt & Duit, 1998)’ Kevin M. Leander and David E. Brown (1999) ‘“You 
Understand, But You Don’t Believe It”: Tracing the Stabilities and Instabilities o f  Interaction in a 
Physics Classroom Through a Multidimensional Framework’, Cognition and Instruction, v o l.17, n o .l, 
pp.93-135. p.95.
176
counterfactive proposition, even in the face of compelling first-hand empirical evidence 
to the contrary. The faulty belief has a high degree o f ‘epistemic entrenchment’, even 
though this does not derive from a virtuous evaluation o f its ‘input credibility’.
The Im portance o f Counterfactives for Learning
Thus, we see that a consideration of counterfactive propositions is an important part o f  
virtuous learning. An encouragement to consider only p  and ignore ~p is a deeply- 
flawed tendency in simplistic leaming-outcomes focused technicism. It is important 
here to distinguish between the terms ‘counterfactive proposition’ and ‘counterfactual 
conditional’, so we shall briefly consider these and see how they relate to the notion of 
‘false belief.
Throughout this work, we have used p to indicate a proposition. This has usually been 
a true proposition (such as ‘Larissa is North o f Farsala’), so anyone believing ‘that p ’ 
holds a true belief. In this case, ~p  is contrary to the facts: it is a counterfactive 
proposition,396 An agent believing that ~ p  thus holds a false belief.
A counterfactual conditional is a different matter, however, and it is important not to 
confuse the two. In his seminal book, Counterfactuals, David Lewis gives the 
sentence, ‘If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’,397 as an example of a 
counterfactual conditional. The antecedent is not true; it is counterfactive. Were it to 
be held by an epistemic agent, it would be a false belief, for as a species kangaroos 
characteristically do have tails. But if in another possible world it was the case that 
kangaroos had no tails, then the consequent -  that they would topple over -  would be a 
highly plausible one. In fact, if the counterfactual conditional is valid, they would 
necessarily topple over in close possible worlds in which the antecedent is true, since 
these worlds would be identical to the actual world in most other respects. So the laws 
o f balance would still apply and the lack o f a tail would lead to toppling. Here we see 
the key difference between counterfactual conditionals and counterfactive propositions: 
the counterfactual conditional is true, but the counterfactive proposition which acts as 
the antecedent is false. This sort o f reasoning is important in science, with respect to 
properties and unactualised dispositions. For example, I can truly assert that “Were I to
396 Charles W Kreidler (1998) Introducing English Semantics (London: Routledge) p.247
397 David Lewis (1973) Counterf actuals, [paperback edition] (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p .l
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drop this Waterford Crystal vase onto the pavement, it would break”, even though I 
have not in fact dropped it. The counterfactual conditional reports a property of glass: 
its brittleness. Our virtue epistemic interpretation o f Nozick 3 employs a similar 
construction. The statement, ‘Were it to be the case that p  is not true, 5 would not 
believe it’, reports a disposition o f the agent to track the truth.
The upshot o f  the analysis above, and these examples, is that even in simple cases o f  
uncontroversial learning ‘thatp \  the class o f counterfactive propositions, ~p, needs to 
be dealt with in three distinct ways:
1. by having mechanisms available which would alert the putative knower to 
the possibility that, despite the testimonial or other evidence that p, it might 
in fact be the case that ~p. When p  is derived from testimony, as we saw 
earlier in a discussion of Pinocchio (p.89), these mental mechanisms 
plausibly operate in the background and are triggered only in the event o f 
certain cues indicating incompetence or insincerity on the part o f the 
testifier, or by discovering significant and irresoluble clashes between the 
proposition p  and the auditor’s existing web C;
2. by carrying out a process of removing ~p and its corollaries from the 
learner’s existing stock o f beliefs;
3. by attaching to p  some defensible warrant, so that in the event o f some 
future candidate ‘knowledge’ indicating ~p, resources are available to 
protect p  from derogation.
If any o f these ways is missing, then the learning has been neither fully intellectually 
virtuous, nor warranted nor secure. Furthermore, in the case o f (ii) (that is, 
counterfactive removal) not occurring, the learner does not really believe that p. For 
consistency, to believe that p  requires the learner not to believe that ~p (together with 
all its implications), so even if ~p is not apparently present in the learners’ web, there is 
still a need on his part to inspect this web for the presence o f ~p or its implications, to 
make sure that he truly is free o f mental contamination by ~p. This process can be 
taken too far, however. As we saw earlier (p.170), one distant implication o f rejecting 
~p and asserting “that p” is that the world is knowable, and thus that the sceptical
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hypothesis h (that there exists a genium malignum, who maliciously distorts all our 
perceptions) is untrue. Thus, only close implications ought to be considered.
In. less simple cases, in which there is some sort o f cognitive dissonance between the 
new propositionp  and prior ‘knowledge’ C, the requirements placed on the learner to 
deal with candidate knowledge p  virtuously are even more demanding. There is now 
the possibility o f some significant change in the learner’s web occurring, a change 
which may mutilate the web rather than merely add another example to (say) a 
securely-enwebbed set o f propositions that ‘x flies’, where x is a bird.
Socrates on Cognitive Dissonance
Plato contrasts the two types of stimulus (which we might call the consonant and the 
dissonant) thus:
Those experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do not at the same 
time issue in a contradictory perception. Those that do have that effect I set down 
as provocatives . . .198
Socrates places a great deal of emphasis on the latter type o f catalyst to learning: 
arguments and propositions which challenge the learner’s belief ‘that p \  We 
frequently find him engaging in dialogues with his companions that challenge their 
preconceptions and inflict upon them a momentary mental paralysis -  his words acting 
like the sting o f the torpedo fish.399 Socrates replies to Meno’s charge -  that in some 
places he would ‘be arrested as a wizard’400 for his mind-numbing effects -  with the 
defence that he only infects others with perplexity because he himself is perplexed. He 
is not just a contrarian. Indeed, it seems that Socrates is just as willing to undergo the 
disorientating effects o f ‘contradictory perception’ as he is to cause them -  all in the 
interests o f capturing the prize o f genuine knowledge. In the dialogue Protagoras, he 
describes the results of the Sophist’s words on him: . at first I was like a man who
had been hit by a good boxer; at his words and the applause things went dark and I felt 
giddy”.401 This is in contrast to accounts in which the knowledge-acquisition proceeds 
without any sort o f intellectual conflict, as in his metaphor for mathematical learning of
398 Plato, Republic, 523b-c.
399 Plato, Meno, 80.
409 Plato, Meno, 80b.
401 Plato, Protagoras, 339e.
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capturing a bird and shutting it up in one’s aviary, to flutter about with the birds already 
there:
Socrates: And when he hands them over, we call it ‘teaching’ and when the other 
takes them from him, that is ‘learning’, and when he has them in the sense of 
possessing them in that aviary of his, that is ‘knowing’.402
The dialectic continues, showing that the true belief represented by the bird is not to be 
classed as knowledge, for the fluttering about o f the birds makes retrieval difficult and 
so one ‘might catch a dove in place of a pigeon’.403 It is the freeness o f the birds -  their 
lack o f tethering -  that denies the aviary the status o f a repository for knowledge. 
Instead o f what we might see as a web-like structure in which fragments o f knowledge 
are related to one another in systematic ways, we have a chaotic free-for-all o f isolated 
propositions (although Socrates does describe some o f the birds as gathering ‘in flocks 
apart from the rest, some in small groups’ as well as those which are ‘solitary, flying in 
any direction among them all’404). More significant than this lack of inter-bird 
tethering, however, is the absence o f any tethering to the world. The birds had been 
captured from their wild state,405 so, while they do represent true beliefs, their 
acquisition (or escape) was largely a matter o f luck: their presence in the aviary was 
randomly-ordained rather than solidly justified. In this respect, they have much in 
common with the statues o f Daedalus in the Meno, which, not being properly anchored 
by a knowledge o f causes, can wander about freely.406 The instability o f the 
birds/statues/propositions can be overcome, claims Socrates, by means o f ‘an account 
(XtWoo)’.407 This ties in nicely with (iii) above, in that by attaching some defensible 
warrant to p, we increase its stability. In the event o f a future indication that ~p might 
be the case, we have the resources to keep p  in the aviary rather than releasing it (as 
long as the warrant for p  is firmer than the warrant for ~p.) Put differently, p  has a 
greater ‘epistemic entrenchment’ than ~p, in virtue of its ‘input credibility’, to reprise 
the more recent phrases o f Johnson and Kang & Lau.
In virtue-epistemology terms, the admission o f ‘birds’ to our mental aviaries ought to 
be carried out judiciously, in that we should not allow entry without a warrant. In 
Plato’s avian mathematics lesson, the teacher ‘hands them over’ without such a
402 Plato, Thecetetus, 198-b.
403 Plato, Thecetetus, 199b.
404 Plato, Thecetetus, 197e.
405 Plato, Thecetetus, 197c.
406 Plato, Meno, 97d.
407 Plato, Thecetetus, 2 0 Id.
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waiTant, Furthermore, even in the case o f uncomplicated belief-expansion, this warrant 
needs to be attached like a badge to the proposition so warranted, so that the putatively 
warranted claims o f a future (contrary) proposition to displace the original can be 
checked for legitimacy against the established warranted claims o f the incumbent. This 
combination o f proposition plus warrant is congruent with Johnson’s ‘tuple belief, 
degree-of-credibility\Am and can be regarded, I suggest, as the fundamental unit o f  
belief-revision and virtuously-reliable prepositional learning.
We have seen, though, that even apparently straightforward cases o f belief-revision by 
expansion are more complex than they first appear. In particular, the expansion o f our 
original aviary (C o) to C\, represented by C\ = (C o  +  p) is an oversimplification, for it 
implies that we can accept propositions willy-nilly, provided that they do not clash with 
our existing belief-set. We have shown that this is not legitimate, for any lack of 
warrant leaves the proposition p  defenceless in the face of a potential, future, freely- 
admitted counter-proposition ~p. However, if the interloper has no warrant either, 
there is no reason to prefer one over the other, so the sitting tenant will remain. Next, 
an approach to these ‘contradictory perceptions’ or ‘provocatives’,409 as Plato calls 
them, is offered.
Legislating Between p  and ~p in the Learning Situation
Returning again to the Levi identity, C  *p =  ( C  “  ~ p) +  p, we see that it is the 
contents o f the brackets which are important in understanding the effect o f  
‘provocatives’. Let us take the new propositionp, which is a candidate for addition to 
the learner’s corpus, to be that ‘Penguins are birds and cannot fly’. Let us further 
propose that the learner had hitherto proceeded by induction from some previous 
knowledge about birds (crows are birds and can fly; magpies are birds and can fly; 
pheasants are birds and can fly ...) to generate the proposition q that ‘all birds can fly’.
4Cllt Johnson (2004) op. cit., pp. 1-2.
409 Plato, Republic, 523b-c.
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■In the learner’s mind, there is now an incompatible set o f  propositions:
All birds can fly
P
* A penguin is a bird 
< AND
Penguins cannot fly
Accepting the truth o f p  requires denying the formerly-held belief that q.
Furthermore, by modus tollens: 
So, in terms o f belief-revision, 
Can now be written as:
q-+~p
C * p  = ( C -  ~ p ) * p  
C* p = ( C “ q ) + p
The learner has now apparently to evict the proposition that q (all birds can fly) 
wherever it has made a home in his belief-web, as well as adding the proposition that p  
(penguins are birds and cannot fly). Not only that, he ought also to identify and remove 
nearby implications of q (for example, that ‘all birds are a potential danger to aircraft’, 
‘no birds can be fenced in’ ...).
This is not the only course o f action available to the young learner, however. His 
warrant for believing that q (‘all birds can fly’) appears to be strong. He has observed 
many birds in flight and has been told by people whose testimony he trusts that they are 
‘birds’ and that their method o f travel is called ‘flying’. Forming the view that the 
ability to fly is an essential feature of the class o f living things termed ‘birds’ is an 
eminently virtuous intellectual action. As it turns out, the learner’s inductive reasoning 
was a case of over-generalisation, but this could not have been predicted by him in 
advance o f the ‘provocative’ p  coming to his notice, any more than the historical 
assumption that ‘all swans are white’ could have been seriously doubted in advance o f  
Abe! Tasman’s discovery o f black swans. So, the learner may well resolve the 
cognitive conflict in ways such as:
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1. Penguins must not be birds.
2. My teacher is joking.
3. My teacher’s testimony is wrong.
4 . 1 shall ignore this strange new fact.
5. Penguins can fly, but they don’t want to.
6. Just because scientists have never seen a penguin flying doesn’t mean that they can’t.
7. Most birds can fly, but not penguins.
Deciding which explanation to plump for is itself a matter requiring intellectual virtue. 
The principle o f minimum mutilation also has a part to play, in that the explanation 
which is plausible enough to resolve the conflict, yet does the least harm to the 
learner’s pre-existing web of beliefs, is the preferred option. ‘My teacher is joking’ 
initially meets these criteria. If, however, p  is confirmed by his parents, then the 
learner can either decide that this is another adult epistemic conspiracy410 such as the 
Santa Claus story, or choose a different explanation (or resolve to ignore this strange 
new fact). Quine’s principle of ‘minimum mutilation’ or Zagzebski’s similar one o f 
“‘informational economy”, according to which no belief is to be given up 
unnecessarily’,411 means in this case not relegating the teacher from her position o f  
being one in whom we can have ‘... proper trust o f authority outside [one’s] area o f  
expertise’,412 unless he has no other option. Explanations (5) and (6) fail once the 
relative shortness of penguins’ wings is pointed out.
The final candidate for the resolution o f the learner’s epistemic predicament is ‘Most 
birds can fly, but not penguins’ -  a statement which accommodates the new knowledge 
p  that ‘penguins are birds and cannot fly’, yet requires minimal adjustments elsewhere. 
It is still true, by and large, that ‘All birds can fly’, if  penguins, kiwis and so on are 
treated as exceptions to a general rule. This allows strictly false implications such as ‘a 
bird’s-eye view means a view from above’ to remain, unaffected, in the learner’s 
belief-set. Such a strategy can be a reasonable one, but not if it acts as an impregnable 
defence against recalcitrant experience. We can imagine a situation in which a general 
belief is under attack from challenging first-hand or testimonial evidence, but the 
learner simply constructs more and more elaborate ‘epicycles’ to save the theory.
410 He probably would not use this terminology, but could still have the concept.
411 Pollock and Gillies (2000) op. cit., p.71.
412Zagzebski VOM ,V3 \9 .
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One common defensive action to save a well-entrenched belief is to dismiss 
troublesome candidates for belief as merely localised aberrations. For example, the 
belief that objects o f greater mass fall more quickly than less-massive ones (and similar 
beliefs about pendulums) is saved from attack in the form o f contrary laboratory 
evidence, by considering the lab to be somewhere special and remote from real life.
The learner can thus believe both p  and ~p, but confine each o f the opposing beliefs o f  
the antinomy to its own domain and thus avoid simultaneity and hence dissonance. “In 
the lab”, he might say, “heavy and light objects may fall together, but not in the real 
world.” This partitioning is given further legitimacy by the fact that many light objects 
(for example a piece o f paper) are affected more significantly by air-resistance, and so 
do actually fall more slowly as a result o f this drag (unless folded into a more 
aerodynamic shape, such as a paper aeroplane). However, this partitioning can act as a 
barrier to learning unless teachers (following Socrates) instead make use o f the tension 
inherent in the dissonance, by drawing attention to it and prompting the learner to 
address it, if not resolve it, in a pedagogically-productive way. Howard Gardner labels 
such productive uses of dissonance ‘Christopherian Encounters’ (after the explorer 
Christopher Columbus) and suggests that in such encounters, ‘you expose your theories 
to disconfirmation. If your theories are consistently disconfirmed, you will slowly 
abandon them and hopefully construct better theories’.413
There was also the mediaeval tradition o f scholastic disputations, and the Dissoi Logoi 
o f the Sophists. This latter was an anonymous moot book written around the late fifth 
century or early fourth century BCE.414 By putting both sides o f various questions (in 
chapters concerning ‘Good and Bad’, ‘Seemly and Disgraceful’, ‘Just and Unjust’, 
‘Truth and Falsehood’ and a section on ‘The Demented and the Sane’) it could well 
have formed the basis for teaching. For example, students could consider the 
circumstances in which damage to shoes can be a good thing: ‘(5) ... if shoes are worn 
out and ripped apart, this is good for the cobbler but bad for everyone else’.415 
Similarly, they might discuss cultural differences over bodily decoration: ‘(13) To the 
Thracians it is an ornament for young girls to be tattooed, but with others tattoo-marks
413 Howard Gardner (1991) The Unschooled Mind, in Howard Gardner (2006) The Development and  
Education o f  the Mind: The selected works o f  Howard Gardner (Abingdon: Routledge) p. 140.
414 According to D.T.J. Bailey (2008) ‘Excavating Dissoi Logoi 4 ’, Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 35, 
pp.249-264, p.249.
15 Anon. (Date: ‘after the Peloponnesian War’) ‘Dissoi Logoi or Dialexeis: Two-fold arguments’ [tr. 
Rosamond Kent Sprague] Mind, vol.LXXVII, no.306, April 1968, pp.155-167, p .156.
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are a punishment for those who do wrong’.416 The overall message o f the ‘two fold 
arguments’ is thatp  is the case for some people in some circumstances, while ~p  
obtains for others.
Elenetic M oves to Cause an Aporia
The characteristic Socratic approach is to use relentless elenchus to nudge the learner 
towards a clash (such as apparently believing both p  and ~p) and thereby bring him to a 
state o f confusion. We see this in the Meno, when the slave boy believes wrongly that 
a square o f area 8 foot2 has sides double that o f a square o f area 4 foot2. Socrates 
diagnoses the problem:
Socrates: ... Now he thinks he knows the length o f  the side o f  the eight foot square.
Meno: But does he?
Socrates: Certainly not.
Meno: He thinks it is twice the length o f the other.
(Plato, M em, 82e)
In order to show that the slave boy’s intuition is wrong, Socrates demonstrates that in 
fact a square o f area 16 foot2 has sides double that o f a square o f area 4 foot2. Since the 
problem set by Socrates is to find the side o f a square o f area 8 foot2 -  or to find V8 in 
modem notation -  the belief expressed by the slave does not produce the desired 
solution. Meno’s slave’s original intuition is/? -  that doubling the sides o f a square 
doubles its area -  but by comparing squares o f sides 2 foot and 4 foot, Socrates shows 
that in actuality p  is not the case. The slave now believes both p  (from his own 
intuition) and ~p (from Socrates’ demonstrated counterexample). Clearly one version 
ought to give way in this cognitive dissonance, so the slave accepts that his own initial 
answer was wrong. Since the first square had side o f 2 foot, and doubling this to 4 foot 
did not produce the desired area o f 8 foot2, the slave quite reasonably interpolates 
between 2 foot and 4 foot, so guesses that 3 foot might be the answer. In showing that 
this too is incorrect, Socrates has brought the boy to the desired aporia:
416 Anon., op. cit., p.158.
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Boy: It’s no use, Socrates, I just don’t know.
Socrates: ... At the beginning, he did not know the side o f  the square o f  eight feet.
Nor indeed does he know it now, but then he thought he knew it and answered 
boldly, as was appropriate -  he felt no perplexity. Now however he does feel 
perplexed. Not only does he not know the answer; he doesn’t even think he 
know s417
Meno: Quite true.
(Plato, Meno, 84a-b)
The boy has now achieved some insight into his epistemic predicament and has 
recognised an aporia. He does not yet possess Sosa’s reflective knowledge, for this is 
‘apt belief aptly noted’,4iS but he does have what we might call ‘inapt belief aptly 
noted’. In other words, he knows that his first-order belief is faulty. The dialogue 
shows that this metacognition may well assist the boy to progress epistemically.
Socrates: So, in perplexing him, and numbing him like the sting-ray, have we done him 
any harm?
Meno: 1 think not.
Socrates: In fact, we have helped him to some extent toward finding out the right 
answer, for now not only is he ignorant o f it but he will be glad to look for i t ...
(Plato, Meno, 84b)
We recall that Sosa’s ‘virtue-perspectivism’ (the description he uses to label his brand 
o f faculty reliabilism) allows for two grades o f knowledge, namely animal knowledge 
(K) and reflective knowledge (K+). The latter is a higher grade o f knowledge, for not 
only do we know (in the sense of having an apt belief, that is, a belief which is accurate 
because o f our adroitness), we also know that we know (iC Ksp). Despite its 
Rumsfeldian overtones, this notion is not foreign to educational thinking, having much 
overlap with concepts such as John Flavell’s metacognition419 and Chris Argyris’
417 Interestingly, Islamic ethics labels these two states o f  (i) not knowing and (ii) not even realising that 
one does not know, ‘simple ignorance’ and ‘compound ignorance’, respectively. We can view these as 
the negative correlates o f Sosa’s ‘reflective’ and ‘animal’ knowledge. The Islamic approach here is 
Aristotelian in nature, dealing with Excess, Deficiency and Moderation, which, for the intellect, become 
Slyness, Stupidity and Wisdom respectively. ‘Slyness is the excessive use o f  the intellect; that is, using 
the power o f the intellect in matters for which it is inappropriate, or using it too much in matters for 
which it is appropriate.’ Muhammad Mahdi ibn abi Dharr al-Naraqi (n.d., Late 18lh century) Jami' al- 
Sa'adat (The Collector o f Felicities) [tr. Shahyar Sa’dat] a l Tawhid Islamic Journal [online] Available at: 
http://www.al-islam.Org/al-tawhid/felicities/3.htm [Accessed 5 June 2010], Section 2, Moral Virtue and 
Vices
418 Ernest Sosa (2007) A Virtue Epistemology. Apt B elief and Reflective Knowledge, vol.I (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) p.32.
4,9 Flavell, reprising his seminal 1976 work, explains that ‘It is called merncognition because its core 
meaning is “cognition about cognition”. Children not only think when solving a problem, but they also 
learn to think about thinking ... ’ John H. Flavell, Patricia H. Miller & Scott A. Miller (2002) Cognitive 
Development [4Ul Edition] (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall) p. 164.
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double-loop learning420, as well as parallels with Donald Schon’s reflective practice 
(specifically reflection on action).421 This new perspective alerts our learner to his state 
of incompetence: in William Howell’s words, he has ascended from a state of 
unconscious incompetence to one of conscious incompetence.422 Having his ignorance 
exposed thus means that the way is then clear for the putative knower eventually to 
acquire not ‘mere’ knowledge (or ‘animal’ knowledge, in Sosa’s repertoire) but an 
elevated class o f knowledge which has both a substantive, cognitive part and a self­
monitoring, metacognitive part. But we are getting ahead o f the narrative; the slave 
boy has only just come to realise that a particular one o f his beliefs is false.
Under the Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson (AGM) paradigm, the boy is now 
beginning the process o f belief-revision by contraction: that is, a belief he previously 
held has been rejected. When this aporia is reached, the possibility o f an epiphany is 
newly present. The nature o f this illumination, and the subsequent new path revealed, 
is one which varies according to the seeker, his epistemic ambitions, and the context in 
which he finds himself. In particular, there is a contrast between (i) the pedagogical 
situation in which a path needs to be constructed connecting the learner’s pre-existing 
knowledge and his new, but pre-ordained, insight (perhaps one o f Meyer & Land’s 
‘threshold concepts’) and (ii) the zetetic one, in which a genuinely new trail is being 
blazed.
Notwithstanding his claims to be merely ‘helping’ Meno’s slave to arrive at the correct 
solution to the geometrical problem by purely maieutic methods, Socrates is arguably 
too directive in the dialogue, prompting Bertrand Russell’s complaint that he (Socrates) 
‘. .. has to ask leading questions which any judge would disallow’.423 The final moves 
which lead Meno’s slave to a correct solution seem to me to involve Socrates teaching 
directly by telling rather than by the claimed maieusis:
420 Chris Argyris (1999) On Organizational Learning [2nd Edition] (Oxford: Blackwell) p.68.
421 Donald A. Schon (1987) Educating the Reflective Practitioner (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass).
422 William Smiley Howell (1982), in The empathic communicator (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co.), 
develops a theory o f  competence-growth which runs: unconscious incompetence; conscious 
incompetence; conscious competence; unconscious competence. Cited in Sheila Furness (2005) ‘Shifting 
sands: Developing cultural competence’, Practice, vol. 17, no.4, pp.247-256, p.252. We note that 
Howell’s model was originally for communicative competence, but it has since been applied to other 
types o f  competence. For example, Furness uses it to categorise the development o f  cultural competence 
in the individual.
423 Bertrand Russell (1961) History o f  Western Philosophy (London: Unwin University Books) p .l 10
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Socrates: Now does this line going from comer to comer cut each of these squares 
in half?
(Plato, Meno, 84e)
or
Socrates: The technical name for it is ‘diagonal’; so if  we use that name, it is your 
personal opinion that the square on the diagonal o f  the original square is double its
area?
(Plato, Meno, 85b)
In response to both o f these statements disguised as questions, Meno’s slave merely has 
to answer “yes”. Socrates leads the way to the solution he knew all along; there has 
been no new trail blazed here.424
The Feldwege and the Holzwege: Two Kinds of Learning Journey
We find Sara Kofinan mirroring this distinction, in separating the Greek odos ‘a path or 
road connecting knowns’ fromporos ‘a passage across a chaotic expanse, a sea-route, 
for example’. 425 We see that such a classification in turn parallels Heidegger’s 
contrasting o f Feldwege (a path through a field which is already laid out for us) and 
Holzwege (a path through a wood, which we make as we go).426 The distinction is of 
great importance in education, for it speaks to the broad difference between instruction 
and enquiry. In the one, we guide the pupil unambiguously to the town o f Larissa; in 
the other we help him to explore the surrounding landscape o f the Thessaly periphery, 
acting as a co-pioneer. Both can represent virtuous actions on the part o f the teacher, 
but perhaps the Holzwege allows for greater learner autonomy, intellectual ownership 
and happily accidental discoveries.
424 The conclusion o f this dialectic is that the boy too knew the solution all along. The Meno illustrates 
Plato’s theory o f  anamnesis, by bringing Meno’s slave boy to a correct geometrical conclusion and 
adducing this as evidence that the boy must have had this knowledge since before he was a man, because 
he never learned geometry in this world.
42i Sarah Kofman (1988) ‘Beyond aporia?’, Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Post-Structuralist Classics, (New  
York: Routledge), p. 10, In Nicholas C. Burbules (2000) ‘Aporias, Webs and Passages: Doubt as an 
Opportunity to Learn’, Curriculum Enquiry, 30:2, p .175. Gerard Cuperus transliterates the Greek 
differently, explaining that, 'Poros is opposed to hodos, a public road that is clearly laid out. A poros  is, 
instead, a way that has to be found’. Gerard Cuperus (2007) ‘Traveling with Socrates’, Gary Alan Scott 
(ed.) (2007) Philosophy in Dialogue: P la to ’s Many Devices [paperback] (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press) p.204. Sarah Kofman’s spelling is, however, used in modem Greek for a motorway: as 
in A nna] OSo.;, the six-lane Athens ring road. It also appears in the English word for a car mileometer: 
‘odometer’.
426 Charles S. Taylor (1998) ‘Holzwege and Feldwege in Cyberwald: The Multimedia Philosophy 
Lecture’, Ejoumal, vol.8, no.l.
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The thrill of the Holzwege needs to be tempered, though, with much traditional 
following o f the Feldwege (particularly with younger learners) to build up both 
confidence and a set o f concepts that will be needed when departing from the beaten 
track. Credulity is not a vice in the early years. Notwithstanding the security o f the 
Feldwege, it is by setting out on the riskier Holzwege427 that the likelihood o f  
serendipitous finds opens up. This use o f serendipity ( ‘an assumed gift for finding 
valuable things not sought for’428) is not, I suggest, a dispensable luxury in education, 
because without it much o f the experience involves zemblanity ( ‘The opposite o f  
serendipity, the faculty o f making unhappy, unlucky and expected discoveries by 
design’429). Not all discoveries so designed are unhappy, o f course, but too strong an 
emphasis on arriving at a pre-ordained proposition p, without entertaining the 
possibilities o f ~p being the case, disbars the learner from exercising intellectual virtues 
other than Zagzebski’s ‘being able to recognize reliable authority’.430
Sosa and B elief Revision
We now return to Sosa’s AAA (‘accuracy, adroitness, aptness.’431) structure of 
knowledge, which uses the metaphor of an archer hitting a target representing true 
belief. In the light of the discussions in this chapter, particularly the notion o f belief 
revision, it is clear that this model is itself in need o f revision.
To avoid holding incompossible, or merely incompatible, propositional knowledge p  
and ~p simultaneously, hitting an isolated target cannot be seen as sufficient for 
knowledge-claims. To modify Sosa’s toxophilic allegory, the arrows must first be 
removed from previous target-beliefs, which are incompatible with the newly-hit 
targets and so must be derogated. Furthermore, any simplistic account o f education, 
which only involves reaching prescribed targets, misses the importance o f non­
427 Riskier in the sense o f  possibly unproductive, A German colleague, Cordula Hansen, points out that 
the word Holzwege also carries the negative connotation captured by the English idiom ‘up the garden 
path’; in other words, it might be the wrong road.
Philip Babcock Gove (ed.) (1993) Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Cologne: 
Kdnemann).
429 William Boyd (1998), Armadillo (London: Hamish Hamilton) ch .12. According to Simon Hertnon, 
Boyd coined this word from the Russian archipelago Nova Zembla ‘a barren former nuclear testing 
ground in the middle o f the icy Arctic ocean’. Simon Hertnon (2008) From afterwit to zemblanity 
(Auckland, NZ: New Holland), p .210. Hertnon gives a quotation from Steven Hayes (2007) as an 
example o f  this word in use: ‘I hate mission statements. They are second only to educational outcomes 
for zemblanity.’ Hertnon, ibid, p.211.
430 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p.l 14.
431 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.22.
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prescribed counterfactives, a body o f propositions which have been shown throughout 
this chapter to be crucial to the knowledge-acquiring enterprise.
Hitting a target has only a provisional quality, and the target p needs somehow to be 
labelled with a justification for being hit, so that it can be defended against (i) future 
attempts to remove the arrow from p  and assert that ~p and (ii) the charge that one of 
the implications o f p  is incompatible with another proposition q. A knowledge o f the 
relative warrants for q and ~q depends on the strengths o f justification for q and p, 
since p  —*■ ~q. Thus, by closure, one has to have a strong justification for p, not just for 
its own sake but also to be able to adjudicate over the question o f rival proposition q. 
Significantly, in a very recent book (2011), Sosa replaces his image o f an archer aiming 
at a single, static target with a huntress, Diana, either selecting and aiming or 
‘forbearing’ to aim at various moving quany. Here, the notion o f aptness is joined by 
one of ‘meta-aptness’, which Sosa defines as follows:
A shot is meta-apt iff it is well selected: i.e., if  it takes appropriate risk, and its 
doing so manifests the agent’s competence for target and shot selection.432
So the learner has a role in choosing which beliefs to target, rather than always being 
required to aim at prescribed propositions, and he deserves second-order credit for 
selecting well, in addition to first-order credit for acquiring a true belief thanks to his 
epistemic virtue. A flock o f rival propositions thus ought to be available to the learner 
sometimes, to enable meta-aptness to be practised. The learner is then animated by the 
virtues o f enquiry. He ought also to be invited to provide a rationale for his choice, so 
that his knowledge ascends to Sosa’s higher grade o f knowledge, K+, by his attaining 
an epistemic perspective on it so that it becomes ‘apt belief aptly noted’.
Finally, an illustrative example o f using intellectual virtue in dealing with 
counterfactives in an educational setting.
Virtuous Counterfactives in the Classroom
If a permanent bar-magnet is plunged into a long coil, the cutting o f the magnet’s field 
lines by the turns o f the coil produces a current. This current flowing in the coil itself 
gives rise to another, temporary, magnetic field, with a shape similar to that of the bar
432 Ernest Sosa (2011) Knowing Full Well (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.8.
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magnet. The question now is, ‘What is the polarity o f the newly-created magnetic 
field?’ One approach is to use a Gedanken experiment, together with counterfactual 
thinking, to arrive at the answer. My suggestion is that this pedagogical method is 
more epistemically sound than simply telling or showing the pupils what the polarity is 
(or perhaps merely helpfully encoding it into a mnemonic for easy memorisation).
Let us say that the N-pole of the magnet is being dropped downwards into the top end 
o f the coil, which is arranged vertically (see fig.2). Since there are only two possible 
magnetic poles -  N and S -  the top of the coil, X, must now either be a N or S pole433 
(See Figure 2).
Figure 2 - Bar Magnet Dropped into a Coil
It is tempting just to tell the students that X will in fact also be a N-pole (that is, the 
same pole as that o f the bottom of the permanent magnet) but it is more interesting to 
consider both possibilities and start with the counterfactive statement ~p: [if a N-pole is 
plunged downwards into a coil, the top o f the coil will be a S-pole], In setting up this
433 The current could also be zero, so a third possibility is that the field produced by the coil is neither N 
nor S but zero. That this is not in fact the case could be demonstrating by connecting a galvanometer to 
the coil and separately testing for the presence o f a magnetic field by a small ‘plotting compass’. This 
latter would have to be performed without the bar-magnet, but with a battery to supply the current. We 
can then insist on either p  or ~p and exclude the middle. The propositions p  and ~p are hence mutually 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive.
434 Diagram from: http://www.s-cool.co.uk/assets/test_its/alevel/physics/lenzs-law/dia02.gif.
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learning episode, we would see to it that the learners already had the prior knowledge 
that ‘opposite poles attract’, so they could be able to deduce that the bar-magnet’s N 
would be attracted by the coil’s per hypothesis S. However, this force o f attraction 
would increase the acceleration of the bar-magnet falling into the coil; this would 
increase the current in the coil; the increased current would increase the field around 
the coil; this would cause an even greater force o f attraction, and so on.
Pupils could thus see that the implications o f ~p lead to an absurdity: energy from 
nowhere. The movement of a bar-magnet into a coil would, under the right conditions, 
quickly lead to large currents, intense fields, and the magnet being pulled out o f one’s 
hand with great force. The conclusion of this reductio ad absurdum is that ~p cannot 
be the case, so p  must be true. Plunging a bar-magnet into a coil in fact produces 
currents such that a temporary field is generated which resists the plunging motion.
This is an instance o f a more fundamental law concerning the conservation o f energy, 
which has many manifestations (including le Chatelier’s principle in chemistry).
Having shown what must rationally be the case, pupils would then check this 
empirically. They would also be invited to consider the effects o f pulling the magnet 
upwards out o f the coil.
The true belief, p, thus acquired has been arrived at by acting from intellectual virtue, 
including a consideration o f the counterfactive ~p; and it has been stored together with 
both empirical evidence that p  and protection against the suggestion that ~p might be 
the case. The knowledge gained is o f the higher type which Sosa calls ‘reflective 
knowledge’ (K+), in that the learner now has an apt belief that his knowing p  is 
defensible against pertinent sceptical doubts (although not against what we might term 
the ‘impertinent’ sceptical doubts o f radical hypothesis h). It also perhaps has 
cognitive links with le Chatelier’s principle in Chemistry, homeostasis in Biology and 
the more general principle o f the conservation of energy, in the pupil’s web of beliefs. 
This gives a clue as to what an epistemically-virtuous approach to teaching Lenz’s law 
might look like, using a reliabilist construal o f ‘virtuous’. Because o f the consideration 
-  and rejection — o f the counterfactive possibility, the first-hand observation of the facts 
of the matter (combined with interpretation and inference), and the weaving of links 
with the rest o f his web, the learner has a well-tethered fragment o f knowledge. It also 
‘passes’ Nozick’s four conditions, since (1) p  is true; (2) the student believes p; (4) in a 
close alternative world in which p  was not true, the student would not believe it
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[indeed, he has entertained and ruled out this counterfactive possibility using reasoning 
and observation]; and (4) werep  to be true, but in a close possible world, he would still 
believe it. The later needs some qualification, for this alternative world must be one in 
which the pupils had already had some experience o f magnetic attraction and repulsion. 
Given this, the method by which the learners acquired knowledge ‘thatp ’ is a good 
one, which uses Sosa’s epistemic faculties such as eyesight, combined with the on­
board resources o f the other perceptual faculties, memory and reason, guided by the 
teacher’s other-regarding testimony.
Now, the student has attained a superior type o f true belief, o f which Sosa would 
approve, as well as Plato:
Socrates: True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts o f  good so long as they stay 
in their place, but they will not stay long. They run away from a man’s mind; so 
they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason. ... Once 
they are tied down, they become knowledge and are stable. That is why knowledge 
is something more valuable than right opinion, What distinguishes one from the 
other is the tether.43S
We can help learners to fasten this tether securely, but if the process is to be virtuous 
they must ultimately take responsibility for this epistemic action.
Conclusions of Chapter 4
Sosa’s reliabilist branch o f virtue epistemology turns out to have been highly fruitful 
when grafted onto educational thinking: particularly when its roots in Nozick’s theory 
are honoured. Attributions of knowledge can rely, inter alia, upon Nozick’s conditions 
(3) and (4) being assertible in the case under consideration. In other words, were p  not 
to be the case (that is, ~p), it would be plausible that 5 would not believe it, and were p 
to be the case, then it would similarly be plausible that 5 would believe it, even if other 
circumstances changed. Thus ‘what-if?’ thinking is indispensable for the person 
carrying out a knowledge-attribution (for example, the teacher when assessing the 
student) and, crucially, indispensable for the epistemic agent himself (the student), if  
his knowledge is to be classed as Sosa’s reflective knowledge, K+, and not merely 
‘animal’ knowledge, K. Thus counterfactual thinking and a consideration o f how a 
small change in circumstances might affect a belief (p, but in a close possible world) is
435 Plato, Meno, 97d-98. Here, he is comparing knowledge to the fugitive statues o f  Daedalus.
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a necessary part of virtuous knowing (or ‘virtuous true believing’, since virtue 
epistemology defines knowing per se in terms of epistemic virtue). Furthermore, the 
Levi identity -  from artificial intelligence theory -  provides support for this notion that 
~p must be considered, because learning qua belief-revision requires the derogation of 
~p and all its close associates. All three of the ways in which the counterfactive ~p 
ought to feature in virtuous learning on our elaborated reliabilist model have been 
carried out: (i) the learners were alive to the possibilities of ~ p  being true; (ii) if ~p or 
its close implications infected their webs of belief, these have been eradicated; (iii) true 
proposition p  has been acquired with sufficient warrant to entrench it against attacks 
from any future weaker epistemic input suggesting that ~p might be the case.
We have thus defined knowledge in a demanding way, which opposes a naive version 
promoted by village technicists. Simplistic notions which involve students learning by 
reliably hitting pre-ordained targets are shown to be suspect, for even on the Feldwege 
some other possibilities need to be at least entertained, if not actively followed.
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Chapter 5 -  Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology 
and Education
Introduction
In this chapter I turn to, and extend for educational purposes, Zagzebski’s neo- 
Aristotelian version of virtue epistemology. This is rather different from Sosa’s 
reliabilist emphasis on the ‘accurate, adroit and apt’436 hitting of a true proposition p, 
but nevertheless it has relevance to the notion of learning as virtuous belief-revision, 
which I developed earlier in the context of virtue reliabilist thought (p. 166). By f 
elaborating on Zagzebski’s model, we see a rich picture emerging of a socially- 
enwebbed epistemic agent who revises his beliefs virtuously by exercising quasi- 
Aristotelian intellectual virtues to bring his doxastic web into closer cognitive contact 
with reality.
Zagzebski’s aretaic approach has an overall agenda of subsuming virtue epistemology 
under virtue ethics. Her line is attractive in a number of respects: in particular, for the 
prominence it gives to phronesis as an indispensable part of both epistemic and moral 
reasoning, and so, for us, its suitability for undergirding a profession which has both 
intellectual and ethical ambitions. However, I feel that an alternative approach of 
keeping virtue epistemology apart from virtue ethics (to the extent that this is feasible) 
makes analysis of the acquisition of knowledge more lucid. I will thus make some 
attempt at such quarantining, while allowing a certain degree of interpenetration where 
that is justified.
Zagzebski’s Definition o f Knowledge
Zagzebski defines knowledge as '... a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out 
of acts of intellectual virtue’ (Virtues o f  the Mind, p.298). This is congruent with the 
conception of knowledge as the outcome of learning qua virtuous belief-revision, 
defended in this thesis. In a much fuller way than Sosa, she names and describes a
436 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.22.
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number of aretaic virtues437 which allow the putative knower to attain such a state of 
cognitive contact with reality. For example, she lists i... intellectual carefulness, 
perseverance, humility, vigor, flexibility, courage ... open-mindedness, fair- 
mindedness, insightfulness ... [and]... intellectual integrity’ in addition to ‘ ... the 
virtues opposed to wishful thinking, obtuseness and conformity’ (VOM, p. 155). 
Whereas Sosa’s brand of intellectual virtue involves the use of intellectual skills and 
genetic endowments (such as the faculty of good eyesight) to achieve reliable access to 
the truth, Zagzebski focuses more traditionally on virtues along the tines of Aristotle’s 
definition: acquired excellences. [See Appendix A for a fuller listing of the Intellectual 
Virtues discussed by Zagzebksi and Sosa]. Some of Sosa’s epistemic ‘virtues’ would 
not be regarded as such by Aristotle, for faculties (buvapat, dunamai) like eyesight do 
not seem to require habituation in the same way as excellences such as courage, as the 
latter explains in Nicomachean Ethics, 1106al8 (see p.53). We now know that there is 
a role for habituation in the development of normal vision, as experiments with animals 
brought up in visually-deprived environments show,438 but there is nevertheless a clear 
qualitative difference between the faculty of eyesight and the virtue of courage -  one 
being the optical and physiological properties of a sensory organ, the other, a 
psychological disposition of a person. Zagzebski also departs from Aristotle’s analysis, 
however, in arguing that not only the moral virtues (such as courage) but also the 
intellectual virtues (such as open-mindedness) are developed by imitation, habituation, 
the overcoming of akrasia, to attain a fully-fledged disposition beyond mere 
continence. For Aristotle, the intellectual virtues are fostered by direct teaching, so in 
this regard she is out of step with him.
If Zagzebski is correct -  and I think that she is -  we can infer that the teacher’s role in 
the learner’s processes of knowledge-acquisition ought to involve giving significant 
attention to the development of the intellectual virtues in the learner, for it is only 
through such virtues that he can attain ‘cognitive contact with reality’. Even accepting 
Zagzebski’s reasoning that the intellectual and the moral virtues share a similar 
aetiology, though, we might feel that the former type is unlikely to be fostered simply 
by setting a good example and helping the learner to habituate himself to virtuously-
4371 recognise that this might look like a pleonasm but I use it to separate off Zagzebski’s neo- 
Aristotelian excellences from Sosa’s inclusion of cognitive skills and innate faculties in his notion of 
epistemic virtue. Neither of the terms is thus otiose.
4 8 The classic work on this is reported in Torsten Wiesel & David Hubei (1965) ‘Extent o f recovery 
from the effects o f  visual deprivation in kittens’, J. Neurophysiol, 28, pp. 1060-72.
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motivated epistemic activity, as a prologue to supplying some stimuli for him to 
addiess virtuously. Just as I argued earlier, that one’s first language and personal 
ontology develop side by side (p.83), so too do intellectual virtue and knowledge. The 
Augustinian notion that the world is in some sense already a set of ‘givens’ -  encoded 
in the child’s private language -  and that learning the language of the natives is only a 
question of the ‘stranger’ constructing a mental table listing these givens, together with 
the appropriate label in the ‘foreign land’ into which he has been bom, was, as we have 
seen, undermined by Wittgenstein (p.83).
Applying a similar line of reasoning to educational virtue epistemology, we see that the 
‘givens’ of the world are not unproblematically cognized as discrete, interpretation- 
neutral objects and events, but are conceptualised alongside the growth of the 
intellectual virtues. Thus it is likely that any thought of teaching the intellectual virtues 
in isolation from putatively substantive knowledge -  as O’ Toole recommends 
(p.146)439 -  can similarly be undermined, in a way paralleling Wittgenstein’s argument. 
It is now commonplace for efforts at developing content-free critical thinking to be 
disparaged,440 but it is also true that teaching the substantive content in the absence of 
any critical thinking ought similarly to be denigrated. If Zagzebski’s thesis that 
knowledge can only be acquired through the good offices of intellectual virtue is true, 
then the corollary is that intellectual virtue can only be developed in the presence of 
knowledge. The bootstrapping required to get this interdependent project off the 
ground is next analysed by considering some of the individual virtues identified by 
Zagzebski.
439 Christopher J. O’Toole (1938) ‘The Teaching o f Intellectual and Moral Virtues’, Ethics, vol.49, no. I, 
pp.81-84, p.81.
0 Emery Hyslop-Margison, for example, makes the observation that: ‘A highly-skilled airline pilot who 
successfully confronts instrument failure by employing alternative guidance techniques may be unable to 
substitute a missing minor ingredient when baking bread’. Emery J. Hyslop-Margison (2003) ‘The 
Failure of Critical Thinking: Considenng Virtue Epistemology as a Pedagogical Alternative’, Philosophy 
o f  Education, (ed. K. Alston) (Urbana, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 2004), pp.319-326, 
p.321. I teach an in-service course to airline pilots, entitled ‘Thinking and Learning Skills’, and can 
confirm that aeronautic critical thinking and academic critical thinking are not co-extensive. It takes 
much work to transfer attention from the terse commands o f the control tower to the supported 
arguments o f the ivory tower.
197
Cultivating Epistemic Virtue and Knowledge
rimportant Epistemic Virtues
I defend here a model of learning as virtuous belief-modification, carried out by an 
epistemic agent animated by epistemic virtue, to bring his doxastic web into closer 
cognitive alignment with reality via intersubjective triangulation with the webs of 
others. First, though, let us simplify the context by removing the putative knower from 
the wider epistemic community and putting him with an individual teacher. It might be 
thought that this stripping back to essentials could be taken even further, to consist 
solely of the learner in his physical environment, unencumbered by the presence of a 
teacher. This would be a step too far, however, for the ‘feral knower’ cannot progress 
much with only his own thoughts for company. Granted, the ‘other’ voice that is 
required for constructive dialogue about the world need not be a teacher -  it could be 
merely a fellow seeker who is epistemically well-placed to be of use, or a book, or an 
internet connection -  but this alternative account of reality, in whatever form it takes, is 
indispensable.441 Without it, the epistemic agent has no resources with which to test 
anything but the simplest of theories about brute reality. Think of Robinson Crusoe, 
alone on his desert island, whose doxastic activities are limited to those needed for 
survival and whose enquiries consist of simple observation and trial-and-error.
Even these attempts at knowledge-acquisition are not entirely free of intersubjective 
influence: they are mediated through memories of words and images originating in his 
past life in the company of others. Arguably, no observation is truly ‘simple’ for minds 
like ours: what we perceive is never innocent of interpretation. For Robinson Cmsoe to 
be a feral knower would require him to have been left on the island as a baby and to 
have leamt everything from scratch. Deprived of ‘teachers’ to provide him with the 
conceptual sophistication which comes with language, his epistemic progress would be 
extremely limited. We see real-life versions of this in accounts of unfortunate children 
kept locked away from human contact: fed, but neither linguistically nor intellectually 
nourished. In the early nineteenth century, for example, the German boy Kaspar 
Hauser became a celebrity in the years following his release from solitary captivity.442
441 It is conceivable that this ‘other’ could be the solitary epistemic agent viewed diachronically. In other 
words, he might keep a reflective journal and use this to supply a different point o f view on a later day 
when liis thinking had changed.
442 Anselm von Feuerbach (1833) An Account o f  an Individual Kept in a Dungeon, Separated From All 
Communication With the World, From Early Childhood to About the Age o f  Seventeen [Translated from
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In more recent times, the discovery of the Californian ‘wild child’, Genie, provided 
1970s psycholinguists with much research material as they attempted to develop her 
language skills. Although she did make some progress, her utterances never became 
more sophisticated than word-combinations rather like garbled telegram messages, and 
her grammar remained underdeveloped: failing to distinguish between the various 
pronouns, for example.443 Both Genie and Kaspar suffered from the lack of a ‘teacher’ 
in their formative years, a deprivation for which later attempts at remediation could not 
fully compensate. A critical period of eukairos had passed and a time of relative 
akairos entered.
So, if the minimum configuration for learning is a learner and a ‘teacher’,444 what are 
the crucial virtues required of the learner for success? One obvious candidate is 
Zagzebski’s ‘proper trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise ... ’ (VOM\ 
p.319). Provided that this trust is warranted, in that the teacher’s testimony is both 
sincere and competent, the learner may acquire knowledge. This is an archetypal 
teaching and learning dyad: the teacher knows certain things and makes her knowledge 
available to the learner via testimony. The learner recognises this testimony as 
trustworthy and legitimately accepts the knowledge on offer. Clearly this process, 
while intellectually virtuous, has its limitations. The chief one arises from the fact that 
the learner and teacher do not share an identical doxastic web, so the meanings they 
attribute to the propositions under consideration cannot match precisely. Not only 
would such a congruence of webs be highly improbable, given their different 
experiences and intellectual gifts, it would do the putative learner no good. If they did, 
per impossibile, possess precisely the same set of beliefs in the same configuration, one 
could not learn much from the other, just as Narcissus’ reflective practice did not 
advance his knowledge greatly.
There are echoes here of Meno’s paradox of learning, in that what the learner really 
needs (a coherent extension of his knowledge) is neither effortlessly attained, nor easily 
recognised when it is attained. By the same token, what he does not need (more 
unassimilated fragments of ‘knowledge’ which offer no threat to his existing stock) is
the German] (London: Simpkin & Marshall). Reprinted in http://www.feralchildren.coin [online] 
[Accessed 19 April 2010].
43 Maya Pines (1997) ‘The Civilising of Genie’ in Loretta F. Kaspar (ed.) (1997) Teaching English 
through the Disciplines: Psychology (Oceanside, NY, USA: Whittier).
444 Construed widely to encompass any more knowledgeable other, text, web-site and so on.
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readily available. In the absence of a one-to-one web-mapping between teacher and 
learner, any testimonially-derived knowledge accruing to the learner would not have 
the same coherence as it could be expected to have in the web of the testifier (assuming 
that she acquired her beliefs virtuously). Lacking other, more critical, intellectual 
virtues, the learner would thus expand his web by simple accretion, without addressing 
a number of the aporias and contradictions which result, and would thus be in the 
unhappy position of possessing an incoherent congeries of disconnected facts.
For the learner’s web to be spun in a coherent manner, the attendant belief-revision 
requires a derogation of certain related propositions in the light of the addition of a new 
proposition p  to existing belief-corpus C, if the theories of Alchourron, Gardenfors and 
Makinson are accepted.445 Accretion without derogation leads to incoherence in all but 
the simplest doxastic episodes. This incoherence is clearly not a desirable outcome; we 
wish the learner virtuously to weave a well-integrated web of true beliefs, or at least try 
to do so. Furthermore, we desire his web not only to possess some coherence, but also 
to be one which he can claim as his own: one for which he can take some credit. An 
uncritical stance towards the teacher-leamer dyad on the part of the learner will not 
enable him to acquire a set of beliefs which displays both coherence and cognitive 
contact with reality. Moreover, simple doxastic trust is a fitting attribute during some 
of the learning undertaken by a tyro, but after his initial successes it is essential that he 
develop a range of other epistemic virtues, in keeping with his intellectual maturity and 
indexed to the matters in hand. The teacher-leamer dyad may be de rigueur, both in 
terms of bootstrapping the process of virtuous belief-formation and in respect of 
sustaining it, but as sole doxastic mechanism it runs into dangers parallel to the well- 
known ‘new evil demon problem’. For discussion purposes, I shall label this parallel 
danger ‘the new Athene problem’.
The ‘New Athene Problem’
The new evil demon problem refers to the possibility that an epistemic agent could 
proceed with due intellectual virtue (interpreted under an internalist paradigm) and still 
fail to reach the truth because of unpropitious circumstances. The putative knower 
could be open-minded, careful, properly trustful of legitimate authority outside his area
445 Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson [AGM] (1985) op. cit., p.510.
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of expertise, and so on, and would thus qualify as embodying the intellectual virtues. 
However, the environment in which he finds himself might be one in which an 
unvirtuous lucky-guesser succeeds in the externalist aim of acquiring true belief, while 
he, the intellectually-virtuous agent, fails miserably. By externalist lights, then, the 
lucky-guesser uses a reliable conduit to the truth in the demon world and thus behaves 
virtuously, while the agent considered (internally) to be virtuous does not use truth- 
conducive methods, so must be regarded (externally) as intellectually unvirtuous. This 
problem has led Zagzebski to treat ‘virtue’ as a success-term and to modify her 
internalist leanings to incorporate some externalist elements, so that for her the 
epistemic virtues are truth conducive. In this respect, she is agent-focused rather than 
agent-centred.
The world of education, however, is not generally regarded as a demon world, because 
teachers can usually be relied upon to be epistemically sincere and competent. As a 
profession, we are concerned for the progress of our students and do not knowingly 
mislead them, by and large,446 so if they accept our testimony they can acquire 
knowledge (apart from those occasions when we are sincerely mistaken). However, 
such solicitude can divert the novice epistemic agents in our classes from their long­
term intellectual aim of acquiring true beliefs, understanding and wisdom. The learner 
can be over-protected.
Sosa, in explaining the difference between his technical terms ‘safety’ and ‘aptness’, 
talks of a safe archery shot which is nevertheless not apt, for: ‘A guardian angel with a 
wind machine could guarantee the safety of a shot even when it is inapt.’447 We recall 
that an accurate shot is Sosa’s metaphor for the acquisition of a true belief, and he 
intends ‘aptness’ to signify that the belief has been acquired because o/the ‘adroitness’ 
of the believer. Clearly, in this scenario, the believer is not to be credited with a 
virtuous act of believing, since (despite its success) it did not follow from his own 
epistemic skill but from the conditions being artificially made propitious by angelic 
intervention.
446 Except on those occasions when we do so for what we take to be their long-range epistemic,
oology 
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pedagogical or prudential good.
7 Ernest Sosa (2009) ‘Precis of A Virtue Epistem l ’, Philosophical Studies, 144, p.108.
This is what I have termed the ‘new Athene problem’: by acting with epistemic 
beneficence, teachers guarantee that learners acquire ‘safe’ beliefs, but the more 
effective these pedagogical interventions are, the less ‘apt’ are the true beliefs so 
acquired. The student recipients of excessive pedagogical beneficence are not in a 
demon world in which intellectual virtue fails to be truth conducive, but rather in one 
governed by Athene, who deflects the epistemic arrow of her charges to reach the truth 
irrespective of their lack, or otherwise, of intellectual virtue. In this environment, there 
is no need to develop the critical virtues, for doing so would only take extra effort, with 
no increase in the acquisition of true beliefs. Indeed, a habit of critique rather than 
acquiescence in these surroundings would make the learners less efficient as doxastic 
agents and might even lead them to form some false beliefs and wrongly take those to 
be knowledge. Under a technicist paradigm, the teacher is right to steer the arrow: to 
do whatever it takes to ensure that the learner reaches the desired outcome of acquiring 
the approved proposition as efficiently as possible. The learner too is right to accept 
this guidance without demur, in the interests of a smooth transfer of ‘knowledge’. He 
will score highly at hitting the targets in the rigged game that village technicism 
encourages. Under a virtue epistemic paradigm, however, these actions can -  under 
some circumstances -  be seen as vicious, for the ‘knowledge’-acquisition has not been 
governed by the learner’s epistemic virtue. Whether we view the teacher’s actions as 
vicious, or as unvirtuous-because-misguided, depends on her intentions. If these relate 
solely to enhancing her examination statistics, irrespective of any genuine learning on 
the part of her students, the former judgement may be reached; but if her heart is in the 
right place and she is only being over-protective, the latter would apply. If the 
pedagogical ends had ostensibly been achieved, but the means were suspect, the 
outcome might only be an ersatz type of ‘knowledge’ and not the real thing. Next, I 
provide some further detail for this claim, with a brief reference to Athene’s role in The 
Odyssey, before going on to suggest a solution to the problem by contrasting two sorts 
of aim: telos and skopos.
King Odysseus of Ithaca charged Mentor (the goddess Athene in human guise) with the 
task of looking after his son, Telemachus, during his extended absence, fighting in, and 
returning eventfully from, the Trojan wars.448 Mentor did not do a particularly good job 
o f ‘keeping all safe’ during the king’s absence, however, so it is tempting to examine 
the narrative for clues as to how Telemachus could have had an easier time of it, given
448 Hamer, op. cit., p.23 § 225.
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Mentor/Athene’s supernatural abilities. This would be to miss the point, though. Were 
Telemachus to have been spared ‘traversing the barren sea’,449 he would not have leamt 
the things he did: valuable knowledge which could not always be encoded into 
straightforward propositional form; knowledge which had to be authentically lived.
Had Athene removed her mask and used her magical capabilities to disclose the 
whereabouts of Telemachus’ father, for instance, or provided some strategic advice 
about the battles he faced, the instant gratification experienced by Telemachus would 
have no doubt been welcome, but in the long run would have been pedagogically 
unsound.450 In addition to missing out on valuable learning experiences, and the 
knowledge -  propositional and otherwise -  which came from these, Telemachus would 
have had little opportunity to develop his own epistemic virtues, had an over-protective 
Athene used her divine powers simply to give him the knowledge he sought, by 
straightforward testimonial means. We see a more prosaic re-statement of this 
principle in Rousseau’s Emile, in the vignette of the broken window.
He breaks the windows of his room; let the wind blow upon him night and day, and 
do not be afraid of his catching cold; it is better to catch cold than to be reckless.451
Environmental feedback from brute reality sometimes provides a learning experience 
of greater vividness -  in this case about actions and consequences -  than the teacher 
can supply. By breaking a window and consequently feeling the cold, Emile leams a 
more valuable lesson than could have been provided by a highly interventionist 
instructor.
Telos and Skopos: Different Ways of Viewing Success
Mortal teachers have neither the distant perspective from Mount Olympus, nor 
Rousseau’s class of one individual, to enable the long-term epistemic flourishing of 
students to be reliably predicted and advanced. Because of this, there can be a 
tendency to focus on short-term epistemic goals. This pedagogical myopia leads to a 
concentration, at best, on the zone of proximal development (to borrow Lev Vygotsky’s 
term), with a blind-spot where a consideration of the student’s zone of distal
449 ib id.
450 Brenda Whitney speculates amusingly about what the student Telemachus might write on his end-of- 
course evaluation form. She suggests that this might be a complaint about his struggles to learn what 
Athene, with her divine powers, could have simply told him. Brenda Whitney (2004) ‘Mentors: 
benevolent fools or goddesses of power?’ Critical Quarterly, vol.46, no.3.
451 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) Emile [tr. Barbara Foxley] Project Gutenberg eBook.
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development might be. In paying inordinate attention to the immediate goals -  the 
skopoi -  we sometimes sacrifice the development of long-term, stable, epistemic 
dispositions in our students. This short-termist tendency has infected other areas of 
intellectual life too. For example, many scientists are expressing unease at having to 
write at length about ‘impact’ on funding applications, since the practical uses of their 
work may not emerge for thirty years or more.452 Likewise, our pedagogical work may 
not bear fruit for decades. Ironically, the more pedagogically ‘skilful’ we become 
(defined in terms of ensuring our students’ success in attaining the immediate learning 
outcomes), the less likely it may be that our students will approach the telos of 
becoming epistemically virtuous.
In discussing the virtues generally, rather than only those pertinent to education, Julia 
Annas advocates the Stoic analysis, in which the success of an action is indexed to how 
it contributes to achieving the overall goal -  the telos -  rather than whether or not it hits 
the immediate target -  the skopos. It is in achieving the former that the action is to be 
classed as a success -  a katorthoma.m  It can be seen that this point of view represents 
a major divergence from the pervasive technicist vision of the present day, which 
regards effective education as the efficient hitting of pre-determined learning targets.
To evaluate the epistemic agents under an alternative, virtuous rubric, it would not be 
the immediate consequences for the learner we would examine, but their long-term 
virtuous motivation and his continued engagement with knowledge.
This is not to elevate merely good intentions as the sole measure of achievement, 
however. As we saw earlier, Zagzebski defines ‘virtue’ as a success term (p.202), and 
in this particular respect, Annas too aligns her view with Aristotle’s notion of the 
virtuous person as successful (katorthotikos) and also with ‘the Stoics, who call a 
virtuous action as performed by a virtuous person a success (katorthoma)’ 454 We note 
that ‘successful’ learning by itself is not enough; there are also both Stoic and 
Aristotelian requirements that the learner be sincerely motivated. So as well as 
defining virtue as a success term, we might also define ‘success’ as a virtue term. If, on 
the other hand, education is seen as just a short-term rite of passage, a successful transit
432 Geoff Watts, Moments o f  Genius, BBC Radio 4, 12 Dec 2010, 13.30.
433 Julia Annas (2003) ‘The structure of virtue’ in Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.) (2003) 
Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from  Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.25.
434 Annas (2003) op. cit., p.23.
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through which will lead the passenger to material success, then pleas for a lifelong 
sincere motivation towards authentic learning sound like baseless pieties.
Halbbildung and Bildung: Counterfeit and Genuine Learning
Peter Sloterdijk suggests that anything that makes no obvious contribution to their 
future prospects in the employment market causes ‘a priori stupefaction’455 amongst 
pupils. We might add that once education is associated too exclusively with the 
economic and social value of qualifications, the danger emerges of the individual 
making no genuine attempt to engage with the ideas being met, but only cynically 
collecting them for personal advantage. Friedrich Nietzsche calls this scheming 
individual the Bildungsphilister (‘educated Philistine’) 456 and Theodor Adomo 
develops this notion further, using the term Halbbildung {‘hdli-bildung’ or ‘pseudo­
edification’)457 to denote education construed by the individual as a set of investment 
strategies which buy advantage in the social hierarchy but do nothing to change his 
perspectives. Christopher Middleton writes of Nietzsche’s notion of Bildungsphilister 
as; ‘“Culture-Philistine” -  a central concept in N’s [sic] analysis of culture as an 
incrustation over a vacuum’ 458 For Adomo, this ‘incrustation’ is not a harmless 
decoration, for he:
,., claims that the half-education dispensed to the masses by educational institutions hinders the 
emancipation of the individual whilst simultaneously severing ties to tradition. Halbbildung 
acts as an agent o f conformity, and although it promises the expansion o f the mind through 
education, it does not fulfil its promise, leaving the individual in a state o f limbo between 
enlightenment and myth. ... Halbbildung is bound to the principle of exchange and is an 
integral part of the web of bourgeois delusion; it is a state in which the spirit has been taken 
hostage by the fetish character o f the commodity. Indeed, Bildung itself becomes a both a 
commodity and a financial investment into the financial future of the individual. ... [However] 
Adomo could not have foreseen the extent to which institutions o f higher learning have been 
forced in the last decades to bow to the pressures of the market place.459
These are strong words, but they alert us to some of the dangers of unvirtuous 
educational practices. A striking recent example I saw that illustrates this phenomenon 
was on the Luas (tram) in Dublin. A student sitting nearby was completing an exercise
455 Peter Sloterdijk (1987) Critique o f  Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press), 
p.xxix in David E. Cooper ‘Postmodernism’ in Randall Curren (ed.) (2003) A Companion to the 
Philosophy o f  Education (Oxford: Blackwell), p.207.
456 In a letter to Georg Brandes, Nietzsche (Feb 19, 1888) claims that ‘The word I coined, 
“Bildungsphilister”, survived the raging fluctuations o f the polemics and has entered everyday 
language’. From: Christopher Middleton (ed. & tr.) (1996) Selected Letters o f  Friedrich Nietzsche 
(Indianapolis: Hackett) pp,285-286.
57 Karen Bauer (1999) Adorno’s Nietzschean Narratives (Albany, NY: SUNY), pp .176-177.
458 Middleton (1996) op. cit., Footnote 135, p.287.
459 Bauer (1999) op. cit., p .176.
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in the writing of four-part harmony, while wearing headphones from which loud, 
aggressive music was spilling. So intrigued was I by this apparent alienation of the 
student from her own learning that I struck up a conversation with her. After realising 
that someone was speaking to her, and taking off her headphones, she confirmed that 
she was indeed working on a piece of four-part harmony and that the music she was 
listening to bore no relationship to the music she was writing. To arrange harmonies 
well involves the cultivation of an ‘inner ear’, such that the composer can ‘hear’ what is 
being written -  an almost impossible task while listening to something unrelated. But 
it is possible to treat the writing of four-part harmony (a standard component of the 
formation of a musician) as an externally-imposed technical exercise, and to carry it out 
algorithmically using prescribed rules. By mechanically applying a set of principles -  
such as organising contrary motion between the melody and bass, and avoiding 
consecutive fifths -  a passable attempt can be made at harmonic writing. The student 
may then indeed ‘pass’ this part of the course, but in a ‘schizophrenic’,460 alienated 
way, for she has not heard internally the sound of that which she claims to be her own 
composition. In terms of observable outcomes, all seems to be well -  and her final 
qualification may well buy advantage in the world -  but clearly all is not well when 
viewed through the lens of virtue theory.
There is plainly something vicious about Halbbildung and its product, the 
Bildungsphilister, so we might ask how Bildung can be reclaimed as part of virtue 
epistemology. The underlying notion of Bildung derives neither from Aristotelian nor 
from Stoic conceptions of epistemic virtue, but from the Romantics of the late 
eighteenth century (including Hegel, Schlegel, Schelling and Schliermacher) who saw 
the highest good as self-realization through individual metamorphosis. Nevertheless, 
all three construals (Aristotelian, Stoic and Romantic) have in common some degree of 
open-endedness about the outcome of the learning journey. The telos of Aristotelian 
virtue is not consequentialist in the sense of arriving at pre-determined ends, and 
neither can the Romantic ideal of the individual making his own destiny be so 
characterised. Nevertheless, they both embody a notion of flourishing: the Aristotelian 
conception being along lines determined by our nature as human beings and the 
Romantic version being towards an apotheosis of the individual, edified by culture. In 
both varieties, a striving for self-improvement is an indispensable feature of the 
definition.
460 Again, I intend here Michael Stocker’s use of this term, and not the medical version.
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However, motivations are not always clear, even to the subjects themselves, and it is 
likely that all but the most highly-principled learners will oscillate between Bildung and 
Halbbildung  and not be quite sure which path they are on at any given time. In the 
present climate of unsophisticated accountability,461 teachers may easily succumb to 
the temptation to inflict Halbbildung on learners rather than assist them in their 
Bildung, Faced with pressing external imperatives, the teacher’s sole aim may be to 
drive pupils towards high examination grades, whatever that takes. If, however, it is 
suspected that there is more to education than that which can easily be measured, the 
notion of Bildung, in common with virtue epistemology, invites a consideration of how 
students’ learning experiences can contribute to their intellectual flourishing 462 Instead 
of focussing narrowly on short-term skopic targets for the perceived present and 
predicted future needs of business and industry, it might be better to think in terms of 
an individual’s life-long learning, of which schooling is only a part.
There was a literary genre in the late eighteenth / nineteenth century, the 
Bildungsroman, a novel which sets out the adventures of a young protagonist and the 
learning which results therefrom. One famous example of this is Friedrich Schiller’s 
(1804) William Tell (a story which describes an interesting variant on target-setting). 
Another is Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Wilhelm M eister's Apprenticeship (1775), 
in which the hero, by means of travel and encounters with a wide variety of people, 
achieves personal growth and self-fulfilment -  a life of ‘flourishing’, we might say:
“I know not the worth of a kingdom”, answered Wilhelm; “but I know I have 
attained a happiness which 1 have not deserved, and which I would not change with 
anything in life.”
James Joyce’s A Portrait o f  the Artist as a  Young Man (1915) also belongs in this 
category. The Bildungsroman may provide us with a more nuanced, less short-sighted 
account of our part in the learning trajectories of our students. We are the characters 
who influence present-day Wilhelm Meisters or William Tells during the time that our
461 It might look intricate, and have statistical sophistication (involving perhaps such techniques as 
‘residual analysis’) but the notion of accountability within a narrow technicist framework is an 
impoverished and unsophisticated one. As Pddraig Hogan notes, ‘The chief remedy [for alleged 
underperformance] lies in restricting the discretion previously enjoyed by such persons or parties and in 
making them strictly accountable for outcomes that can readily be measured and compared to those 
achieved by other schools in an open competition for grades, pupils and resources.’ Padraig Hogan 
(2000) ‘Virtue, Vice and Vacancy in Educational Policy and Practice, British Journal o f  Education 
Studies, vol,8, no.4, pp.371-390, p.372
4821 develop this theme at greater length in Se£n Moran (2007) ‘What is science education for?’, School 
Science Review, 89, 326, pp.97-102.
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paths cross. Attractive as this notion of learning as a journey is, though, we are not 
merely fellow wanderers who randomly engage with learners at a particular way-point 
in their expeditions, but epistemic and moral agents with a particular role and its 
attendant responsibilities. Swallowing the Bildung notion may be a cure for 
pedagogical myopia, but the emphasis on the learners’ teloi could well have the 
consequence that the skopoi are neglected. To continue the ophthalmic metaphor, we 
might describe this as pedagogical hypermetropia.
Such uncorrected long-sightedness could be seen as a culpable flaw in a teacher, for it 
prevents us from seeing the more immediate features of the pedagogical setting which 
require attention. It is tempting to take an Aristotelian line on this dichotomy and 
suggest that there may be a happy medium between the excess of converging power 
that causes myopia and the deficit of converging power which leads to hypermetropia, 
but this mean would not in my view represent a virtuous compromise. There are times 
when the long view is the most useful perspective for the teacher to take on learning 
and other times when more detailed, close-up features need to seen with acuity. A 
certain nimbleness is required to be able to switch between the two ranges, so it is 
presbyopia which is the impairment to be ameliorated. Such an inability to 
accommodate one’s view to that which the situation demands is likely to lead to 
pedagogical action which is less than admirable, for it is based on an unvirtuous 
appraisal of the context, corresponding either to short-sightedness or to long­
sightedness.463
Virtuous Responses to Aporias
One crucial difference between teacherly practice which tends towards Bildung and 
that which leads to Halbbildung is how the teacher responds to the learner who has 
reached an aporia by holding propositions both that p  AND that ~p. His having 
seemingly paradoxical ‘epistemic property rights’ to such a pair of incompossible 
propositions arises because the rights in question flow from two different origins -  one 
externalist in nature and the other internalist. The externalist view is that ‘if one relies 
on what is, in point of fact a (sufficiently) reliable process, one is entitled (hence, has
483 Myopia is shortsightedness; hypermetropia is longsightness; presbyopia is an inability to 
accommodate the lens of the eye to different distances.
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the right) to accept its deliverances’.464 Against this, according to Fred Dretske, is the 
internalist stance that one is ‘justified in rejecting [these same deliverances]’. This 
justified rejection originates in reasons to be found in the ‘cognitive repertoire’465 of the 
agent.
We see this clash of rights most clearly in the classroom situation in which the learner 
is entitled to accept the prepositional deliverances of the teacher (who is ‘delivering the 
curriculum’, perhaps) while simultaneously rejecting these same propositions for 
reasons manifest in his own cognitive repertoire. If the teacher is in point of fact 
reliable in giving testimony about matters such as p  (whether the student knows this or 
not) then he is entitled to accept and own p  on the strength of her testimony, while 
simultaneously holding belief on the basis of his own intemally-available 
misgivings about p. My earlier account of a pupil coming to believe BOTH that for a 
pendulum there is a relationship between period, T, and angle, 0, AND that there is no 
such relationship, is a case in point (p. 177). This seems to me to be an unstable 
position. The learner needs to come down on one side or the other to restore epistemic 
equilibrium, for if he does not, he is on the road to becoming a Bildungsphilister. Even 
if he does come down on the correct side, this could still be for non-epistemic reasons 
and hence intellectually remiss:
She might have prudential or religious reasons for accepting P as true (e.g., he will 
skin me alive if I don’t believe it) that are quite independent of the truth of P. If 
these reasons are strong enough, they might give one a right -  religious or 
prudential as the case may [sic] -  to believe. 66
Although these cannot be considered as epistemic entitlements, they still seem to have 
some purchase in the learning situation. Reasons for holding particular beliefs which 
are purely (say) prudential467 do not display epistemic virtue, but the learner who holds 
these beliefs may nevertheless be seen as being entitled to them, if we follow through 
Dretske’s analysis to the educational context. So, on this account, a learner believing 
something for examination purposes only, without incorporating it into his web of 
beliefs, is acting within his rights. If we are to maintain a virtue-epistemic orientation 
however, the absence of intellectual rights to the proposition in question disbars the
464 Fred Dretske (2000) ‘Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?’ Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol.LX, no.3, pp.591-606, p.595.
465 By this, I take it that Dretske means that the reasons are accessible to the agent.
466 Dretske (2000) op. cit., p.594.
487 In the sense o f  self-serving; in this case, prompted not by love of learning but by fear of failure.
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putative knower from such a property claim.468 Here we might take issue with Dretske 
and deny his assertion that the learner’s doxastic performance in this prudentially- 
motivated scenario is a rightful one (or an ‘apt’ one, in Sosa’s sense) and thus 
characterise it instead as ‘inapt’: an occasion of Halbbildung. I earlier described such 
apparent learning as ‘Vicious Acceptance’ (p. 115). In the absence of either epistemic 
entitlement or justification, a prudential claim will not do, since we are seeking an 
attribution of knowledge and by its very nature this is an epistemic matter.
To return to the pendulum scenario. The gap between what actually connects the 
agent’s belief to the truth (the externalist right to believe; an epistemic property right 
that does not fall into abeyance through ignorance of this right) and what seems to him 
to be a justified belief (but which in point of fact is flawed) gives rise to the (p AND 
~p) aporia. The learner is virtuously holding a falsehood, which he maintains in 
parallel with the true proposition offered by the teacher, for prudential reasons. If the 
learner ignores this aporia and treats ‘school-knowledge’ and ‘personal-knowledge’ as 
domains which need not intersect, he is, as we have seen, undergoing the process of 
Halbbildung. In order to avoid contributing to this pseudo-edification, the teacher 
ought to have regard both to her own beliefs and to the need to demonstrate open- 
mindedness in respecting the student’s viewpoint. This latter is not to take a relativist 
position, but to recognise the necessity of addressing the learner’s ~p as a prelude to his 
virtuous acquisition of p. Now, the possibility arises for the student to entertain, and 
perhaps assent to, true proposition p , for epistemic and not merely prudential reasons. 
He can regard the teacher’s testimony, “that p", as an epistemic source or invitation, 
and not just an implied instruction: “It is in your interests to assent to my assertion ‘that
p ”\
Ultimately, entitlements to knowledge rest on trust. As we saw earlier, in a discussion 
of testimony (p.85), the default position is that we accept the deliverances of testimony 
at face value, unless there is reason to think otherwise -  an example of Zagzebski’s 
virtue of ‘proper trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise ...’ (VOM, p.319). 
Even if there is a discrepancy, the student ought to make the attempt to ameliorate it:
468 This is not of course a legal construal of intellectual property rights: the learner need not have
developed the beliefs in question, but he ought to have enaged with them virtuously,
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We must apply a principle of charity (or some similar interpretive maxim) in interpreting the 
speech of others ... so that agreement is maximized or optimized amongst us and them. We 
must, that is, find their expressed beliefs mostly correct by our lights.4*
As teachers, we should try to ‘think alongside’ our students to see why they believe that 
~p, whenp  is in fact the case (so we, from our better-informed, more authoritative, 
position, believe). This willingness to entertain an opposing point of view may even on 
occasion cause us to revise our own belief-set. Although this temporary role-exchange 
may happen more frequently at third or fourth level, it is still important for pedagogical 
purposes at all levels of education that the learners’ viewpoints are honoured, unless we 
claim omniscience. As John Stuart Mill famously puts it:
To refuse a hearing to an opinion because they are sure that it is false is to assume that their 
certainty is the same as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of 
infallibility.470
Mill goes beyond merely arguing for what we might term ‘epistemic humility’, 
however. He feels that the clash of opposing opinions is vital for learning, for, ‘Both 
teachers and learners go to sleep at their post as soon as there is no enemy in the 
field’,471 He berates the person who contents himself with ‘cram’ and, in a gesture to 
the scholastic disputations of mediaeval times, recommends that ‘... if opponents of all- 
important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them and supply them with 
the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil’s advocate can conjure up’472 
This last injunction applies only to ‘moral and human’ topics. Moreover, such 
disputation is aimed at ‘real understanding’ rather than knowledge simpliciter, so we 
ought not to take Mill’s prescription to apply in every case of teaching and learning. 
Notwithstanding the dangers of sleeping at the post in the absence of disputation, it 
would also become tiresome to put every proposition p  to the test by pitting it against 
Furthermore, this can create the illusion that p  and ~p are worthy adversaries, even 
when they are not. We sometimes see examples of this phenomenon in the epistemic 
activities of the mass media.
For instance, former UK Ambassador to the United Nations Sir Crispin Tickell berates 
BBC environmental analyst Roger Harrabin for the BBC’s policy of ‘balance’ over
^ C o a d y  (1992) op. cit., p. 157. Here he is summing up some of Donald Davidson’s thoughts on the 
matter, drawn from a number o f  works, both earlier and later.
4,0 Jo in  Stuart Mill (1859) On Liberty (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974) p.77 [Italics in original]
471 Will (1859) op. cit., p .105.
472 Will (1859) op. cit., p.99.
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issues such as climate change.47’ The BBC, claims Tickell, were “guilty” of 
inappropriate even-handedness, since “97%” of scientists accepted theories of climate 
change, while a mere “3%” did not. The reporting of minority contrarian views thus 
distorts audience perceptions, since providing equal air-time in the interests of balance 
implies an unfounded parity of esteem. Even if the riposte to the eccentric view during 
these interviews is robust, the allocation of a time-allowance for p  and ~p as if their 
credibility-ratio was 50:50 gives the eccentric view undue prominence, and may have 
the effect of injudiciously promoting the testimony of those with what Locke calls ‘an 
interest’:474 the fossil fuel industry in this case, according to Tickell.
In more extreme cases, the two sides might not even share the same fundamental 
paradigm. I have met this phenomenon while teaching science in Belfast, when some 
students refused to acknowledge generally-accepted Uranium-235 half-life evidence for 
the age of the Earth, since this clashes with the pronouncement of Archbishop Ussher 
of Armagh that the Earth was formed in 4004 BC, as indicated by his analysis of 
biblical genealogies. The scientific paradigm is thus rejected by a student of A-level 
physics, who claims that God has tweaked radioactive decay curves and put fossils into 
position to test our faith 475 As a teacher, one could engage in a debate at this point or, 
for the sake of pedagogical pace (and peace), suggest that the two versions are merely 
different narratives and as long as each is confined to its own domain they need not 
clash. Thus, in a science examination, it would be prudent to use scientific theory 
rather than biblical exegesis to answer scientific questions. One experiences some 
disquiet in taking this way out, however, and the feeling that endorsing such a lack of 
intellectual integration is an occasion of Halbbildung. Indeed A.C. Grayling, in a live 
discussion immediately following Martin Rees’ 2010 Reith Lecture,476 asserts that in 
such cases, “One can’t really stand on the sidelines”. He goes on: “[Whilst] one always 
applauds people who are conciliatory and eirenic as you are in these matters, surely 
there is a line that can’t be crossed there.” Rees concedes that he, in common with 
other astronomers, would draw the line at creationism, and I take it that he has in mind 
such naïve variants as Ussher’s.
473 Roger Harrabin (2010) Uncertain Climate, Mon 30 Aug 2010, 21:30, BBC Radio 4, 198m, Long 
Wave.
474 Locke, Essay, bk.IV, ch.XVI, §11.
4751 discuss this in Seän Moran (2007) op. cit., pp.97-102
476 Martin Rees (2010) ‘What we’ll never know’, Reith Lecture, BBC Radio 4, 198m Long Wave, 15 
June 2010.
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On the other hand, doxastic coherence and integration are not absolute requirements, 
and we can accommodate scientific and pre-scientific beliefs quite comfortably even 
when they might seem to clash. After learning about the heliocentric solar system, for 
example, we all continue to use the terms ‘sunset’ and ‘sunrise’, for there is no need to 
exorcise these misconceptions and insist pedantically on ‘earthspin’ instead. The 
virtuous teacher can thus exercise some phronesis in deciding which alternative 
frameworks to challenge and which to leave alone. If she does decide to challenge the 
students, by direct or extended testimony, there is always the possibility of an epiphany 
and what we might term a ‘recantation’. I remember a pupil who suddenly realised, 
while we were watching and discussing a video about the solar system, that the blue 
sky above us is not solid, so she blurted out this revelation excitedly to the rest of the 
class. This could not have been the first time that she had seen footage of the Earth 
from space, but it suddenly made sense to her in the context of our classroom dialogue. 
To their credit, her classmates refrained from any mockery.
Palinodes: Statements of Belief-Change
The notion of recanting is vividly illustrated in Plato’s Phcedrus, in the form of a 
palinode.477 The dramatic vignette, depicting an episode of belief-revision, involves 
Socrates acting on a warning from his daimonion that harm will befall him if he does 
not recant and make atonement for his earlier blasphemous speech about Eros.
Socrates is accused of making both factual and religious transgressions. Both errors, as 
we remember Murdoch pointing out (p.44), can be taken as examples of hamartano 
(which means, inter alia, to ‘make a mistake, or ... do wrong or sin’) 478 In recanting 
and repenting of both types of ‘error’ we acknowledge our former separation from, and 
assert a closer connection with, the truth or the good. In overseeing this belief-revision, 
the teacher’s role could well be one guided by sungndme, one meaning of which is 
‘sympathetic judgement’, and another is ‘pardon’.
We ought not to overplay the sin/pardon aspect of this analysis, though. Socrates’ 
sometimes brutal elenetic approach to dialogue often leads to his interlocutor 
experiencing the public embarrassment of being wrong (the etymology o f ‘elenchus’ 
deriving from ‘shame’, as we recall [p.70]) and this is not something we ought
477 The etymology o f the word is instructive: ‘Palm ’ means ‘again’ (as in palindrome) and an ‘ode’ is a 
song or lyrical verse. So giving a palinode, like recanting, involves ‘singing again’.
478 Iris Murdoch (1992) Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Penguin) p.99.
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routinely to inflict on the learner in typical contexts. Nor ought the recanting be solely 
to avoid the threat of dire consequences, for this will encourage a prudential rather than 
an epistemic basis for professing beliefs, and he is once more on the road to 
Halbbildung. Socrates’ high-mindedness would not allow him to recant purely for 
prudential purposes, as the manner of his death attests, so in Phœdrus the daimonion's 
warning only acts as a spur to finding genuine epistemic reasons for his change of 
heart. We cannot always rely on learners to be so principled, however (particularly in 
systems which foster habits of compliance), so the danger of elenchus being followed 
by only apparent recanting is significant.
Virtue ContextuaUsm and the Teacher’s Role
If the notion that the job of the teacher is to shame her students into compliance is 
largely rejected, for the reasons just given, then we need to suggest what can replace 
this role-description. This will still largely involve helping the student to learn, of 
course, rather than just engaging in a free-flowing dialogue. The leamer may 
occasionally act in such a way as to alleviate his teacher’s epistemic predicament -  for 
example, by giving advice on how to set up a FaceBook account -  but this is not 
usually seen as a central aim of formal education. It is normally the teacher who 
exhibits concern for the epistemic well-being of her pupils, not vice versa. In the 
FaceBook scenario, the teacher (rather than the pupil) is exhibiting the virtue of ‘proper 
trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise ...’ {VOM, p.3I9), but given the 
standard asymmetries of the classroom, this is commonly seen as a pupil-virtue. These 
considerations lead to a conjecture that the social roles of the epistemic agents involved'' 
will play a large part in determining the context for virtuous intellectual activity.
Sarah Wright has developed a type of methodological contextualism which she calls 
‘virtue contextualism’479 and which I next apply to teachers and learners. Her 
methodological contextualism asserts that what she terms our ‘interests’ determine the 
parameters of what can legitimately be asked. For example, when ‘doing history’, 
questions about the authenticity of a document are perfectly acceptable, but musing on 
the possibility of Bertrand Russell’s sceptical hypothesis ‘that the world was created
479 Sarah Wright (2010) 'Virtues, Social Roles and Contextualism’, Metaphilosophy, vol.42, nos.1-2, 
pp.95-114.
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five minutes ago’480 being true is not. This is not a legitimate question for a historian to 
entertain professionally, even in his most radical moments, for if he asks it he is no 
longer doing history. Given the difficulties of foundationalism, one has to begin with 
some basic assumptions and these will be determined by the particular methodological 
context in play. To Wright’s history example, one might add the unexamined starting 
point of theology that God exists, and the assumptions of educational theory that not 
only does knowledge exist, but students can also be helped to acquire it.
Wright’s methodological contextualism is more stable than other forms of 
contextualism (for example, her ‘attributor contextualism’) but it is not completely 
unaffected by changes in ‘conversation’. Wright gives the perspicuous example of the 
court, with its clear-cut rules of evidence and admissibility, accepting without cross- 
examination the word of someone running into the courtroom and shouting, “Fire!”
The epistemic methodology has changed: the game is no longer one of a sober 
weighing of legal evidence to evaluate how well it matches up to the standard of 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’, but is rather an instant assessing of a threat to personal 
safety. We also see what might be termed a ‘methodological switch’ such as this 
happening in the classroom context. What begins as an emulation of scientific 
methods, with the tyro investigators acting as young scientists, changes to one of 
passive acquiescence when the teacher puts a stop to the pupils’ conjectures and their 
experimental refutations and announces the ‘Correct Answer’, which they should learn 
for the examination. Judgements concerning whether or not the teacher was right to 
switch the epistemic rules of engagement in this way are themselves matters for 
epistemology: in particular, I suggest, they are concerns of other-regarding virtue 
epistemology.
That this sort of manoeuvre frequently happens in classes does not give it normative 
force: we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. Under a prudential remit, the teacher is 
entitled to make the switch, and the pupils are entitled to accept its deliverances for the 
sake of examination success. But, in virtue-epistemic terms, such an action might be 
regarded as vicious, robbing the learners of both the entitlement and the justification for 
accepting the ‘Correct Answer’. Our analysis need not be so stark, however. If the 
teacher has acted not with phronésis but merely with cleverness (Aristotle’s
480 Wright (2010) op. cit., p. 103.
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demotes481), then she can be judged negatively from a virtue-epistemic perspective for 
aiming at her learning target only if, in Aristotle’s phrase, ‘the mark be bad’, in which 
case ‘the cleverness is mere smartness’. On the other hand, ‘if the mark be noble, the 
cleverness is laudable’ 482 So what would constitute an epistemic ‘noble mark’ in this 
case? This might arise from the teacher’s realisation that the learners were unlikely to 
arrive at the target knowledge in a timely way, given their pre-existing epistemic webs 
and their stumbling doxastic efforts. She ought, however, to make some extrapolation 
from the empirical evidence which members of the class had amassed, to show that the 
proposition she offered was at least plausible. If doxastic bridges are built between at 
least some of the learners’ investigations and the putative knowledge being put 
forward, then the announcement of the ‘Correct Answer’ would not be epistemically 
vicious. On the other hand, merely dismissing cynically the empirical enquiries of the 
pupils and over-riding them with ‘approved knowledge’ would be epistemically 
vicious, since it both offends against testimonial justice and paints a picture of science 
as being not a mode of rational investigation, but rather a habit of acquiescence with 
authority. That teachers are often put in the position of simply depositing information 
into passive students (to use Friere’s ‘banking’ metaphor) is something of an 
indictment of the present system for its encouragement of epistemic vice and its 
marginalising of virtue.
More sensitive teachers, on short-circuiting enquiry in this way, would feel a twinge of 
psychic distress at their lack of other-regarding epistemic virtue, while others might not 
even recognise their actions as vicious, since on skopic prudential grounds they could 
be seen as admirable. We might suggest that the fault lies with assessment schemes, 
and that these should be tightened up to make sure that the student really did know ‘that 
p \  However, this would only lead to a sort of examination ‘arms-race’ in which 
examiners would devise ever more sophisticated ways of determining the candidates’ 
knowing, or otherwise, ‘thatp', while some cynical teachers and strategic learners 
would respond by adopting increasingly tortuous techniques for showing that they did 
apparently know ‘that p \  without going to the trouble of engaging with it in any deep 
way. The loser in such a process would be the learner who wanted sincerely to engage 
with the knowledge, to explore it and test it and make it his own. This could well be a 
less efficient and effective strategy than simply finding out what the examiner wanted
481 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk.VI, 1144a, 24-29.
482 Aristotle, NE, bk.VI, 1144a, 24-29.
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and giving it to her. So the methodological context here includes the examination hall, 
and even the thought of the examination hall, and powerfully encourages the learner to 
do what would be considered epistemically vicious in other contexts. Examination 
methods need not inevitably be vicious, but some undoubtedly are.
Wright’s modification of methodological contextualism to embrace the role of virtue -  
giving rise to the hybrid ‘virtue contextualism’ -  has something to offer when 
analysing the epistemic virtues suitable for teaching and learning. She asks us to 
consider the case of a ‘passive follower of a cult leader’.483 To be a ‘good’ cult 
follower is not good simpliciter, she argues, because the doxastic practices which are 
regarded highly by the cult -  such as ‘ignoring doubts from others and even doubting 
one’s own experiences’ 484 -  are not compatible with a good epistemic life. This 
analysis is congruent with my earlier description of the ‘new Athene problem’ (p.203) 
with the difference that the teacher’s intentions are probably more benign than the cult 
leader’s. Even so, the ‘good’ (that is, highly receptive) pupil may not be good 
simpliciter, for he too is acting in ways not compatible with a good epistemic life and is 
becoming habituated to a passive credulity.
The upshot of these discussions is that in considering the epistemic virtues in the 
context of education, we ought not reduce the teacher’s role in promoting the learner’s 
epistemic well-being to one of sincere and competent testimony to a passive recipient, 
for examination purposes, even though this is one perfectly acceptable intellectual 
virtue from Zagzebski’s list. To over-use such testifying would rob the learner of the 
opportunity to develop a range of intellectual virtues, in different contexts, which are 
both (i) constitutive of the epistemic good life and (ii) instrumental in the achievement 
of eudaimonia. It could also lead to the learner’s becoming a cynical, strategic 
Bildungsphilister, with two distinct doxastic webs: one populated by virtuously- 
acquired knowledge and some knowledge unavoidably taken on trust, the other filled 
with atoms of disconnected, inauthentic and unvirtuous ‘knowledge for academic 
purposes’.
Furthermore, while the teacher ought to have a stable disposition to advance both the 
knowledge and the intellectual virtues of the learners, this is neither the only social role
483 Wright (2010) op. cit., p. 109.
484 Wright (2010) ibid., p. 109.
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nor the only context to which the teacher should cleave. Although a full discussion of 
the moral virtues is outside the scope of the present work, there are clearly times when 
promoting the epistemic flourishing of the learner is trumped by more general ethical 
considerations. For example, although it may be epistemically virtuous to organise 
first-hand explorations of porcine eyeballs for a biology class, it would be morally 
vicious to inflict this experience on Muslim pupils, using non-halal pork offal. 
Switching between epistemic, moral and social roles in this way is a requirement of the 
virtuous teacher, and one which depends upon her having a finely-attuned, phronetic 
sensitivity to the learners and the competing desiderata. Here, I intend ‘moral’ to 
include not only proscriptions (such as on the eyeball dissections above) but also 
prescriptions for right action, and virtues directed towards a flourishing life.
Intellectual work is not, nor ought it be, conducted in a value-free vacuum; and in many 
cases the moral and the epistemic are aligned: it is good for the pupil, both morally and 
epistemically, to know most of the things which are on offer in educational institutions. 
But if it comes to a clash, the epistemic ought usually to give way to the moral. Having 
sounded this tocsin, I next develop Zagzebski’s work in new directions by discussing 
the intellectual virtues which are fitting dispositions for teachers to have.
Virtuous Roles of the Teacher
In examining the epistemic virtues which are pertinent to the teaching and learning 
situation, it is evident from the discussions above that there will be differences between 
their relative significance for the teacher and the taught. For example, the other- 
regarding epistemic virtues are more important for the teacher to exemplify than they 
are for the learner, if certain common-sense assumptions about testimony and 
classroom asymmetries are held.
On my analysis, the teacher’s intellectual virtues are important in three distinct yet 
related ways: viewing her as (1) a knower, (2) an other-regarding epistemic agent and 
(3) an exemplar of intellectual virtue. All three of these personce potentially enhance 
the prospects of the learner who interacts with them in acquiring knowledge, but there 
is also a fourth responsibility for virtuous teacher: (4) to gesture towards the limits of 
knowledge. I shall consider these in turn.
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First, if the teacher is herself a ‘good’ epistemic agent, she is prima facie well 
equipped to further the intellectual journeys of her students. In being animated by the 
epistemic virtues as part of her own continuing intellectual formation, she has not only 
acquired a web of propositions, together with suitably coherent interlinking and 
adequate tethering (both positive and counterfactual), but has also further entrenched 
these virtues by habituation. Being equipped thus with both intellectual virtue and 
knowledge is a necessary but not sufficient condition for her to advance optimally the 
knowledge-acquisition projects of her students, for it only gives her the potential to 
contribute to their projects. This virtuous intellectual investment is readily cashed in 
pedagogically, however. As David Carr puts it:
... it is not just that well-read and culturally literate teachers are invariably more interesting 
teachers ... but that such broader wisdom and understanding [leads to] ... correspondingly 
enhanced interpersonal capacities.485
Written into the idea of cultural literacy, being well-read and, particularly, having 
‘wisdom’ and ‘understanding’, is the proviso that the development of this desired state 
is, and continues to be, intellectually virtuous. If this is not the case for a particular 
teacher, then Dickens’ warning in Hard Times ought to be heeded:
He had worked his stony way into Her Majesty’s most Honourable Privy Council’s Schedule B, 
and had taken the bloom off the higher branches of mathematics and physical science, French, 
German, Latin, and Greek. He knew all about all the Water Sheds of all the world (whatever 
they are), and all the histories of all the peoples, and all the names of all the rivers and 
mountains, and all the productions, manners, and customs of all the countries, and all their 
boundaries and bearings on the two and thirty points o f the compass. Ah, rather overdone, 
M’Choakumchild. If he had only learnt a little less, how infinitely better he might have taught 
much more!
On the other hand, if the teacher has acted from intellectual virtue to equip herself with 
wide-ranging knowledge, the picture is rosier, but there is still a need to pay attention 
to the epistemic predicaments of her students and not merely download all of this 
ethically-sourced knowledge uninvited. For this valuable pedagogical potential to be 
doxastically active with respect to the learners, some alignment must exist between her 
project and theirs. This leads to a second way in which the intellectual virtues of the 
teacher are important: her other-regarding epistemic virtues.
1. Teacher as Knower
485 David Carr (2007) ‘Character in Teaching’, British Journal o f  Educational Studies, vol.55, no.4, 
p.386.
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As we saw earlier, (p. 122) Jason Kawall places much emphasis on truth-telling as an 
other-regarding epistemic virtue. This is undoubtedly an important part of teaching, 
but we know in the light of much previous discussion that seeing clear testimony 
simpliciter as a reliable way of enhancing the epistemic position of students is a little 
naïve. I have already challenged Kawall’s view that the epistemology of teaching 
reduces to the question: ‘How can an agent best transmit information and knowledge to 
others in her epistemic community?’,486 and have suggested that teachers are better 
conceptualised normatively as benevolent epistemic agents who are motivated to 
enhance the knowledge webs of learners by whatever means seem to be both virtuous 
and effective. Even if these means turn out to be straightforward testimony, we still 
ought to deploy what Henri Bergson terms ‘ tact de la vérité pratique,487 in order to 
‘tune in’ to what our students need from us at that moment -  whether they know it or 
not -  and to provide it obligingly and virtuously.
We use sympathetic judgement and understanding of our interlocutor (Aristotle’s 
sungnômë and sunesism ) to ‘think[s] with the other and undergoes] the situation with 
him’ .-489 In doing so, our testimonial interventions are more likely to help the learner 
on his way. Martin Buber uses the Latin phrase ‘ imitatio dei absconditi sed non 
ignoti ',490 in this regard, to suggest the teacher’s freely giving of an unbidden service. 
The teacher offers a pedagogical relationship to the pupil, even though he may not be 
aware that this offer has been made. The relationship is initially unbalanced, in that the 
teacher ‘experiences the pupil’s being educated, but the pupil cannot experience the 
educating of the educator’. Moreover, once the pupil fully takes on board the offered 
perspective, the teacher’s work is at an end: ‘In the moment when the pupil is able to 
throw himself across and experience from over there, the educative process would be 
burst asunder, or change into friendship.’ I addressed these aspects of teacherly virtue 
at greater length in the earlier chapter on ‘Other-regarding Epistemic Virtue’.
2. Teacher as Bearer of Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtue
486 Kawall (2004) op. cit., p.271.
487 ‘Tactfulness in practical truth.’ From a speech at the Sorbonne prize-giving of 1895 (in Hans-Georg 
Gadaitier (1975) op. cit., p. 25.
488 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk.6, ch. 11.
489 Gadamer (1975) op. cit., p.288.
490 ‘la imitation of a God hidden but not unknown.’ Martin Buber (1947) Between Man and Man 
(London: Routledge Classics, 2002) All Buber quotations here are from p. 119.
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The third mode by which the teacher may act from intellectual virtue to enhance both 
the knowledge and virtue of her students is by behaving as an exemplar. This is a 
particularly interesting area, so I develop this theme at some length. Linda Zagzebski 
has recently described a version of exemplarist virtue theory which treats of the moral 
virtues.491 Given her interest in the intellectual virtues and her project to incorporate 
these into the moral virtues492, it is likely that she will eventually bring the intellectual 
virtues under this exemplarist theory umbrella. She has already departed from Aristotle 
in arguing that the intellectual virtues are developed by imitation, habituation and the 
overcoming of akrasia, and not by direct teaching,493 so a developing of this theme of 
imitation, by way of considering epistemic exemplars, is probable in her future 
writings. In the meantime, I sketch out what the notion of an intellectual exemplar 
might be, and how teachers can act as exemplars in ways that are helpful to the learner.
Zagzebski uses the Putnam-Kripke theory of direct reference to ground her exemplarist 
ethics model, so a brief excursus through this is in order. According to the Putnam- 
Kripke thesis, references to natural kinds such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’ can be fixed by 
ostensión without knowing the nature of the kinds to which they refer. As Putnam has 
it: ‘The extension of our terms depends upon the actual nature of the particular things 
that serve as paradigms, and this actual nature is not, in general, fully known to the 
speaker\ 494 Nevertheless, Kripke maintains that ‘natural-kind words are rigid 
designators’,495 so the ostensive fixing enables the word ‘water’ to refer to the same 
kind, both before and after the empirical investigations which yielded the identity of 
‘water’ and ‘H2O’. This attaching of a designator to that designated is a community 
affair. Putnam asserts that ‘the extension of a term is not fixed by a concept that the 
individual speaker has in his head’ and that there is a ‘division of linguistic labor’,496 in 
which we ‘can rely on a special subclass of speakers’ for recognising whether or not a 
particular putative instantiation genuinely falls within such an extension. So, we can 
all point out exemplars of gold and water, but only certain specialists have the ability
3. Teacher as Epistemic Exemplar
491 Linda Zagzebski (2010) ‘Exemplarist Virtue Theory’, Metaphilosophy, vo!.41, nos.1-2, pp.41-57.
492 Most prominently in Linda Zagzebski (1996) Virtues o f  the Mind.
493 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p. 155.
494 Hilary Putnam (1973) ‘Meaning and Reference’ Reprinted in Louis Pojman (ed.) (2001) Classics o f  
Philosophy: Volume HI, The Twentieth Centmy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.314 [Emphasis 
added].
495 ibid., p .314.
496 ibid, p .3 11.
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and apparatus to determine whether the gold in the Golden Temple of Amritsar is pure 
Au, or if the watery liquid in the ‘nectar pool’ which surrounds it, is actually H2O. We 
non-specialists can sometimes be fooled (by iron pyrites [FeS2] -  fool’s gold -  for 
instance) but we cannot all be fooled all of the time, for if all the gold were to be not 
Au but FeS2, the designator ‘Gold’ would, by communal consent, refer to what we used 
to call Iron Pyrites. I shall come back to this latter point after examining what use 
Zagzebski makes of the Putnam-Kripke theory.
Zagzebski’s main claim in this respect is that we can identify a ‘good person’ without 
having a full definition of what the term means: ‘Picking out exemplars can fix the 
reference of the term “good person” without the use of descriptive concepts’.497 She 
further claims that we can all successfully use the term as long as there are some people 
in our community with the ability to identify exemplars. Our use of the designator 
‘good person’ is one of approbation and is, she proposes, prompted by our admiration 
for the person in question. This admiration is of a pre-theoretical nature, relying on 
narratives and parables that prime us to recognise those whose goodness makes them 
fitting subjects for our admiration and emulation. Just as in my fool’s gold example, 
however, we can be wrong about this. If everyone uses the term ‘gold’ for iron pyrites, 
then this becomes the designator for that particular natural kind. Similarly, if everyone 
uses the phrase ‘good teacher’ exclusively for those who achieve high examination 
results from their pupils, then ‘good teacher’ and ‘teacher whose pupils do well in 
exams’ become co-extensive. Zagzebski too recognises this fallibility (not specifically 
vis-à-vis teachers), but she suggests that ‘our emotion of admiration is generally 
trustworthy’.498
My concern here, though, is not the moral exemplars discussed by Zagzebski but their 
intellectual counterparts. I wish to know if the notion of a paradigmatically good -  
hence admirable and imitation-worthy — epistemic agent is a plausible parallel to the 
paradigmatically good moral agent. If this is the case, then the teacher ought to be such 
an exemplar, in order that students might become intellectually virtuous by imitating 
her epistemic practices. This will be a gradual process, but, according to Zagzebski in 
an earlier work, it can be considered virtue-driven from the beginning: ‘... even young 
children can perform acts of intellectual virtue before they are old enough to acquire
497 Linda Zagzebski (2010) ‘Exemplarist Virtue Theory’, Metaphilosophy, vol.41, nos.1-2, p.54,
498Zagzebski (2010) op. cit., p.54.
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the intellectual virtues. ... [a]s long as they are old enough to imitate the behavior of
, 400virtuous persons .
What seem to be missing from the parallel case, though, are the narratives and parables 
that ground the learner’s admiration. For all our moral stories about the Good 
Samaritan, Florence Nightingale, Gandhi et al., there are few epistemic counterparts. It 
is difficult even to think what the equivalent designator might be for the epistemic 
‘Good Person’: ‘Scholar?’ ‘Intellectual?’ ‘Thinker?’ ‘Enquirer?’ Granted, some 
scientists have been cited as exemplars, but the focus tends not to be on their careful 
scholarship or epiphanic insight but on some irrelevant attribute. We think perhaps of 
cosmologist Stephen Hawking’s motor neuron disease or game theorist John Forbes 
Nash’s paranoid schizophrenia.500 Both of these scholars may be admirable, but they 
are hardly imitable, save as moral exemplars of triumph over adversity by tenacity. 
Their eponymous discoveries o f ‘Hawking radiation’ and the ‘Nash equilibrium’ pale 
into insignificance in the popular mind, when compared with the more visible trappings 
of motorised wheel-chair, voice-synthesizer or eccentric behaviour. Missing from 
popular culture are narratives and parables with an epistemic rather than a moral arc.
To be sure, in very specific fields, there is much consensus about who the 
epistemically-admirable agents are. One could easily draw up lists for ‘Virtue 
Epistemology’ or for ‘Virtue Ethics Applied to Education’, for example. But one needs 
to be personally engaged in the field in question, or in a close cognate, in order to be 
able to make these judgements: so the beginning student has to take much on trust.
Recognition of the teacher qua epistemic exemplar is not, I suggest, a one-step process. 
The best we can hope for is that the learner first recognises the teacher as a good person 
and then emulates some of her attributes and behaviours, including the epistemic class 
of these. Conversely, if the teacher is seen not as morally admirable but as, say, 
despicable, any exemplary epistemic behaviours may well be swamped by the learners’ 
distaste for the person exhibiting them and hence not emulated. It is a rare virtue on the 
part of a learner to be able to put aside any distasteful moral intuitions about his teacher 
and emulate her intellectual dispositions. This is an empirical claim rather than a 
statement of analytic necessity, and we can imagine some — perhaps the more mature -
499 Zagzebski, VOM, p.280.
500 Depicted by Russell Crowe (2001) in the film A Beautiful M ind
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learners being able to dissociate the moral and epistemic aspects of their teacher and 
model themselves on the latter. These will be few in number, I suspect.
A moral compass is acquired before an epistemic one, for, as we have seen, we have no 
choice but to take just about everything on trust in our early native-language-leaming 
years. Thus we initially possess little discrimination between reliable and unreliable 
sources of testimony. Even though an epistemic sensibility is eventually developed, 
our moral intuitions about persons still exert a powerful influence. Of the three key 
attributes which pupils value in a teacher, two can be considered moral and one 
epistemic. Decades of research on what pupils feel constitutes a ‘Good Teacher’ 
consistently reveals the same three dimensions: (i) The knack of keeping order (ii) 
Good interpersonal relations (iii) Ability to help pupils learn.501 Although there are 
undoubtedly interactions between the three, and too impermeable a division is thus 
untenable, we see that the first two are primarily in the moral sphere and the last in the 
epistemic. We do not have to draw on Maslow’s hierarchy of need to see that without 
good order and a congenial social environment, the more rarefied intellectual needs are 
unlikely to be fulfilled adequately. So, the exemplary teacher must be seen by learners 
as morally admirable -  at least with respect to her classroom conduct -  before learners 
will engage with her epistemically or see her as worthy of emulation as an intellectual 
exemplar.
Kai Horsthemke and Mike Kissak develop this theme further and show the importance 
of the ‘comportment’ of a teacher if she is to be an exemplar.502 1 take ‘comportment’ 
here to mean ‘manner’ or ‘bearing’. They use the German gerund Vorleben to indicate 
‘living one’s life as an example’.503 Horsthemke and Kissak suggest that the word 
contains some normative force, in that one’s ‘exemplification-in-conduct’ ought not 
only to be emulable but ought also to be worthy of emulation.504 This draws a 
distinction between Vorleben as a role-modelling with a moral purpose and role- 
modelling simpliciter, which is often popularly attributed to celebrities who ‘have been 
elevated to this status with sudden fame and fortune, without any kind of appropriate
501 See for example Jean Rudduck & Julia Flutter (2004) How to Improve your School: Giving Pupils a 
Voice (London: Continuum Books) pp.75-79.
502 Kai Horsthemke and Mike Kissak (2008) ‘ Vorleben: educational practice beyond prescription’, J. 
Curricufum Studies, vol.40, no.3, pp.277-288,
503 Since a gerund is a verbal noun, a near-equivalent in English would be, I suggest, ‘role-modelling’. 
We can refer to ‘the teacher’s virtuous role-modelling’ as if it were a noun, though her activity ‘she 
models’ is described by a verb.
504 Horsthemke and Kissak (2008) op. cit., p.280.
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training or instruction’.505 Vorleben is thus a useful shorthand for ‘worthy role- 
modelling’. Since an important purpose of education is some degree of learner 
autonomy, however (bearing in mind my earlier caveat that the ‘feral knower’ is in a 
sub-optimal position vis-à-vis knowledge [p.93]), this Vorleben is not intended to be 
copied holus bolus. We do not wish the learner to be a clone of ourself. In this regard, 
Horsthemke and Kissak use the term ‘ethical templates’506 to convey a notion of 
teachers as general exemplars of high standards of conduct, rather than models to be 
copied slavishly in specific details. In the doxastic realm, we might use the parallel 
designator ‘epistemic template’. By her engagement with knowledge, the teacher 
shows in a general, but only partially emulable, way, what a good scholar behaves like.
David Carr too feels that teachers ought to be role-models: ‘... teachers and (perhaps) 
religious ministers should be models or exemplars of good character for others -  rather 
than simply good technicians or crafts-persons’.507 Although he sees teachers primarily 
as moral exemplars, perhaps his point here can be extended to a notion of teachers as 
intellectual exemplars. Indeed, Carr mentions the desirability of teachers seeking the 
‘cultivation of habits of wide-ranging enquiry, and of reflection upon the potential of 
such enquiry for the development of others ...,508 This is a complex statement, 
touching on both self-regarding and other-regarding epistemic virtues, and it needs a 
little unpacking if it is to further our present concern regarding teacher-modelling of 
intellectual virtue. Under an Aristotelian scheme, the virtues (including the £habit[s] of 
wide-ranging enquiry’) are able both to contribute to the agent’s eudaimonia, and to be 
constitutive of eudaimonia. The virtues lead to the agent’s flourishing and are 
themselves elements of such flourishing. So the teacher, in common with any other 
virtuous person, ought to cultivate the virtues (moral and intellectual) because doing so 
is both a component of, and a path towards, eudaimonia However, the teacher, by dint 
of her calling, also has a particular other-regarding role, so we can variously 
characterise the cultivation of intellectual virtue in her case as (i) an end in itself, (ii) a 
route to her own eudaimonia (iii) a model for the students of a virtuous epistemic agent 
and (iv) a necessary condition for developing intellectual virtue in others effectively. 
We see that (i) is for its own sake, (ii) is instrumental to the teacher’s flourishing, (iii)
505 ibid., p.280.
506 Hoisthemke and Kissak (2008) op. cit., p.281.
507 David Carr (2007) ‘Character in Teaching’, British Journal o f  Educational Studies, vol.55, no.4, 
p.382.
808 ibid ,p.382.
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is indirectly instrumental to the students’ flourishing and (iv) is directly instrumental to 
the students’ flourishing. By involving herself in virtuous ‘wide-ranging enquiry’, she 
is modelling what a good knower ought to be, as well as acquiring knowledge and 
cultivating her own intellectual virtue, which, after suitable reflection, she can put to 
good use in ‘the development of others’.509 Although the actions under (i) and (ii) do 
not directly concern the learner, they nevertheless constitute material for the field-work 
which he, qua informal classroom anthropologist, is undertaking with respect to his 
teacher’s comportment. It is here that performative contradictions between the 
espoused and the actual may be noticed by the watchful learner. For example, in a 
science lesson, the teacher who talks of a ‘fair test’ and ‘respect for the experimental 
evidence’ can be undermined in his eyes when she yields to the temptation to fudge the 
results of a laboratory demonstration to fit the textbook answer. The message which 
comes across loud and clear in this scenario is that the intellectual virtues are important 
neither for their own sake, nor for their contribution to knowledge or personal well­
being: what counts, despite the rhetoric and the elaborate scientific apparatus, is the 
‘Correct Answer’ in the book.
So, in addition to collecting informal field-data on the moral behaviour of the teacher, 
the student is also paying attention to her intellectual activities. Some of these latter 
behaviours are consciously enacted by the teacher, as when she make an ostentatious 
display of looking up a word in a dictionary or checking a relative atomic mass on a 
periodic table of the elements wall-chart -  facts of which she is actually already in 
possession. These would fall under category (iii) above, for her doxastic pantomime is 
purely for display purposes, is offered as a behaviour to emulate, and is hence 
indirectly instrumental in cultivating the virtues of her students. She shows visibly and 
humbly that we too, despite being authorities on our subject-specialisms, must still use 
trustworthy sources to check, confirm or acquire knowledge.
Other intellectual behaviours of the teacher are not consciously offered as exemplars of 
good doxastic practice, but they are nevertheless sometimes noted by the students.
They can see that we derive pleasure from intellectual engagement; that we become 
excited by knowledge; that knowledge-acquisition has both helped us to flourish and is 
also an important continuing part of that flourishing. These things are hard to fake, so 
perhaps the best way to appear to students to be a good intellectual is simply to be a
509 ibid. p.382
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good intellectual. There can be no contrivance here: who you are will shine through to 
the watchful eyes of the leamer-observers. Having said this, though, I repeat my earlier 
caveat that emulation is unlikely unless students first approve of the teacher’s acting in 
accordance with the moral virtues (p.224). An ‘untrustworthy, disrespectful, unfair, 
spiteful, indiscreet, lazy, bullying, humourless, charmless, poorly-motivated or self- 
obsessed’510 teacher -  to use Carr’s description of a teacher who is not ‘professionally 
commendable’ -  is also not likely to be an effective role-model for the intellectual 
virtues, even if she possesses a full and obvious complement of them.
These first three personce of teachers with respect to intellectual virtue are somewhat 
constraining (though not unvirtuously), if characterised as invitations or instructions to 
the learner to engage with the teacher as (i) knower, (ii) guide and (iii) exemplar. But, 
as we saw earlier, the telos of Aristotelian virtue is not consequentialist in that it does 
not blinker its bearer into obediently following a road leading to pre-determined ends 
(p.207). Similarly, neither is the Romantic ideal of the individual making his own 
destiny via Bildung one of safely staying on the Feldwege. The fourth and final 
intellectual persona of the teacher is thus more concerned to let the learner off the leash 
so that he can explore for himself the unknowns of the Holzwege.
4. Teacher as Mystery-Alerter
Cathleen Stutz and Susan Tauer describe the (university) teacher who awakens such a 
sensitivity towards mystery in her students as ‘exemplary’.511 They contrast the 
exemplary teacher with her ‘competent’ counterpart who merely helps her students to 
‘gain some intellectual skill, some level of proficiency in the subject’.512 By drawing 
the distinction in this way, however, there is a danger of equivocation over the word 
‘exemplary’, for now it is not clear whether the exemplary teacher is a model for other 
teachers to emulate (with respect to their orientating students towards mystery) or a 
worthy template for the students themselves (as in (3) above: Teacher as Epistemic 
Exemplar). Nevertheless, their description of an exemplary teacher at work is 
illuminating in a number of respects. They depict a vignette of a poetry lesson that 
involves both individual and choral readings and guidance from the teacher about some
510 Carr (2007) op. cit.,p.370.
511 Cathleen Stutz and Susan Tauer (2000) ‘The Awakening of Intellectual Virtue’, Boston University 
Journal o f  Education, vol. 182, no.2, p.37. They do not write from a virtue-epistemology perspective, 
and confine themselves largely to an analysis o f how university lecturers might act in exemplary ways.
512 Stutz and Tauer (2000) op. cit., p.41.
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of the technical features. The result of all of this prosaic preparatory work is claimed to 
be as follows:
Those concrete experiences will help a student know how to listen to Yeats’ Sailing to
Byzantium, but the more attentively students listen, the more they will perceive that there are
some mysteries in that poem, and in all poetry, that will not be revealed. When teachers can
help students develop some proficiency, see inherent mysteries within a discipline and commit
themselves to further study, those exemplary teachers have guided the students towards
wisdom. What may seem paradoxical is that wisdom, an intellectual virtue, is founded upon 
513mystery.
It seems to me that the ‘exemplary’ teacher here conforms to the first meaning above 
[(i) a model for other teachers], for she wishes to induce mystification in her students 
yet does not model bafflement herself. Indeed, in the vignette her teaching consists of 
displaying a secure -  we might say ‘non-baffled’ -  knowledge of the mechanics of the 
poem, by using such techniques as ‘pointing out the shifts in vowels and consonants’, 
rather than a Wittgensteinian passing over in silence of the things whereof she cannot 
speak. Notwithstanding this ambiguity, their endorsement of the fostering of an 
attunement to the unknown in students is a useful one in the light of our earlier 
discussion.
As well as travelling along the Feldwege defined by the teacher’s offered propositions, 
the students now also have the possibility of discovering for themselves that there are 
many other true propositions which she has not yet encountered. More significantly, 
they may also come to realise that some true propositions will remain forever out of 
reach and unarticulated, and that the very project of analysing a poem such as Sailing to 
Byzantium in terms of a series of propositions is radically unfinishable. The students 
are entertaining the possibility that a lengthy string of propositions (p \,p 2, ... p n) will, 
in some circumstances, always fall short of completeness and thus fail as satisfying 
knowledge. Not all knowledge can be expressed propositionally. This shortfall is 
particularly notable in the arts; even those whose practice demands codification in 
words. The poet Ted Hughes (1967) describes how, when he was a schoolboy, ‘I was 
plagued by the idea that I really had much better thoughts than I could ever get into 
words’.514 We might object here that both Wittgenstein’s private language argument515
513 Stutz & Tauer (2000) op. cit., p.41.
5!4 Gary Claxton (2000) ‘Tlie anatomy of intuition’ in Terry Atkinson & Gary Claxton (eds.) (2000) The 
Intuitive Practitioner (Buckingham: The Open University Press) p.46.
5,s Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) Philosophical Investigations [tr. GEM Anscombe, L953] Third Edition 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) §256, p.78.
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and Sapir-Whorf s516 characterisation of language as a mould that helps shape our 
thoughts, rather than a cloak which merely dresses them, show Hughes to be 
philosophically mistaken. Nevertheless, the intuition that there is something elusive 
about language and thought, and that there is work to be done when straying from the 
comfortable path, is a powerful one. The village technicist illusion that a set of 
learning outcomes can authentically capture the intellectual effort of learning in such a 
liminal area is also dispelled. Missing too from the typical targets of the educational 
technicist is the notion that the enjoyment of intellectual engagement is a respectable 
goal of education. We turn next to this idea, which appears somewhat radical when 
stated starkly even though it flows from the Aristotelian notion of the virtues in action 
as constitutive of eudaimonia.
Delight as a Mark of Virtue
One signature of virtuous activity is, according to Aristotle, delight, for: ‘The man who 
does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just 
who did not enjoy acting justly... ’ (p.61). The implications of a virtue approach to 
education are not without their difficulties in this respect, however. Indeed, even David 
Carr, who is usually sympathetic to such a general approach, counsels that, although 
they are good things, ‘... enjoyment, satisfaction and so on ... are only contingently 
related to learning outcomes [and] it is not at all clear how these might constitute 
educational aims of teaching’.517 Pace Carr, the further development and implications 
of virtue epistemology show that enjoyment can be an educational aim, for genuine 
knowledge can only be acquired virtuously, and a signature of virtuous action is 
delight. This conclusion ought to be tempered by two qualifications, however.
The first relates to the unarguable observation by Carr that ‘... parents would have 
cause to complain about any teacher who had made his or her pupils happy or confident 
without teaching them anything’.518 To accommodate this, we accept that 
‘happiness’519 is a necessary but not sufficient sign of virtuous learning. As an
516 Benjamin W horf (1956) Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press).
517 David Carr (2003) Making sense o f education: an introduction to the philosophy and theory o f  
education and teaching (Abingdon: RoutledgeFalmer) p. 114.
518 ibid., p.l 14.
5,91 use the scare quotes around ‘happiness’ to acknowledge that this need not indicate anything as 
strong as joy or euphoria. It is here as shorthand for something closer to Carr’s ‘enjoyment and 
satisfaction’.
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indicator of learning it would not be enough to satisfy those of a positivist cast, being 
elusive and unreliable, but the notion that it ought to be present at certain points in the 
virtuous learning process is an appealing one. We recognise in our own learning 
journeys those pleasurable moments of insight when a new path opens up to us. If we 
are well attuned to our students, we may see the gleam in the eyes of those who have 
now ‘got it’. Both the processes of learning and the products of learning (which, for 
the purposes of the present work, we take to be prepositional knowledge) can lead to 
these brief occasions of uplift.520 However, while pleasure ought to accompany 
virtuous learning, its presence is not a reliable signal that such learning has taken place: 
the glint in the student’s eye might have an entirely different cause. As Aristotle points 
out, a well-ordered affect in the intellectual sphere requires preparation, for, ‘.. .the soul 
of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble joy’.521 We 
note that this is noble joy, not ignoble hedonism. Before he reaches this state, the 
student may do the right thing intellectually, but only in a continent, joyless manner, 
rather than being due to an educated desire. The signs of pleasure we observe could 
thus originate from some less elevated source.
The second qualification involves counterposing the argument, to conclude, wrongly, 
that a lack of enjoyment indicates the absence of virtuous learning. In practice, we 
know that some students bring their personal problems with them into the classroom, 
such that any positive effects of an occasion of virtuous learning might well be 
swamped by their prevailing low mood. The student might view the classroom as a 
safe oasis of calm in the midst of a chaotic and harsh private life, and may well be able 
to learn virtuously but not show much by way of overt pleasure. Furthermore, it is 
unrealistic to expect learners to manifest continuous delight in their learning, for there
520 There are links here with Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s notion o f ‘flow’ experiences: ‘statefs] in which 
people are so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter; the experience itself is so 
enjoyable that people will do i t ,.. for the sheer sake of doing it.’ In the classroom we sometimes see 
pupils in this state, and we ourselves can experience flow in our teaching, which in turn draws pupils into 
becoming more engaged with their learning. I suggest that if our attunement is in good order, we can 
recognise our own state of pedagogical flow and its effects on our learners, and differentiate it from mere 
self-indulgentparrhesia. Although Csikszentmihalyi’s work is based on empirical psychology, he 
makes fleeting reference to the Nicomachean Ethics bk.I and bk.IX. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1991) 
Flow: The Psychology o f  Optimal Experience (paperback edition) (New York: HarperPerenial) p.4
521 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, bk.X, 1179b25 (Revised Oxford Translation). We should interpret 
this with a little caution, though. Book 10 goes against the grain o f the preceding books by placing the 
intellectual life above all others: ‘the life according to intellect is best and pleasantest, since intellect 
more than anything is man. His life, therefore is also the happiest’ (1178a6). But, in this book he is 
valonsing specifically the ‘contemplative activity’ of ‘those who know’, not the intellection o f ‘those 
who enquire’. (1177a22-27). Nevertheless, in the Aristotelian scheme, virtuous activity of any kind 
ought to bring enjoyment to the well-habituated person, so we can take his ‘noble joy’ to accompany 
cognitive activity other than the contemplation of eternal truths.
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is an ebb and flow to the process which will be mirrored in a changing affect. Times of 
elenchus, in particular, involve some degree of discomfort rather than joy: we think of 
Socrates’ metaphorical images of being stung by the torpedo fish,522 or being dealt a 
blow by a good boxer. 523 Moreover, our other-regarding pedagogical intentions may, 
indeed should, on occasions be teloic rather than skopic, so the doxastic pay-off, and 
the consequent pleasure, will only be manifested at some point in the future. The 
enjoyment is then an indirect aim, in the sense discussed earlier (p. 140).
A consideration of enjoyment, or the lack of it, also points the way, though, to a 
principled justification for attending to the skopoi -  a reason which is more worthy than 
one of a mere prudent response to the exigencies of short-range targets. We have seen 
that an absence of ‘happiness’ in the learners need not be unduly alarming to teachers, 
for it may be masked by low mood or may appear later when a particular pedagogical 
telos is reached. But a permanent lack of happiness, a pervasive low self-esteem and 
dissatisfaction with learning, will almost certainly have deleterious consequences for 
virtuous learning: a persistent negative affect will militate against the receptiveness and 
open-mindedness needed for such learning. Here, the well-attuned and other- 
regarding, epistemically virtuous teacher can intervene positively by having the 
learners tackle a small, easily-attained skopos. Thus, the learners achieve some limited 
epistemic target, experience the attendant feeling of uplift and have their faith restored 
in the pleasures of learning. Because the teacher has acted successfully in ways 
animated by other-regarding virtue, she too should experience some satisfaction.
This stratagem ought not to be overdone, however, or what I have termed the ‘new 
Athene problem’ (p.203) might arise. Some degree of instant doxastic gratification is 
needed from time to time, in order to keep learners’ spirits up, but a tolerance for 
deferred gratification in overcoming the various aporias that are part of significant 
learning is an important intellectual disposition to be cultivated. Joel Kupperman 
points out the dangers to the character-development of students when ‘teachers out of a 
misplaced kindness tried to make success easy and immediate for their students, and 
failure highly unlikely’.524 Even better than mere tolerance for deferred gratification 
would be nikhedonia: a pleasurable anticipation of future success. Thus the learner
522 Plato, Meno, 80.
523 Plato, Protagoras, 339e.
524 Joel J Kupperman (1999) ‘Virtues, Character and Moral Dispositions’, Jan Stuetel & David Carr 
(eds.) (1999) Virtue Ethics and Moral Education (London: Routledge)
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would not retreat from puzzlement, or demand an instant resolution of ‘p  or ~ p l \  but 
would engage virtuously with the recalcitrant ideas in a spirit of “Saper aude!” until the 
deserved moment of clarity came. In practice, this scenario, in its extended form, is 
more common in the postgraduate phase, but modest versions ought to be judiciously 
allowed at all stages of education, so that the virtues of epistemic courage and 
perseverance are cultivated in a process punctuated by delight.
Open-mindedness
‘[OJpen-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence’ appears on Zagzebski’s list 
of intellectual virtues (VOM., p.l 14), and ‘closed-mindedness’ is identified as one of the 
intellectual vices (VOM, p. 152). This is a particularly salient pair of attributes in the 
teaching and learning situation and I argue next that exemplifying the virtue and 
avoiding the vice is important to the teacher, both as a route to her own knowledge and 
also for the sake of Vorleben for her students.
If we now address the virtue, we may initially assume that exercising open-mindedness 
defeats a tendency to closed-mindedness and that this is necessarily an epistemic good. 
This assumption would be an over-simplification, however, for open-mindedness 
seems to be the kind of scalar attribute which permits of degrees characterised as 
excess, deficit and virtuous mean. One could be so open-minded that ‘one’s brains fall 
out’525: the excess named ‘credulity’.526 Conversely, one could be so lacking in open- 
mindedness that one’s disposition is better described as closed-minded, and this 
extreme deficit of open-mindedness could be labelled ‘corrosive dogmatism’. An 
Aristotelian mean between these extremes would be to instantiate the right degree of 
open-mindedness, in the right way and for the right reasons. This, it seems to me, is 
the disposition at which teachers ought to aim, both for their own epistemic well-being 
and for that of their students. Furthermore, the desirability of cultivating such a mean 
extends beyond the epistemic, for belief may issue in action and faulty beliefs may be 
the spur for actions which compromise the individual’s flourishing. For example, a 
belief that crystal healing has some merit beyond a mere placebo effect could cause an 
epistemic agent to place her faith in a gemstone rather than accept the need for more
525 This phrase is common in discussions of open-mindedness. Die earliest source I have found is Max 
Radin(1937) ‘On Legal Scholarship’, The Yale Law Journal, vol.46, no,7, pp.l 124-1141, p.1133. 
s26 Here ‘credulity’ is a vice, but Reid treats it as a virtue to be co-ordinated with ‘veracity’.
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robust medical intervention to treat a serious condition. In this case, her excessive 
open-mindedness towards the occult (involving too generous an appraisal of any 
evidence for healing, perhaps coupled with a closed-minded antipathy to scientific 
medicine) could be both epistemically and physiologically damaging. On the other 
hand, an unwillingness to entertain new ideas (especially those which clash with the 
agent’s pre-existing belief-sets: Socrates’ ‘provocatives’ which ‘issue in a contradictory
52? ■ •perception’ ) could also limit her well-being, by closing off the learning of new 
beliefs which might potentially have been the spur to some rewarding actions. Here, a 
deficit of open-mindedness has limited the eudaimomia of the agent, both constitutively 
and instrumentally, in that being able to apply the right degree of open-mindedness is a 
virtue and hence would have been rewarding both in itself and also in respect of the 
benefits to which it might have led.
Open-mindedness is, it seems to me, an attribute relevant chiefly to an epistemic 
agent’s attitude to testimony. To a first approximation, we are not typically open- 
minded about direct experience: we do not carefully weigh up the pros and cons of 
forming a perceptual belief but are forced to take doxastic short-cuts in the interests of 
epistemic economy. A naturalistic explanation for this tendency could be that those 
early humans of the Pleistocene era who rigorously evaluated any perceptual evidence 
indicating impending attack by a predator did not survive long enough to be our 
ancestors. We have thus inherited a propensity to believe what we seem to see and to 
act on it promptly if it represents a danger. On crossing the road, we do not feel a need 
to defuse sceptical arguments before getting out of the way of the tram that seems to be 
on a collision course with us. Thus, perceptual beliefs are largely non-voluntary and, 
since we have no choice about them, we can neither be credited with open-mindedness 
nor accused of closed-mindedness in acquiring them. Even so, they may well represent 
knowledge. However, I opened this paragraph with the delimiter ‘to a first 
approximation’, for it is clear that some less-threatening perceptual beliefs are filtered 
by previous experience and other beliefs, so thus have some degree of voluntariness. 
For instance, a connoisseur of Impressionist paintings could carefully form a belief 
about the authenticity of a newly-discovered work which was prima facie thought to be 
of that genre. This is a perceptual belief -  being based on what the expert sees -  but it 
is filtered by experience and not forced upon him in the same way as the early human 
having no choice about recognising and responding to the threat from a sabre-toothed
527 Plato, Republic, 523b-c.
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tiger. There is a problem in this analysis, though, in that equating open-mindedness 
with voluntarism conflates the intellect and the will. The difficulty can be overcome by 
considering what we might term first-order and second-order choices. We may choose 
to be open-minded in general, and entertain a number of competing points of view, 
while accepting that we have no control over certain specific beliefs (for example: 
Danger! Tiger!). Choice concerns only second-order dispositions, which, for minds 
like ours, will be over-ridden by more pressing, choice-free perceptual knowledge 
when the need arises.
Next, we shall explore further the nature of a virtuous, open-minded approach to 
testimony, including the apparent conflict between holding firm beliefs and being open- 
minded. Although this discussion is of key interest in the educational context, I deal 
first with the issues in general, before returning specifically to teaching and learning.
O u t earlier discussions of testimony used the vignette of the stranger asking a passer-by 
the way to Larissa as a paradigm case of testimony-giving (p.79). In the absence of 
signs to the contrary, the stranger assumes not only that the local person is competent to 
give directions but also that he is sincere in his intention to guide him to the best of his 
knowledge. Having no choice, the stranger acts on the basis of this testimony. This 
acceptance is based on the a posteriori default rule we met earlier (p.85):
If a speaker S asserts that p to the hearer H, under normal conditions, then it is
proper and correct for H to accept S’s assertion, unless H has special reason to
object.528
Its a posteriori nature is such that the phrases ‘normal conditions’ and ‘special reason to 
object’ only acquire meaning after s has built up experiences of cases saliently similar 
to the one under consideration. One has only to have had a few experiences such as 
being approached by a young man and told (wrongly) that, “The pyramids are shut 
today, but my shop is open”,529 to formulate by induction the informal general rule that 
being approached thus with unsolicited advice usually constitutes ‘special reason to 
object.’ Conversely, if one interrupts an older woman who appears to be shopping and 
asks her for directions, these conditions are normally congenial to truth-telling, for she
528 Uebel (2009) op. cit., p.5.
529 Tliis was written before the Egyptian demonstrations o f early 2011.
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is less likely to have a deceptive agenda (Locke’s ‘interest’530) and will typically 
default to sincere helpfulness.
Whether or not we accept the deliverances of testimony with respect to a particular 
utterance is, however, usually a matter of choice for the auditor. Unlike perceptual 
beliefs, any propositions offered via testimony which pose an unwanted challenge to 
our pre-existing belief-web, are capable of being screening out by epistemic agents 
such as us. Doing this leaves our web intact, but blocks the possibility of its being 
improved by means of virtuous belief-revision, and so may constitute the vice of 
closed-mindedness. As we have seen, though, open-mindedness can be overdone, and 
there is something of a clash between believing firmly and claiming to be open- 
minded: a clash we shall examine next.
Jonathan Adler explores this issue of an ostensible incompatibility between open- 
mindedness and the firm holding of beliefs. He quotes Peter Gardner’s example of ‘a 
teacher who affirms: “I am open-minded about whether racism is evil, but I believe it 
is’” .531 We might judge that in attempting to assert an intolerance towards intolerance, 
yet claiming to be open-minded, the speaker seems to be guilty of self-contradiction. 
This tension looks, on the face of it, to parallel Moore’s Paradox, notes Adler:
P, but I do not believe that P. e.g. It’s raining, but I do not believe that it’s 
raining.532
This paradox, I suggest, dissolves when rephrased as:
It could be the case that p, but I do not believe that p.
However, this has downgraded the statement’s doxastic status to one more akin to 
agnosticism rather than the all-out disbelief that Moore’s statement asserts: although 
the agent’s present stance is one of disbelief, this is not firmly held. Such a move 
would not satisfy Adler, for he denies that beliefs admit of degree and he thus requires 
an ‘all or nothing’ commitment to beliefs such as the evilness of racism. His key
530 Locke (1706) .Essay, bk.IV, ch.XVI, §11.
531 Peter Gardner (1993) in Jonathan Adler (2004) ‘Reconciling open-mindedness and belief, Theory 
and Research in Education, vol.2(2), pp. 127-142, p. 128.
532 Adler (2004) op. cit., p. 129.
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reason for the claim that ‘few of our beliefs are held as degrees of belief is that ‘it 
would introduce too much complexity for coherent thought’. This does not seem right. 
A web of beliefs would contain a large number of propositions, linked in complex ways 
and possessing variation in what we might call ‘tensile strength’. Under epistemic or 
situational stress, some beliefs might fail, while others would remain intact. For 
example, we can imagine the weakly anti-racist passer-by in early twentieth century 
Alabama apparently urging on the lynch-mob, because his belief that ‘discretion is the 
better part of valour’ is more durable than his commitment to a characterisation of 
racism as evil. This akratic failure then forces him later to re-evaluate his various 
competing beliefs more honestly. He may later decide, for the sake of consistency, to 
adopt racist views that are more in line with his actual behaviour, or he may continue 
with his former views but despise himself for his incontinence. It is plausible that we 
become most aware of the relative doxastic strengths of competing propositions when 
we are forced to act in a way congruent with either one or the other, in a dichotomous 
fashion such as this.
Adler’s own solution to the problem is, I feel, an interesting one, with a satisfying 
theoretical generalisability. It has something in common with my ‘Tiger!’ discussion 
above. In essence, he suggests that we can hold a particular belief firmly, yet still 
admit to a fallibility with respect to our overall web of beliefs (although Adler does not 
use the term ‘web’). By this, he does not mean to imply that we would countenance a 
holus bolus paradigm shift involving our entire web, but rather that we acknowledge 
the presence of hitherto-unknown flaws distributed around it.533 We recognise that 
there will be mistakes in the web, but when inspecting any particular element of the 
web -  say p\ -  we affirm that this, pro tanto, is not among them. Such a model then 
leads Adler to a definition of open-mindedness that I feel convincingly defeats 
Gardner’s ‘anti-racist yet open-minded teacher’ problem:
Open-mindedness is then a second-order (or ‘meta’) attitude toward one’s beliefs as believed, 
and not just toward the specific proposition believed, just as fallibilism is a second-order doubt 
about the perfection o f one’s believing, not a doubt about the truth of any specific belief.534
Gardner’s teacher can now be a full blooded holder of anti-racist beliefs, yet still allow 
for the possibility of their revision qua members of an inescapably flawed overall
533 Sites of ‘compound ignorance’, as al-Naraqi puts it. Muhammad Mahdi ibn abi Dharr al-Naraqi (n.d.) 
op. cit.
5 4 Adler (2004) op. cit., p. 130.
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belief-set. She is not open-minded about racism as a specific belief, but she is open 
minded about beliefs in general. Her general willingness to revise any belief, given 
strong enough contrary grounds, is a measure of her open-mindedness: but it implies no 
admission beforehand that she may have erred in the particular case. We might add 
that if her original belief had been acquired virtuously, it would possess a security 
which militates against too easy an abandonment in the face of weak evidence to the 
contrary. Even strong counter-evidence need not automatically lead to the belief being 
jettisoned, for the model of a Quinean web of beliefs always allows for adjustments to 
be made elsewhere in order to save a treasured belief. There are certain core 
propositions and values which we would strongly resist derogating.
Having considered the relationship between testimony, belief and open-mindedness in 
general, we now return to the educational situation.
In the case of formal teaching and learning, the testimonial context is precisely not like 
the paradigm case of asking a passer-by the way to Larissa. Most classroom 
interactions take the form of the testifier offering unsolicited testimony to the auditor, 
and would thus normally be a cause for suspicion on the part of the auditor, thereby 
constituting Ubel’s ‘special reason to object’ (p.85). However, the testifier here is not a 
local person with a self-serving agenda, approaching some innocent abroad, but a 
teacher who has, by dint of qualifications, the meeting of licensing requirements, 
professional experience, teaching track-record, perhaps publications, and so on, 
established her credibility as a source of testimony in a particular domain. Even if the 
significance of these positive signs is not known to the auditor, that the processes of 
educator recruitment, selection and appointment have in fact taken place gives 
inductive support by proxy to the auditor’s doxastic reliance on the deliverances of her 
testimony.
The anti-reductionists (who, we recall, regard testimony as innocent until proven 
guilty) would allow an a priori, pro tanto acceptance of this teacher-testimony without 
such support, but the epistemic situation of the teacher is enough to satisfy even the 
more stringent criteria of the local reductionists, who treat testimony as guilty until a 
reliable track record is established. The learner, then, has the epistemic right to believe 
the teacher, as far as the teacher’s speciality is concerned, and herein lies a problem.
By believing what he is entitled to believe (a right, as we saw, accepted even by the
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lights of reductionism [p.85]), he appears to be behaving with epistemic virtue, but he 
is nevertheless acting in a way not conducive to longer-term intellectual flourishing, so 
in fact his behaviour is unvirtuous. He is being too open-minded or too willing to drop 
previously-held beliefs (or perhaps merely going through a pretence of believing: an 
instance of Halbbildung). Here, we must distinguish once again between the skopoi 
and the teloi. Acting with epistemic virtue and doxastic efficiency now -  by 
unquestioningly accepting the teacher’s testimony -  may not be so virtuous when the 
long view is taken, for this is not the only route to knowledge, nor can testimony 
always be trusted. To be too skopic in orientation is not virtuous. As we saw earlier 
(p.92), some testifiers have a non-epistemic agenda, so, in developing an epistemically- 
virtuous approach to testimony, as in cultivating any desirable disposition, the agent 
needs to become habituated to a good way of acting, given the way the world actually 
is. He ought to progress from the naive credulity of his early years to a more nuanced 
receptivity befitting the sophisticated learner. We turn next to how such progress is 
made.
Habituation to Cultivate the Intellectual Virtues
It is by repetition that virtues are acquired, according to Aristotle: we become good by 
performing good acts. This habituation is a staged process, proceeding initially by 
imitating virtuous persons. Gradually, with continued practice and the overcoming of 
akrasia, the virtues are internalised and the person can be regarded as virtuous in the 
sense of having a ‘firm and unchangeable character’ [VOM, p. 155]. It is important to 
remember here that Aristotle regards the acquisition of the intellectual virtues 
differently from that of the moral virtues: the former being by instruction and the latter 
by imitation and habituation. He regards intellectual excellences as different from 
moral excellences, and residing in different parts of the soul. However, I accept 
Zagzebski’s argument that both the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues are 
developed by emulation, practice, the defeat of akrasia, continence and, finally, 
internalisation. We see that the learner does not, for example, acquire the intellectual 
virtue of having ‘...the ability to recognise the salient facts’ (VOM, p.21) by being 
directly instructed in saliency, but by having opportunities to develop and practise an 
eye for saliency modelled on the virtue observed in action in the teacher’s epistemic 
practice. We could envisage, for example, the teacher elaborating upon the first 
paragraph of a text in plenary, then assigning pairs of students to the remaining
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paragraphs, with the task of similarly unpacking and identifying the key points of their 
allotted paragraph. Here, we see in action the notion of the teacher as exemplar that I 
developed earlier in this chapter (p.222).
The trouble is that such opportunities for imitation and practice are often unavailable to 
the learner, or else are undermined by classroom exigencies. If what counts (for 
assessment purposes) in the example above is that the key points of the text be learnt, 
then having the students stumble around searching for saliency themselves may appear 
to be both inefficient and an abdication of the teacher’s role. So, instead of allowing 
the students to find out for themselves, unambiguous testimony about what is salient in 
the text, expressed in the most vigorous terms, replete with mnemonics, tricks of the 
trade, shortcuts, strong images, vivid metaphors, useful tips and simplifications is 
deployed, as ostensibly the most reliable way to ‘get it across’ and ‘make it stick’. By 
many students, these are seen as the actions of a good teacher. For ‘success’, the 
student has merely to acquiesce in this process by being a receptive auditor and a 
diligent memoriser. However, if one uses a virtue perspective to question the 
desirability of such one-way transmission and challenge the definition of success 
implied by this description, a different picture emerges.
The teaching can now be seen as vicious, in that the teacher’s approach bespeaks 
closed-mindedness, and the students are guilty of the vice of credulity. My example is 
not even the worst type of passive epistemic vice. In extreme cases, ‘in countries like 
Pakistan, where the language is not Arabic, children who spend their days memorizing 
the Qur’an do seem to be reduced to the status of tape-recorder’.535 Perhaps such 
criticism is unfair to most transmission-orientated teachers, though. In terms of moral 
and epistemic teloi, such a teacher, I have argued, is acting neither virtuously nor 
effectively. But with respect to epistemic skopoi, the teacher is hitting the target in a 
highly efficient manner. Her sense of moral purpose may also well be beyond 
reproach, if viewed against a short time-scale. Indeed, we often hear teachers 
expressing explicitly myopic, yet strategic, sentiments such as, “My job is to get them
5J5 Roberts & Wood (2007) op. cit., p,262. Although we see what they mean, Roberts & Wood are 
undeniably outsiders to this process (both being US Christians) and will have a very different perspective 
to the insiders. Some of us who remember the Latin Mass are grateful for having encountered various 
mysterious phrases whose meaning was only revealed after years o f rote-leamed response, and perhaps 
the teios of some madrasas is similarly longer-range. However, if the entire curriculum consists purely 
o f the non-virtuous learning of an unknown tongue, we would have to class it as vicious by secular 
educational criteria.
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the points [A-level grades, etc]. Once they make it to university they can start thinking 
for themselves.” In a sense, the teacher is trying to do the best she can for her students, 
by helping them to hit immediate epistemic targets, using any means short of the illegal 
or the immoral.536 The student has the right to accept this help, an entitlement 
predicated on the likely truth of the teacher’s testimony and the absence of any warning 
signs to the contrary.
However, an over-reliance on such s/co/wi-friendly practices carries with it the danger 
of fostering a habit of passive acquiescence on the part of the learner. William Hare 
spells out the long-term hazards of such habituation:
Even if  teachers were invariably reliable and accurate, it would not be desirable for students to 
develop a habit of uncritical deference at school which will not serve them well in the wider 
world where they will need to invoke a critical attitude towards many claims, some put forward 
by charlatans, but some also by experts.537
The difficulty here, if we can label it as such, is that most teachers fall into the broad 
category of relative ‘expert’ rather than that of ‘charlatan’, and pupils generally do not 
have enough knowledge, experience or intellectual confidence to challenge their 
teacher in her domain of expertise. This being so, in the conventional classroom, 
pupils are characteristically not given adequate opportunities to develop their critical 
powers. Supporting such development in formal learning situations is not a 
straightforward matter, though, for an even more serious difficulty would arise were 
teachers to be charlatans -  even part-time pseudo-charlatans for sound pedagogical 
reasons -  for this could undermine the trust which is a vital component of virtuous 
student-teacher relations.
Moreover, once the genie is out of the bottle and students form the opinion that all 
sources of testimony are contaminated in one way or another, a corrosive cynicism 
could take hold, a vice possibly even more epistemically counter-productive than the 
habit of passive acquiescence which it replaced. The teacher who has taught students 
to challenge all claims to knowledge may be hoist by her own petard and disbelieved, 
along with all the other apparently authoritative voices whose debunking she 
encouraged.
536 Having said this, I should point out that stories surface periodically in the press concerning teachers 
who do cross this line -  often claiming to have acted in a moment of madness but with the best interests 
o f  the students at heart.
537 William Hare (2007) ‘Credibility and Credulity: Monitoring Teachers for Trustworthiness’, Journal 
o f  Philosophy o f  Education, vol.41, no.2, pp.207-218, p.211.
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Clearly what is needed here is that students are helped to cultivate a sensibility that can 
recognise and accept credible testimony (including most of the teacher’s) and, at the 
same time, identify those sources and occasions for which a more guarded stance is 
indicated. They need to be able to ‘disaggregate’ the various types of testimony -  as 
Elizabeth Fricker puts it (p.96) -  and treat each one accordingly. Acquiring an 
attunement to testimony -  in both its simple and extended538 forms -  is an important 
part of becoming a sophisticated epistemic agent who is able progressively to enhance 
his cognitive contact with reality by combining the deliverances of testimony with 
those of perception, memory and reasoning. The process is not a simple one, so the 
learner will require time and exposure to bring his sensibility into alignment with the 
cultures into which he is being inducted. A discernment ought to be cultivated, for 
example, which sees a debate about the authorship of Shakespeare’s plays as proper, 
but dismisses out of hand a suggestion that these might be twentieth-century works. To 
be in this position is not simply a matter of being alert to obvious warning signs (for 
instance, spelling and grammatical mistakes and a suspect provenance of key 
propositions in a web-page) but rather one of being something of an insider to the field 
in question.
To develop what we might term ‘epistemic connoisseurship’ in the students is the work 
of a teacher, motivated by other-regarding epistemic virtue. In this activity, we are 
inducting the students into practices, helping them to become tyro ‘mathematicians, 
literary scholars, historians’,539 and so on. We wish for others what we have ourselves: 
an enwebment with a subject-discipline and a set of relevant virtues, overseen by 
phronesis. It is only part of our task, however, and in our praxis as teachers we need a 
range of virtues (again governed by phronesis) in order to support the learner in his 
acquisition of knowledge and epistemic virtue. We consider these next.
538 That is, from written texts, websites and so on,
539 Alasdair MacIntyre & Joseph Dunne (2002) ‘Alasdair MacIntyre on Education: In Dialogue with 
Joseph Dunne’, Journal o f  Philosophy o f  Education, vol.36, no. 1, 2002, p.5. Dunne has a firm view on 
teaching being a practice in its own right, but his interlocutor MacIntyre is more ambivalent: ‘It’s not 
clear to me how far we disagree. You say that teaching is itself a practice. I say that teachers are involved 
in a variety o f practices and that teaching is an ingredient in every practice.’ ibid, p.8. Since the present 
thesis argues the case for the teacherly virtues, crowned by phronesis, and sees the internal goods of 
education as a major constituent o f the learner’s overall flourishing, as well as being worthwhile in 
themselves, it displays no such ambivalence.
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Teacherly Virtues
Attempts have been made in the past to list the teacherly virtues540 -  one famous 
example being Brother Agathon’s/John Baptiste De La Salle’s The Twelve Virtues o f a 
Good Teacher:
Thus, we might list Wisdom first, because it presents the main objective, the total 
objective that a teacher should propose to himself. Prudence might be placed 
second, because it makes a teacher know how he should act so as to fulfill his role 
properly. Then the other virtues should follow, each in its place, and the work might 
end with Gentleness, the crowning virtue of a good teacher, thanks to the value 
given it by Charity, the queen and mistress of all virtues.541
This notion of a hierarchy of such teacherly virtues, with wisdom and prudence at the 
top, but ‘crowned’ by gentleness and charity is an attractive one, even though it is 
eventually dismissed by Agathon: ‘But such an arrangement seemed to us a merely 
artificial one, of no real utility’. Some of his advice on teacher virtue still rings true in 
the context of the contemporary classroom or seminar room, but several of his 
pronouncements seem to lack both theoretical and practical justification. For example: 
‘[the teacher] must also refrain from making faces, joking, striving for humour.’ In 
Appendix B, which we shall discuss in a moment, I ignore this rather po-faced advice 
and include Aristotle’s virtue of eutrapelia (wittiness: the mean between boorishness 
and buffoonery). Other assertions bespeak the tradition of monastic obedience in 
which the work is situated: ‘A good teacher ... will not fail to follow faithfully the 
book of the Conduct o f Christian Schools, which was drawn up and is based entirely on 
the careful consideration of long experience.’
In Appendix B, I attempt a more secular version of De La Salle/Agathon’s project, in 
order to assist the reader, and gather, all in one table, the teacherly virtues which have 
been identified throughout this thesis. These are not presented in a free-standing
540 There is very little published material on virtues in teachers. In a recent paper, the notion of the 
virtuous teacher in one particular context has been rather bizarrely defined as: a cadaver. The title of 
‘Virtuous Teacher’ apparently ‘motivates donors to take the role of highly revered teachers of future 
doctors. One enlisted donor spoke to a class of anatomy students one year before passing away, saying 
that he would allow students to make wrong incisions on his body so they can leam and prevent future 
errors on a live patient.’ Steven C. Lin, Julia Hsu, Victoria Y. Fan (2009) “ ‘Silent virtuous teachers”: 
anatomical dissection in Taiwan’, British Medical Journal, vol .339, p. 1438
541 Brother Agathon (1785) The Twelve Virtues o f  a Good Teacher (Les Douze Vertus d'un bon Maître) 
[tr. Brother Gerard Rummery, 1998) [Online] available at: 
http://www.napcis.org/12VirtuesGoodTeacher.pdffaccessed 19 Sep 2010].
This work was based on John Baptiste De La Salle’s list of teacherly virtues: Gravity, Silence, Humility, 
Prudence, Wisdom, Patience, Reserve, Gentleness, Zeal, Vigilance, Piety, and Generosity.
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fashion but are co-ordinated with the epistemic virtues to be cultivated in learners. 
Aware that it may be seen as redolent of the arbitrary ‘bag of virtues’ approach 
disparaged by Lawrence Kohlberg vis-à-vis moral education,542 I provide here a 
suitable health warning. I do not claim that this scheme is exhaustive or necessary: it is 
merely illustrative. The virtues are drawn mainly from Aristotle and Zagzebski. In 
common with De La Salle/Agathon, the virtues of wisdom, prudence, gentleness and 
charity feature prominently amongst what I have categorised as the over-arching 
virtues of a teacher, in the form of phronesis543, sóphrosyné, praotes and philanthropia 
respectively.
Teacherly Epistemic Virtues
It should be stressed that there cannot be a hard and fast system of leamer-virtues to be 
developed, together with complementary teacher-virtues to support these desiderata. 
Rather than forming the basis of a strict algorithm, or a technè, the table merely shows 
some possible ways in which the teacher, guided by the overarching teacherly 
intellectual and moral virtues of phronesis544 and philanthropia (and using the 
attunement of sungnóme), might respond to the learner’s epistemic predicament. It is 
not the only way of categorising the epistemic virtues. Indeed, grouping the virtues in 
any strict taxonomy disguises their highly interconnected nature, for virtue cannot be 
carved at the joints so neatly. However, if the teacher is animated by the right virtue in 
the right way for the right reason, the interlocking of teacherly and learner virtues may 
lead to successful, virtuous and pleasurable uptake by the learner. Perhaps the main 
use of this table, though, is to illustrate the variety of ways in which the virtues can 
support each other across the teacher-leamer dyad. It also hints at possible mirages, in 
which the learner’s apparent epistemic achievements only reflect a simulacrum of the 
intended virtuous engagements. For example, a pupil may depend upon his Cliff
542 Kohlberg says, ‘I have criticized the “bag of virtues” concept of moral education on the grounds, first, 
that there are no such things and, second, if there were, they couldn’t be taught.’ Lawrence Kohlberg 
(1981) Essays in Moral Development 1 p.29-. Quoted in Douglas C. Langston, Conscience and other 
virtues: from  Bonaventure to MacIntyre (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University) p.38. 
[Echoing, according to Langston, Plato’s/Socrates’ claim that we do not know what virtue is and that it 
cannot be taught. Langston also explains that promoting the ‘bag’ might become indoctrination if  there 
is no critical element in its use. (p.172)].
543 The match between Aristotle’s phronesis and De la Salle/Agathon’s wisdom (Wisdom is a virtue 
which gives us knowledge of the most exalted things through the most excellent principles so that we 
may act accordingly) is not perfect. Indeed, Agathon claims that, ‘There is another kind o f wisdom 
which does not come down from on high, but on the contrary is earthly, animal, diabolical ... it adopts 
exclusively the maxims of the world, while rejecting those of the Gospel.’ This seems to have more in 
common with Aristotle’s cleverness [deinotes], which can be used for good or ill.
544 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk.VI, 5, 1140b4.
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Notes545 or the teacher’s ‘definitive’ reading of Macbeth (thereby exercising ‘proper 
trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise’), instead of responding to the play in 
a less compliant way (by using the ‘... ability to think up illuminating ... 
interpretations of literary texts’). The over-helpful teacher or secondary text may 
interfere with the pupil’s authentic engagement with the primary text in this case.
An Example: The Social Epistemic Virtues
If we look a little more closely at one of my categories of epistemic virtue, we can see 
how the interlocking of leamer-virtues with teacher-virtues might work beneficially. In 
its concisely-stated form, Appendix B is not particularly revealing, so I shall take one 
set of virtues (of the five sets presented there) and elaborate upon it. A similar exercise 
could have been undertaken with any other of the virtue sets.
Under the heading ‘The Social Epistemic Virtues’, our desire is that the learner 
develops the virtues which would enable him to act as a socially-located epistemic 
agent. This would involve his cultivating the dispositions both to ‘receive others’ say- 
so’546 and to ‘be truthful when [he] tell[s] other people what is what’.547 Furthermore, 
rather than indulging in an undisciplined parrhesia, we wish him to combine a default 
intellectual candour with ‘knowing [his] audience and how they respond’.548 When he 
receives testimony, we would like him to be animated by the virtue of ‘reflexive critical 
openness’, a virtue which enables [him] to avoid ‘epistemic injustice -  that is, failing to 
believe people when they ought to be believed, but also believing someone who ought 
not to be believed’.549 So he evaluates the arguments of his interlocutors (or, perhaps, 
the extended testimony of a web-site) fairly, while displaying ‘Proper trust of authority 
outside [his] area of expertise’.550
545 Even worse, he may find a ready-made essay about ‘This dead butcher and his fiend-like queen’ at 
http:/Avww.echeat,com/essay.php?t=33333 [Accessed 19 Sep 2010],
546 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.95.
547 Thomas Reid (1764) An Enquiry, in Michael Welboume (2002) Is Hume really a reductivist? Stud. 
Hist. Phil. Sci, 33, p.419.
548 Zagzebski, VOM, p. 114.
?49 Miranda Fricker (n.d) in S.E. Marshall (2003) Epistemic Injustice: The Third Way? Metaphilosophy, 
vol.34, nos. 1/2, p. 176.
550 Zagzebski, VOM, p.319.
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Having set out the leamer-virtues to be cultivated under the heading ‘The Social 
Epistemic Virtues’, we turn next to the tallying teacher virtues which will tend to 
support such cultivation.
First of all, it is worth remembering that many teachers are experienced in public 
intellectual discussion, while learners -  even adult learners -  typically are not. So to 
develop the social epistemic virtues, a measure of sensitivity and supportiveness will be 
desirable: attributes linked more strongly to the moral virtues than to the epistemic. 
Thus, praotes (gentleness, good nature, patience)551, eleutheriotes (liberality, 
generosity)552 and intellectual charity are the default teacherly dispositions here. On 
the other hand, by acting with solicitude in determining our students’ epistemic 
predicaments, we might feel that on certain occasions a Socratic ‘provocativeness’553 is 
in order (particularly for the more bumptious students), so we use our sense of eukairos 
to make our elenetic interventions in a timely way. Throughout these occasions of 
learning, we do well to bear in mind that our students, as informal anthropologists, are 
taking note not just of our espoused views, but also of how we comport ourselves 
morally and intellectually. Too brusque a dismissal of a learner’s half-formed opinions 
is thus not a suitable action for a teacher who aspires to Vorleben -  a willingness to act 
as an emulable role-model. A more worthy approach is for her to to receive the flawed 
or inchoate views respectfully, and then find courteous ways of alerting their bearer to 
any problems she has identified, in order that he may recognise these for himself. This 
of course takes more time than simply telling the learner what we feel he needs to 
know, but if there is a genuine desire to develop the social intellectual virtues, it would 
be be time well spent.
By behaving in ways animated by the teacherly virtues outlined, the teacher is not only 
encouraging the development of the learner’s epistemic virtues, she is also enabling 
him to acquire knowledge. In modelling and supporting the virtue of ‘reflexive critical 
openness’ for the student, she encourages him to acquire knowledge via the testimony 
of others in an epistemically-virtuous way. Furthermore, by acting with 
‘provocativeness’, the teacher forces a consideration of the contrary propositions ~p 
and their corollaries: an intellectual activity on the part of the learner which
S5! J.A.K.. Thompson and Hugh Tredennick (1953, 2004) [trs.] Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics 
(London: Penguin Books) p.312.
552 Thompson & Tredennick (1953, 2004) op. cit., p .311.
553 Plato, Republic, 523b-c.
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corresponds either to the rippling derogation of ~p and its close implications 
throughout the learner’s doxastic web, or to a replacement ofp  by ~p should the 
challenge be irresistible.
Since classroom time is not unlimited, a judgement needs to be made that trades off the 
time spent on specific intellectual virtues with the time devoted to others in the suite, 
and to the knowledge which is to be acquired. To legislate between the competing 
desiderata, the teacher ought to be animated by the Aristotelian virtue ofphronësis, so 
that a virtuous compromise may be reached.
Teacherly Virtues as Means Between Extremes
This, in turn, relies on the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, in which a virtue is seen as 
the juste milieu between two vicious extremes: one the vice of excess and the other, the 
vice of deficit. There is thus a virtuous mean for truth-telling, between the excess of 
unremitting parrhesia and the deficit of sullen taciturnity. That is not to say that the 
extremes never represent appropriate pedagogical action, however. We can draw here 
on Shapin’s principle, which we met in Chapter 2, that for each epistemic maxim, there 
is a counter-maxim. So, the maxim that the teacher’s first duty is to Teach 
enthusiastically (with a capital‘T’) has the counter-maxim that this may overload the 
learner epistemically, and so silence may be best. Thus, as teachers we can choose to 
adopt a testimonial role anywhere up to, and including, the two tropes of (i) the 
garrulous expert, enthusing about her specialist field and (ii) the silent guru, who sends 
the disciple away to find out for himself. However, were we to embody one of these 
styles exclusively, it would represent a diachronous epistemic vice. So, over time, the 
amount of Teaching needs to be finely judged to avoid both what we might characterise 
as hyperparrhesia and epistemic silence. As we saw earlier (p. 137), there is also the 
possibility of leavening our truth-telling with some pedagogically-justified 
misinformation, which either sacrifices the immediate truth for a longer-range truth, or 
alerts the learner to the dangers of credulity. During the times that the teacher is not 
engaging in sincere testimony, the other teacherly virtues find application. These non­
testimonial, other-regarding epistemic virtues encourage such desiderata as enquiry, 
scholarship, creativity and the social epistemic virtues in the learner, as we see in the 
table in Appendix B.
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A similar move can be made with respect to each of the other groups of epistemic 
virtues. So an excess of the teacherly virtues which encourage, say, enquiry on the part 
of the learner, may lead to an over-emphasis on pure discovery learning and hence also 
be vicious in its neglect of testimony, scholarship and so on. The learner may follow 
many blind alleys when left to his own devices. Too much content-free encouraging 
(being ‘the guide on the side’) is as undesirable as too much telling (that is, acting as 
‘the sage on the stage’) and it is by cultivating situational, skopic and teleological 
awareness that the teacher is able to act in accordance with phronesis to judge the 
virtuous mean for a given concrete learning situation. Hitting this desirable spot 
involves developing all of the learners’ epistemic virtues in a balanced way. Thus, the 
virtues I have grouped under categories associated with ‘doxastic trust’, ‘enquiry’, 
‘creativity’, ‘scholarship’ and ‘the social epistemic virtues’ ought to be cultivated 
equitably, with none being allowed to atrophy by neglect. It is by habituation that the 
virtues are developed, so learners should be encouraged to practise all of the 
intellectual virtues. Here, I stress, there is no simple algorithm or techne which can 
reliably tell the teacher which epistemic virtue ought to be fostered in learners at any 
given time: attunement to the particulars and phronesis are indispensable.
In closing this section on the educational implications of the responsibilist variety of 
virtue epistemology, it is worth heeding Zagzebski’s plea for ‘understanding’ to be 
rehabilitated as an epistemic goal. We look in vain for it, or the related desideratum of 
wisdom, in lists of learning outcomes -  indeed, as we shall see in a little while, some 
would even outlaw the use of the term in educational settings. Zagzebski quotes from 
Locke’s ‘Epistle to the Reader’, which opens his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, and since this links nicely with my earlier discussion of Aristotle’s 
‘delight’ criterion of virtue (p.230), I too shall quote directly from Locke:
... he is little acquainted with the subject o f this treatise, the UNDERSTANDING, 
who does not know, that as it is the most elevated part of the soul, so it is employed 
with a greater, and more constant delight, than any of the other. Its searches after 
truth, are a sort o f hunting and hawking, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part 
o f the pleasure ... every moment of his pursuit, will reward his pains with some 
delight; and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot 
boast much o f any greater acquisition.554
This is a more generous conception of worthwhile epistemic goals than the rather 
pinched contemporary notion of the learner as a collector of propositions to be later
554 John Locke (1706) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Penguin Books, 1997) p.7.
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presented as evidence of learning. Locke asserts that this hunter, ‘who has raised 
himself above the alms-basket, and [is] not content to live lazily on scraps of begged 
opinion’,555 will thereby experience a greater satisfaction. With the caveat that, as we 
have seen, Locke is unduly negative towards testimony, it seems as if this active, 
engaged, pleasurable enquiry is a route to understanding. The intellectual engagement 
that Locke promotes will, we hope, create a more coherent and wide-ranging epistemic 
web for the learner, by the virtuous accession, modification and derogation of 
propositional and other types of knowledge. Coherence is needed for understanding, 
while correspondence can be enough for knowledge. To understand p  is to be able to 
accommodate it into his web of belief by means of the construction of suitable linkages 
to form a coherent whole.
Conclusions of Chapter 5
A neo-Aristotelian construal of epistemic virtue has many lessons for education. By 
developing the insights of Zagzebski and others, we see the learner as an enwebbed 
epistemic agent who acts from intellectual virtue to revise his beliefs virtuously, and 
thus comes into closer cognitive contact with reality. The teacher is viewed as a 
benevolent epistemic agent who uses testimony, open-mindedness and the rest of the 
epistemic virtues to enable the learner to enhance both his knowledge and his 
intellectual virtue -  thereby helping him to flourish intellectually. She acts in this 
project as a knower, as a bearer of other-regarding epistemic virtue, and as a worthy 
role-model. In constructing a list of the epistemic virtues to be cultivated in the learner, 
and the co-ordinate virtues which the teacher might draw upon to support such 
cultivation, it has turned out that the teacher’s moral virtues are indispensable (for 
example, those of benevolence and patience). Any theoretical barrier we might erect 
between the epistemic and the moral virtues is thus to be considered permeable, at least 
in the case of the teacher’s other-regarding virtues.
555 ibid, p.7.
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Chapter 6 - Implications of Virtue Epistemology for 
Educational Practice
Virtue epistemology has been shown to be capable of rehabilitating epistemology as a 
fitting contributor to educational discourse and practice. It has been revealed 
throughout this thesis to be a productive seam which can benefit educational thinking 
and which in turn profits from an engagement with the field of education.
This is largely a work of positive educational epistemology, which regards as 
foundational the assertion that it is possible to achieve knowledge. It examined the 
conditions under which such an achievement can take place, with a view to 
illuminating educational thinking. The first three chapters consisted largely of 
exposition on, and further development of, key themes in virtue epistemology, with a 
strong focus on the associated topics of testimony and other-regarding epistemic virtue. 
Chapters 4 and 5 attempted to cash in the promissory note of the introduction -  that 
virtue epistemology is capable of enriching educational discourse -  by considering the 
educational implications of the reliabilist and responsibilist varieties of the new field.
In this concluding chapter, we shall draw the main themes together and consider some 
further implications for educational practice.
Once the gap between true belief and knowledge was opened up, and we took seriously 
Socrates’ uncharacteristically strong claim that ‘knowledge is more honourable and 
excellent than true opinion’,556 the conditions for ¿nowWge-acquisition (as opposed to 
the less valuable activity of forming mere true beliefs') were shown plausibly to include 
epistemic virtue -  particularly where Sosa’s ‘reflective knowledge’ is concerned. That 
the cultivation of the epistemic virtues, and the growth of knowledge which these help 
to take place, ought to be a key component of the educational project was demonstrated 
at length. The overall task of this thesis was to expand, develop and deploy the 
resources of virtue epistemology to test whether it might provide an explanation of 
what knowledge consists in, how learners might flourish intellectually, and how the 
teacher can support this flourishing. Carrying out this work did demonstrate that an
556 Plato, Meno, 98, 4.
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extended conversation between virtue epistemology and education concerning these 
matters advances their shared interests, and has thus made a modest contribution to 
knowledge.
We saw that the epistemic virtues are important if the learner is to acquire knowledge, 
particularly if we wish him to go further than Sosa’s ‘animal knowledge’, and that 
being animated by such virtues is vital for his intellectual flourishing. Because virtue 
epistemology is concerned with the virtuous motivation for, and the astiology and 
proper maintenance of, concept-webs, and not merely with apparent evidence of their 
possession, a pedagogy influenced by it will be a more exacting model for teachers to 
match up to than some rival versions. By exemplifying the self-regarding intellectual 
virtues and exercising her other-regarding virtues, the teacher can help the learner both 
to cultivate his own epistemic virtues and to acquire genuine knowledge. Furthermore, 
before responding to the learner’s epistemic predicament, she should bring into play 
her attunement towards him to synchronise her suitable ‘tallying’ other-regarding 
virtues, in order to support the intellectual virtues that she wishes to foster in him on 
that occasion. This sensitive co-ordinating process helps the learner both to cultivate 
his epistemic virtues and to acquire knowledge. Because of the attunement, judgement 
and choice between competing virtues required of the teacher, this is a role for a 
phronimos engaged in a praxis, who is animated by phronésis to act virtuously for the 
good of others in a social setting. There is an inescapable degree of unpredictability 
surrounding such action -  unlike the strict conformity to a plan {eidos) that the rival 
techné-poièsis paradigm requires -  but the recurrent interplay between other-regarding 
virtue and other-regarding epistemic acts, in which the skopoi can change, is the best 
way of assisting the learner to acquire genuine knowledge and flourish intellectually. 
This places demands on the teacher, who must develop her own excellences 
characteristic of the intellectual good life, and be willing and able to exercise them with 
sungnómè in order to be beneficial to her students in this way, but the rewards are 
worthwhile. She wants for her students the epistemic goods for which she herself has 
an appetite, so while her medium-term ambition for them vis-à-vis knowledge is the 
demanding one o f ‘sensitivity’, her long-range intellectual telos for students is ‘safety’: 
a property that can only genuinely come with the passage of time and experience. 
Furthermore, the learner ought to be supported by the teacher to develop his own
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phronesis in the context of his participation in the praxis that defines the subject. This 
again is a long-term project, one which the teacher can help to inaugurate and foster.
We also developed an exigent model of knowledge, which required the use of the 
intellectual virtues to bring the learner’s web into better congruence with reality. This 
stressed the importance of considering the counterfactive class, ~p; for, without such 
engagement, the learner’s doxastic web is like Socrates’ aviary of incoherent, 
untethered propositions. Using ideas from AI theory, we found that once p  is accepted 
as true, ~p and its implications ought to be removed from the learner’s web; and that p  
requires learning with adequate input credibility -  and hence epistemic entrenchment -  
to enable a defence against future epistemic input that might imply ~p to be true.
Sosa’s notion of aptness (accuracy because adroit) also demands the use of intellectual 
virtue, and builds into the concept of knowledge the notion of credit due to the learner 
for his epistemic performance. For Sosa though, this epistemic performance might be 
nothing more than the exercising of good colour vision: not an epistemic virtue on 
Zagzebski’s reading. ‘Reflective knowledge’ is of a higher grade, however (and will 
need more expansive intellectual virtues), because the learner not only knows that p, 
but has an epistemic perspective on this knowing and thus has better epistemically 
entrenched beliefs, of a more admirable type. These more challenging construals of 
learning and knowledge that we elaborated upon from the reliabilist perspective, are 
superior to simplistic and reductionist alternatives, and will require a more responsive 
pedagogy.
Given its virtue turn, epistemology is now not only equipped to engage productively 
with education in general, it is also able -  pursuing here a sub-theme -  to provide a 
principled challenge to some of the worst excesses of village technicism in education: 
excesses that could easily lead the learner to Halbbildurtg. Here we might concur 
broadly with Richard Paul, who says that ‘the present structure of curricula and 
teaching not only strongly discourages [the intellectual virtues’] development but also 
strongly encourages their opposite. Consequently even the “best” students enter and
557leave college as largely mis-educated persons... ’
557 Richard Paul (1993) Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing 
World, pp.319-332 (Sonama: Foundation for Critical Thinking) reprinted as ch. 13, Guy Axtell (ed) 
(2000) Knowledge, Belief and Character (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield), p. 164.
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A booklet endorsed by the Irish Higher Education Authority and funded by the 
National Development Plan as a contribution to the Bologna Process illustrates the 
nature of some of the thinking in this area: reductionist assumptions which our 
educational virtue epistemology can censure and replace with more demanding 
alternatives. In the glossary, ‘knowledge’ is defined as ‘The ability to recall or 
remember facts without necessarily understanding them’.558 Lest we should think that 
there is room elsewhere for understanding, the advice on constructing learning 
outcomes includes: ‘Avoid vague terms like ... understand ,..’.559 The pervasive 
rhetoric is that learning outcomes should be clear and -  above all — demonstrable, and 
that knowledge and understanding are mere chimeras. We might allow that the mission 
of technicism in education was originally well-intentioned -  to rescue teaching from 
what it saw as sloppy and ineffective practices by putting it on a rational footing -  but 
we see here that it has over-reached itself and sought to impose an impoverished view 
of knowledge that is detrimental to education.
The casualty in this campaign of emphasis on narrowly-conceived ‘learning outcomes’ 
is the student who learns to be insincere and only apparently to deliver outcomes such 
as these, for to him these have value only inasmuch as they lead to reward, not for their 
own sake. As a strategy for the learner, it is eminently rational, but the acquisition of 
ersatz ‘knowledge’ -  in which the knowledge is neither legitimately owned nor 
appreciated authentically save only as fungible means to an end -  is not intellectually 
virtuous. Although we might allow that knowledge-acquisition is possible without the 
use of intellectual virtue (in Zagzebski’s thicker sense of these, at any rate) his 
untethered, unvirtuous acquisition of a true propositional belief provides the learner 
neither with the resources to carry out a defence of the proposition in the light of prima 
facie evidence showing the belief to be faulty, nor with a rationale for virtuous belief 
revision should it be seen that the proposition ought to be derogated.
So this simulacrum of a virtuous belief is not properly enwebbed with the rest of the 
learner’s knowledge but sits in isolation, or perhaps in the company of other ‘academic’ 
knowledge (the word ‘academic’ here becoming a pejorative one). The system that has 
brought about this alienation is flawed, ironically, by being too systematic: too
558 Declan Kennedy (2007) Writing and Using Learning Outcomes (Cork: University College Cork) 
p.78.
559 ibid., p.43.
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concerned with inputs and outputs; too nakedly results-driven. Students should be 
discouraged from seeing learning as merely a tiresome way of achieving the desired 
end of knowledge -  the Bildunsgsphilister's view -  and regard it instead as a life- 
enhancing activity with its own internal goods. This hinges on the difference between 
learning as a techne (whose associated activity, poiesis, ought rationally to be 
minimised, since the poiemata are all that matter) and learning as a praxis -, a 
worthwhile activity in its own right as well as a way of acquiring knowledge.
But while knowledge as poiema is valorised, a number of undesirable consequences 
will follow, the most extreme being plagiarism: a growing phenomenon that virtue 
epistemology shows to be vicious, hence non-creditworthy, since the true beliefs were 
not acquired thanks to epistemic skills and faculties but by means of doxastic shortcuts. 
Plagiarised ‘knowledge’ is not ‘apt’, to use Sosa’s term (i.e., the epistemic agent’s 
apparent doxastic success is not due to his intellectual skill and hence is not creditable 
to him). In the worst cases, not even the Zagzebskian virtue of ‘recognizing reliable 
testimony’ is animating the student, for he perhaps merely appropriates the first 
offerings from an online search engine, uses little in the way of discriminatory powers, 
and engages with the text only to the extent of altering the fonts and removing any US 
spelling and obvious hyperlinks. Not only are counterfactives, ~p, not considered 
(together with any consequent derogation of linked propositions), even the substantive 
proposition, p, is not properly entertained and is thereby not given its rightful place in 
the belief-web of the student. He is thus alienated from the ‘knowledge’ he claims to 
possess.
One might object that using virtue epistemology to show the act of plagiarising to be 
wrong is to use a sophisticated steam-roller to crack a nut which is easily opened by 
other means. The village technicist, for example, would view the student’s behaviour 
as both immoral and a threat to the reliability of his systems; the virtue ethicist would 
see such cheating as inimical to the learner’s flourishing. This would be to 
misunderstand the astiology of plagiarism, however. If the student receives the 
pervasive message that outcomes are what count -  rather than intellectual virtue, 
engagement, knowledge, understanding or enwebbedness -  he will rationally and 
efficiently furnish such apparent outcomes. Once the village technicist’s pernicious 
definition of ‘knowledge’ as the ‘ability to recall or remember facts without
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necessarily understanding them’560 achieves currency, it is no surprise that learners start 
to act in accordance with it. If the sources happen to be credible, the use of plagiarised 
text is a reliable route to apparent, demonstrated knowledge, in the sense of espousing 
true ‘beliefs’ -  even if the putative beliefs are not authentically entertained but are 
merely conveyed untouched to the one assessing them. Repugnant as this is, the 
learner’s actions can be seen not only as rational but also as honouring business 
principles such as efficiency, outsourcing and the use of initiative. But the technicist 
fails to see his definition of knowledge as the root of the problem and proposes 
technical solutions in response to the students’ cheating. There follows a technical 
escalation of plagiarism-detecting software pitted against more and more sophisticated 
ways of evading exposure. If, on the other hand, a culture of intellectual virtue is 
fostered, rather than what Lyotard terms ‘performativity’,561 engendered by a crude 
technicist narrative, there is a greater prospect for a more authentic engagement with 
knowledge. The issues around plagiarism are epistemic and ethical, not technical, but 
it is the technicist’s definition that prepares the ground for the epistemically-vicious 
activity of some students. The problems begin when students take the technicist at his 
word and accept an inadequate definition of ‘knowledge’. Our definition of 
knowledge, following Nozick, is a more stringent and demanding one, requiring not 
only thatp  be true, but also that: the student believes p; were it not to be true, he 
wouldn’t have believed it; and were it still to be true but the circumstances changed, he 
would still believe it. This ‘subjunctive’ view of knowledge considers epistemic 
causation and not just the target belief, thereby requiring epistemically-virtuous 
epistemic action. Such a level of stringency may sometime be asking too much -  and 
we might concede that knowledge does not always require intellectual virtue -  but 
nevertheless it is a construal to which we ought to aspire.
Even if the learner’s response to the technicist’s framework does not extend as far as 
plagiarism, there may well be some doxastic insincerity vis-à-vis the propositions he 
purports to know. Students in Ireland talk of ‘learning-off a topic for an examination, 
a process that typically includes the memorising of standard answers to predicted 
questions. Knowing (in the virtue-epistemic sense), believing or understanding are not
560 Kennedy (2007) op. cit., p,78.
561 Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard writes o f a language game ‘in which the goal is no longer truth, but 
performativity -  that is, the best possible input/output equation’. J-F Lyotard (1979) [tr. G. Bennington 
and B. Massumi. (1984)] The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press) p.46.
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required: performance is all. Indeed, any virtuous engagement with knowledge might 
be harmful to the candidate’s prospects, so is avoided in favour of the industrious
562adsorption of tried and tested propositions and algorithms. To cater to this strategy, 
in Ireland there are a number of ‘grind schools’,563 whose sole pedagogical ambition is 
to coach teenage candidates to achieve the highest possible points in the Leaving 
Certificate examination. As The Irish Times puts it, ‘An Easter journey to the local 
grind school has become the norm for diligent exam students at the expense of their 
parents who are prepared to pay upwards of €800 for an intensive crash course’.564 
And, under a village technicist construal, it works: ‘... yet again ... so-called grind 
schools and fee-paying schools dominate the league tables, as students strive to gain 
higher points for college entry’.565 The fee is thus a ‘clear investment’, according to 
the Principal of Dublin’s biggest grind school, The Institute of Education. Here we see 
education being cynically construed as a shrewd investment strategy that buys 
advantage in a competitive career market: an instance of what Adomo calls 
Halbbildung. It seems inevitable that such a tightly-focused project will provide the 
student with much that does not meet the criteria we have developed for knowledge -  
being neither sensitive, well-tethered nor apt.
Having discussed some of the negative effects of inadequate conceptions of what it is 
to know, we return to virtue epistemology for a summary of a more nuanced view of 
knowledge, teaching and learning. Here, I shall reprise the main themes of the earlier 
chapters and set these in educational contexts. The sections here are ‘Virtue 
Reliabilism’, ‘Virtue Responsibilism’ and ‘Virtuous Testimony’. There follows an 
exploration of how teachers ought to act -  qua other-regarding epistemic (and, 
inescapably, moral) agents -  and how learners ought to act as developing epistemic 
agents. I end by outlining some other important implications of virtue epistemology for 
educational practice.
562 During chemical ‘adsorption’ the new substance is not incorporated into the substrate (as in the case 
of ‘absorption’) but only forms a surface film. Here, I use the word as a metaphor for the process of 
‘leam ing-off for an exam. The epistemic input,/?, is not absorbed into the learner’s web -  with the 
attendant derogation of incompatible propositions ~ p , and interlinking to other parts o f the web -  but is 
deposited only at a surface level, with a limited permanence, fit only for the skopic purpose of imminent 
examination recall.
563 The link to Thomas Gradgrind in Dickens’ Hard Times is an obvious one, but there seems to be no 
documented etymological connection.
564 Arne Kerr (2006) The Irish Times, March 4.
565 Katherine Donnelly (2007) Irish Independent, November 22.
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Virtue Reliabilism and Education
Sosa’s reliabilism and Zagzebskj’s responsibilism are the two major kinds of present- 
day virtue epistemology. We recall that both, as agent-focused epistemologies, reverse 
the direction of analysis characteristic of traditional belief-based epistemologies, to 
view knowledge as true belief acquired by cognitive agents via acts of cognitive virtue 
(instead of true belief to which a decontextualised knower ought to assent because of 
certain attributes of the beliefs themselves).
In analysing Sosa’s faculty reliabilism, a consideration of Nozick’s legacy led to the 
inference that counterfactual subjunctive conditionals are one key to understanding this 
type of virtue epistemology. When this was parlayed to the educational context, a 
conclusion emerged that simply requiring learners to aim unambiguously at clearly- 
defined epistemic targets will, in the long run, fall short of a sustainable doxastic 
process. Notwithstanding the necessity of learners acquiring some unexamined true 
beliefs, myths and habits early in life (or early in their exploration of a new field) as 
matters of faith, there is a clear imperative later to consider propositions other than 
those in their immediate sights. Thus, any list of propositions, such as may be found in 
a syllabus or set of learning outcomes, comprises only a fraction of the real doxastic 
task if their acquisition is to represent anything more than Halbbildung.
Sosa’s notion of reflective knowledge (K4), or ‘apt belief aptly noted’ (K, Ksp),s66 
encourages a more wide-angled view than the telescopic sight aimed at the individual 
propositional target. The learner must consider features beyond the proposition itself 
and so attain some degree of perspective on his knowing, in order to see how the 
proposition in question may be either defended or derogated in the face of recalcitrant 
epistemic input. This amounts essentially to the same requirement as Socrates’ 
‘tethering’. The learner needs not only to have an apt belief that p  (that is, a belief the 
success of which is due to the skill manifested), he must also have an apt belief that his 
knowing p  is defensible against pertinent doubts. I extended Sosa’s thinking in this 
area by suggesting that the chief doubts which may arise are the result of entertaining 
the counterfactive class of propositions, ~p. Sosa himself, employing (in his 2011 the
564 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.32.
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the counterfactive class of propositions, ~p. Sosa himself, employing (in his 2011 
book) the metaphor of Diana the huntress either deciding or forbearing to take a shot, is 
coming back to the notion of entertaining propositions other than p\ a welcome return 
to the consideration of ~p that his previous sidelining of ‘sensitivity’ underplayed.
Built into Sosa’s variety of virtue epistemology is the concept of desert, or credit for 
knowledge acquired virtuously. To him, the learner can only justly claim to have 
knowledge when he uses his epistemic skills and faculties to obtain the truth, such that 
he can take credit for so doing. Sosa’s notion of ‘aptness’ signifies ‘accurate because 
adroit’ — other words the effort we are praising the learner for is the intellectual action 
that caused the knowledge-acquisition. Although it is too strong a thesis to claim that 
knowledge always requires intellectual virtue, his requirement of desert maps well onto 
educational thinking and rules out certain activities which may involve the acquisition 
of true beliefs, but which we nevertheless intuit as being undeserving of credit. 
Conversely, the acquisition of higher-grade knowledge, K+, demands our extra 
approbation. Such judgements require a form of epistemic justice, in that we attribute 
knowledge correctly to those who have it and not to those who do not. Just as 
‘knowledge+’ in the learner is particularly worthy of our approval, true, apparent 
beliefs which are ‘demonstrated’ (in the terminology of learning outcomes) but do not 
either represent virtuous intellectual activity or reflect the learner’s actual web of 
beliefs, can sometimes be considered reprehensible.
Sosa’s criterion of ‘aptness’ demands a more authentic, epistemically-virtuous 
grappling with knowledge than the technicist requires -  his ‘reflective knowledge’ to 
an even greater extent. This is thus an improvement both on simplistic definitions such 
as Kennedy’s (p.253) and on the crude operationalising in the grind schools of a view 
of knowledge as no more than that which scores points on the Leaving Certificate. 
However, rather than using Sosa’s reliabilist designation of epistemic virtue as, ‘...a 
quality bound to help maximise one’s surplus of truth over error’,567 we might prefer 
the learner to act from what we could term ‘Quinean epistemic virtue’ (and define it as 
‘that which leads to a better web of belief), or a Zagzebskian ‘that which leads to 
greater cognitive contact with reality’. These alternatives de-emphasise the importance 
of individual true or false proposition p. They both also enhance the role of 
counterfactives, ~p, accommodate Sosa’s higher-level ‘reflective knowledge’ (K ) and
567 Ernest Sosa (1985) ‘Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue’, Monist, 68, no.2 (April) p.227.
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thus, contra Kennedy, promote understanding as a desirable epistemic goal. 
Nevertheless, there are certain individual propositions (some of which treat of 
‘threshold concepts’ [p. 153]), which ought to be carefully accentuated by the teacher in 
a timely manner, because of their property of opening up the doxastic possibilities for 
the learner and thus being conducive to his intellectual flourishing. Having said this, 
we see that it is not in adding to the stockpile of facts (or ‘surplus of truth over error’) 
that their value lies, but in their clearing the way for new sections of the learner’s web 
to be constructed.
We might also question Sosa’s claim that epistemic virtue resides in eyes, ears, 
memory and so on, and suggest instead that it is in how these faculties are used, and 
what steps are taken to compensate for their imperfections, that virtue is exhibited. 
Drawing parallels with moral act evaluation, in which ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, academic 
approval should be directed to a greater extent towards truth-seeking activities and 
dispositions rather than only towards the states o f belief which result from these. It is 
in the use of his faculties that credit (or discredit, or non-credit) accrues to the user.
This means, for instance, that pupils with special educational needs still deserve 
epistemic credit for virtuously using their cognitive endowments, even if the resultant 
epistemic achievements are not so high.
Moreover, in an educational organisation, the onus is on those in a stronger epistemic 
position (that is, the teachers) to help those who are weaker. This does not seem 
initially to apply as compellingly to students helping their peers, though, for doing so in 
a competitive educational environment weakens their relative position by helping 
others to catch up, and so offends against prudence (in the sense of shrewd self- 
interest). It is, however, the other-regardingly epistemically-virtuous thing to do, and 
the blame for promoting the alternative lies with the traditional educational rules of 
engagement. A more collegial approach would emphasise the socially-enwebbed 
nature of knowledge and downplay the prominence of the putatively autonomous 
knower. It would also promote the intellectual flourishing both of the epistemic 
beneficiary and of his benefactor. The relationship between desert and achievement is 
not as clear-cut as we might initially think, once the undeserved nature of propitious or 
unfavourable intellectual endowments is raised; to discern epistemic justice, therefore, 
requires attunement on the part of the teacher.
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Zagzebski’s responsibilism takes intellectual virtue to be an indispensable means of 
acquiring ‘knowledge’, or, as she puts it, ‘ . a state of cognitive contact with reality 
arising out of acts of intellectual virtue’.568 We might feel that her indispensability 
thesis is too strong, but nevertheless still argue that the educational project requires that 
our learners cultivate the epistemic virtues in order that they may enhance their 
intellectual alignment with the world. Part of Zagzebski’s project was to assimilate the 
epistemic virtues to the moral, a move I resisted for the sake of conceptual clarity. 
However, because it is directed towards one of the three great transcendentals,569 the 
pursuit of truth is a key part of a flourishing life: so in a wider sense we can see it as 
joined to the striving towards the good life that Aristotelian moral virtue 
presupposes.570 Zagzebski does not argue in this way, however. Instead of claiming 
that their utimate aim is eudaimonia, she attempts to unify the virtues at the level of 
motivation by suggesting that lying beneath all of them -  both the intellectual and the 
moral -  is ‘a love of being in general’ (VOM, p. 167). Notwithstanding these unifying 
moves, it is still useful to consider the intermediate aim of the virtues, and in the case 
of the intellectual category of these, knowledge, understanding and wisdom are the 
targets.
A wide range of epistemic virtues is desirable in animating both teacher and learner and 
orientating them towards these intellectual goods, for any undue emphasis on a subset 
of these will have a distorting effect on teaching and learning. Zagzebski provides a 
thick account of the intellectual virtues, and her naming and describing a number of 
these was helpful in my co-ordinating them between learner and teacher in the last 
chapter (and in Appendix B). An important instance of this -  although certainly not to 
be regarded as the only one -  is the key teacherly virtue of giving helpful testimony:
Virtue Responsibitisra and Education
568 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p.298 [bold face in original],
569 Interestingly, while Aristotle treats truth and goodness as transcendentals, ‘Nowhere ... does Aristotle 
discuss beauty as a transcendental property’. Daniel Gallagher (2006) ‘The Platonic-Aristotelian 
Hybridity o f Aquinas’s Aesthetic Theory’, Hortuius, vol.2, no. 1, p.2. However, in NE bk.2, Aristotle 
criticizes the agroikos — the ‘person o f  undeveloped taste and appreciation’ (footnote to 1104a24) -  so 
the pursuit o f  beauty is not un-Aristotelian. Jonathan Bames (2003) op. cit., p.34
570 Interestingly, while Aristotle treats truth and goodness as transcendentals, ‘Nowhere ... does Aristotle 
discuss beauty as a transcendental property’. Daniel Gallagher (2006) ‘The Platonic-Aristotelian 
Hybridity o f Aquinas’s Aesthetic Theory’, Hortuius, vol.2, no. 1, p.2. However, in NE bk.2, Aristotle 
criticizes the agroikos -  the ‘person o f  undeveloped taste and appreciation’ (footnote to 1104a24) -  so 
the pursuit o f  beauty is not un-Aristotelian. Jonathan Bames (2003) op. cit., p.34
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Reid’s ‘propensity to be truthful when we tell other people what is what’,571 to which 
we turn next.
Virtuous Testimony and Education
Important day-to-day epistemic virtues for the teacher include a beneficent disposition 
to give good testimony to her pupils. We need to be alert to the temptation to overdo 
this, however, since ‘it is possible to talk too much: so as to pollute the dialectical 
space’.572 The teacher who indulges in a non-stop monologue, comprised of an 
indiscriminate mixture of important and trivial propositions, administrative 
instructions, reprimands, hints and tips, may simply confuse the learner. Moreover, as 
we have seen, ‘good testimony’ is not to be conflated with simple truth-telling -  though 
sincere testifying ought to be a default tendency -  but should involve a teacherly 
willingness to discern and help alleviate the epistemic predicament of the learner, 
together with an open-minded personal enwebbedness in her subject-discipline(s). In 
this sense, good testimony is a virtuous mediation between an evolving discipline and 
the doxastic needs of the student. The extent to which the unsettled nature of the 
discipline is honoured will depend on the phase of education and the positioning of the 
student within the discipline, in that advanced postgraduate students ought arguably to 
engage more with emerging, tentative knowledge, and younger primary pupils with 
knowledge of a less contested type. This is not an absolute prescription, however, for 
some debates are accessible -  in a simplified form -  to even the most junior learners.
The formal learning situation is a peculiar context in that it is one of the few situations 
in everyday life where the auditor may know little or nothing apropos the subject 
matter about which testimony is being given. In this doxastic setting, the teacher can 
insist on Coady’s acceptance principle being in force (p.87), for the learner has no way 
of knowing if the testimony is trustworthy or not. It is better, however, if the teacher 
can assist the learner in rationally and affectively bridging the gap between her new 
testimony and his previous experience and belief-web, so that he is able to assess its 
plausibility for himself. To do so will require the teacher to have insight both into her 
students’ webs of belief and into the current state of development of their intellectual 
virtues.
571 Reid (1764) op. cit.,p.419
572 Sosa (2011) op. cit., p.42.
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One important aspect of a virtuous approach to testimony is being fair to testifiers. 
Miranda Fricker’s notion of ‘epistemic justice’573 gains some purchase here, for we 
wish to habituate learners to be just in their approach to testimony: that is, to believe 
those who ought to be believed on a particular occasion and to disbelieve those who 
ought not to be believed. We can extend Fricker’s definition to encapsulate some 
further types of intellectual justice relevant to the learning situation. These relate to 
approbation towards:
1. Testimony worthy of belief (Fricker’s notion of justice to the testifier -  either 
learner or teacher);
2. Genuinely creditworthy apt knowledge or, better still, reflective ‘Knowledge+’ 
possessed by the agent (a just regard for the learner, which rewards his epistemic 
virtue);
3. Epistemic distributive justice (the teacher, or other more knowledgeable agent, 
responding to need or gifting knowledge supererogatorily).
The generous impulse underlying this last action needs to be tempered, as we have 
seen, by the insights of sungndme, or we stand in danger of unhelpfully swamping the 
learner with too many true beliefs. There is a just amount of testimony — neither too 
much nor too little -  which can only be discerned reliably by phronesis.
As teachers, we ought to foster progress by the learners along the dimension of ‘non­
gullibility’, to recognise category (1) above. We would like our younger learners to 
begin the process of becoming masters of folk psychology with respect to testimony, 
and thereby come to know that ‘some people or types of people on some topics are 
reliable, others on others aren’t’.574 This mastery will grow, typically, through the
575stages of incompetence, conscious competence and finally unconscious competence. 
We do not want our pupils to acquire a general suspicion -  for that would be 
epistemically and morally corrosive -  but we do wish them to cultivate an attunement 
to mendacity and agendas: not a continuous polling but a ready triggering in the event 
of subtly-signalled testimonial deception (the real-life equivalent of Pinocchio’s nasal
57i Miranda Fricker (n.d.) op. cit., p. 176.
574Elizabeth Fricker (1995) op. cit., p.407.
575 This process o f  competence growth is described by William Smiley Howell (1982) op. cit. in Furness 
(2005) op. cit, p.252.
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elongation). For these ‘epistemically-adept’ mature epistemic agents, Coady’s 
‘standard warning signs of deceit [or] confusion ...,576 are then easily picked up. 
Learners can be helped to achieve this by starting from a default position of simple 
credulity577 towards testimony in general, then moving to a more discerning credulity 
confined to ‘non-loaded’ situations. Thus our students gradually develop an 
attunement towards epistemic agents and their testimony on various subjects -  a 
learning process that takes place alongside the development and finessing of the other 
epistemic virtues. Students have an ‘a priori prima facie (pro tanto) entitlement to rely
578on’ our apparent understanding, qua teacher, of the topic under discussion as being a 
genuine one -  and hence to accept our pronouncements -  but this is not enough. We 
want them to develop a mature stance towards testimony: a virtuous positioning 
between the extremes of a naïve ‘unreflective acceptance’ of others’ opinions and the 
obdurate rejection of reliable authority.
It is clear then, that if learners over-use ‘acceptance with reason inhibition’579 (see 
p.97), there is a danger of their going to sleep at their doxastic posts, so they need to 
become accustomed to their teacher sporadically misleading them for pedagogical 
purposes, without losing trust in her. With sophisticated learners (including a number 
of those at second and third levels, and perhaps some even earlier), it is possible to 
build an expectation that the teacher will on occasion be an agent provocateur or act in
* * 580a faux-naïf manner and thus provide some ~p ‘provocatives’ (to use Socrates’ term), 
without the students losing their sense of default trust in the teacher. Here, we see 
potential for an Aristotelian ‘delight’ in her acting from (epistemic) virtue in such a 
ludic way, without her epistemic reputation being sullied.
The pupils’ affective responses are important here, according to Zagzebski: ‘...the 
ability to recognise reliable authority partly involves having trained feelings that permit 
one to be a reliable judge of the trustworthiness of another’.581 In order that they can 
develop and practise their testimonial judiciousness, we need to provide learners with 
testimony that ought not be believed, thus triggering their incredulity and helping them
576 Coady (1992) op. cit., p.47.
577 1 use the word ‘credulity’ here as not a vice but as a virtue, in Reid’s sense o f  a disposition that tallies 
with veracity (p. 101).
578 Burge (1993) op. cit., p .110.
579 Henderson (2008) op. cit., p. 197.
580 Plato, Republic, 523b-c.
581 Zagzebski, VOM, p. 151.
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avoid the vice of unreflective acceptance. We saw earlier, however, that the very 
means by which infant credulity is eventually undermined (such as stories about Santa, 
the Tooth Fairy and the like, which are then revealed to be false) has its own dangers. 
Principe and Smith’s paper shows these hazards vividly and underlines the need for 
good judgement on the part of the teacher -  in particular, when determining the mixture 
of what we might term ‘fact’ and ‘fantasy’.582
One relatively risk-free way of providing testimony which ought to be challenged, but 
which does not undermine trust in the teacher, is to use the extended testimony of the 
World Wide Web. The ability to differentiate between the plausible-but-suspect and 
the genuinely-credible has always been important, but the explosion in ‘knowledge’ 
which the Internet has catalysed makes the development of this virtue even more 
pressing: the Internet is a source of both true beliefs and egregious misinformation. 
Howard Gardner complains in his latest book that ‘blogs can claim without evidence or
583consequence that the current American president was bom in Kenya’. Exposmg 
these in silico false beliefs need hurt no-one’s feelings, nor disrupt the bonds of trust 
that ought to link teacher and pupil. Such activity does, however, provide practice in 
detecting false, incompetent or agenda-driven testimony. It also develops the important 
new epistemic skills of ‘navigationism’ in this virtual ocean of knowledge.584 But 
some of the warning cues which are present in social epistemic settings are not 
available in cyberspace. One method of cultivating attunement to mendacity in these 
former arenas is by the use of role play: we could, for example, set up a productive 
debate about the siting of a wind farm, to be carried out by students playing 
representatives of the various special-interest groups (farmers, conservationists, 
electricity-supply companies, politicians and so on). A subsequent discussion about 
the role-play would then be used to air some key epistemic points with respect to 
testimony.
582 Principe & Smith (2008) op, cit,, pp.625-642.
583 Gardner (2011) op, cit., p.3. These rumours subsequently forced the president to produce his ‘long- 
form’ birth certificate, and even this action did not quash them all. It took the assassination o f  Osama 
Bin Laden to divert attention away from this issue.
584 Sean Moran (2008) ‘After behaviourism, navigationism?’, Irish Educational Studies vol.27, no.3, 
pp.209-221.
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We might idealise the teacher as an other-regarding, intellectually-virtuous, benevolent 
and emulable epistemic agent who is motivated to enhance both the knowledge and the 
epistemic virtue of learners by whatever means seem to her to be both virtuous and 
effective. Benevolence, prudence or justice may well override these epistemic 
desiderata, however, and the teacher is also, fortunately perhaps, likely to fall short of 
being either an epistemic or a moral saint.
The starting point for a teacher to be of actual epistemic use to a learner is for the 
former to be well-educated. To be an effective other-regarding epistemic agent, we 
need first to have been, and to continue to be, a regarding epistemic agent, in order 
that our efforts to improve the epistemic predicaments of others are tethered to reality 
via our own active engagement with knowledge. Carr, as we have seen, endorses this 
view in his claim that teachers ought to be well-read.585 This virtuous tethering -  which 
will demand critical engagement by the teacher and not just passive acceptance of what 
she reads, hears, sees and so on -  is what gives the knowledge its value, and lifts it 
above the class of mere true belief. The teacher who has putative ‘knowledge’ that is 
not properly enwebbed to reality may be less confident in, and will hence avoid, free 
ranging discussion and virtuous exploration, for fear of being exposed. Her knowledge 
ought to go beyond the syllabus and be well-tethered, so that she is able to entertain 
and counteract the suggestion that ~p. Furthermore, if Zagzebski is right that the 
epistemic virtues are initially acquired by imitation and habituation, then teachers ought 
to act as exemplars of epistemic virtue in order to provide a Vorleben for the learners. 
This is a much more demanding role than a simplistic notion of the teacher as the 
deliverer of a centrally-prescribed curriculum. Moreover, we ought not only to have 
the other-regarding, epistemically-virtuous motivation to model intellectual virtue and 
help our students to attain Zagzebksian ‘cognitive contact with reality’, but must also 
have the means to bring this to fruition. During the virtuous epistemic engagement, 
both teacher and learner should feel some degree of pleasure, if Aristotle is correct 
about this signature of virtue.
How Teachers Ought to Act
58S C m  (2007) op. cit., p.386.
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Our actions during this virtuous teaching episode (including, but not limited to, 
Teaching with a capital‘T’) must be (i) motivated by intellectual virtue; (ii) of a type in 
which an intellectually-virtuous person would engage; (iii) non-accidentally successful 
in achieving its goal in the intended beneficiary; and (iv) pleasurable to the agent. In 
this felicitous epistemic interchange, Aristotle’s sungndmé (sympathetic judgement) 
allows us to understand our interlocutor’s precise predicament before attempting to 
give the help that our own active engagement with knowledge enables us to provide. 
Sungnómé and nous act as precursors to teacherly eupraxia in the case o f ‘all good men 
in their behaviour towards others’.586 We can take our apprehension of the specific 
needs of the learner in the concrete situation to supply the minor premiss in a practical 
syllogism, in which the major premiss asserts our (defeasible) epistemic duty to aid our 
students in their epistemic predicaments. Behaving with regard to this syllogism is 
central to our work as teachers. We use it intuitively to act from the appropriate 
interlocking virtues in the given case. For example, if we wish to develop the learner’s 
creative intellectual virtues of originality and inventiveness which ‘qualify as 
analogous to supererogatory moral traits’ (VOM, p. 155), we might adopt a two-stage 
approach, starting with uncritical encouragement and followed by a sympathetic 
maieutic process,587 which is animated by the virtue of being ‘a good listener (and 
critic) insofar as [we] help other epistemic agents to examine their own beliefs 
carefully and lucidly’.588 Recognising the minor premiss is not an easy task, though, 
and to do it justice we need to be capable of putting ourselves into the learner’s shoes 
and of discerning sensitively his epistemic predicament, while bearing in mind the 
structure of the subject-discipline with which we are both engaging.
It is perhaps desirable on grounds of autonomy that the process is not too totalising, 
however: the ‘enwebment’ in an epistemic community I have advocated ought still to 
respect the individual’s doxastic web. Our other-regarding epistemic acts should not 
involve drowning the learner’s voice as he struggles to access the prize of the 
knowledge we offer, ‘if he will only see things as we see them’. The added inducement 
of academic credit, if he succumbs to our vision, adds further to these dangers. Our 
pedagogical intentions thus trump our purely epistemic duties and these in turn are 
trumped by the moral virtue of benevolence, for we ought to keep in mind the telos of
586 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk.VI, 6, 1143a, 32.
587 Plato, Thecetetus, 149-152.
588 Kawall (2004) op. cit., p.260.
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the learner’s overall flourishing as well as the immediate epistemic skopoi. So, using 
our insights and kairik powers to bypass pupils’ autonomy and ‘spellbind’ them is to be 
done sparingly and with great care. As we saw earlier, there can be some justification 
for mythologising, partial truth-telling, indirection and oversimplification as skopic 
routes to the longer-range telos of enhanced cognitive contact with reality. However, 
making too strong a case for the propositions we are pushing onto learners would have 
much in common with Aristotle’s vice of boasting [alazoneia].5&9 The right degree of 
testimonial force -  that which falls short of spellbinding, but is not rejected before it is 
entertained -  can be determined only by teacherly phronesis.
In addition to a consideration of the epistemic needs of individual learners, we ought to 
bear in mind that the teacher is one (important) node in the temporary epistemic 
community that the class periodically forms. So, her epistemic largesse, if informed by 
sungndme, can also be effective in a more diffuse way than through the straightforward 
teacher-leamer dyad. By increasing the knowledge available to the community she 
nurtures, the teacher is due other-regarding epistemic credit, as long as there is a degree 
of uptake, intellectual virtue and pleasure distributed around the community’s web. 
Although some of this may not come to fruition immediately, and some may depend 
upon further mediation via the community, this does not detract from the credit 
deserved by the teacher, for her beneficial agency has increased the epistemic good in 
her classroom.
How Learners Ought to Act
So that the learner may benefit from these good intentions and virtuous pedagogical 
actions, he too must bring some virtues to the table, and these should interlock with the 
teacherly epistemic virtues in the way described earlier (p.244). In the simplest case, 
this could be a combination of the learner’s ‘being able to recognize reliable 
authority’,590 and the teacher’s ‘teaching virtues: the social virtues of being 
communicative, including intellectual candor and knowing your audience and how they 
respond’.591 As we have seen at various points in this work, though, over-reliance on 
this dependency-driven dyadic combination is fraught with dangers. The learner, 
therefore, ought to be animated by the full range of intellectual virtues, in proportions
589 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1127al3-15.
590 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p. 114.
591 Zagzebski (1996) VOM, p. 114.
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suitable for his age and propensities and for the particular concrete learning situation. 
Our part in this is to act from virtues co-ordinated with those we wish to animate the 
learner, perhaps along the lines of the table in Appendix B.
A balanced approach to this is desirable: massaging the learner’s ego by never 
challenging his web of beliefs is not the action of a virtuous teacher. But, at the other 
extreme, a steamrollering elenchus or unremitting parrhesia on the part of the teacher 
may so undermine the learner that he retreats beneath his carapace and is unable to 
engage with the ideas virtuously, if at all. We should foster an atmosphere in which 
learners can take pride in their acquisition of knowledge and experience nikhedonia592 
on those inevitable occasions when progress temporarily stalls (p.232). In order to 
achieve this desideratum, the teacher ought to be well-attuned to their epistemic 
predicaments and successes and thus able to make eukairik interventions and bestow 
appropriate praise. Modelling other-regardingness in this fashion, and promoting it in 
other ways, can help develop the fellow-feeling and generosity of class members. If 
the classroom social environment is safe and conducive to honesty, not only will 
general well-being be promoted, virtuous learning will also be more likely to occur.
Final Implications and Conclusions
We can view the student as someone who acts from epistemic virtue to bring his web of 
beliefs into closer cognitive alignment with reality by means which include 
intersubjective triangulation with the webs of others, including that of his teacher.
We can identify the teacher normatively as both personally and epistemically virtuous, 
a cynosure for others seeking to develop their intellectual dispositions, and a source of 
testimony and intersubjective triangulation for the epistemic community. In being so, 
she ought also to achieve a benevolent attunement with those whose epistemic 
predicaments she wishes to help ameliorate, whilst intervening in a eukairik and 
virtuous way. Unlike Kant’s philanthropist, who is not to be thought virtuous when 
Tind[ing] an inner satisfaction in spreading joy and tak[ing] delight in the contentment 
of others’,593 she deserves approbation precisely when she feels thus, as long as this
592 A pleasurable anticipation o f  future success.
593 Kant (1785) op. cit„ p.8.
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affect is well-grounded. The virtuous teacher will feel pleasure at the right things for 
the right reasons.
In practice, the teacher generally has a set of propositions {p\,pi and so on), which she 
would like the learner to know, but a simple statement of these propositions, with no 
consideration being given to their negations (~pi. ~p2 and so on) or the broader 
implications is, as has been demonstrated, an unsatisfactory system for encouraging 
virtuous belief-revision in the learner. Any ‘borrowed wealth’ the learner may thus 
acquire will ‘turn into leaves and dust when it comes to use’.594 As the Levi identity 
shows (p. 173), part of this belief-revision in response to epistemic input p  is a process 
of derogating ~p and its dependent proximal propositions. For these changes to ripple 
through the learners’ epistemic webs, sufficient time and a fuller engagement than that 
provided by the teacher’s being in declamatory mode are needed, and this relies on the 
learner being animated by epistemic virtues other than simple credulity. Open- 
mindedness, for instance, allows the learner to entertain both p  and ~p, before making a 
virtuous judgement about which one of the two to derogate. Of course, such leisurely 
inspection of atoms of knowledge is not practicable for an entire programme of 
learning, for p  is only one of a large set of propositions, which the teacher wants the 
learner to know, and which in turn constitute only part of the overall desired outcomes, 
typically expressed as knowledge, skills and competences. Furthermore, learners’ 
minds, as well as our own, are like Descartes’ ‘ancient cities that were once mere 
villages and have become large towns [and] are [thus] usually ... poorly laid out’:595 a 
fact which renders naive any expectation that every p  — ancient and modem -  is equally 
defensible. Some true propositions acquired in early childhood may be unexamined 
and hence are to be regarded as Sosa’s ‘animal knowledge’ — and others would have 
the status of mere true beliefs -  but new knowledge should as far as possible follow 
more stringent building regulations and conform to Sosa’s higher-grade knowledge 
(K+): ‘apt belief aptly noted’ (Kj K.sp). The learner then not only has an apt belief that 
p, but also an apt belief that his knowing p  is defensible against future pertinent 
sceptical doubts that imply ~p. This is a more robust and better-tethered type of 
knowledge. The epistemically-virtuous learner thus acquires a superior variety of 
knowledge than his less creditable classmate: scientia rather than cognitio.
594 Locke (1706) op. cit., bk.I, ch.IV, §23.
595 René Descartes (1637) Discourse on Method, [tr. Donald Cress] (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998) p.7.
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The scenario to be avoided is one in which the teacher has herself acquired a set of 
propositions credulously from an authoritative source (perhaps a national school 
curriculum authority) and now expects her pupils to do likewise. Some virtue 
epistemologists have not yet appreciated that their work can help counter this view, and 
indeed make some statements which support it. Sosa, for instance, draws a distinction 
between ‘assertion ... as a human being who communicates with other human beings, 
and assertion as occupier of a role’.596 Moreover, he explicitly characterises a teacher 
as ‘a mouthpiece for a deeper institutional source of the information conveyed ... that 
is the school.’ But neither this, nor Kawall’s claim that the teacher’s epistemic duty is 
to ‘transmit information’,597 will do. This is not a desirable other-regarding modus 
vivendi for teachers, since there is an epistemic bypass connecting the enunciandum 
and the enounced, with the teacher qua enunciator being merely a conduit for the pre­
determined syllabus. This role is not an epistemically-virtuous one, in the same way as 
an internet connection is not virtuous (nor, we might add, is it vicious: it is simply a 
neutral channel.) There is something objectionably inauthentic and mechanistic about 
acting almost like a ventriloquist’s dummy in this way, which the virtuous teacher 
ought to resist and remedy by a critical engagement with the enunciandum and an 
encouragement to the learners to do likewise. Such an engagement by the teacher 
endows the enounced with greater value -  the difference between Levinas’ ‘saying’ and 
‘said’ (p.67).
In order to enable this proper engagement to take place, it may well be necessary to 
reduce the amount of content, for such parsimony will release the time needed for a 
more leisurely, virtuous approach to the remaining propositions. The alternative of a 
closed-minded, dutiful ‘transmission’ of approved propositions on the teacher’s part 
and the consequent lack of authentic doxastic engagement by the learner is the road to 
Halbbildung, even if the pupils appear to be doing well, judged by their examination 
results.
Furthermore, an unreflective use of assessment of this prepositional knowledge could 
reward vice and penalise virtue, thus offending against epistemic justice in my sense 
number 2 (p.262). Indeed, the contemporary obsession with measurable learning 
outcomes and awarding credit for overt intellectual performance does not discriminate
596 Sosa (2011) op. cit., p.47.
597 Kawall (2004) op. cit., p.271.
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between the virtuous and vicious backstories to such performance (as we saw in the 
case of the music student on the tram [p.206] who may well have achieved a high score 
on her music assignment). To the positivistically-inclined assessor, two students who 
hit tie  same targets deserve the same credit, but from a virtue perspective one may be 
seen as less epistemically-praiseworthy than the other, if his applauded performance 
comes from a shallow mimesis rather than from genuine intellectual virtue.
In closing, we see that the teacher is not to be seen as merely an efficient deliverer of 
prescribed learning outcomes but as an epistemic agent whose personal engagement 
with knowledge, and whose sensitivity to the epistemic predicaments of her students, 
enables her to act in ways conducive to their flourishing vis-à-vis knowledge and the 
cultivation of intellectual virtue. Her learning targets ought not be too tightly defined 
and her practice should not be reduced to algorithms. However, her virtuous make-up 
must include both the intellectual and the moral, typified by the other-regarding 
teacherly virtues of sungndmé and philanthropia.
In order to be a truly virtuous person, moreover, Aristotle requires her to embody all of 
the virtues -  an implausibly stringent demand. However, he puts one intellectual virtue 
in the lead role, for ‘the possession of the single virtue of practical wisdom will carry 
with it the possession of them all.’598 This is the virtue of phronèsis, championed by 
David Carr, Wilfrid Carr, Joseph Dunne, Elliot Eisner and others, who have brought 
Aristotelian ideas to bear on some educational concerns over the past two decades or 
so, by way of seeking a more defensible set of commitments than rivals such as 
technicism can offer. It is this practical wisdom which enables the teacher to do the 
right thing in the concrete, social, learning situation: to be animated by the correct 
epistemic virtue in order to co-ordinate with that virtue which ought to be cultivated in 
the learner at that moment; to enounce epistemically-helpful testimony (neither too 
much nor too little); to deal sympathetically with counterfactives, ~p, when they arise 
in the learner (or to introduce them as ‘provocatives’ when they do not arise); and to 
model what it is to be an epistemically and morally virtuous person (not a saint, but 
someone who is doing her best in the given situation and usually gets it right). By such 
other-regarding epistemic action on the part of the teacher, the learner is helped to 
cultivate his own intellectual virtues and thus enhance his ‘cognitive contact with
59S Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1145a3.
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reality’. When this confluence of virtues occurs, a deeper, more fully-enwebbed 
learning takes place, which will be more authentic, more perspectival and longer lasting 
than some of the counterfeit ‘learning’ promoted by adherents of less-developed 
construals of knowledge. The learner will be better educated. Such access to epistemic 
goods is part of the learner’s overall well-being; and part of his intellectual flourishing 
is to be animated by the epistemic virtues. Furthermore, during some of these learning 
moments, both epistemic agents -  the teacher and the taught -  will experience a 
merited intellectual and affective uplift.
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Appendix A: Summary of Intellectual Virtues and 
Vices in Aristotle, Sosa and Zagzebski
Aristotle: Complete List of Intellectual Virtues from Nicomachean Ethics 
Sophia (Theoretical Wisdom)
Nous (Understanding)
Eplsteme (Theoretical Knowledge)
Techne (Technical Rationality)
Phronesis (Practical Wisdom)_____________________________________
Sosa Zagzebski Zagzebski
Examples of Examples of Examples of
Intellectual Virtues Intellectual Virtues Intellectual Vices
‘ Faculty of ‘Adaptability of ‘Mak[ing] hasty
colour vision’ intellect’ (VOM, 1996, generalizations’ (VOM,
(2007, p.31) p.21) 1996, p.5)
‘The competence ‘The ability to recognize ‘Ignoring] the
we exercise the salient facts’ ( p.21) testimony of reliable
when we trust authority.’ (p.5)
our colour vision ‘Sensitivity to detail’
in an ordinary (P-21) ‘Intellectual prejudice’
case’ (ibid., p.32)
‘The ability to think up
(p-148)
explanations of complex ‘Intellectual pride,
‘Commitments sets of data’ (p.21) negligence, idleness,
[which] come cowardice, conformity,
courtesy of ‘The ability to think up carelessness, rigidity
Mother Nature illuminating scientific ... wishful thinking,
and her hypotheses or closed-mindedness,
evolutionary interpretations of literary insensitivity to detail,
ways, but many texts’ (p.21) obtuseness and lack of
others must be thoroughness,...
learned.’ (ibid., ‘Intellectual care’ (p.21) giving up too soon ...
p.85) proneness to
‘[Intellectual] discouragement...
‘A disposition to 
receive others’
discretion’ (p.21) self-deception’ (p. 152)
say-so when we ‘Intellectual fairness’ ‘... Intellectual
hear it or read it.’ 
(ibid., p.95)
(p. 109)
‘[Intellectual] caution’ 
(p. 109)
rashness’ (p. 152)
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Sosa Zagzebski Zagzebski Vices
Virtues Virtues (cont.) (cont.)
(cont.)
‘Open-mindedness in ‘[Being] overly
‘ stable collecting and thorough, overly
dispositions for appraising evidence’ sensitive to detail,
belief (p l 14) overly cautious’
acquisition’ (P-152)
[including exotic ‘Fairness in evaluating
alien belief- the arguments of others’ ‘Hypocrisy’ (p. 162)
acquisition (p. 114)
involving] ‘fields ‘The vices of excess:
of force, waves, ‘Intellectual humility’ excessive
mathematical (p. 114) attentiveness,
structures and thoroughness,
numerical ‘Intellectual diligence,
assignments to perseverance, diligence, perseverance’ (p. 196)
variables in care and thoroughness’
several (p.114) ‘Dogmat[ism]’ (p.207)
dimensions’
(1980, p. 159) ‘The detective’s virtues: ‘[The] vice of being a
thinking of coherent chronic guesser
explanations of the [which] has no name’
facts’ (p. 114) (p.208)
‘Being able to ‘The unreflective
recognize reliable acceptance of the
authority’ (p. 114) 
‘Insights into persons,
opinions of others’ 
(p.305)
problems, theories’ ‘Nosiness arising out
(p. 114) of envy’ (p.314)
‘The teaching virtues: £Form[ing] a belief as
the social virtues of the result of a desire
being communicative, 
including intellectual 
candor and knowing 
your audience and how
for fame’, (p.321)
they respond’ (p. 114)
‘Originality and 
creativity’ (p. 123)
‘Curiosity’ (p. 123)
‘ [but] both Augustine 
and Aquinas call 
curiosity a 
vice’
Intellectual courage 
(p. 150)
2 9 8
Zagzebskl 
Virtues (cont.)
- ‘The virtue that is the 
mean between the 
questioning mania and 
unjustified conviction 
[which] has no simple 
name’ (p. 154)
‘Intellectual carefulness 
... humility, vigor, ... 
insightfulness, and the 
virtues opposed to 
wishful thinking, 
obtuseness and 
conformity’ (p. 155)
[but] ‘ ... Aristotle 
would have thought of 
humility as a vice’
(P-88)
‘Intellectual integrity’
(p. 155)
[Intellectual virtues such 
as originality and 
inventiveness which]
‘... qualify as analogous 
to supererogatory moral 
traits’ (p. 155)
‘Autonomy’ (p. 159)
‘Trust is a mean 
between gullibility and 
suspiciousness’ (p. 160)
‘Boldness’ (p. 181)
‘Intellectual sobriety’
(p. 185)
‘[Newman’s] “illative 
sense”...’ (p.225)
‘Proper trust of authority 
outside [one’s] area of 
expertise’ (p.319)_____
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Appendix B: Table Showing How the Learner's and 
the Teacher's Epistemic Virtues Might Co-ordinate
This list the virtues relating to the learning and teaching situation, which have been 
discussed in this thesis. Here I show possible ways of co-ordinating relevant virtues 
between the learner and the teacher, but I make no claims for the table: it is merely 
illustrative. The choice of which virtue to embody in the concrete learning and 
teaching situation is a matter for the teacher, guided by ber phronësis.
Apart from the first set, each of the five others lists a loose collection of the virtues 
we may wish to foster in the learner under a particular heading, followed by a number 
of the virtues with which the teacher might be animated in response.
It is no substitute for the nuanced discussion on ‘tallying’ or ‘co-ordinate’ virtues to 
be found in the later chapters of this thesis, but I offer it to the reader in the hope that 
it is found to be helpful. If it is not, it can safely be ignored.
The Over-arching Teacheriy Virtues
■ Phronësis.5"
■ Sôphrosynë.
■ Praotës (gentleness, good nature, patience [doceur in Agathon’s list] ).600
■ Philanthropic! (cpiÀavôpcùTtia, benevolence).
■ ‘The teaching virtues: the social virtues of being communicative, including 
intellectual candor and knowing your audience and how they respond’ (VOM, 
p.114).601
■ ‘Adaptability of intellect’ (VOM, p.21).
■ Vorleben — willingness to act as a worthy role-model.602
■ Technë (in the sense of other-regarding pedagogical techniques; with the 
proviso that the deployment of these is ultimately governed by phronësis).
■ Sungnômë (sympathetic judgement).
■ Sunesis (understanding).603 The person who has such understanding ‘thinks 
with the other and undergoes the situation with him’.604
599 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VI, 5, 1140b4
600 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, (tr. Thompson & Tredennick (1953, 2004) p.312
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Learner
‘Being able to recognize reliable authority’ (VOM, p. 114).
‘Intellectual humility’ {VOM, p. 114).
‘Trust... a mean between gullibility and suspiciousness’ {VOM, p. 160). 
‘Proper trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise’ (VOM, p.319). 
‘A disposition to receive others’ say-so when we hear it or read it’.605
Teacher
■ Veracity [orparrhesia] ‘the propensity to be truthful when we tell other 
people what is what.’606
■ ‘Integrity (including an unwillingness to misuse one’s status as expert)’.607
■ Eutrapelia (wittiness: the mean between boorishness and buffoonery).608
■ Eirdneia (irony, self-depreciation, understatement).609
The Virtues of Doxastic Trust
601 This can, I feel, be written as a combination o f veracity and sunesis.
602 Horsthemke and Kissak (2008) op. cit., p.280
601 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk,6, ch. 11
604 Gadamer (1975) op. cit.,p.288
605 Sosa (2007) op. cit., p.95
606 Reid (1764) op. cit., p.419
607 Kawall (2004) op. cit., p.260
508 This enables the teacher to perpretate Aquinas’ ‘jocose’ lie, which, as well as giving pleasure, can 
also he useful in that it disrupts the dependency o f  the learner on the teacher’s parrhesia.
609 Eirdneia is regarded by Aristotle as a vice o f  deficiency (the mean being aletheia, which we can gloss 
here as ‘disclosure’ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (tr. Thompson & Tredennick (1953, 2004)), p .311.), 
but it can be an other-regarding epistemic virtue by way o f  playing down our own grasp o f  the truth in 
order to allow our beneficiary to find it for himself, in much the same way as Athene disguises her 
powers and holds back from full disclosure to enable Telemachus the opportunity to develop his own 
epistemic and character virtues. Homer, The Odyssey. But, ‘Mock modesty, in the case o f  Socrates or 
Uriah Heap [Dickens’ D avid Copperfield\, can be seen as inverted boasting. It is clear that... many o f
Socrates’ contemporaries felt he acted in a superior or arrogant way towards his fellow citizens.’ Emily
R Wilson (2007) The Death o f  Socrates (London: Profile Books Ltd.) p.40
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Learner
‘Ability to think up explanations of complex sets of data’ ( VOM, p.21).
‘Ability to think up illuminating scientific hypotheses or interpretations of literary 
texts’ {VOM, p.21).
‘Ability to recognize the salient facts’ (VOM, p.21).
‘A sensitivity to detail’ (VOM, p.21).
‘ The detective’s virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts’ (VOM, 
p. 114).
‘Insights into persons, problems, theories’ (VOM, p.l 14).
‘Open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence’ (VOM, p.l 14). 
‘Newman’s “illative sense”... ’ (VOM, p.225).
‘Adaptability of intellect’ (VOM, p.21).
‘Curiosity’ (VOM, p. 123).
Teacher
■ ‘Fairness in evaluating the arguments of others’ (VOM, p. 114).
■ ‘Sensitivity to detail’ (VOM, p.21).
■ ‘Intellectual fairness’ (VOM, p. 109).
■ ‘Intellectual humility’ (VOM, p.l 14).
■ ‘Insights into persons, problems, theories’ (VOM, p. 114).
■ ‘Reflexive critical openness’, a virtue which enables us to avoid ‘epistemic
injustice -  that is, failing to believe people when they ought to be believed, but
also believing someone who ought not to be believed’.610
The Virtues of Enquiry
610 Miranda Fricker, op. cit., p. 176
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The Virtues of Creativity 
Learner
‘Originality and creativity’ ... (VOM, p. 123).
Intellectual virtues such as originality and inventiveness which ‘... qualify as 
analogous to supererogatory moral traits’ (VOM, p. 155).
‘Intellectual courage’ (VOM, p. 150)
‘Intellectual boldness’ ( VOM, p. 181).
‘Intellectual vigor’ (VOM, p. 155).
‘Intellectual Autonomy ’ (VOM, p. 159).
Teacher
■ ‘Creativity (which can inspire others, and lead to the discovery of new truths 
in a community)’.611
■ ‘.. .the skills of a good listener (and critic) insofar as they help other epistemic 
agents to articulate and examine their own beliefs carefully and lucidly’.612
613■ A willingness to act with Maieusis.
<u Kawall (2004) op. cit., p.260 
i12 ibid., p.260
6,3 Plato, Thecetetus, 149-152
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The Virtues of Scholarship 
Learner
‘[Intellectual] perseverance, diligence, thoroughness’ (VOM, p.l 14).
‘[Intellectual] care’ (VOM, p.21).
‘[Intellectual] caution’ (VOM, p. 109).
‘Intellectual integrity’ (VOM, p. 155).
‘ Intellectual sobriety’ ( VOM, p. 185).
‘[Intellectual] discretion’ (VOM, p.21).
‘Virtues opposed to wishful thinking, obtuseness and conformity’ (VOM, p. 155). 
‘[Intellectual] fairness’ (VOM, p. 109).
‘Virtue that is the mean between the questioning mania and unjustified conviction 
[which] has no simple name’ (VOM, p. 154).
Teacher
■ ‘The ability to recognize the salient facts’ (VOM, p.21).
■ Sincerity.
■ Praotës (gentleness, good nature, patience).614
■ ‘Proper trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise’ (VOM, p.319).
■ Epistemic Justice.615
■ ‘Sensitivity to detail’ (VOM, p.21).s
6M Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics tr. Thompson & Tredennick (1953, 2004)) p.312
615 Miranda Flicker (n.d) op. cit., p. 176
3 0 4
The Social Intellectual Virtues
616
617
618 
619
Learner
‘Social virtues of being communicative, including intellectual candor and 
knowing your audience and how they respond’ (VOM, p. 114).
Veracity [or parrhesia] ‘the propensity to be truthful when we tell other people 
what is what’.6,6
‘A disposition to receive others’ say-so when we hear it or read it’ (Sosa, 2007, 
P-95).
‘Fairness in evaluating the arguments of others’ (VOM, p.l 14).
‘Proper trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise’ (VOM, p.319). 
‘Reflexive critical openness’, a virtue which enables us to avoid ‘epistemic 
injustice -  that is, failing to believe people when they ought to be believed, but 
also believing someone who ought not to be believed’. 617
Teacher
■ Vorleben -  willingness to act as a worthy role-model.
■ Solicitude in determining the epistemic predicaments of our students.
♦ z  I o■ Eleutheriotës (liberality, generosity).
■ Intellectual charity.
■ ‘Reflexive critical openness’
■ A sense of Eukairos.
■ Provocativeness ,..619
■ Praotës (gentleness, good nature, patience).
Reid (1764) op. cit., p.419
Miranda Flicker (n.d) op. cit., p. 176
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (tr. Thompson & Tredennick (1953, 2004)) p.311 
Plato, Republic, 523b-c
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